ar W
37577

PRESIDENT WHITE LIBRARY.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

arW37577 Cornell University Library

Dr. Girardeau's anti-evolution:

3 1924 032 221 958
olin,anx

DR. GIRARDEAU'S ANTI-EVOLUTION:

THE LOGIC OF HIS REPLY.

BY JAMES I. MARTIN.

COLUMBIA, S. C.

PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN PUBLISHING HOUSE.

1889.

Cornell University Library

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

DR. GIRARDEAU'S ANTI-EVOLUTION:

THE LOGIC OF HIS REPLY.

BY JAMES I. MARTIN.

COLUMBIA, S. C.

PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN PUBLISHING HOUSE.

1889.

11

DR. GIRARDEAU'S ANTI-EVOLUTION: THE LOGIC OF HIS REPLY.

"First pure, then peaceable, . . . without partiality." JAMES iii. 17.

Encouraged by the friendly spirit of Dr. Girardeau's "Reply," I make this second attempt.* Thus may each of us promote, not only our mutual edification, but that of the Church at large; and by advancing her purity secure her peace, and at the same time give all due encouragement to sound learning, whether derived from the works or from the word of God. Let it be borne in mind, that both formerly and now, my attack is not against Dr. Girardeau—the logician—but against his logic; not his knowledge of the principles of logic, but his application of these principles, he being not infallible. My argument, therefore, if it be in any sense a "torpedo" (the Dr.'s simile), is intended not "for blowing up an argument and its author," but for blowing up the "argument," and thereby saving the "author." To this task I address myself all the more cheerfully because, as I trust, both he and I desire to seek after, to know, and to "walk in the truth."

There are many sources of error, such as prejudice, passion, sloth, and pride, even where the knowledge of the laws of Logic may be perfect. Logic is blind—it is "necessary" thinking—it *must*, if true to itself, go whithersoever its premises lead; it can only *conclude* from the *given* premises. If, therefore, the "Regulative" (or any other) faculty be at fault, whilst this would seriously cripple (not theoretically but practically) the success of the "Elaborative" faculty, still it would not necessarily prove the ignorance or even the false application of the rules of Logic. *E. g.*, All men are quadrupeds; Cæsar is a man; therefore Cæsar is a quadruped. Here the *Logic* is perfect; but the man who accepts the major premise would thereby prove that his *Regulative* faculty was sadly disjointed. Logic determines, in and of itself, not the truth or falsity of the premises, but the validity or invalidity of the conclusion. The insane reason logically: their regulative-faculty is at fault; not their elaborative. Hence inconsistency is sometimes a proof of *feigning* insanity, and consistency a proof of *real* insanity.

The Doctor complains against me, because as his critic I proceeded to

* For the full text of Dr. Girardeau's "Reply," see the Appendix.

determine the "purport" of his article, as if "possessed" of his "consciousness." I certainly supposed that I was, and that I had a right to that assumption; for I took for granted that he used language to *express* thought. But, if he claims that I erred in my interpretation, it is not for me to contradict him on such a point as this; although I must say (on this supposition), that he was very indiscriminate in his choice of language. The criticism was: "The argument is evidently designed as a disproof of Evolution. This is manifest from the opening sentence; and even more so, from the application in the closing paragraphs of the article." Now, let us see what that "opening sentence" is, and what the "application in the closing paragraphs." The opening sentence: "None but the maintainers of a rigid process of evolution, enforced by a law of blind, immanent necessity, would deny that man has degenerated from his primitive condition." Therefore, of course, Evolution cannot be true; because according to that theory man has *advanced*—the antithesis of "degenerated." "The application in the closing paragraphs": "We proceed very briefly to show the bearing of the miracle, as *contra-natural*, upon various theories." Then follows: "1. Atheism. 2. Pantheism, Atheistic Evolution, and Materialism. 3. The professed Theistic Evolutionist. 4. The professed Christian Evolutionist. 5. Agnosticism." All these the Doctor claims to have overthrown by the truth of the "*Contra-Natural Character of the Miracle*." The "opening sentence" attempts to plant a blow plump between the eyes of "evolution," as flatly contradicting the doctrine of the Bible regarding the fall of Adam; and of the *five* vigorous blows in the "closing paragraphs," in which the assailant puts forth all his strength, the attempt is to give the *coup de grace* to the "Evolutionist" *three* times out of every five. Thus, to me, as critic, the "opening sentence" looked as if he had raised his hind-sights for a shot at long range at the "Evolutionists," and the "closing paragraphs," in which he is engaged in burying the dead (?) Evolutionists, seemed to confirm the opening presumption. But then, since the charge is denied, and he alone knows what he really meant, I must claim that the interpretation of his "purport" was due to no fault of the critic, but to the Doctor's misleading language.

A second complaint which the Doctor lodges against his critic is, that I pronounced his whole article a "stupendous failure," because a "single corollary" did not refute the "evolutionary hypothesis." I must beg him to read my article again, and more carefully the second time. He will find my language very carefully guarded: "*So far as the argument*

based upon his definition is relied upon to prove that Evolution is not true and cannot be true, because it contradicts the Bible, I am sure the Doctor has made a stupendous failure." (*Pamphlet*, p 1.)

The "Reply" professes to limit itself to the criticism in my "first article"—viz.: "Contradicts Logic (1) in his redundant definition; (2) in his incoherent argument." Then, in the next to the last paragraph, he says: "If his [Dr. M.'s] charge that I have contradicted Logic has been proved to be inconclusive, it is likely that the charge of contradiction to the Confession of Faith, standard authors, and the Bible is in the same category." The wary sophist would have left this sophistical train of reasoning to suggest itself to the unsophisticated mind of the unwary reader; but the Doctor suggests it himself, and claims it to be of force—"an Israelite indeed in whom there is no guile." Sound in Logic, *ergo*, sound in Confession of Faith, Bible, etc. He must therefore be held accountable for the logic of this suggestion: 'I have vindicated myself from the charge of contradicting *logic*; therefore I am vindicated from the charge of contradicting (1) the Confession of Faith, (2) standard authors, and (3) the Bible.' There were six separate and independent charges, each built upon an independent base; the Doctor imagines he has thrown down the first column of argument, and then politely bowing to the public he says, "The fall of one is the fall of six." The curtain drops, but the six columns remain in their original integrity; and as the audience retire they whisper: "Another sample of the Doctor's anti-evolution logic."

Those (some at least) who have known the learned Professor for many years, and have often witnessed his valiant assaults upon those who depart from the Confession and the Bible, have been surprised and pained to discover such a radical change between the present and the past—to be so earnest in defending himself against the charge of anti-*logical*, and so indifferent to the far graver charges—anti-*Confessional* and anti-*Biblical*.

In that first article to which he proposed to confine himself, there were two distinct criticisms: "(1) redundant; (2) incoherent." He attempts to justify himself against the first; but seems to have forgotten that the fullest success here would not have vindicated him from the second. "Granting his definition, still Evolution is not disproved." (*Pamphlet*, page 3.) The argument (as against Evolution) is a *non sequitur* upon either supposition.

* My criticisms appeared first in four articles in the *St. Louis Presbyterian* and in the *Southern Presbyterian*, afterwards in pamphlet form as one article.

But has the "Reply" really disproved the "redundancy"? On the contrary, it makes a great parade of forces—marching round in a circle—and then concludes the review by this surrender: "The question is not, whether if one specific mark renders the definition adequate, one only ought to be inserted. That is admitted." On the other hand—what the Doctor claims "*is not* the question," was and is precisely the very question. The scope of my remarks, the point of my criticism—"redundancy"—the illustrations I used, all furnish sufficient proof of this. Even the references to Burgersdyck, Porphyry, and Hamilton furnish no disproof of anything asserted by me. 1. *Burgersdyck*: what his actual definition of Logic is, we are not informed in the "Reply," only the "genus," and then the sources from which the "difference" is taken, viz., "end; office; matter or object." It would have been better had the Doctor given the very words of the definition itself, and not the sources "from" which. Again, I must call the Doctor's attention to the fact, that my criticism of his definition was not, because it embraced *two or more* specific marks, but because they rendered his definition "redundant"; not because he embraced "office," but because embracing "office" in this instance introduced "redundancy." Turning to *Pamphlet*, p. 1, he will find my language to be: "We may again demand that he shall not include in the abstract 'definition' of 'miracle' not only the '*nature*,' but also the '*office*' of the miracle; unless he can first prove that there cannot possibly be in *nature* or in *thought* any such thing as miracle apart from its office; (and in the case of *his* definition) apart from *the* particular 'office' which he has assigned to it." If I should propose to define "Cow," the term "milk" would be "redundant"; but should I propose to define Dairy Cow, the term "milk," if omitted, would be a very essential defect, and render the definition inadequate. Because Burgersdyck used "office" in the definition of "Logic," *ergo*, the Doctor may use "office" in the definition of "miracle"!! 2. *Porphyry*. I see nothing here militating against my position. As explained by Porphyry himself, the one term *mortale* was essential to differentiate between man and God; just as much so as the one term *rationale* was essential to differentiate between the brute and man. True, I would not, any more than the learned Doctor, "defend the material truth of the definition." For, to my mind, under existing circumstances, the term "animal" not only includes *mortale*, but already sufficiently discriminates man as such from God; just as the term "rationale" not only includes *immortal*, but already sufficiently discriminates man as such from the brutes. Whilst on this point let me say, that I may prevent any possible misunder-

ing, that it is noticeable. confining the attention to man and brute, the highest analysis of man furnished by human philosophy is—*rational* animal. The term *rational* does not express all the difference between man and the lower animals, but it sufficiently discriminates, and there, therefore, the definition stops. If, however, as some claim, there is proof that the brute has not only intellect, but the faculty, however feeble, of reasoning, then, as soon as this shall be admitted, the term *rational* will no longer differentiate, and as common to brute and man will disappear (as a specific mark) from the definition of man. Some higher quality, say *moral*, found in man and not found in brutes, will take the place of *rational*. Should the moral sense—distinction between right and wrong—be subsequently discovered to exist (however feebly) in the brute, then, of course, that term would disappear from the definition of man. Some higher quality (say *spiritual*), found in man and not found in the brute, will take the place of *moral*. Even now we (some of us) discriminate between men and men by affirming “carnal” as indicating the death of the spiritual nature in man; and “spiritual” as indicating the regenerated man in whom the spiritual nature has been restored to life again by the Holy Ghost. So that it is not whether one or a dozen specific marks may be inserted *if necessary*, but whether in the case of the definition by the Doctor such elements were inserted as rendered it “redundant.”

3. *Hamilton*. The above remarks leave little to be said under this head. Of course, if we choose to conceive of men existing elsewhere than on this earth, then to distinguish these from those we shall have to append “terrestrial—or, of this earth.” But just how this quotation from *Hamilton* proves *Hamilton* to have violated his own rule; or how it relieves the Doctor’s definition from “redundancy,” or his argument from “incoherency,” would overtax the logical acumen of *Aristotle* himself. So likewise with the other quotations—from *Bowen* and from *Jevons*; the “Reply” has rendered the *critique* upon his *Review article* good service. All the authorities quoted in the “Reply” are either irrelevant or else they confirm the criticism.

I shall make no defence if any one shall charge me with *superfluity* for proceeding, in the next place, to notice what the Professor of Theology has said regarding the answers to the *Shorter Catechism*. To offend as little as little as possible, I shall call attention to but one of the Professor’s specimens. He claims, *e. g.*, that the answers in the *Shorter Catechism* are specimens of logical definition by genus and species; but many of those answers give more than one specific mark; what then? Why then the Doctor’s critic is reduced to this dreadful dilemma: either

he must retract the charge of redundancy against the Professor, or else he must consent to fasten the same charge upon the Shorter Catechism, *i. e.*, against the Westminster Assembly; they and the Doctor must sink or swim together. But this identification I cannot perceive. 'The Shorter Catechism frequently furnishes more than one specific mark; therefore the Doctor's definition of miracle is not redundant; and his anti-evolution argument is logically consequential.' I am not ashamed to confess, that in my judgment this is another specimen of the Doctor's incoherent argumentation. Is there no other escape from this dilemma than that indicated by him? I think we have no dilemma at all confronting us. There is nothing before us but a broad open path. The "*Reply*" has placed the *Catechism* in an awkward dilemma; and I shall rescue this standard from the charge "illogical," by proving that its answers are not to be considered in the light of logical definitions. Take, *e. g.*, the answer to the question, What is justification? Take the analysis of this answer furnished in the "*Reply*": Proximate genus: "act of God's free grace." Since, however, adoption belongs to the same genus, how is justification to be distinguished therefrom? What are the specific differences? "(1) Pardon; (2) acceptance of the person as righteous; (3) imputation of Christ's righteousness; (4) reception of Christ's righteousness by faith alone." Such is his analysis; and he insists that it is an instance of "the definition of justification" by genus and species. If so, let us test it. The whole of the genus must be found in each of the species. What is the *genus*? "Act of God's free grace." What is the *fourth specific* mark? "*Reception of Christ's righteousness by faith alone.*" "Faith," then, according to this analysis must be an "*act of God's free grace*"; whereas in reality, and according to the Catechism's own explanation of "faith," it is *not* an "act of God" at all, but solely an act—gracious act—of the *believer*. The Catechism, therefore, no less than the Bible, needs to be rescued from the Professor's logic. But is this answer in any sense a logical definition of the term "justification"? If so, how would it apply to the justification of *Adam*, if he had stood during the term of his probation? How would it apply to the justification of an *innocent* man falsely charged (say) with murder? How would it apply to the justification of the *angels who fell not*? How would it apply to the justification of the *Second Adam* upon his performing the conditions of the covenant of Redemption? It is perfectly manifest, therefore, that the "proximate genus of justification" is *not* an "act of God's free grace." Surely the Professor's language must needs be revised in order to save the reputa-

tion for logic of the Westminster divines. Is it not manifest, that the framers of the Catechism did not intend to give a logical "definition, by proximate genus and specific difference," of the term "justification," but a scriptural explanation of the justification of a *sinner* under the covenant of *grace*? Is it not equally manifest, that under the one single question—"What is justification?"—the Assembly answers *several* distinct but consecutive questions, *e. g.*, (1) What is it? An act. (2) Whose act? God's. (3) What class of God's acts? Free grace. (4) What does God do in this act? Pardons. (5) Pardons what? Sins. (6) How many sins? All. (7) Whose sins? Ours. (8) What else does he do in this act? Accepts. (9) Whom? Us. (10) As what? Righteous. (11) In whose sight? His sight. (12) Upon what ground? Righteousness of Christ. (13) Upon what principle? Imputation. (14) What instrument? Faith alone. (15) What class of creatures are thus justified? The "ungodly." (16) With or without works of their own? "Without works." (17) Under what covenant? Covenant of Grace. Surely not thus do Logicians define by genus and species. The lover of the Catechism therefore will look with apprehension to Columbia, not to Memphis, when grieving "over the wreck of the Shorter Catechism."

There need be no difficulty in determining the scope of the term definition. *Finis*—end, *terminus*—a boundary line. Definition marks out the *end* of a term, points out its *boundary lines*, up to which it does go, beyond which it must not go. Definition discriminates severely and exactly between this term and all other terms—it individualizes an idea; puts the term in such clothing that no other term can wear it; or in such shape that it will fit into no other encasement. Whatever, then, of course, is necessary to accomplish this severe and cast-iron limitation—whether it be one word, or a thousand words—is legitimate. But there is nothing in all this that contradicts what I quoted from Hamilton: "Definition in the stricter sense must afford at least two, and *properly only two* original characters, viz.: that of the genus (*proximum*) and that of the *difference* by which it is itself marked out from its *co-ordinates* as a distinct *species*." The "invariable rule" which I mentioned was: "The less you put in your definition, the wider its application; the more you put in your definition, the narrower its application." (*Pamphlet*, p. 1.) This the "Reply" does not and cannot dispute. The careful reader will note, in this connection, that the "Reply" has furnished no defence against the charge: that the Doctor "has given in his premise the definition of *some* miracle, and drawn his conclusion as if

he had given the definition of *all* miracle. From a *particular* premise he has drawn a *universal* conclusion." (*Pamphlet*, p. 2.) I reiterate, therefore, with emphasis the criticism: "Dr. Girardeau's definition of miracle—*pure and simple*—proceeds not only by genus and by species, but also by variety, etc." (*Pamphlet*, p. 2.) To profess, *e. g.*, to define Dog—"pure and simple"—and yet include in that definition not only marks which differentiate between dogs and all other animals—not dogs, which, of course, would be essential; but also to add marks which differentiate not only between different species of dogs, but also between different varieties, would certainly be illogical. If you profess to be defining a particular "species" of dog, then, of course, give in addition the specific mark of that species; if you propose to give the definition of a particular "variety," then, of course, add the differentiating mark of that variety. But, in the name of all sound reasoning, do not define a particular "species" or "variety," and then insist that a certain animal cannot be "Dog," because it lacks the marks peculiar to this *species* or that *variety*. Thus to do would be to "ignore the rule laid down by Sir William Hamilton (*Logic*, p. 342)"; and also to "violate a fundamental rule of the syllogism."

In the next place, the "Reply" seeks refuge from my criticisms in the fact that "Logicians divide definitions into two kinds—the narrower (*angustior*) and the wider (*latior*)." And then he proceeds strangely to argue as if I had denied that his definition was any definition at all. "Of course, then," (he argues) "the wide are definitions as well as the narrow." But this was never denied; the point was and is, the Doctor's definition is "redundant," and his argument a "*non sequitur*." The charge was not that it was something *minus* "definition;" but that it was "definition" *plus* something else: *surplusage* was the point of my objection; and I indicated, by brackets, the overlargeness. (*Pamphlet*, p. 1.) Now, a "wider" definition may be superfluous, no less than a "narrower" one. There is nothing here for the Doctor, then, but a roofless refuge.

Neither does the Doctor claim that, in his *Review article* he was defining in the "wider" sense; his native honesty would not permit him to set up this claim. His language is: "I did not say that I was furnishing a narrow definition. I may have had the benefit given me of the supposition that I intended to use the wide, even if the critic held that it could not be the narrow." He does not even now say that he intended his definition to be of the "wider" species; nor even now does he demand this construction; but only pleads that since he "did not say

I was furnishing a narrow definition," the generosity of the critic should have given his friend the "benefit" of the *doubt*. But then it must be remembered that critics [κριτής] like judges dispense not alms but justice; they must never forget that they are servants of truth and of righteousness. None, more than I, would walk backward with the mantle of charity to cover the Doctor's faults, as I know none, more than he, would do so unto me. But then this kindly office must not be sought at my hands when I am sitting in judgment upon the Doctor, viewing with a "critic's eye" his offences against truth and sound learning, to the detriment of the purity and peace of the Church. "He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord." (Prov. xvii. 15.)

Not to protract my remarks upon this division, let us note what Hamilton says about these different species of Definitions, in order that the Professor may enjoy the full "benefit" of the *doubt*. Let us briefly glance at Hamilton's analysis: "Formal Perfection" of thought: (1) Clearness; (2) Distinctness; (3) Harmony. Rules by which these are secured: (1) Definition; (2) Division; (3) Probation. Declaration: (1) Definition *Proper*—"where *two* of the *essential* and *original* attributes of the defined subject are given, whereof the *one* is *common* to it with the various species of the *same genus*, and the *other* *discriminates* it from these." (2) Definitions in the *wider sense*: 1st. Explication; 2ndly. Exposition; 3rdly. Description. Now, under which one of these three *sub-refuges* will the Doctor seek shelter? Certainly we should always prefer, for the sake of "Clearness"—the end of "Definition"—to furnish, wherever possible, the Definition *proper*, *i. e.*, the narrow (*angustior*). But, if we have not advanced far enough in our knowledge, as Hamilton suggests, why then, of course, Definition in the wider sense (*latior*) will prove a very useful and even necessary auxiliary. Consequently, under these necessitous circumstances, very many privileges have been granted by Logicians to Definitions in the "wider" sense. These *tentative hypotheses*—since they do not claim to be "Definitions *Proper*;" since they are "only to be considered as a *prelusive* definition; and as the mark of an *incipient* and *yet imperfect* knowledge; and since they "make *no pretence to logical perfection*; and are *only subsidiary* to the discovery of more *perfect* definitions—are *not* to be *very rigidly dealt with*." (Hamilton's Logic, 340-349.)

I shall not, therefore, be led astray by this false scent. It is not, whether he defined in "narrower or wider" sense; but whether, in whatever sense, it was (1) "redundant"; and (2) disproved Evolution; and

(3) proved the Bible and Evolution to be "mutual contradictories." His refuge is no refuge. Granting the "wider sense," still his definition is surcharged; and still there is a missing link between his premise and his conclusion.

The "Reply" presses me with this home-thrust: "How would Dr. Martin adequately define, by a single specific mark evolution?" Let me commend the Doctor to a more careful perusal of my criticism. He will find (*Pamphlet*, p. 3) that I had already anticipated this kindly thrust: "Evolution—'DESCENT *with modification*.'" Surely this is an adequate definition.

From what has been said, it seems perfectly clear that the first column and a half of the "Reply" is largely an *ignoratio elenchi*. The Doctor has endeavored to disprove what I have never affirmed; and to prove what I have never denied, viz., that logicians have subdivided definitions into two kinds: 1, narrow; 2, and wide; and that when necessary to adequacy a definition may contain more than one specific mark. But the real questions at issue between us, he has either neglected or ineffectually assaulted.

The Doctor's "Reply" still insists, that "Wonderful" and "Evidential" are so inherently the qualities of "Miracle," that without them an event "cannot be a miracle." Here is his own analysis: "I. Highest genus: Event. 1. Proximate genus: Wonderful event. (1) Specific marks, differentiating it from other wonderful events: 1st. Contravention of the known course of nature; 2ndly. Accompanies, (a) the teaching of a person claiming to be commissioned by God; (b) or a revelation; (x) professing to be divine; (y) and intended to promote human holiness." Here is his own synthesis: "Miracle: I. Wonderful event: 1. Contravening the known course of nature: 2. Accompanying: (1) the teaching of a person claiming to be commissioned by God; (2) or a revelation; 1st, professing to be divine; 2ndly, and intended to promote human holiness. . . . Defined from 1, its nature; 2, and its office." (179.) That is, in answering the question—"What, then, is a miracle?" he has really answered *two* questions, viz.: 1. What *is*? and 2. Why? or 1. What is "nature" of miracle? 2. What is the "office" of miracle? Note, that he proposes the question concerning "A miracle," that is, ALL miracle, not SOME; i. e., he furnishes this as the abstract definition of the term "Miracle."

Now let us hear Dr. Thornwell: "What, then, *is* a miracle?" . . . "It is an event *either above or opposed* to secondary causes." Then several pages farther on, under a distinct head numbered "2," he pro-

ceeds: "Having *settled* that the ESSENCE of the miracle consists in the *contranatural* or the *supernatural*, we are now prepared to investigate its *apologetic worth*." He distinctly mentions this department to be *another question*: "The question to be answered is briefly this—Is the miracle, in itself, from its own intrinsic character, a sufficient credential of a Divine inspiration or a Divine commission?" This is the second question: the first was, "What *is* the miracle?" He feels no preparation to "investigate" the *second*, until he has "*settled*" the *first*. Hence he escaped giving a *multifarious* definition, and its logical consequences. This second question Dr. Thornwell "answers in the affirmative." Remarking upon his definition, he says: "Leave out the *notion* of these secondary causes, and there *can be no miracle*." *Nota bene*, "the notion"—the abstract idea—not the concrete presence: "can be no miracle"—when?—at the moment of "creation from nothing in the first instance"? *not only*; but also at any subsequent period in the whole history of the material universe;—"there CAN BE NO miracle." Clearing the way for his definition, cautiously feeling his way for "the peculiarity of the miracle," he remarks: "He [Trench] explains the terms by which miracles are distinguished in Scripture, but these terms express only the effects upon our own minds, the purposes for which, and the powers by which, they are wrought, and the operations themselves—the effect, the end, the cause—but they do not single out that in the phenomenon by which it becomes a wonder, a sign, a power, or a work." Still farther feeling his way, he says: "The scriptural *term* which gives us the nearest insight into the real nature of the miracle is precisely the one of which Dr. Trench speaks most slightly—the word *wonder*. It is true that every wonder is not a miracle, but every miracle is a wonder. The cause of wonder is the unexpectedness of an event; and the specific difference of the miracle is, that it contradicts that course of nature which we expected to find uniform." Then, having thus discriminated between that which is and that which is not; having assigned "wonder" to a position as "effect," and perceiving that, as point of view, it afforded the "nearest insight into the real nature," he announces in clearness, beauty, and severest simplicity the result: "It is an event either above or opposed to secondary causes." (*Collected Writings*, Vol. 3, pages 228–233.) Evidently he did not drag into the inner essence the "effect" and the "nearest" *point of view*; his logical instinct taught him to leave these where they belonged—amongst the externals. That which was an accidental and common property would not serve to define—to differentiate. Hence the *ante bellum* Professor's

measure is too small for the *post bellum* Professor's wear. Hence the definition given by Dr. Thornwell *excludes* "wonderful," but that given by Dr. Girardeau *includes* it. Perceiving, as Dr. Thornwell did, that "every wonder is not a miracle, but every miracle is a wonder," he refused to incorporate the term "wonderful" in his *definition*; he preferred that which differentiated. From my criticism on this point the "Reply" sought two avenues: (1) "Dr. Martin narrowly limits the wonderful to the unexpected;" but escape by this route was already blocked; for I had distinctly said (*Pamphlet*, p. 2), "Wonderful would have to be ranged under the second head, . . . i. e., the *effect* on the mind of the beholders." Now, "unexpected" is the state of mind *before* the miracle is wrought; "wonderful" is the "effect"—state of mind *after* the miracle is wrought. It is something existing in the *mind*, not in the *miracle*; taking place in the mind *after* the miracle has been performed, not *before*. (2) "I expressly assigned" (says the "Reply") "wonder or wonderful event as the proximate genus. I could not therefore have made it a specific mark." But, is it essential in proving a definition to be "redundant," that the term objected to should be the "specific mark"? How, then, can the fact, that the Doctor did not make "wonderful" one of the *specific* marks, relieve his definition of the charge of "redundancy"? Besides, I did not overlook the fact, but distinctly recognised it, that in the *Doctor's* definition "wonderful" was made the "proximate genus." (*Pamphlet*, p. 9) There is another fact which, equally, I did not overlook, viz., that "proximate genus and specific difference" are *related* terms: the proximate genus is *just as much* a specific mark, differentiating in its sphere, as is the specific difference a mark differentiating in its sphere; these things are not immovable, but movable; they are on a sliding scale; *upwards*—the specific difference becomes proximate genus; *downwards*—and the proximate genus becomes specific difference: take *one* principle of division and the scale slides upwards; take *another* principle of division, and it slides downwards. This (which the Doctor's self-esteem will not suffer him to challenge) effectually blocks his passage through the second avenue.

In the next place, let us see how the "Reply" defends the *Review article* from the charge of "redundancy" in introducing "evidential" as a specific mark of "a miracle."

The defence may be ranged under three heads:

1. "I [the Doctor] hold that it is essential to the miracle, and not accidental, that it is evidential." This, of course, no reader of the *Re-*

view article will doubt. But, equally, no reader of the "Reply" will perceive in it any proof of the correctness of what the Doctor holds. Therefore this part of the "Reply" may safely be left to take care of itself.

2. That the miracle is evidential of "divine communications, is . . . universally, or at least well-nigh universally, conceded." But this was not the point of my criticism; and the affirmation, therefore, does not relieve the Doctor's position. That all writers on miracles have treated them as "evidential," is one proposition—a proposition I have never denied; that all (or nearly all) writers on miracle have "incorporated credential of divine communications" in their definition of "a miracle"—miracle in the abstract—all miracles, is a very different proposition—a proposition which, even could the Doctor demonstrate, would fall very far short of proving that the incorporation of it did not render the definition "redundant."

3. "Dr. Thornwell did not formally incorporate it [evidential] in his definition." This is very manifest; and equally manifest is it, that Dr. Girardeau *did* "incorporate it in his definition."

"He [Dr. Thornwell] treats it as essential to the miracle." "Essential" to *what* "of the miracle"?—(1) the *definition* of it?—or (2) the *exhaustive treatment* of the *subject*—"MIRACLES"?—the unmodified title of his discourse. The latter, of course, not the former: for, let it never be forgotten, not till Dr. Thornwell had settled the "ESSENCE"—that which is "essential"—did he feel "*prepared* to investigate its *apologetic* worth," that is, the "credential" division of his subject. It is, therefore, not only manifest that "Dr. Thornwell did *not* incorporate it in his definition," but no less clearly manifest, that he did *not* "treat it as essential to the [*definition* of] miracle."

Now let us turn our attention to the defence, made in the "Reply," to the criticism, that the Doctor's argument is *contra-logical*, *i. e.*, *non sequitur*, *i. e.*, incoherent.

1. The "Reply" objects to my analysis of the Doctor's views. "As we understand the drift of his argument there is an *implicit* claim, that since all 'events' must fall under one of these heads, *viz.*: 1. *Supernatural*, *i. e.*, 'Creation' *ex nihilo*; 2. *Contra-natural*, *i. e.*, 'miracle'; or 3. *Natural*, *i. e.*, according to 'the known course of nature'; therefore there is no standing room left for Evolution." (*Pamphlet*, p. 3.) This analysis, the "Reply" objects, opposes "supernatural and contra-natural as mutually exclusive," and as such is "mistaken." The "Reply" furnishes this analysis: I. *Supernatural*: 1. *Contra-natural*, *i. e.*,

"miracle." 2. *Non-contra natural: i. e., not "miracle," i. e., "Creation ex nihilo in the first instance."* II. *Natural: i. e., according to "the known course of nature."* This analysis the "Reply" defends thus: "I do not know, and I fancy Dr. Martin does not know, that all which is supernatural is contra-natural, but I do know that all which is contra-natural is supernatural." On the contrary, however, that is just what the Doctor's critic fancies he does know. It was this conviction which induced me to lay down this proposition, viz.: "It makes no particle of difference whether you say an event or a creation, is *super*-natural, or *contra*-natural. Every thing or event is either (1) natural, or (2) non-natural—it makes no shadow of difference whether you say *super*, or *contra*, or *præter*, or how many changes you may choose to ring on the Latin prepositions. If it is non-natural, it is miracle; if it is natural, it is not miracle." (*Pamphlet*, p. 2.)

Why is not every supernatural event contra-natural? It seems to us that the mere *accepted* force of language sustains the affirmative of this question. All events are either natural or non-natural: 1. The supernatural therefore is non-natural; 2. The contra-natural therefore is non-natural. Every non-natural event is a "Miracle": 1 Every *supernatural* event therefore is a *miracle*; 2. Every *contra-natural* event therefore is a *miracle*. The steps of this argument would seem to be intuitive. If they are valid, then the Miracle is indifferently *super* or *contra*. Therefore, that analysis, which furnishes *two species* of the supernatural [(1) miracle—because it is *supero-contra-natural*; (2) non-miracle—because it is *supero-non-contra-natural*] is an illogical analysis.

Evidently, according to the Doctor's own analysis he will need to amend the title of his Review article, so as to read: "*The Supero-contra-natural character of the miracle, as contrasted with Natural Events, and with the supero-non-contra-natural character of Creation from nothing in absolutely the First Instance.*" To this revised statement of the Doctor's doctrine of "a miracle," the curious might append several questions; *e. g.*, Since you do not hold that Creation *super*, and Creation *contra*, are mutually exclusive, why may not the "super" be *contra*, and the "contra" *super*, if not in the whole, at least in the part? Why did you not define miracle to be a *supero-contra-natural* event? If miracle is an event—*supero-contra-natural*, what is an event "super" but not *contra*? what an event—"contra" but not *super*? what an event, "super" but neither *contra* nor *non-contra*? Since you claim to range "Creation *ex nihilo* in the first instance," *co-*ordinately with miracle as *Contra-natural*, under the genus *Supernatural*,

then, since "miracle" must contain *all* that is in *supernatural plus* what is in *contranatural*, with what consistency can you say creation *ex nihilo* in the first instance cannot be a miracle, because it is *super*; whereas "super" is the very *genus* under which you range miracle? Since you admit the resurrection of Lazarus to be a miracle; and since you claim that the restoration of his body to life is an instance of creation *ex nihilo* in the second instance; what is the specific mark differentiating between creation from nothing in the *first* instance, and creation from nothing in the *second* instance, which makes the resurrection of Lazarus a miracle, and the original creation of all things from nothing *not* a miracle? How is it possible, that creation of *all* things from *nothing* "in the first instance" does *not* contradict the "known course of nature"? but creation of *some* things from nothing in the *second* instance *does* "contradict the known course of nature"? If, according to your theory, Lazarus's life was *annihilated* at his death and again *exnihilated* at his resurrection; and this act of *annihilation* was *not* a miracle, but the subsequent act of *exnihilation* was a miracle; then why may not *every* act of "exnihilation" be a miracle? and if so, why may not the grand *all-comprehending original* act of "exnihilation" be a miracle? If not, then why should *all other* *exnihilating* acts be miracle, save only the one *original* *exnihilating* act?

But so far as my contention with the Doctor on this point is concerned, I have no more interest in denying this analysis than I had in denying the other analysis. As formerly, so now I say: "Granting, therefore, his classification, no refutation of Evolution follows." The argument against Evolution remains, as before, notwithstanding the "Reply," a *non sequitur*. Evolution finds a place under both "miracle" and "natural," as I have proven in my *Pamphlet* (pages 3-5), drawing the proof from (1) Nature; (2) Confession of Faith; and (3) the Bible.

2. The next point in the "Reply," it is freely confessed, is stunning. I have not yet recovered from the blow. "Dr. Martin is again mistaken in affirming that I have held that the creation of Adam's body was miraculous. On the contrary, I have always, of set purpose, avoided expressing that opinion." I imagine that this declaration from *Dr. Girardeau* startled the Church. What opinion does the Professor hold regarding the "creation of Adam's body"? Certainly, whatever it may be, this declaration puts him in direct conflict with the *opinion* of the majority in the General Assembly of 1888. That opinion is: "that Adam's body was *directly* fashioned by Almighty God of the dust of the ground." If this language does not teach that the "creation of

Adam's body was *miraculous*," then language has lost its power to express thought. If, however, it does and can only mean that the "creation of Adam's body was miraculous," then it is in palpable discord with Professor Girardeau's opinion. Strange exhibition of human nature! On October 3, 1888, Dr. Girardeau is found *publicly* "contending against the decision of the General Assembly;" yet that very week he leads his Presbytery in adopting that celebrated *Interdict*, which "*forbids the public contending against the decision* [this very decision] *of the Assembly*." Is it at all likely that the Presbytery of Charleston will call this eminent presbyter to account for this flagrant offence? Or was it the intention of the majority in that Presbytery, by this Presbyterian but unpresbyterian Interdict upon public discussion, to manufacture a muzzle for the minority *alone*?

Upon general principles, in my criticism I took for granted that, if there was one opinion which the eminent leader of the opposition did hold it, was that the "creation of Adam's body was *miraculous*." Now, as formerly, however, I cannot see how he could hold that opinion consistently with some principles enunciated in his *Review article*. Now, however, I feel that light is dawning. If we do not yet know what opinion the Professor holds on this burning question which has so vexed the Church for the past four years, we feel confident we are possessed of his consciousness on the negative side of this question; we know what opinion he does *not* hold: he publicly disavows holding "that the creation of Adam's body was *miraculous*." Yea more; he has "*always of set purpose avoided expressing that opinion*."

Since the Doctor is fond of Logic—a master in the art—suppose he listen to a friend's advice, who would thus gently lead him by the line of Logic safely through this labyrinth of doubt. *E. g.*, all events are either: 1. *Contra-Natural*; or 2. *Non-contra-natural*. All *Non-contra-natural* events are either: 1. *Creation ex nihilo* in absolutely the first instance, *i. e.*, under the genus *Supernatural*; or 2. *Natural*, *i. e.*, under the genus *Non-supernatural*. But now: the creation of Adam's body was an "Event." The Doctor disavows holding that it belongs to the class of "miraculous" events, *i. e.*, the class *contra-natural*. It must, then, belong to that class of events known as either: 1. "Supero-non-contra-natural," or 2, that class known as "Natural,"—Non-supero-natural. But the Doctor is very confident that the creation of Adam's body must be ruled out of this class, *i. e.*, the "Natural;" for he says, in his "Reply," "Now we maintain that Adam's body *was not born*." Then, of course, the Doctor is bound by the laws of Logic to

hold that the creation of Adam's body must be classified as an event belonging to the head of *Supero-non-contra-natural*, *i. e.*, to the class of "Creation *ex nihilo* in absolutely the first instance." Thus: Adam's body was either: 1. Creation *ex nihilo* in absolutely the first instance; or, 2. It was Natural, *i. e.*, born like the rest of us, by ordinary generation of a human father and a human mother; or, 3. It was miraculous. But it was: 1. *Not* "miraculous"; 2. It was "*not* born." Therefore, by the laws of Logic, 3. It must have been "created *ex nihilo* in absolutely the *first* instance." Now the Doctor is out of the labyrinth, in the broad sunlight of a "good and necessary consequence." True, this good and necessary logical reduction of the Doctor's position has led him into an attitude which contradicts: 1. Science; 2. General Assembly, 1886 and 1888; 3. Confession of Faith; 4. Bible; 5. Himself; and in this self-contradiction, this unique, logical, impregnable conclusion, he is seen standing illustriously and pre-eminently *alone*, on the very pinnacle of his glory, the *wonder of the ages*. Still, this need not disturb *his* conscience, as it does not disturb the conscience of the *Church*. The Church seems, like Gallio, to "care for none of these things"—contradictions, *e. g.*, of the Confession of Faith and of the Bible—providing only they are held by the valiant and trusted Professor of *Theology* in the Seminary at Columbia, So. Ca.

But let us not overlook the fact that the "Reply" has not left the Professor without a forethoughtful provision by way of retreat in case of emergency. He is not absolutely committed to the *thesis* that the creation of Adam's body was *not* "miraculous." As he studies the trilemma: 1. Born; 2. Miraculous; 3. Creation *ex nihilo*; he boldly marches up to the first, and writes his verdict—"Not born;" looking now very cautiously at the second, he writes a Scotch verdict—"Not proven;" he is still an anxious inquirer—seeking light; therefore if any man charges that the Professor teaches his classes that the creation of Adam's body was "miraculous," that man is "*mistaken*"; if, however, it be insinuated that the Professor teaches that the creation of Adam's body is *not* miraculous, the reply is at hand—"I have always of set purpose avoided expressing that opinion," *i. e.*, on either side of this question, the Doctor's policy has "always" been to be non-committal, and that of "set purpose." Like the landless laird, astraddle of the line-fence between two farms, he is prepared for attack from either side, being always found standing on that foot which is on the other side of the fence. Truly he has of "set purpose" so arranged matters as to be "always" strongly entrenched. Until, therefore, he decides this question, he is

under no necessity, from this point of view, to tackle the third proposition of the trilemma; hence, in respect to this, "deponent saith not" what his opinion is; and since "his days are determined," and he is a skilful rider, he may go down to his grave perhaps, firmly "set" on the top rail which divides between the adjoining farms of *supero-contra-natural*, and *supero-non-contra-natural*. As the Doctor does not know himself on this point, how can his critic be required to know him?

Every effect has a cause, and curiosity is native to the human mind; we cannot therefore repress the inquiry, *Why* has the Professor studiously "avoided expressing that opinion"—viz., "that the creation of Adam's body was *miraculous*"? Can it be because, from his exalted perch, he *studiously* keeps one eye vigilantly open to the *trend* of scientific opinion on this question? Such is the habit of his school of thought; they reject the principle of *harmony* in the species "non-contradiction," that they may embrace the principle of *harmony* in the species "identity of teaching." Thus, in investigating the "connection between Natural Science and Revelation" the habit of his school of thought is very different from the habit of thought of that school which he so industriously antagonizes, and seeks to render harmless by a presbyterial muzzle. The thought will force itself upon us, that perhaps after all Dr. Woodrow's labors have not been altogether in vain, in respect to the leader of the opposition. May it be, that the Professor's "opinion" on this point—Adam's body—has not been expressed, and that of "set purpose," because of the impression—left upon his mind and subsequently wrought out—by Dr. Woodrow's *Address on Evolution*? *E. g.*, this paragraph from the *Address*: "Having now pointed out the probable absence of contradiction between the Scripture account of creation and the doctrine of Evolution, except in the case of man so far as regards his soul, but without having at all considered the probable truth or falsehood of Evolution, I proceed next, as briefly as possible, to state a few of the facts which *seem* to be sufficient at least, to keep us from *summarily* rejecting the doctrine as *certainly* false." Upon the whole, as we study Doctor Girardeau's present posture—"of set purpose avoided expressing" an opinion as to "Adam's body," whether its "creation was *miraculous*" or *not* *miraculous*—it does have the appearance of one who, having anxiously forecast the future, carefully trims his sails for a change in the weather—a possible verdict on the part of Science in favor of Evolution. The General Assembly, at Augusta, and again at Baltimore, assured the Church and the world that there was no danger; but the Doctor is not disposed to abide by these ecclesiastical deliverances on non-ecclesiastical

matters; he takes his own horoscope, and acts the wise part recommended by Solomon: "A prudent man foreseeth the evil, and hideth himself: but the simple pass on, and are punished." To this extent, therefore, he may be regarded as a *Semi-Woodrowite*; and may the day be not far distant when we shall give him the right hand of fellowship, and welcome him into our full communion. There is this difference between the school which the Professor seems to be abandoning, and that to which as his friend I cordially invite him. The former, interpreting Scripture on scientific points, keeps one eye on the facts of science and the other eye on the sacred record, so as to interpret the one in exact "harmony" with the other; of course, this process has in the past and must in the future treat alternately the Bible and Nature as if they were noses made of wax, and hence the "variations" and "conflicts" must be provoking and countless until the harmonizing process is completed and the *residuum* of harmony is at last discovered. The latter school treats both the Bible and Nature as respectable, independent, infallible witnesses of the truth of God, each supreme in its own divinely assigned department. Thus, in each department—independently studied—we seek, not what they call "harmony," but what we call "non-contradiction"—the *harmony* of "non-contradiction." We have no need, therefore, to suspend our interpretation of the sacred record till the returns from the secular record are all in; neither therefore are we ever called upon to "import" into the sacred record the latest verdict of the secular. On the contrary, we believe that what the Bible teaches now it has always taught and always will teach; and that these teachings are and have been attainable by all students of the Bible without any aid from outside sources, if only we could lay aside prejudice, passion, sloth, and pride. Having reached our interpretation, by which we are assured of "non-contradiction," we then, so far as the Bible is concerned, rest without fears by day or alarms by night, and let the Natural Scientist work out his conclusions without fear, favor, or affection—without any prejudice of mind against the Bible on account of unnecessary friction between the Scripturist and the Naturalist. In reaching this happy posture—of "non-contradiction"—"we do not need to show that our interpretation *must* be correct, but only that it *may* be correct—that it is not reached by distortion or perversion, but by an honest application of admitted principles of exegesis." (*Woodrow's Address.*)

Perhaps a comparative view just at this point may be profitable:—

General Assembly: 1. Adam's body; miracle. 2. His body; not born.

Dr. Girardeau : 1. Adam's body ; not miracle (?). 2. His body ; not born.

Dr. Woodrow : 1. Adam's body ; not miracle (?) 2. Adam's body ; born (probably).

Thus it will be seen that the Assembly differs from Dr. Woodrow on both points, and from Dr. Girardeau on one ; that Dr. Girardeau differs from the Assembly on one point, and on that point agrees with Dr. Woodrow ; that he agrees with the Assembly on one point, and on that point differs from Dr. Woodrow. With one hand he grips the hand of the Assembly, with the other the hand of Dr. Woodrow. The undersigned is disposed to side with the Assembly on the *first* point, viz. : Adam's body ; miracle ; and to side with Dr. Woodrow on the second point, viz. : Adam's body ; born.

But, returning to the *trilemma*, let us not forget that Dr. Girardeau escapes the necessity of embracing the third alternative—viz. : that Adam's body is a "creation *ex nihilo* in absolutely the first instance"—only by being allowed the "benefit of his doubt" whether "Adam's body was a miraculous creation." What he says is, that his critic, in "affirming" that he "has held to the miraculous creation of Adam's body, is mistaken." Ordinarily such a disclaimer implies that he holds the opposite view from that which his critic "mistakenly affirmed;" therefore, for the present, at least, I shall affirm, that the leaning of the Professor's mind is toward the proposition—that, since the creation of Adam's body was 1. Not Natural ; 2. Not Miraculous ; 3. It must have been "*ex nihilo* in absolutely the first instance"—in other words, it was an event *supero-non-contra-natural*.

3. In the third place, the "Reply" objects to my criticism—"incoherent argument"—by admitting the justice of that criticism ; *i. e.*, provided I can fairly meet the issue between "evolutionism and *special* creationism." This task I most cheerfully enter upon ; and I trust the Doctor will manfully abide "the issue."

Here it is a pleasure to know that for once, at least, the critic was not mistaken. I attributed to the Doctor the position, that creationism and evolutionism are exact contradictories. This is what was said : "The idea is : 'Creation' is the exact *contradiction* [not of nature, but] of 'Evolution.' *Miracle* is the *contradiction* of *nature*, but *Evolution* is the *contradiction* of *Creation*." (*Pamphlet*, p. 4.) And in the argument which followed, I clinched it by reminding the reader "that it has already been proven, according to the *Bible as interpreted in our standards*, that Evolution may be ranked under either of these two categories viz. : Creation by (1) miracle, or by (2) Nature.

The Doctor's "Reply" can be understood only by supposing that he failed to read, or else failed to remember, that I gave *two* instances of Evolution by *special* creation, viz.: (1) the birth of *Isaac*; and (2) the birth of *Jesus*. The first instance (as to interpretation) was confirmed by reference to the *Confession of Faith*; the second needed no confirmation. The proof, therefore, that the argument of Prof. Girardeau against Evolution as applied to Adam's body was *incoherent* was expressly built upon the ground which had already been established, that there was no contradiction between Evolution and Creation—whether "*special*" or "ordinary." Hence, since Girardeau's body came by ordinary generation, as we learn from Nature, and also by Creation, as we learn from Scripture, so there is no contradiction between evolution and *ordinary* creation. And since the bodies of Isaac and of Jesus came by extraordinary generation, and also by evolution, so there is no contradiction between evolution and extraordinary, *i. e.*, "*special*" creation; the birth of Isaac was an instance of an "individual born of individuals within the same species;" the birth of Jesus was an instance of an "individual of one species born of an individual of a different species;" yet both Isaac and Jesus were instances of evolution by "*special*" creation; both of these instances, therefore, prove that there is *no contradiction* between "evolutionism and *special* creationism;" thus the "issue" as stated by the Doctor was fairly met; thus my original argument is fully sustained, viz.: that to reason, because God "created" Adam's body—even though by a "special" act of creation—therefore Adam's body could not have been been "evolved," is to reason "incoherently." Since Girardeau's, Isaac's, and the Messiah's bodies were all evolutions, and all creations, and instances of three different modes of creation, under one of which modes the creation of Adam's body *might* come; therefore, to argue that what *might* have been (because all that the Scriptures say of Adam's body is that it was a creation) *could not* have been, because it was a creation, is most assuredly to argue with the utmost incoherency. Nor will the plea that Adam's was a case of "special" creation remove the incoherency; for that plea will *not cohere* with the special creation of the bodies of Isaac and of Jesus. Nor will the plea that Adam's body was not created like Girardeau's body remove the incoherency; for that plea will *not cohere* with the proof, which grants that difference, and yet, by that very grant, shows the incoherency of the argument against evolution drawn from that difference. Nor will the plea that Adam's body was not born at all remove the incoherency, for that plea will *not cohere* with the *state of the question*—the "issue"

between us—viz.: Was the body of Adam born or not born?—that plea therefore “begs the question;” certainly no logician would consent to meet the charge of *non sequitur* by submitting a *petitio principii*. Nor will the plea that the critic “begged the question” remove the incoherency, for that plea is an *ignoratio elenchi*, it will *not cohere* with the *only* point the critic undertook to prove, or cared to prove, or needed to prove, viz.: that *even though* Adam’s body *had been* created by Evolution, still that would be no contradiction of the Bible statement, that God created his body of the dust of the ground; upon that we based the argument, that the assertion that Adam’s body was “not evolved” because it was “created,” was incoherent; and that the assertion that the Scriptures contradicted the “evolution” of Adam’s body because the Scriptures assert “creation” of Adam’s body, was incoherent; and therefore that the conclusion, that evolution and the Scriptures are “mutual contradictories,” because the Scriptures affirm that Adam’s body was “created,” is a *non sequitur*. Our task was to prove, not the “harmony” according to the *Doctor’s* school, but the “non-contradiction” according to the *Woodrow* school. According to the *former* school, the Doctor’s task was, not merely to “maintain,” but to *prove* by “good and necessary consequence,” that Adam’s body “was *not born*”; before he could *coherently* draw the conclusion, that the Bible and evolution were “mutually contradictory.” According to the *latter* school, my task, in order to refute the Doctor, was, *not* to prove that Adam’s body *was* born; but simply to prove (as I did), that whether it *was* born or *not* born; whether generated like the body of Girardeau, of Isaac, or of Jesus, or *not generated at all*; whether evolution of Adam’s body were true or false; still the Bible remained *uncontradicted*, because it gave no testimony *for* or *against* evolution; it was *neutral*; it was “silent.” The Professor’s *thesis* was—The Bible and evolution are “mutually contradictory;” my *thesis* was the contradictory opposite—The Bible and evolution are “not” mutually contradictory. If, therefore, evolution be *true*, the Bible is *not* contradicted; equally so, therefore, if evolution be *false*, still the Bible is *not* contradicted. So far, therefore, as the “issue” between us is concerned, I had no interest whatever in maintaining the truth or falsity of evolution in general, or of Adam’s body in particular; whether he was born or not born, the criticism of the Doctor’s argument, viz., “incoherent,” remains. Either Adam was born or he was not born; in *either* event he was “created out of the ground;” in *either* event the Bible and evolution are *not* “mutually contradictory;” in *either* event the Doctor’s argument is incoherent. My argument was

based, not upon the supposition that the one was *true* and the other *false*, but upon the supposition that *no matter which* alternative was true, the Bible was not contradicted; but inasmuch as these alternatives are themselves “mutually contradictory,” the one must be true and the other false; but, which was true and which was false, was to me, so far as my argument was concerned, a matter of supreme indifference; because that argument was based on the supposition that *either one or the other* might be true.

That what has been detailed above, was really my line of argument will be fully confirmed by reading the *Pamphlet*, pages 3 to 5. The first step was to prove that “there is no contradiction between creation by ‘natural’ process and ‘Evolution.’” The second step was to prove that “there is no contradiction between creation by ‘miracle’ and ‘Evolution.’” If creation by “miracle” does not include “special” creation, then I should like to be informed what it does include? The Doctor may say, “Creation by *miracle* does not include *all special* creations; because it does not include creation by *supero-non-contra-natural* method; “if thus he shall insist, then we shall insist, that to affirm this method of the creation of *Adam’s* body, is flatly to contradict the literal word of God, for it says that “the Lord God formed man dust of the ground;” but the Doctor would say: “The Lord God formed man *ex nihilo* in absolutely the first instance.”

Then our conclusion was: “Therefore, although the Bible teaches that God *created* the body of Adam, still it *MAY* be true that Adam’s body (as Girardeau’s body) came by Evolution; for certainly Girardeau’s did, and yet God is *equally* Girardeau’s Creator as he was Adam’s.” (*Pamphlet*, p. 5.) And let me add just here, that the Bible teaches of *all* men (and therefore of *Girardeau*) no less than of Adam, that the Lord God formed them “*dust of the ground*.” Now, then, our argument was and is, that to argue—Adam’s body was *not* “*evolved*”; because God “*created*” Adam’s body, was to argue incoherently. To argue “incoherently,” is to conclude *without justification* from the *premises*; the conclusion against “Evolution” because of “creation,” is to conclude without justification from the *premises*; the Doctor’s argument was of this kind, as has been shown (*Pamphlet*, pages 3 to 5); therefore the Doctor’s argument is incoherent.

How does the “Reply” seek to set aside this train of reasoning? Listen: “Where, then, is the contradiction between the creation and the evolution of Adam’s body? I answer: None whatever, if Adam’s body was created like mine—that is, through birth. . . . Now, we maintain

that Adam's body was not born. . . . The issue is between evolutionism and special creationism." All this, just as if I had not already superabundantly proven, that there is no contradiction "between evolutionism and SPECIAL creationism," and therefore squarely met "the issue."

What was my argument designed to show? That "Adam's body *was* created like Girardeau's, that is, through birth"? *Not at all*. It was designed to show that the simple fact that the Scriptures assert "create" of Adam's body, does not *disprove* "evolution" of Adam's body, any more than "creation" of Girardeau's body *disproves* "evolution" of Girardeau's body. Other scriptures abundantly prove, that the formula in Gen. ii. 7, is applicable to Girardeau's body as to Adam's. And my argument is equally good whether Adam's body is a "special creation" or *not*—as shown by the creation of the bodies of Isaac and of Jesus; both of these bodies afford instances of "evolutionism" and of "special creationism;" equally good whether Adam's body was an evolution or not—descent with modification or not—created through birth or not. It did not behoove *me*, therefore, to prove that Adam's body *was* born, but it did rest upon the *Doctor* to prove that Adam's body was *not born*; whilst it rested upon me to prove only (as I did) that the Doctor's *line of proof was a non sequitur*—that in his premises his conclusion found *no* justification. To illustrate: The Doctor's *argument* is: Adam's body could *not* be an "evolution," because it was a "creation," *i. e.*, a "special creation." My *disproof* of the Doctor's argument is: the Doctor's argument is a *non sequitur*; because, (1) "creation" (natural) does not exclude "evolution"—Girardeau's body, *e. g.*; (2) creation miraculous (or "special") does not exclude "evolution"—the bodies, *e. g.*, of Isaac and of Jesus; (3) "special creation"—in the sense of "*ex nihilo* in absolutely the first instance"—does not disprove evolution of Adam's body; for the creation of Adam's body was *not* an instance of *this* kind of creation, any more than the bodies of Girardeau, of Isaac, or of Bethlehem's babe; (4) "Special creation"—in the sense of "*ex nihilo* in the second instance"—that which the Doctor teaches the resurrection life of Lazarus was—the creation of Adam's body *could not* be; for the man is "mistaken," says the "Reply," "in affirming that I [the Doctor] have held that the creation of Adam's body was miraculous." Besides, according to the literal word of God, the creation of Adam's body *cannot* be ranged under the head of creation *ex nihilo* either (1) in "absolutely the *first* instance;" or (2) "in the *second* instance." It must therefore be ranged under the head of either (1) "natural;" or (2) "miraculous;" but not "*ex nihilo*" (*a*) in the "*first*,"

or (b) in the *second* instance. But we have seen that creation (1) natural, or (2) miraculous, does not exclude evolution; Adam's body, therefore, whether a "natural" or a "miraculous" creation, does not *exclude* evolution; it *may* therefore have been created by evolution; therefore the Doctor's argument, which *mediated* the proof of non-evolution of Adam's body, through the term "creation"—[whether "natural or miraculous"—seeing it must be one or the other]—in the premise—"creation excludes evolution"—is a *non sequitur*.

To illustrate again: the *Doctor's* argument is tantamount to this:

The whale cannot be a reptile; because it is a vertebrate.

Criticism: Since vertebrate includes reptile, the Doctor's *argument* is "incoherent"—even though it be true that the whale is not a reptile.

"Reply": But since the whale is a "special" class of vertebrate, my argument is not incoherent.

Criticism: Since vertebrate includes reptile as a "special" class, the argument is still incoherent, *even though it be true* that the whale is *not* a reptile. There are four "special" classes of vertebrates: 1. Mammals. 2. Birds. 3. Reptiles. 4. Fishes. You do not prove that the whale is not a "reptile" by proving that it is a "vertebrate"; neither do you prove that it is not a reptile by proving that it is a "special" class of vertebrates; for, although it is a "vertebrate" and even a "special" class of vertebrate, yet *for all that* the "whale" *may* be a "reptile." It does not behoove *me* to prove that the whale is *not* a reptile; even though I admit that, still your argument is incoherent. But it does *dévolue* upon *you* to prove your proposition by proving "whale" to be—"mammal;" or "bird;" or "fish"—something that *excludes* "reptile." Now just so in the matter of "creation;" granting, for argument's sake, the Doctor's *fourfold* subdivision, viz.: 1. Natural. 2. Miraculous: (1) *contra-natural*; (2) "*ex nihilo* in the *second* instance." 3. "*Ex nihilo* in absolutely the *first* instance." You do not prove anything against "evolution" by proving "creation" of Adam's body; you prove nothing against it by proving "special" creation of Adam's body; for, this being true, still "evolution" *may* be affirmed of the "creation" of Adam's body. Neither does it behoove *me* to prove that Adam's body is an instance of evolution—that is not my proposition; my proposition is, that *your argument* is a *non sequitur*; and that therefore, so far as regards your argument. Adam's body *may* be an "evolution." On the contrary, however, it does behoove *you*—in order to sustain your proposition—viz.: that "creation" of Adam's body is "not evolution"—to prove (1) not that it was a "creation"—that is admitted; (2) not that it was a "spe-

cial" creation—that, for argument's sake at least, is admitted; (3) but to prove that it was a "special" creation of the class "*ex nihilo* in the *second* instance;" or (4) to prove that it was a "special" creation of the class "*ex nihilo* in absolutely the *first* instance." Either of the last two would *exclude* evolution. When you have *proven* that this *last*, or this *next* to the last proposition, is true regarding the body of Adam, then you will have proven, that it is something which could *not* have been "born," and therefore could not have been an "evolution"—*descent with modification*.

Meantime the position of the Woodrow school remains impregnable: The Bible is *silent*—does not say: (1) whether Adam's body *was* "born;" or (2) whether Adam's body *was not* "born;" so, then, whether the scientist shall eventually decide: (1) that Adam's body *was* "born," the Bible will be connected with that proposition in the category of "non-contradiction;" for the Bible is *silent* on "that point;" or (2) whether the scientist shall eventually decide that Adam's body *was not* "born," the Bible will be connected with that proposition in the category of "non-contradiction;" for the Bible is *silent* on "that point."

It is manifest, therefore, that Dr. Girardeau's reply to my criticism on this point is a fatal concession. He attempts to parry the blow by seeking shelter under the distinction between "special" and "natural" creation. He finds, however, that he is just as equally shelterless under the one as under the other; and that, in substance, he has actually abandoned the last inch of ground upon which to erect a shelter. Under the head of "special," as differentiated from "natural," there were three positions: 1. Miracle. 2. *Ex nihilo* in the "*first*." 3. *Ex nihilo* in the "*second*." "Miracle" was the only ground of POSSIBLE tenability, but that he hastily abandons; the two remaining are of impossible tenability, and even the *second* of these two remaining he fled from in confusion, when he abandoned "miracle;" for he holds that "*ex nihilo* in the *second*," is a "miracle;" for he holds that resurrection of Lazarus is an instance of *ex nihilo* in the "*second*;" and he holds that resurrection of Lazarus is a "miracle." His case therefore is hopeless.

On the other hand, my argument is equally good under either supposition: (1) natural; or (2) miracle; and I claim, on the *accepted* force of language, that these two are not only mutual exclusives, but that they are *exhaustive*—as much so as natural and non-natural, or miracle and non-miracle. His defence, however, according to himself, is good only on condition that Adam's body is a "special" creation; and that, moreover, as we have seen, of a peculiar *variety*, viz.: "*ex nihilo* in ab-

solutely the first instance;" for he has abandoned "miracle," of the first and second varieties; he rejects "natural;" and therefore "creation *from nothing* in absolutely the first instance," is *all* that remains to him. We know how valiant he is, how fearless, how ready to throw himself into the breach, how prompt to offer himself as one of a forlorn hope when the precious truth is at stake. We do not therefore despair of seeing him undertake the task of proving that "Adam's body was created *ex nihilo* in absolutely the first instance." When he shall have accomplished this feat, he will have richly earned the title, HERCULES of LOGIC. But, as our brother whom we "love in the truth," we forewarn him, that ere that chaplet shall be placed upon his noble brow, *like* Samson, and yet *unlike* Samson, he will, in the hour of the greatest success of his life, have tumbled into ruins, not the temple of the Philistines, but the temple of Christianity; for he will have demonstrated the Bible in the first chapters of Genesis, at least, to be a myth; and he himself will doubtless perish in the overthrow.

The Doctor evidently felt the gravity of the concession which he had made; for he proceeds immediately to inform us—"now we maintain that Adam's body *was not born*." But where is the *proof* that it was "not born"? He furnishes none—he begs the question. This is his proposition—"Adam's body was not born." What I have proven is that: for all that the Scriptures reveal on this subject, and for all that the Doctor's argument has proven, it is an *open* question whether "Adam's body was born" or not. It behooves him to *prove* his proposition; and I think he will utterly fail in any and every attempt so to do; but until he has proven it, I claim the full measure of his concession: "Where, then, is the contradiction between the creation and the evolution of Adam's body? I answer: NONE WHATEVER, if Adam's body was created like mine—that is, through birth." And, furthermore, I insist, that should he prove that Adam's body was a "special" creation, he will not yet have proven that it was "not born"; for the bodies of Isaac and of Jesus were "special creations," and yet they *were* "BORN."

4. In the fourth place, the "Reply" addresses itself to the "argumentative application"—*i. e.*, to the *disproof* of Theistic Evolutionism drawn from the Doctor's "definition" of miracle: the *disproof* of the one is included in the *proof* of the other; so the "Reply" thinks. To this point perhaps even the Doctor by this time thinks I have addressed myself *ad nauseam*.

Reserving for a subsequent page what I shall say as to the *irrelevant* matter contained in the "Reply's" three paragraphs on this head, I shall

give present attention to that *single* sentence which has the remotest relevancy to my criticism. Let us get the state of the question (*Review article*, p. 206): According to the Doctor, the *Theistic Evolutionist* "holds that God evolves the world by an unbroken process of mediate creation." Thence the Doctor infers that "no mediate creation could be miraculous;" yet the creation of Adam's body was very likely "miraculous," certainly (*per* Dr. Girardeau) *not* natural, and certainly was mediate, seeing, according to the Doctor, it was "formed out of the dust;" yet the creation of Isaac's body and of the Messiah's was certainly "miraculous," and as certainly "mediate." Although, therefore, it should be true, "that God evolves the world by an unbroken process of *mediate* creation," still it does *not follow* that "no *mediate* creation could be *miraculous*;" for "mediate" and "miracle" are not mutual exclusives. Therefore at this point the Doctor's argument against the Theistic Evolutionist breaks down; the conclusion does *not follow* from the premises, his argument therefore is a *non sequitur*.

Then, in the next place, the astute logician supposes that the theistic evolutionist defends himself by appealing "to the miracle of creation from nothing in the first instance:" *i. e.*, the theistic evolutionist replies to the Doctor by claiming to believe in the most stupendous of all miracles—original creation. This the Doctor seeks to evade, by laying down the proposition: "Creation from nothing cannot be a miracle." The futility of the Doctor's argument to prove this proposition, has been abundantly shown in the *Pamphlet*. As, therefore, the Doctor failed to prove that "creation from nothing cannot be a miracle;" so the conclusion he draws from that premise as against the theistic evolutionist, is a *non sequitur*. Still the Doctor is generous: even granting that it has occurred [*i. e.*, granting that the original act of *exnihilation* is a miracle], *that miracle* "contradicts his theory"—*i. e.*, the theory of the "theistic evolutionist." Let us see the contradiction: the theistic evolutionist in "his theory" embraces the idea of the miracle of *exnihilation*, as the very starting point of his theory, because *that* miracle "begins the order of nature;" there is no contradiction here certainly. Therefore the Doctor's inference—"He [theistic evolutionist] cannot therefore admit the existence of the miracle"—is a *non sequitur*; the theistic evolutionist not only does admit miracle, but admits it "in the very beginning" of his theory. To argue, therefore, that because the theistic evolutionist denies miracle *subsequent* to the original act of *exnihilation*, therefore to admit miracle in the very *original* act of *exnihilation*, "contradicts his theory," is certainly to argue with the utmost incoherency.

Now, I shall leave the reader to judge how much force (in the way of defence against my criticism) there is in this paragraph from the "Reply," all that remains of the three paragraphs after extracting the *irrelevant* matter. That argument was briefly this: "If a miracle, as contra-natural, has occurred, it contradicts the position of the theistic evolutionist, for he admits no miracle but that of creation out of nothing in the first instance, but that cannot be a miracle." But "that argument," as we have seen, is a *non sequitur*. Now, where is the proof in this "Reply," or even *attempted* proof, that "that argument" is *not* a *non sequitur*? Nowhere, save only in the bare repetition of that argument, and that in a mutilated form; and just why, in his "Reply," the argument was shorn of these words—viz.: "But, if it has occurred, it contradicts his theory"—is matter of curious speculation. Now, as to *that argument* we have seen, that even as *contra-natural*, miracle embraces "creation *ex nihilo* in the first instance," and that admitting that the miracles, *e. g.*, of the New Testament, contradict the theistic evolutionist, that is one proposition, but that proposition does not disprove mine, viz.: That the Doctor's *argument* against theistic evolution is incoherent, for both these propositions may be true, for they are not mutual contradictories. The "Reply," therefore, like the argument which it professes to defend, is *incoherent*.

One can scarcely restrain the surmise that the Professor does not know what "*non sequitur*" means. Because I do not believe in theistic evolution, therefore I must endorse every argument that the Doctor (or any body else) may urge against it. Or, because I expose the fallacy of the Doctor's argument against theistic evolutionism, therefore I believe in that form of evolution. Because this exposure occurs in a pamphlet devoted to the defence (another of the Doctor's fallacies) of Dr. Woodrow, therefore Dr. Woodrow must be a theistic evolutionist; or, at least, Dr. Martin does not know the difference between Dr. Woodrow and "the thorough-paced theistic evolutionist." Such logic as this is surely too palpably puerile to require any severer castigation than this bare mention. If this had been the only occasion on which such fallacies were practised by the opponents of Dr. Woodrow, there would be less to regret; on the contrary, however, it seems to be one of their stock performances. Dr. Woodrow's name occurs nowhere in the *Pamphlet*—save only as a convenient *antithesis* on the *title page*. He was not consulted at all in the preparation of that first series of criticisms (or of this second series); no single quotation—save one, "evolution—descent with modification"—was made from any of his writings; and

that without any mention of his name. As the *Pamphlet* clearly evinces, my object was, not to defend Dr. Woodrow, but the *Bible*, seeing that precious volume, by Dr. Girardeau's argument, had been bound in the meshes of his sophistries, and handed over to be the sport of the Philistines.

I took especial pains (*Pamphlet*, p. 12) to say: "Science *as such* is neither Christian nor anti-Christian, neither atheistic, pantheistic, nor deistic." Nature, the basis of all Natural Science, is, as God made it, neither atheistic, theistic, nor Christian, but simply and intensely *natural*—"and all very good." Is nature sin? God forbid; but sin, taking occasion by nature, works in us all manner of infidelity. Because some farmers are atheists, we would not subdivide the science of farming into atheistic and non-atheistic. Two physicians—one an atheist, the other a devout Christian—may agree on every essential point in the science of medicine, and in the practice of the healing art. Because there are on the one hand atheistic and on the other hand Christian physicians, no one has ever thought of dividing medical science into atheistic and Christian, although the former will seek to give only an atheistic explanation of the *occult* action of medicines, and the other only a Christian explanation of the same action. Because one man *confirms* his atheism by atheistic inferences from the facts of science or of nature, no more proves science or nature to be atheistic, than it proves the Bible to be atheistic, because some men *confirm* their atheism by atheistic inferences from the facts of Scripture. The two physicians agree as to the *facts*; they agree as to the *scientific* conclusions; but, beyond this, one is confirmed in his atheism, and the other in his adoring reverence. They both see the heart, the arteries, the veins, and the relations between them all, and their several functions; they both make the same use of this knowledge in the diagnosis, prognosis, and practice; beyond this, the one sees God in them all, the other sees nothing but "organic dust" and "natural law"—"*God is not* in all his thoughts." How illogical it would be to argue: therefore the study of anatomy and physiology lead to atheism. Still, it is a sad truth, revealed in Scripture and confirmed in nature, man "by wisdom knew not God. . . . Even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge." Agnosticism, therefore, confirms the Scriptures, even as the Scriptures discover the root of agnosticism.

Before proceeding farther in direct line, I shall turn aside for a brief moment.

I wish to point out the at least apparent change in Dr. Girardeau's

view. In 1884, he held (as was gathered from my private correspondence with him, and also from "*The Substance of Two Speeches*," before "the Synod of South Carolina, at Greenville, S. C., October, 1884"): That Evolution, as inculcated by Dr. Woodrow, 1. Did *not* contradict any doctrine in the *Evangelical* scheme; 2. Did *not* contradict any doctrine in the *Calvinistic* scheme; 3. He was *not* prepared to say that it contradicted the *Bible*—in its highest, "absolute, and infallible sense;" 4. But he maintained, that it contradicted "the Bible as *our Church interprets* it, . . . *our Bible—the Bible as it is to us.*" That is, he held, four years ago, that Dr. Woodrow's view contradicted *our* "Church Standards" as to the creation of Adam's body; and now, *notu bene*, how does it contradict the "Church Standards"? By contradicting, (1) *not* their "absolute" sense, (2) but their *relative* sense—*i. e.*, the sense put upon the "Standards" by the "Church's prevailing and recognised views." We have then, 1. The *Bible*—the word of God; 2. The *Presbyterian Bible*; 3. The Presbyterian "*Confession*"—founded *immediately* upon the Presbyterian Bible, and *remotely*, perhaps, upon the word of God—*God's Bible*; 4. The Presbyterian "Church's prevailing and recognised views," founded upon and interpreting the Presbyterian Confession, and that Confession founded upon and interpreting the Presbyterian Bible, and that Bible founded upon and interpreting God's Bible—*perhaps*. Now, when the eloquent orator boiled all this down, what was the *residuum*? "The statements of *representative* theologians and the *orthodox* [by what criterion?] belief of God's *people* in the *Presbyterian Church*." It seems to me we may put it through *two* more processes, and so at last, get this concentrated extract of the orator's test of Dr. Woodrow's fitness to hold the Perkins Professorship in the Columbia Seminary, viz.: 1. *Vox populi Presbyteriani vox Dei Presbyteriani*; 2. MIGHT makes RIGHT. Such was *his opinion* in 1884.

What is "his opinion" *now*—1888? Speaking of "the professed Christian Evolutionist"—Dr. Woodrow, *e. g.*—the *Review* article says: "They," *i. e.*, "the Scriptures" and the views of "the professed Christian Evolutionist"—Dr. Woodrow, *e. g.*—"are mutually contradictory, and one must be true, the other false" (206). It is *not now*: 1. The representative theologians and the orthodox belief of God's people in the Presbyterian Church; 2. The Presbyterian Church's prevailing and recognised views; 3. The Presbyterian Confession; 4. The Presbyterian Bible; 5. But, in 1888, it is "the Scriptures"—the Bible—*God's Bible—the Bible* in its highest, "absolute, and infallible sense." Not a

single qualifying phrase or word is used in the *Review article*, no reference is made to the "*Standard sense*." Have the Professor's eyes been opened to see the inconsistency of his position in 1884? Has he now fled for refuge to the Bible—without saying in *which* sense? A very convenient refuge. Or, has he abandoned, after four years more of light, the "*Standard sense*," and deliberately chosen the "*absolute and infallible sense*" of the Bible, as that which contradicts the "*theory*" of Dr. Woodrow—"the professed Christian Evolutionist"? If this is not his position, then, by all means, let him amend his universal proposition—the "*Scriptures*" and evolution "are mutually contradictory," so as to read: *Not* the *Confession of Faith* and evolution are "mutually contradictory," for this proposition we have seen is false (*Pamphlet*, pp. 3-5), but so amend it as to read: "The statements of *representative* theologians and the *orthodox* belief of *God's people* in the *Presbyterian Church*," and the "*theory of the professed Christian evolutionist*," are "mutually contradictory." This proposition, since it will hurt no one but (1) "the representative theologians, and (2) the orthodox (?) of God's people in the Presbyterian Church," will possibly not be disputed by me, and so we shall "have peace." For—1. I do not belong to the "representative theologians in the Presbyterian Church;" 2. I do not belong to the "orthodox" (*i. e.*, when *interrogatively* put) of God's people in the Presbyterian Church.'

But still, granting that the Doctor amends his proposition, yet for practical purposes, *i. e.*, by way of relief to tender consciences, it will be necessary for the Professor to furnish *criteria*, by which to decide such questions, *e. g.*, as these:

1. Which is "*the*" Presbyterian Church? Or, at least, to *which* one of the "Presbyterian" Churches do you refer?
2. Who are the *representative* theologians?
3. To *which* of their "statements" do you appeal?
4. Who are "God's" people in the Presbyterian Church?
5. Amongst *God's* "people" in the Presbyterian Church, *who* are the "orthodox"?
6. To what "statements" of (1) God's (2) people (3) who are orthodox, (4) in the Presbyterian Church, do you refer?
7. Where have you found (1) "statements," (2) on Dr. Woodrow's theory, (3) by God's (4) people (5) who are orthodox (6) in the Presbyterian Church, (7) which "statements" contradict Dr. Woodrow's theory? *Requiescat in pace.*

Let us now turn our attention to another remarkable exhibition of the Doctor's logic.

He submits, in defence of his views, that "if the miracle be a credential, whether that feature of it is rightly or wrongly included in the definition, the use of that fact to prove that creation, *in the first instance*, was not a miracle, is relevant." To this astounding statement the reply is obvious. If "credential" be an essential element of "miracle," then it could not "rightly" be *omitted* from the definition. If, however, it be *not* essential, then it could not otherwise than "wrongly" be *included* in the definition. The inclusion of it in the *first* instance would be necessary to render the definition *adequate*; the exclusion of it in the *second* instance would be necessary to save the definition from "redundancy." The fallacy here is in holding, as the "Reply" says, "that evidential is *essential* to the miracle and *not* accidental," and yet supposing, for a single moment, that it could be "wrongly" included in the "definition." If it is "essential," it *must* be included; if it is "accidental," it *must not* be included. The fallacy, in the next place, consists in supposing that in determining whether any given event—*creation ex nihilo*, *e. g.*—is, or is not a "miracle," you may test the claims of that event with equal relevancy by the "redundant" element of the definition, as by that element which is *not* redundant; *i. e.*, the "accidental" is just as good a test of the "whether or not?" as is the "essential." The "*redundant* definition" is just as good a test of truth as is the *purely and severely* "*adequate* definition." That which is "wrongly" included in a definition, serves just as well for "testing" purposes as that which is "rightly" included. Or, to put it a little differently, so as to obviate any objection from the Doctor: If the critic insists that "evidential" in the "definition" renders it "redundant," then I will put "evidential" *outside* of the "definition." Then I will test whether or not creation *ex nihilo* is a miracle, *first* by the definition, and, if it passes that test, I shall then cry, "Halt!" and proceed to test it by that which is *not in* the "definition;" and if it shall fail to pass that test, then I will reject it from the category of "miracle;" for "I hold that evidential is essential to the miracle and not accidental," *i. e.*, *intrinsic* and *not extrinsic*. But why then, Doctor, do you *consent* to put it *outside* of the definition, and then apply the definition as if evidential were *inside*, and *not outside*, just as if you had *not consented*? Why "grant," and then "apply" as if you had *not granted*? In this apparent "grant for argument's sake," you very shrewdly *beg the question*.

Credential though not belonging to the essence is a concomitant—or circumstance—of *some* miracles; but this can give no base for arguing that creation *ex nihilo* cannot be a miracle because not wrought for eviden-

tial purposes. This argument could be used only after it has been proven that "evidential" is *essential* and intrinsic of *all* miracles—not of *some* only (and that the "evidential" effect must operate in the very moment when the miracle is performed, and not afterwards *only*; this rule, of course, would render the resurrection of Christ no miracle); whereas the Doctor has not proven, and is not likely to prove, that it is intrinsic of even a *single* miracle, how much less then of all? Dr. Girardeau's hypothetical proposition, therefore, is absurd: "*If the miracle [i. e., some miracle] be evidential [whether essentially so or accidentally so], then that feature, whether rightly or wrongly included in the definition, may be relevantly used to prove that creation ex nihilo in the first instance, is not a miracle; because creation in the first instance is not evidential.*" The fallacy here is very patent: In the first place, he concludes from a *particular* premise, as if it had been universal; in the next place, he concludes from specially modified premises as if those special modifications had been omitted: *e. g.*, the *premise* is (seeing it is "some" miracle) "*whether essential or accidental,*" but the *conclusion* is drawn as if the "or accidental" had been omitted from the premise; again, *e. g.*, the *premise* is—"whether rightly or wrongly included," but the *conclusion* is drawn as if the "or wrongly" had been omitted from the premise. Let us exhibit the Doctor's argument in its naked deformity: "*If some miracle be accidentally evidential, then that feature, although wrongly included in the definition, may be relevantly used as a test; But, according to this test, creation ex nihilo is not a miracle; because it lacks evidential, which is an essential feature of all miracle, and is therefore rightly included in the definition.*"

How can that which is not essential to the being of a thing be relevantly used in argument as if it were essential? How can that which is essential be relevantly used in argument as if it were not essential? Evidential (or credential) as a quality of the miracle is just as good in argument whether that quality is "rightly or wrongly included in the definition," *i. e.*, an inadequate definition, or a redundant definition, is no whit better in argument than an adequate definition: in the matter of "argument," so far as "definition" may be concerned, "inadequate" and "redundant," "*correct*" and "*incorrect*," are *obsolete* terms! In the name of Logic, why then should the logician be at all careful in defining his terms? or why should all sound reasoning insist upon accuracy of definition? Suppose, then, an argument of this kind by way of illustration: This "*fact*" (stabbing, *e. g.*, with a knife) is not essential to that killing which is murder; but is sometimes a circumstance of that killing

which is murder ; but this "fact" (stabbing, *e. g.*, with a knife) is *absent* in the case of A. B. ; therefore A. B. is *not* guilty of murder.

But for the special reference to me, by the Doctor himself, I should not have noticed the topic that I now introduce. Let me say just here, that to this hour, after most careful inquiry, I have not been able to discover the name of the "friend of Dr. Martin," to whom the "Reply" refers. Since the "Reply" assigns to me the task of "deprecating the logic of this definition of his [my] attack," *i. e.*, upon Dr. Girardeau's *Review article* ; and since the logic, *i. e.*, the analysis, is that of Dr. Girardeau himself, and not of my *unknown* "friend," I, therefore, although reluctantly, respond to the Doctor's challenge, and "deprecate the logic of this definition" of "Cyclone" by Dr. Girardeau : Proximate genus, Storm ; specific difference, consisting of four specific marks—(1) Windy ; (2) Moving in a circle ; (3) Blown by Dr. Martin ; (4) Demolishing *Professor Girardeau*."

The first deprecatory remark I would make regarding the matter is, that the term "Cyclone" [used by ***, the author of "*The Wreck*," in *Southern Presbyterian*, September 20, 1888], in the connexion in which it occurs, is what rhetoricians would call a *simile*, and not what logicians would call a "definition." Secondly, the Doctor's definition of Cyclone, under the circumstances, affords an instance of the "fallacy of equivocation:" (1) supposing that the things themselves are similar, because they have *similar relations* ; (2) pressing the analogy *too far*, or making the application 'of it *more complete* than the nature of the case justifies, in consequence of overlooking the *exact point* of the analogy. (Whately's *Logic*, 200–206.) It violates the rule for interpreting metaphors, parables, etc., viz.: that for the most part they touch like two globes at a *single* point, not like two plane surfaces when superimposed at *all* points. The Doctor's interpretation of Cyclone makes an illustration go on all-fours, and may be called a quadrupedal interpretation. The Professor himself would be shocked, if one of his students (following his example) should apply this principle of interpretation to the metaphor comparing the coming of the "Son of man" to that of a "thief." (Broadus, *Prep. and Del.*, 69, 157, 373.) Thirdly. The Doctor's definition of Cyclone tested by the five rules (Hamilton's *Logic*, 344), is found to be heterogeneous, redundant, tautological, and ambiguous. Perhaps the Doctor will claim that his definition was merely sportive ; if so, alas, that in his merry, no less than in his serious, moods, he should define so defectively—so indefinitely.

Let us examine next the "Reply's" attempt to confirm the doctrine of

the *Review article*, viz.: that "Creation from nothing cannot be a miracle."

1. The "Reply" seeks shelter under the distinction between creation *ex nihilo* "originating" a course of nature; and the same act "during" a course of nature. Instead, however, of overlooking this distinction, it was precisely upon the Doctor's own ground of creation "originating," etc., that the first argument to prove his "self-contradiction" was based. (*Pamphlet*, p. 10.) Nor does the "Reply" yet save the Doctor from logical suicide, or vindicate the coherency of his argument. Again, so far from attempting to "involve him in self-contradiction, because he admitted" the miracle of the resurrection of Lazarus to be a "creation *ex nihilo* as regards his animal life," it is frankly confessed that the discovery was never made that the Doctor held that view till the information was furnished in the "Reply." It was thought that the Professor taught as the *Confession of Faith* certainly does, that 1, death (in this sense) was the separation of the soul from the body; that the soul was then made perfect in holiness, and passed immediately into glory, and that the body rested in the grave till the resurrection; and 2, that resurrection consisted in the reunion of the soul and body. But that the Professor held that there is in man a third distinct entity, viz.: "animal life," and that 1, death consisted in the *annihilation* of this animal life; and that 2, resurrection consisted in the *exnihilation* of it, is a matter which has been learned for the first time in the "Reply." True the Doctor may claim that this theory is related to the teaching of our Standards in the category of "non-contradiction," and that therefore his teaching is in "harmony" with the Confession; granted; but if so, why should he refuse to observe toward others the Golden Rule? If, however, in harmony with the creed of the Church, can it be in harmony with the Scriptures? "And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit (*pneuma*) and soul (*psukee*) and body (*soma*) be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." 1 Thess. v. 23. It seems, then, that the "Reply" teaches that the "soul" (*psukee*—"animal life") of Lazarus was *annihilated* at his death and *exnihilated* at his resurrection. Does he then believe that, "at their death," the *souls* of believers are *annihilated*; the *spirits* (same as "soul" in Con. Faith) "do immediately pass into glory," having been made "perfect in holiness;" and that their *bodies* are given to corruption? Does he believe that in the general resurrection the *body* is "resurrected;" the *spirit* is "reunited" to the body; and the *soul* "exnihilated"? If so, then whilst it may be true that the Doctor's private

creed may "not contradict" the Church's public creed, still, his creed contradicts the Apostle's prayer. For the *Apostle* prays that the "whole spirit and soul and body may be *preserved* blameless;" but the Doctor teaches that the *soul*—"animal life"—instead of being *preserved*, is "annihilated" at death and "exnihilated" at resurrection.

But the Doctor may object to my interpretation of 1 Thess. v. 23. Moreover, he may object to my attributing to him the "*tripartite*" view. Again, he may deny the fairness of my inference that the "animal life" of Lazarus is a "distinct entity." But then in my justification, let me plead: that which is *annihilated* must have been an "entity"; that which has been "exnihilated" must be an *entity*. Since, at his death, Lazarus's "animal life" was *annihilated*, and at his resurrection it was "exnihilated," it must be an "entity"; and since, according to my previous supposition, the Doctor held the *body* of Lazarus, as also the *spirit* of Lazarus, to be *entities*, and "distinct" from the animal life of Lazarus, it would seem that I was correct in attributing to him the view that Lazarus's animal life was a *third* "distinct entity;" but if so, then it was a fair inference—my attributing to him the "tripartite" view. But it is always one's privilege to repudiate the *holding* of that which may be logically inferred from his positions. If, therefore, the Doctor does not hold that the animal life of Lazarus was a "third entity distinct" from his body and from his soul; let us inquire, with which one of these two entities—his "body"? or his "soul"?—does the Doctor identify the "animal life"? Or does he identify it with both his "body" and his "soul"? In either case he will be not in harmony with the standards of the Church, but in direct contradiction thereof. "The *souls* of believers are, at their death, made perfect in holiness, and do immediately pass into glory; and their *bodies*, being still united to Christ, do rest in their graves till the resurrection." (Shorter Catechism, Quest. 37.) If, therefore, the Doctor holds to the annihilation at death, or the exnihilation at resurrection, of the "body" or the "soul," or of both the body and the soul, then he holds a proposition which is in *direct contradiction of our standards*.

Dr. Girardeau is mistaken, therefore, in charging that I denied him the benefit of his distinction—"in the first instance." (*Pamphlet*, p. 10.) Therefore his defence, grounded upon this mistaken allegation, fails to perform the function of a "Reply"—it does not *defend*. So, too, his critic did not feel, as the Doctor desires he should have felt, viz., the obligation "to have refuted the argument for the *contra-natural* character of the miracle before he could fairly invalidate the conclu-

sion." For my *criticism* was not that the miracle is not "contra-natural," therefore your argument is invalid; but, notwithstanding it be true that the miracle is "contranatural," yet still your argument is not valid. My point was, your argument refutes itself, by proving too much; and this was done upon your own base, viz., that "creation begins the order of nature."

It seems, then, that creation *ex nihilo* in the *second instance* is a miracle, and that the resurrection of Lazarus is one of this class; and that creation from nothing in the *first instance* is not a miracle. What, then, constitutes the difference between the "first" instance and the "second"? Wherein do they *intrinsically* (not *circumstantially* or *contingently*) differ, so that the one is a miracle, and the other "cannot be"? This difference, whatever it is, would be at last the *essence* of miracle. According to the Doctor it would be not the "notion," but the *presence*, of "secondary causes," *i. e.*, nature in a position *contra*, *i. e.*, at last the essence of miracle is *presence* of nature as *contra*, *i. e.*, the inner essence of a thing is a contingent external circumstance; *i. e.*, the accident is the essence. But even judged by this criterion, it is doubtful whether Lazarus's resurrection was a miracle; for, whence came that animal life of Lazarus at the time of the first quickening of his body? If *ex nihilo*, then there is absolutely no difference between the first quickening and the second quickening of his body. If not *ex nihilo* in the first quickening, then it is still less necessary to suppose it was *ex nihilo* in the second; for having been once brought into existence, we know of no instance of annihilation; and therefore this radical difference between the first and the second, would be lacking: Lazarus's resurrection would not therefore be an example of *ex nihilo* in the second instance; it (so far as the restoration of his "animal life" is concerned) would lack therefore the *contra natural* element as compared with the first: *i. e.*, neither of them would be *ex nihilo*; *i. e.*, both would be not *ex nihilo*; *i. e.*, the first and the second quickening would be reduced to the same level; and as the first was *nō* miracle, so the second was none; though the first was *natural* and the second was *contra-natural*! This burden is surely too heavy for the Doctor's "theory"—it crushes the life out of it.

2. The "Reply" is very positive in the second step of his defence: "Manifestly, if the miracle be *contranatural*, there could have been no nature to be contradicted" in exnihilation in "absolutely the first instance;" therefore, creation from nothing in the first instance "cannot be a miracle." But the "manifestly" strikes us as just the other way; for of all the most "contra" natural things—"creation from nothing in

absolutely the first instance" takes the lead. He must needs prove, in order to validate his conclusion, not only that miracle is contra-natural (that his critic believes as firmly as he does, and the whole course of my criticism abundantly proves it), but he must prove, in the second place, that original exnihilation cannot be contra natural. To argue that it cannot be *contra* natural, because there was "no nature there to be *contradicted*," is after all but reasoning in a circle; or, if the Doctor prefers it, to introduce a fourth term into his syllogism, and thus to be guilty of what is called in logic "illicit process." If miracle is contra natural, and contra natural excludes super natural, and original exnihilation is super-natural; then, of course, miracle and original exnihilation are mutual contradictories. But the "Reply" denies that "contra" *excludes* "super;" and insists that "super" *includes* "contra." So, then, what is granted in the premise is forgotten in the conclusion. It should be seriously weighed by him, that the logical sequence of "*Contra-Natural*," as *expounded and applied* by its author, excludes from the category of miracle, original exnihilation—the very "beginning of *all* miracles." To most minds this will prove, (1) either that the Doctor's text was corrupt; or, (2) that his exposition of the text is illogical.

The "Reply" insists that to say original creation "was supernatural is not enough." But then no such claim was set up; the criticism did not stop there; it proceeded to show that both supernatural and contra-natural are alike miracle. Every super is non natural; every non natural is miracle; every miracle is contra natural; original exnihilation is super; therefore non natural; therefore miracle; therefore contra natural.

"So also" (the "Reply" continues), "in denying that creation out of nothing in the first instance was evidential, and concluding that therefore it could not be a miracle, I meant to deny that it was a credential of a divine message or revelation. Now that we are certified of the fact, I admit that it is evidential of God's existence and almighty power. But that it was either when it occurred, or now, evidential of a divine message or revelation, I cannot see. Neither can I see how, in the first instance, it was evidential of anything, since, *ex hypothesi*, there were no recipients of evidence in existence."

1. All that the above may prove is, that in the Doctor's own hands his theory of the miracle is so defective as to rule out the very "beginning of all miracles." Most men will judge his theory and condemn it, because of this defect. Creation from nothing in absolutely the first instance is the "one powerful negative," which, according to Bacon's canon, will consign the Doctor's theory to the category of a "disproved hypothesis."

2. Miracle, then, is a *specific* credential—not merely a species, but a *variety*. Miracle is “credential”—specific mark; but not credential in *general*, but in particular—*i. e.*, variety; not credential *after* it has occurred, but *at the time* of its occurring, *i. e.*, a sub-variety; and credential of a divine *message*, *i. e.*, a sub-sub-variety. Yet, on this principle, all the Bible miracles would cease to be miracles *to us*; for we were not “witnesses of their occurrence;” to us they are credentials *after* they occurred; therefore not miracles!

3. But he expressly allows that Creation, though not credential at the time of its occurring, would be “now evidential of God’s existence and almighty power;” although we never witnessed it; and no one else ever witnessed it save the Almighty. Judged by this criterion, we are almost compelled to conclude that “creation *ex nihilo* in the first instance” is the only real miracle. Yet the Doctor’s language (206), “Creation from nothing cannot be a miracle,” was absolute, it hinted of no exception. Now, however, it appears that it was not a miracle “when it occurred,” because then it could not be “evidential of God’s existence and almighty power;” and not even now “evidential of a divine message or revelation;” and in the “first instance not evidential of anything.” But “*Now*—I admit it is evidential of God’s existence and almighty power.” Once the testimony was, it “cannot be a miracle.” Again, the testimony changes: “it is evidential,” therefore we may conclude it can be a miracle; not only because it is “evidential,” but because it proves that “creation *ex nihilo* in the first instance” is “contra-natural.” When we inquire of the Doctor why he testifies differently on these two occasions—“cannot be;” *can be* a “miracle,” he may reply: Not because of the exigency of the argument; but because of the accident of time—*i. e.*, the difference between “then and now.” The accidental circumstances of time and place are so potent that they change the radical essence of the same identical phenomenon from that which cannot be miracle to that which can be. The inner essence has changed, but the outward form remains identically the same; and that because in this particular instance, circumstances (of time and place) alter the essential nature of a phenomenon. This, it will be perceived, is the reverse of the effect of “wonderful.” By “wonderful” that which was a miracle in the days of Moses and of Christ would cease to be a miracle now; by “evidential” that which could not be a miracle “in the beginning” becomes a miracle “in these last days.” Certainly in the Doctor’s hands logic has proven “evidential” of a most “wonderful” event—it has wrought the Non-Contra-Natural into the Contra-Natural, *et vice versa*.

4. One would suppose, from the Doctor's "Reply," that the question between us is: He affirms that miracle is "contra," and I deny; I affirm that miracle is "super," and he denies. This, however, is not the state of the question and cannot be unless he shall change his base. The real state of the question is: He affirms, and *I also affirm*, that miracle is "contra-natural;" he affirms, and *I deny*, that original exnihilation cannot be a miracle. We both affirm exnihilation in the *second* instance to be a miracle. The Doctor says original exnihilation cannot be *contra* natural; his critic affirms that exnihilation, whether (1) *originating* a course of nature, or (2) *during* a course of nature, is like all other miracles, "indifferently *super* natural or *contra* natural."

In order to invalidate the Doctor's argument against Evolution, there was no attempt, neither was there any necessity, to "refute the argument for the *contra*-natural character of the miracle." What was attempted (and successfully) was to "refute" the proposition—that miracle was *contra* natural as against supernatural, *only contra* natural, *nothing but contra* natural. There is a vast difference between the proposition—Miracle cannot be anything but *contra* natural as distinguished from supernatural; and the proposition—Miracle is *contra*-natural. The Doctor holds the former; his critic the latter proposition. His "Reply" therefore fails to defend.

5. So, too, one would suppose from the "Reply," that because I maintained that exnihilation is "miracle," therefore I maintained that it was "evidential" also. In truth, however, I affirmed nothing on this latter point. My only interest was to point out the connexion between the Doctor's inclusion of "evidential of a divine messenger" in his definition, and his conclusion therefrom, that original exnihilation cannot be a miracle. His inclusion involved a *conclusion* that involved an *exclusion*. He will search in vain for even the remotest hint that ever I claimed original exnihilation was "evidential of a divine message." He seems to have mixed his premise and my conclusion; he holds that nothing is "miracle" that is not "evidential of a divine message;" I hold that original exnihilation is a "miracle;" therefore he concludes that I hold that exnihilation is "evidential of a divine message." Surely this is logic run mad. Still pursuing the same logical method—mixing his premise and my conclusion—twirling around and around his notion and mine till he seems to have forgotten "which is which"—no wonder he says, "neither can I see how in the first instance it was evidential of anything." Where have I ever claimed that any miracle is *essentially* "evidential"? Only thus could he logically demand of *me* to find "evidential" in that which

I find to be "miracle." On the contrary, I have entered it as one exception to *his* doctrine that he has embraced in his definition of miracle the quality "evidential," whereas I maintain that this quality is an "accident;" essential to none, but accompanying only "some" miracles. So that once more the "Reply" fails to answer the demand.

6. But even the Doctor, if you only grant him a little *time*, can discover some feeble beginnings of "evidential" in original exnihilation. Not, when by the omnipotent will of Jehovah, the material universe sprang from nothing into *kosmos*, was it "evidential of anything." But "now that we are certified of the fact, it is evidential of, 1, God's existence; and 2, almighty power." It is matter of surprise that one so skilled in logic should find so little evidential power in exnihilation. Paul could find in it: 1. "Eternal power; and 2. Godhead;" and so potent did he regard it as a divine message, that he insists "they are *without excuse*" to whom creation delivered this message. "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." Rom. i. 20. Perhaps if the "Reply" would consult some of the Professor's Lectures on Theology, it might be found that this stupendous event is evidential of something more than, 1, "existence, and 2, almighty power." What progress, then, has the "Reply" made in supporting the position that original exnihilation "cannot be a miracle;" or in defending the Doctor's, 1, redundant definition; 2, and incoherent argument?

In the conclusion Dr. Girardeau says: "If, however, Dr. Martin chooses to regard the miracle as not essentially evidential, he is entitled to his opinion. Only he must be content to occupy an exceptional position."

1. I have already shown that it is the Doctor who occupies that exceptional position.

2. So far, however, as he intended it as an *argumentum ad hominem*, I am not unwilling at any time to be classed in the number of "*exceptional*," provided only I am found on the side of "truth and of right." I trust I shall never abandon a position because it is "exceptional;" or flee to another because that other may secure a position for the time in the ranks of the majority. It was the damning charge against the "chief rulers" that they had convictions of the right, but they "did not confess . . . for they loved the praise of men."

Some additional specimens of the *Logic* of the "Reply" shall now engage our attention.

1. Defending himself against the criticism—"redundant definition," the Doctor insists that the references to the pillar of cloud and the manna that fell in the wilderness are sufficiently offset by the miracle of regeneration. The point of my criticism was, that, if "wonderful" is properly in the definition (as belonging to the *essence* of the "miracle" and not to the *accident* of *some* miracle, and *common* to miracle with other events *not* miraculous), then, when the essence evaporated, the miracle itself would evaporate; and so that which was miracle at the beginning must have ceased to be such at the end of "forty years." But this result of the Doctor's definition proves that the term "wonderful" should not have been incorporated as a *differentiating* "mark," either as "specific" or as proximately "generic," for it proves too much, viz.: That that which is miracle is no miracle, or that which is miracle to-day is no miracle to-morrow. The same was shown to be true of turning "water into wine," if it should be repeated at every "marriage," and in fact may be applied to any miracle.

To all this the "Reply" makes answer:

1. That I have "narrowly limited the wonderful to the unexpected." This part of his defence has already been exposed.

2. Then he asks: "Will he [I] ever cease to regard his conversion as wonderful?" To which I reply:

(1) Will the Doctor endorse this syllogism? viz.: Some miracles are wonderful events; pillar of cloud and manna are wonderful events; *Ergo*, they are miracles. If so, then he will doubtless approve this syllogism: Some buggies have tongues; two-horse wagons and carriages have tongues. *Ergo*, they are buggies. Or will he endorse this? Some miracles (regeneration, *e. g.*) are continuously wonderful events;

Pillar of cloud and manna are not continuously wonderful events;

Ergo, they are miracles. If so, then he will doubtless smile approvingly upon this:

Some women are continuously beautiful to the end of life;

Mr. John Smith's beauty evaporated long before he was forty years of age;

Ergo, Mr. John Smith was a woman.

(2) From a *certain* point of view, it is very certain that every creation is a "wonder": The rolling heavens; the tiniest grain of sand; the minutest animalcule; therefore, "wonder" would not, from this point of view, differentiate miracle from non-miracle even in the "proximate genus."

(3) The daily preservation of a sinner's soul in the estate of grace

"to the end," is as much a marvel of redeeming power (as much *contra-natural*), as the original introduction into that estate. The parallelism, therefore, between regeneration and the "pillar" and the "manna" breaks down just where the Doctor's defence most needs it to stand firm. Wonder, in this case, belongs to the very essence of regeneration itself, and not to the essence of the "miraculous" element of regeneration. My regeneration, therefore, was and *continues* to be a wonderful event, but, in defining it, I would not think of incorporating "wonderful," for it would not be a differentiating mark—other events, not regeneration, and not miracle, are wonderful. Besides it differs from "pillar" and "manna" in not being repeated twice a day for forty years. Had I undergone regeneration anew once or twice a day for the last forty years, it would certainly have ceased long ere this to be a "wonder" to me or to any one else. I would then, indeed, "be an exception to the class—converted sinners," for, according to the Scriptures, the soul of man is regenerated but once, and that for all time and for all eternity.

(4) From the *miracle* point of-view, that wonder is not of the essence of regeneration may be seen from these considerations, viz.: 1st. No one could be regenerated who did not instantaneously and contemporaneously strike wonder into the mind of beholders. 2dly. The act of regeneration on God's part is always completed before wonder could be produced as an "effect" of it in the mind of the regenerate or of the beholder. 3dly. No one could be regenerated, except in the presence of witnesses. 4thly. Since regeneration itself cannot be the object of human vision, but can be known only by its "fruits," and by "the witness of the Spirit," therefore, the wonder could not be an effect produced in the minds of the witnesses by regeneration *immediately*, but only as an effect produced *mediately* by the effects of regeneration in the daily walk and conversation of the regenerated, for only thus can they "make their calling and election sure." The wonder-element then of the miracle of regeneration is an *effect* of an *effect* and not the essence. 5thly. "Elect infants dying in infancy," or adults converted in dying, since there would be no "human witnesses" of their regeneration, would not furnish the "miracle" element of regeneration. It would lack: (1) "Wonderful," and (2) "Evidential."

(5) Let us apply the Doctor's *criteria*:

1st. Creation, "*when* it occurred," was not evidential (although afterwards it became evidential), therefore cannot be a miracle.

Regeneration—of infants, *e. g.*—when it occurs, is not evidential (although, afterwards, it may become so should they live; if, however,

they should die, it never becomes evidential), therefore regeneration of infants cannot be a miracle; *i. e.*, *contra-natural*.

2dly. Creation, because of the "absence of human witnesses, *when* it occurred," cannot be a miracle.

Regeneration—of infants, *e. g.*—because of the absence of human witnesses, whereby the wonder-element was lacking "when it occurs," cannot be a miracle.

Thus the Doctor's argument will not stand the test; it proves too much, *viz.*, That the *contra-natural* is *not* miracle.

2. In one point (besides that mentioned on a previous page) it affords gratification to note that the Doctor and his critic are agreed: As it has been proven "that I contradict logic, the Confession, standard writers, the Bible—everything, the proof that I contradict myself may be proof that I have got right." The "Reply" should have mentioned that this was distinctly granted in my former criticism. On page 11 of my *Pamphlet* I had said, "Still the Doctor may contradict himself, and yet, by the law of non-contradiction and excluded middle, he may be right in one or other of the contradictories."

3. Not the least remarkable specimen of Professor Girardeau's logic is found in these words: "It was the out-and-out theistic evolutionist whom I fought . . . and as Dr. M. fights me for so doing, it is clear as day that he fights for the out-and-out theistic evolutionist." It seems to me, however, that the impartial reader will discover that "it is clear as day" that I was fighting not the Doctor, but his logic; fighting not for the theistic evolutionist, but waging a warfare in the interest of sound reasoning. When I entered an exception (*Pamphlet*, pages 12–13) to the Doctor's defence of the "*Contra-Natural* character of the Miracle," against the objection made by some "Christian writers," did I thereby endorse that objection and reject the *contra-natural* character of the miracle? Certainly not. I simply refused to endorse the *Doctor's line of defence*. So, regarding "the out-and-out theistic evolutionist," surely every calm and disinterested reader will see it thus. Does the Professor endorse every argument for the existence of God he has ever read? Does he endorse every answer against atheistic objections to the existence of God he has ever read? If not, will he consent to be classed, on that account, as an atheist?

4. Still another specimen of logic: Because Dr. M. criticised Dr. Girardeau's argument against theistic evolutionism, therefore, (1) Dr. M. identifies *Dr. Woodrow* "with the thorough-paced theistic evolutionist." (2) Since, in fighting for the theistic evolutionist, Dr. M. thinks he is

fighting for Dr. Woodrow, therefore, Dr. Woodrow must be a believer in theistic evolutionism. Hence the Professor rushes to the defence of his *quondam* colleague and extricates him from the awful imputation by informing the public that my attack upon Dr. Woodrow was a sin of ignorance on my part. "He (Dr. M.) did not, as I believe, intend to identify Dr. Woodrow with the thorough-going theistic evolutionist, or to defend the latter. He simply made a mistake." You are right again, Doctor. I did not intend to "defend" the out-and-out theistic evolutionist, but to defend the cause of *sound reasoning*. I did not intend to "identify" Dr. Woodrow with such bad people, but I did intend to identify Dr. Girardeau with a *very bad line of defence*. Whether, in so doing, I proved myself guilty of a "mistaken identity," I shall leave to the verdict of an impartial public. (3) To condense it all in one—these three paragraphs of the "Reply" are built upon this general proposition, viz.: Because, as a convenient *antithesis*, the term "Woodrow" appears on the *title page* of my *Pamphlet*, therefore whatever I hold must, of course, be held by Dr. Woodrow, and all that Dr. Girardeau's logic can squeeze out of my sayings must be the expression of Dr. Woodrow's views, except so far as the generosity and valor of my friend, Dr. Girardeau, may rescue my friend, Dr. Woodrow, from the attacks of his friend, Dr. Martin.

Now, it will scarcely be believed, and yet it is true, that all this knight-errantry on the part of the present occupant of the *Theological* chair, in defence of the illegally ousted Professor of the *Perkins* chair, is calmly passed in review before the public, as the Doctor's "Reply" to my charge that his attack upon the "Theistic Evolutionist" is an "incoherent argument"! Can it be that the Doctor's conscience urged him to this measure of reparation?

When the "Reply" shall make it "clear as day" that because a lawyer defends his client against a certain line of proof that he is guilty of burglary, therefore that lawyer is himself a burglar, or, at least, approves of burglary, then he may claim that I believe in theistic evolutionism, or, at least, mistook Dr. Woodrow for a theistic evolutionist.

The "Reply" has brought to mind an incident of my Seminary life. The then Professor of Theology had been lecturing for several days, presenting "arguments for the existence of God." At the conclusion of that branch of the subject, he assigned to one of the class "the analysis of Dr. Clarke's *a priori* argument for the existence of God." But, when the student, at a subsequent recitation, read his analysis, it was to show that "Dr. Clarke's *a priori* argument is a *petitio principii*."

Turning to another student, the Professor inquired, "Which one of my arguments for the existence of God has occurred to your mind as the most convincing?" The reply was: "All of them seem to me to have *begged the question*." Had that Professor practised the same method of reasoning as Dr. Girardeau in his "Reply," he would no doubt have reported both of these students to their respective Presbyteries for atheism; or, at least, he would have maintained (accommodating the language of Dr. Girardeau): "It was this man—the out-and-out atheist, whom I fought; and as these two students fight me for so doing, it is clear as day that they fight for the out-and-out atheist."

5. The last specimen of the "Logic of his 'Reply'" to which reference shall be made, is perhaps the most remarkable.

By some legerdemain of logic the Doctor represents me as holding (1) the "first man" and Adam as two very distinct individuals; (2) thence involving myself and Dr. Woodrow in "an hypothesis which reduces to unity two contradictories;" (3) from this dilemma he kindly offers to rescue Dr. Woodrow and myself by supposing "that Dr. Woodrow holds—and Dr. Martin knows it—to the hypothesis of *Pre-Adamite* man. That would save the contradiction," *i. e.*, between these two propositions: "The first man's body was evolved; Adam's body was not evolved." But still the "Reply" is not willing that Dr. Woodrow shall escape, "He would still be involved in self-contradiction; for, if the body of the *Pre-Adamite* man was evolved, and the body of Adam was not, there would have been a gap between the two which the process of evolution did not cross."

After thus delivering himself of this irrelevant matter, which, let the reader remember, helps to pass for his "Reply" to the criticism—"incoherent argument" against "theistic evolutionism," the Doctor satisfies the longings of his logical instinct by returning to his "first supposition. Dr. Martin appears to be as ignorant of Dr. Woodrow's views as the distinguished professor seems to be of his own."

Now, in searching for the medium of proof by which the "Reply" thus identifies Dr. Woodrow and myself in this "self-contradiction," it is furnished in these words: "But, yet, on the flag he flies at the head [*i. e.*, on the *title page* of my Pamphlet] of his numerous columns, he [Dr. M.] inscribes the name of the leader [Dr. Woodrow] who has maintained that grotesque hypothesis." What *grotesque hypothesis*? This: 1. "The first man's body was evolved; Adam's body was not evolved. 2. To affirm non-contradiction between an hypothesis embracing those contradictories and the Bible." Now, I challenge Dr. Girardeau for the

proof of his assertion: 1. That either Dr. Woodrow or I ever maintained a distinction of persons between the "first man" and "Adam." 2. That either of us ever held, (1) that the "first" man's body *was evolved*, or (2) that "Adam's" body was *not evolved*—i. e., "not born." 3. That either of us ever maintained "non-contradiction between those contradictions and the Bible."

But let the reader not forget to scan the Doctor's *medium of proof*: The term "Woodrow" is inscribed upon my battle-flag; therefore Dr. Woodrow is responsible for all my sayings in that Pamphlet. Some patriotic regiment emblazes upon its battle-flag the face or inscribes the name of "Washington;" therefore General Washington—the Father of his country—is responsible for all the military blunders of that Colonel and his regiment. Such is logic in the hands of the "Reply."

In the next place, let us look into the *Pamphlet* for the *materials* upon which the Doctor's "logic" wrought, when he *concluded* that Dr. M. held: 1. A distinction between the "first man" and Adam. 2. That the first man "was born," and that Adam was "not born." 3. That Dr. M. believed in a "Pre-Adamite man." 4. That he maintained "non-contradiction" between the Bible and "that grotesque hypothesis."

As the Doctor has furnished no references, and as he professed to "limit my [his] remarks to the criticism contained in the first article;" and since that "first article" terminated with the first paragraph of the second column on page 5 of the *Pamphlet*, it need not detain us long to lay before the mind the premises upon which the Doctor founded his conclusion.

On page 4 the *Pamphlet* says: "Now let us take the creation of Adam's body: Was this event *Contra* natural? or *Super* natural? or *Natural*? By the canon he has laid down it would be impossible for him to answer either one of these questions. Was the 'creation' of Adam's body *natural*? How can he know, for it was the *first* and *then only* body of *man*. According to his canon, then, he cannot tell whether this event is *natural* or *non* natural; for there would be *no other human being in existence* with which to compare it so that it may be 'determined' what is God's 'natural' mode of creating *human* bodies." Again, giving the substance of the Doctor's argument in the *Review*, the *Pamphlet* proceeds: "The Bible says, God *created* the body of Adam. Science says, the body of the *first man* came by Evolution—*natural* process; whereas creation, though not miracle [*contra* natural] is yet *super* natural. Whether, therefore, by *Super* or by *Contra*, it

did not come by *natural* laws as affirmed by the scientific evolutionist ; therefore the *body of Adam* did not come by Evolution."

If there are any rules of exegesis by which to determine a man's thoughts by his language, then the merest tyro in interpretation must perceive, that in using the above language, I meant not two distinct and separate individuals, but one single and identical individual. "Adam's body" is spoken of as the "first and then only body of man ;"—it is further asserted that at the time of the creation of *Adam's* body, there was "no other human being in existence." So again, "body of Adam" is used synonymously with "body of the first man." How in the name of Logic the Doctor obtained from this material the proposition that I held "Adam" and the "first man" to be two different individuals ; and that I taught that the *first* man "was born" and that *Adam* was "not born ;" and that I believed in a "Pre-Adamite man ;" and that I affirmed "non-contradiction" between the Bible and "that grotesque hypothesis," surpasses my powers of comprehension. True, upon the hypothesis not of Logic but of a bewildered imagination, mistaking my paraphrase of the Doctor's argument as if it were an argument of mine—thus blending in wild confusion the subjective "grotesque" images of the Doctor's own fancy and objectifying those images as if they were real, they might rise up before him, now in the image of his critic, and now in the "grotesque" shade of his quondam colleague—Dr. Woodrow, who, like Banquo's ghost, will not down at the bidding of Dr. Girardeau.

But laying aside imagination, and returning to reason and common sense, I must confess my utter inability to reach that exact point of view from which the Doctor sees so clearly "that grotesque hypothesis." The "first man," different from "Adam ;" the former "born ;" the latter "not born." Of course, on this hypothesis the first man would be a "Pre-Adamite man ;" of course, on this hypothesis, Adam's body if not born could not have been evolved ; for evolution is DESCENT *with modification* ; of course, on this hypothesis Dr. Woodrow would be guilty of "self-contradiction" if he maintains that, 1, Adam's body was evolved. *i. e.*, "born ;" 2, and yet that Adam's body was "not born," *i. e.*, not evolved. But then I must again challenge Dr. Girardeau for the proof of his assertion that Dr. Woodrow maintains these two contradictory propositions. To maintain that Adam's body was *probably* "evolved," and at the same time to admit that it *may* possibly have been "not born," is certainly not to be guilty of self-contradiction (you may maintain the probability of one and admit the possibility of the other without

logical suicide); it is merely to admit that "evolution" *may* be true of Adam's body, or that "non-evolution" *may* be true of Adam's body, but that no matter which one "may" be true, *both* are related to the Bible in the category of "non-contradiction;" for the Bible affirms neither the one nor the other—it is "SILENT" on these points. But again, I utterly fail to reach that point of view from which the Doctor sees so clearly "that grotesque hypothesis" whether held by Dr. Woodrow, by myself, or by any one else, viz.: 1. First man; 2. Adam different from first man; 3. First man born; 4. Adam not born. 5. Non-contradiction between the Bible and this hypothesis. Now, I should like the Doctor or any one else to point out: 1st, the *grotesqueness* of that hypothesis—Why may not there have been a "first" man individually different from "Adam"? 2ndly. The *grotesqueness* of holding to the possible "birth" of the first man, and the possible "non-evolution" of Adam—Why may not *both* these suppositions be true? 3dly. The *grotesqueness* of holding that these points are related to the Bible in the category of "non-contradiction"—What do the Scriptures say in *contradiction* of them? Let the Doctor beware, lest in attempting to point out the heterodoxy of "that grotesque hypothesis," he "break the silence of Scripture," and so merit the condign punishment of his Presbytery—jealous guardian of the rights and liberties of the Baltimore Assembly; or lest some future Assembly shall lay an injunction of "silence" upon him for thus attempting "to break the silence of Scripture."

Had it suited the Doctor's leisure to read the last page of my Pamphlet, or having read it, had his memory retained it, he would have been saved all anxiety as to my holding the hypothesis of "Pre-Adamite man." Since the discussion was regarding Adam's body, so all my remarks had reference to his body—whether I used the term "Adam" or the phrase "first man." Besides, the quotations already furnished from the fourth page of my *Pamphlet*, the Doctor will find these on the last page: "The first man was formed by miraculous intervention; the same is true of the creation of the first woman; and these are the primeval parents of the human species." Then follows an enumeration of the "first" *four* of the species: "Adam, Eve, Cain, Abel." Then follows the expression—"Whether we look at the first Adam as the introduction of the species 'man.'" Then again, "Adam the 'first man.'" And again: "The original species of man . . . formation of Adam's body." What could have been a more explicit safeguard against the inference—"Pre-Adamite man"? It is as if I had said, The first man was the husband of Eve, and the father of Cain and Abel and the whole line of Adam's race;

down to the end of time. What a curious exhibition of the practical application of the laws of Logic the "Reply" furnishes, when, out of such material as this, the Doctor inferred "Pre-Adamite man." Evidently his logical faculty was coiled up in its winter quarters, whilst his imagination was careering wildly over the plain enjoying the vivifying influence of the genial rays of the vernal sun.

As to the Doctor imputing to me the notion "that the first man's body was born, but that Adam's was not born," I give up in despair the attempt to find anything I have said upon which he could justly found such an imputation. If, indeed, he imagines he finds it in the expression of my belief that Adam's body was *miraculously* created; he could only have done so by forgetting that the miraculous creation of the bodies of Isaac and of Jesus was perfectly consistent with the evolution, *i. e.*, with the birth, of those bodies. But we have seen too many specimens of the miracle-working power of the Doctor's logic to be any longer struck with wonder at any exhibition of his talent in this line.

Fortunately I have escaped the tender mercies of "the children" to whom the "Reply" relegates the task of "refuting" me on this point. For it appears that if the "children when asked, Who was the first man? answer, Adam," they will *not* "refute," but *confirm* the teaching of the Doctor's critic. If, however, the children should be asked, Who was the "second man"? they would very promptly answer, "Cain." Whereas the Apostle Paul would answer, "The second man is the Lord from heaven." 1 Cor. xv. 47. Whether the Doctor would decide that the children had refuted the Apostle, or that the Apostle had refuted the children, I am at a loss to conjecture. My decision would be, that neither had refuted the other; that both had answered correctly—scripturally; that the apparent conflict was reduced to unity under the head of "non-contradiction."

The "Reply" has quoted from Sir William Hamilton a passage which suggests the possibility of "other worlds" besides ours being inhabited by "rational animals." Now, of course, those rational animals may be "human," or they may be conceived to be "not human." Doubtless the author of the "Reply" has himself often indulged in the speculation whether the other worlds are inhabited; and if so, whether the inhabitants are like or unlike the men and women of our race; whether, like Adam, their primeval father was an immediate creation from "star dust," or mediately created through birth—natural, or *contra* natural? But, again let me caution him that in speculating upon such points, he is approaching perilously near the "danger line." For the Bible reveals *but*

one race of "rational animals"—the descendants of "Adam, the first man." But if another race of rational animals *may* be found and yet the Bible not be contradicted, why should the Bible be held to contradict Pre-Adamite man? Why should Post-Adamite man, or another race of rational animals on this planet, or in other worlds, be less contradictory of the Bible than Pre-Adamite man? The Bible speaks of neither one nor the other. Why should Saturnite man be less contradictory than Pre-Adamite man—seeing the Bible is equally silent as to both? It tells us no more whether there are men in the other worlds, than whether there were other men on this earth before Adam. Ask the Bible, Are the stars inhabited? It answers not. Ask the Bible, Were there any Pre-Adamite men? Still it answers not. It tells of "Adam, the *first* man," and of "the Lord from heaven, the *second* man," although twenty-seven generations of Adamites intervened between the "first" man and the "second." Strangely, too, in this connection appears the fact that the same formula of words addressed to Noah after the flood was addressed to Adam: "And God blessed Noah and his sons, and said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and *replenish* the earth." Gen. ix. 1. "And God blessed them [Adam and Eve], and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and *replenish* the earth." Gen. i. 28.

Supposing, therefore, that according to the Scriptures, Adam was the first man, I used Adam and first man as interchangeable terms. Of course every one knows that "first" means "first" (*Potter's Dwarries*), but the question will recur, What does "first" mean? Perhaps the Doctor had better first settle what "first" means, before he launches out into another untried sea of speculation, or engages in another tilt with scientists. To aid him in this investigation let us look at some inspired usages of the term: "*First day*"—Gen. i. 5, although, according to the well-established science of geology, there were millions of days which had preceded *this* "first day." "For your fellowship in the gospel from the *first day* until now"—Philipp. i. 5, although, doubtless, many days, years, and centuries had passed before *that* "first day." "And he called the name of the *first*, Jemima"—Job xlii. 14, although she was only Job's first daughter of the *second set* of ten children. "That Christ should suffer, and that he should be the *first* that should rise from the dead"—Acts xxvi. 23, although many (Lazarus and others) had already risen from the dead. "*First covenant,—testament,—tabernacle*"—Heb. viii. 7; ix. 1, 2, 6, 8, 15, 18; x. 9. Yet there had been many tabernacles erected before *that* "first tabernacle" in the wilderness. So,

moreover, there was a covenant before *this* "first" Sinai "covenant," viz., the covenant with Abraham; and there was still a covenant which antedated this Abrahamic covenant, viz., the covenant of works; and there was a covenant which was even prior to this Eden covenant, viz., the covenant of redemption. So, whilst it is true, that "the *first man* Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit"—still, we might, without at all impugning the absolute accuracy of the Sacred Scriptures, propound to the first man Adam the question of Eliphaz the Temanite: "Art thou the *first man* that was *born*?"—Job xv. 7. Many mummies and skeletons of men have been found and history tells of millions of men all of whom lived and died between Adam and Christ, yet these do not contradict the Scripture statement: Adam, the "first" man, and Christ, the "*second*" man; first of a given series, second of a given series—or first of a new departure.

The *Scientist*, as such, knows nothing of *Adam's* body, since it has never been discovered, or, at least, identified amongst the fossils. But, by reason, the Scientist knows that there must have been a "first" man. The *Bible* student, as such, knows of "Adam's" body as the body of the "first" man. So, then, in my *Pamphlet*, in order to accommodate both, I spoke of the "first" man, which language is understood by both the Naturalist and the Scripturist; and then I spoke of "Adam," which language is understood by the Scripturist alone. My argument was based on the supposition (whether true or false) that "Adam" and "first" man are equivalent terms. Even though there were no Pre-Adamite men, still there certainly were Pre-Adamite animals. There was no ground, therefore, for the Doctor's imputing to me the notion "that the first man's body was born, but that Adam's body was not born." There was no call, therefore, for his attributing to me the holding of "the hypothesis of Pre-Adamite man," or any other of the irrelevant matters which he has interjected into his "Reply" to my criticism that his argument against the theistic evolutionist is a *non sequitur*.

"We have but the two instances—Adam, the 'first man,' and Christ, the 'second man'—both as to their bodies created by 'miracle,' and the latter certainly by *MEDIATE* creation and by *EVOLUTION*" (*Pamphlet*, p. 16). As there was no contradiction between the *miraculous* "birth" of the "second" man, and the "evolution" of his body and the "creation" of that body, so I held that there can be no necessary contradiction between the *miraculous* "birth" and the "evolution" and the "creation" of the body of the "first Adam." As the former was, so the

latter (reasoning *analogically*) *may* have been an instance of creation by PARTHENO-GENESIS; and so the "genetic" evolution of Adam's body would in no way contradict the statement, "And the Lord God formed man dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." For the proposal was: "Let us make man *in our image*." 1. That certainly did not refer to his *body*. 2. It was a proposal to take "man," and now make him "in our image." 3. By that breathing upon him man "became a living soul." "And when he had said this, he breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost"—Jno. xx. 22. Thus, "in the image of God created he him." Thus, "when Jesus himself began to be about thirty years of age," he received the baptism of the "Holy Ghost"—Luke iii. 22, 23. And so, possibly, for anything that the Scriptures teach to the contrary, Adam may have been thirty years old when he received the baptism of the Spirit by which he became a "living soul"—created in the "image of God." So far, therefore, from contradicting the Scriptures the hypothesis of evolution suggests a striking analogy between the "first" man and the "second" man as to the creation of their bodies. And this would sufficiently answer the question, "Why no more than one Adam appeared?" for this plain reason: It pleased the Lord to create but one; as it pleased him to create but one second Adam.

Adam was born—it was a miracle—he was the first man. Jesus was born—it was a miracle—he was the second man. This is the substance of what was meant by the passage which I have quoted from the sixteenth page of my *Pamphlet*. Not that either then or now I would *teach* that Adam *was* born, but that, supposing evolution of his body to be true, he *may* (following the analogy of the *second* man) have been born of a virgin mother.

As there is nothing in Scripture which contradicts this, so the Doctor's proposition that the Scriptures and evolution "are mutually contradictory" must be amended so as to read: They are *not* mutually contradictory. And, as we have abundantly seen, notwithstanding the "Reply": 1. The Doctor's definition remains "redundant." 2. His argument against Evolution is still "incoherent."

JAS. L. MARTIN.

MEMPHIS, Tenn., December 14, 1888.

APPENDIX.

From the Christian Observer.

REPLY TO DR. MARTIN.

What is a Miracle.

BY REV. J. L. GIRARDEAU, D. D.

In four successive numbers of the *Southern Presbyterian*, Dr. J. L. Martin has recently attacked an article written by me, and published in the last *Presbyterian Quarterly*, in defence of the contra-natural character of the miracle. The article was almost wholly occupied in vindicating against objections, the position that the miracle is contra-natural. When the argument had been finished, it occurred to me that the view sustained by it might be applied to atheism, materialism, pantheism, evolutionism, and agnosticism. Dr. Martin, as if possessed of my consciousness, declares it obvious that the purport of the article was the refutation of evolutionism. This is an entire mistake; and if he demands proof of a statement made by an old friend, I would refer to the whole apparent aim, strain, and tenor of the article, and to the very few words spoken in regard to evolutionism.

It would have been perfectly fair for him to single out the special application of the argument to the evolutionist, and make it the point of attack; but it was hardly so to say not a word with reference to the main contention of the article, and represent it as a "stupendous failure," because a single corollary did not, as he judged, refute the evolutionary hypothesis. Ruled, as his mind was, by this estimate of my argument, his whole discussion was foredoomed to be colored by prejudice.

My respect for Dr. Martin's acknowledged abilities induces me, although reluctantly, to say some things in reply. His own recapitulation of his first two articles is: "Dr. Girardeau's *Quarterly* article contradicts: 1. *Logic*, (1) in his redundant definition; (2) in his incoherent argument. 2. The Confession of Faith. 3. *Standard* authors: (1) A. A. Hodge; (2) Chas. Hodge; (3) J. H. Thornwell." The third article is devoted to proving that I contradict myself; and the fourth,

that I contradict the Bible. I shall limit my remarks to the criticism contained in the first article—namely, that I contradict logic; and to the chief points of that criticism, without attempting to follow it into its forest of specifications. I shall not strictly observe Dr. Martin's order of statement, because, begging his pardon, I cannot regard it as logical: he mixes proximate genus with specific difference.

THE DEFINITION OF MIRACLE.

I. Dr. Martin charges that my definition of a miracle is "redundant"—a "fatal" defect, which makes him as "my friend," "ashamed and sorry" for me. The definition he assails, briefly put, but not as clearly and fully as in the *Quarterly* article, is: *A miracle is a wonder, contra-natural, accompanying a professed divine message.* We are agreed that a definition proceeds by the proximate genus and the specific difference.

1. One of Dr. Martin's proofs of redundancy is, that wonder is superfluously inserted as a specific mark. He is entirely mistaken as to fact. I expressly assigned wonder, or wonderful event, as the proximate genus. I could not, therefore, have made it a specific mark. I did include in the specific difference, two specific marks, contra-natural and evidential. I did not include wonderful. That was explicitly made generic. The criticism stumbles badly at the outset.

In the next place, Dr. Martin denies that I had the right to incorporate anywhere in the definition the quality *wonderful*. For, if a miracle were repeated, it would cease to be wonderful. The pillar of cloud and fire, for instance, would not have been miraculous except at first. Dr. Martin narrowly limits the wonderful to the unexpected. Will he ever, in this world, cease to regard his conversion as wonderful? If so, he would be an exception to the class—converted sinners. The criticism is captious. He makes me, in the sequel, contradict Dr. Thornwell. But that great man upon this point says:

The scriptural term which gives us the nearest insight into the real nature of the miracle is precisely the one of which Dr. Trench speaks most slightly—the word *wonder*. It is true, that every wonder is not a miracle, but every miracle is a wonder.

Evidently he made wonder the proximate genus under which miracle is included. But, perhaps, his logic and his analysis of the nature of a miracle were fatally defective, like mine.

2. Dr. Martin reproaches me for redundancy, because I embrace, in the specific difference of the miracle, more specific marks than one. He

urges the absolute, irrefragable rule of logic, that the specific difference (*differentia*) is restricted to but one specific mark. In support of this position he uses Sir William Hamilton's authority against me. It behooved him to be very sure of this rule, before he mercilessly employed it as a pestle to bray me in his mortar. But—

(1) The enforcement of this rule would convict distinguished logicians of ignorance, ruin some of their definitions, and make sad havoc of others which are as dear to Dr. Martin as the blood of his heart. A few illustrations must suffice. Bowen says :

The intension of every species contains the genus—that is, the aggregate of marks which characterise the genus—and the specific difference—that is, the aggregate of marks by which this species is distinguished, both from the genus to which it is subordinate, and from the other species with which it is co-ordinate . . . species and genera may be perfectly discriminated by one or few characters.

Jevons says :

It is evident, therefore, that there must be more qualities implied in the meaning of the species than of the genus, as well as a certain additional quality or qualities by which the several species are distinguished from each other. Now these additional qualities form the *difference*, which may be defined as the quality, or sum of qualities, which mark out one part of a genus from the other part, or parts.

These must serve as samples. Take now a practical specimen of definition by an old logician of whom Sir William Hamilton speaks with great respect, and whose work was a text book with John Owen and the dissenters of his day. Burgersdyck, in his *Institutionum Logicarum*, is defining logic itself. He proceeds by the genus and the difference. The genus is art. "The difference," he says, "is taken from the end, the office (!) and the matter or object." Here are three specific marks in the specific difference, and among them "office," for the use of which in the *differentia* of my definition, Dr. Martin chastises me.

But to come home: Let us take the definition of the Westminster Shorter Catechism. Begin with the definition of God. In this celebrated definition you have a number of specific marks con-noting along with the generic, the adorable subject. After pronouncing this "the best definition in a brief compass," Dr. Thornwell says :

Here the genus to which the substance of God is referred is spirit, in strict accordance with the Scriptures and the manifestations of his nature which are made by his works; the difference, those qualities which belong to spirit in its full and normal development, heightened beyond all bounds of conception by terms which are borrowed from God as an object of faith.

Take the definition of justification. The proximate genus is "act of God's free grace." But adoption belongs to the same genus. How is justification to be distinguished from adoption? By the specific difference. Now, that consists of a number of specific marks: (1) Pardon; (2) acceptance of the person as righteous; (3) imputation of Christ's righteousness; (4) reception of Christ's righteousness by faith alone. In this definition, which is clear, distinct, and adequate, you have in the proximate genus the nature, in the specific difference the office, the ground, the mode, the instrument; and, besides, the office of the instrument.

I need pursue this analysis of the Shorter Catechism definitions no further. The same will be found true, to a greater or less extent, of the definition of the work of creation, of the works of providence, of sin, of effectual calling, of sanctification, of repentance, of prayer, and of a sacrament. They all involve more than one specific mark in the specific difference. Now let Dr. Martin go and triumphantly flourish his inexorable rule, which I have so ignorantly violated, over the wreck of the Shorter Catechism which its application would make.

Hold! It will be said, these are not definitions proper. To this I answer: Logicians divide definition into two kinds—the narrower (*angustior*) and the wider (*latior*). Of course, then, the wide are definitions as well as the narrow. For definition would be the proximate genus, including under it the two species, narrow and wide. Now, in giving my definition of a miracle, I did not say that I was furnishing a narrow definition. I may have had the benefit given me of the supposition that I intended to use the wide, even if the critic held that it could not be the narrow. Why this vehement onslaught? Why the application to my definition of a rule applicable only to some particular kind of definition? Why, when the definition contained fewer specific marks than some of those in the Shorter Catechism? The critic has "o'er-vaulted himself." In his eager attempt to break down my argument, he has torn the Shorter Catechism to shreds. Calvinists have been wont to regard its definitions as excellent, whether they may be assigned to one kind or another, narrow or wide, but the same rule by which he would destroy mine would destroy them.

But is Dr. Martin quite sure that the narrow or strict definition limits the specific difference to one specific mark? The question is not, whether if one specific mark renders the definition adequate, one only ought to be inserted. That is admitted. But it is, whether one specific mark in all cases renders the definition adequate. Porphyry, in his cele-

brated Introduction to Aristotle's Categories, defines man as *animal, rationale, mortale*. In relation to this definition, he says :

The differences of rational and mortal are constitutive of man, but those of rational and immortal, of God, those, again, of mortal and irrational, of irrational animals.

This definition was adopted by Abelard, Albertus Magnus, and Petrus Hispanus. I am not defending the material truth of the definition, but instance it to show that great logicians have incorporated more than one specific mark into a specific difference. But it may be said that modern logic has expurgated this defect. Let us, then, hear Sir William Hamilton. In regard to the far-famed definition of man, he says :

If the definition, *man is a rational animal*, be adequate, we shall be able to say, *Every rational animal is human—nothing which is not a rational animal is human*. But we cannot say this ; for though this may be true of this earth, we can conceive in other worlds rational animals which are not human. The definition is, therefore, in this case too wide ; to make it adequate, it will be necessary to add *terrestrial*, or some such term as—*Man is a rational animal of this earth*.

I cannot multiply examples. How would Dr. Martin adequately define, by a single specific mark, evolution ? LeConte gives three ;—or creation ?—the Shorter Catechism gives four :—or a torpedo, either a fish, or a machine, or an article for blowing up an argument and its author ?

So far, as to the logical *form* of my definition of the miracle, I can see no reason for my sharing Dr. Martin's shame and pity in view of my failure in that respect.

THE OBJECT OF MIRACLES.

II. As I design to compress what I have to say into this communication, but little room is left for the consideration of the criticism of the *matter* of the definition, and argumentative application.

1. I hold that it is essential to the miracle and not accidental, that it is evidential. That it is a credential, and a credential of divine communications, is the catholic doctrine both of the friends and foes of the Bible. It never occurred to me to defend by strenuous argument what is universally, or at least well-nigh universally, conceded. Although Dr. Thornwell did not formally incorporate it in his definition, he treats it as essential to the miracle. But if the miracle be a credential, whether that feature of it is rightly or wrongly included in the definition, the use of that fact to prove that creation, *in the first instance*, was not a miracle, is relevant, whatever may be thought of the truth of the argument.

2. Dr. Martin is mistaken in alleging that I opposed supernatural and contra-natural as mutually exclusive. I do not know, and I fancy Dr. Martin does not know, that all which is supernatural is contra-natural, but I do know that all which is contra-natural is supernatural. This sweeps away a large section of Dr. Martin's argument to prove my self-contradiction.

3. Dr. Martin is again mistaken in affirming that I have held that the creation of Adam's body was miraculous. On the contrary, I have always, of set purpose, avoided expressing that opinion. This also vacates of force much of what he has said.

4. Dr. Martin presses the point that I am palpably wrong in making the evolution of Adam's body and its creation contradictory; and thus he reasons: My body was created, but it was evolved. There is here no contradiction. Where, then, is the contradiction between the creation and the evolution of Adam's body? I answer: None, whatever, if Adam's body was created like mine—that is, through birth. But to say that, is to beg the very question in dispute, namely, Was Adam's body created through birth? If it be granted that birth is a species of creation of bodies, does it follow that all bodies must be created in that way? Now, we maintain that Adam's body was not born, and that, consequently, it was created in a different way from ours. To argue, then, from the creation of our bodies through birth to the creation of Adam's body through birth is, I say, to beg the question in dispute. It is a question that cannot be settled by assuming that Adam's body was created in the same way as ours are. The question, at the present day, so far as the animal kingdom is concerned, is not as to evolution by birth *within* a species, but as to evolution by transmutation of species: *Are individuals of one species born of individuals of a different species just as individuals are born of individuals within the same species?* In a word, the issue is between evolutionism and special creationism. Dr. Martin misconceives, as many do, the point at issue.

5. Something must be said as to the bearing of my argument to prove the contra-natural character of miracles upon the Theistic evolutionist, and I meant one who is an out and out evolutionist, holding the evolution of everything, body, soul, and all. I had no reference, could have had none, in that argument, to a position held by no Theistic evolutionist that I know of. My eye was not resting on an hypothesis which reduces to unity two contradictories: the hypothesis that the first man's body was evolved by descent from animal forms, but that Adam's body was not so evolved; or, to put it more briefly, that the first man's body

was born, but that Adam's body was not born. It may have been left to children to refute it, who, when asked, Who was the first man? answer, Adam. It was antecedently improbable that such a man as Dr. Martin would valiantly contend for this *olla podrida*. True, he affirms non-contradiction between the Bible and science, but he could not have meant to affirm non-contradiction between the two propositions: The first man's body was evolved: Adam's body was not evolved, or, to affirm non-contradiction between an hypothesis embracing those contradictories and the Bible. It is incredible that Dr. Martin's logic would allow him to do that. But, yet, on the flag he flies at the head of his numerous columns, he inscribes the name of the leader who has maintained that grotesque hypothesis. Can it be that he does not understand the position of the leader for whom he is doing battle? For Dr. Martin speaks of Adam's body alone. There is one conceivable solution of the difficulty which, however, I am reluctant to adopt. May it be that Dr. Woodrow holds—and Dr. Martin knows it—to the hypothesis of *Pre-Adamite man*? That would save the contradiction. If so, tell it out. Let us know. But that can hardly be the solution, for two reasons: First, Dr. Woodrow would have had the courage of his convictions, and frankly avowed the belief; secondly, it would not help Dr. Woodrow one jot, as he would still be involved in self-contradiction; for, if the body of the Pre-Adamite man was evolved, and the body of Adam was not, there would have been a gap between the two which the process of evolution did not cross. I return, then, to the first supposition. Dr. Martin appears to as ignorant of Dr. Woodrow's views as the distinguished professor seems to be of his own.

Further, Dr. Martin also does palpable injustice to Dr. Woodrow by identifying him with the thorough-paced theistic evolutionist, who holds to the evolution of soul and body. The truth is, that he meant to fight for Dr. Woodrow, but he really fights for another man. Dr. Woodrow avows his belief in all the miracles of the Bible, but this other man, with whom Dr. Martin confounds him, admits no miracle but what he calls the miracle of creation out of nothing in the first instance; all else is an "unbroken process of mediate creation." It was this man—the out-and-out theistic evolutionist, whom I fought in the paragraph criticised, and as Dr. Martin fights me for so doing, it is clear as day that he fights for the out-and-out theistic evolutionist. But he did not, as I believe, intend to identify Dr. Woodrow with the thorough-going theistic evolutionist, or to defend the latter. He simply made a mistake. In defending Dr. Woodrow, when he was not attacked, he "kicked before he was

spurred," and did injustice to his friend. This alone throws the argument of his first article, as the printers say, "into pi."

It will not answer for Dr. Martin to say that he only defended Dr. Woodrow in regard to a point at which he agrees with the pure theistic evolutionist, namely, the miraculous character of creation out of nothing in the first instance; for, first, he has not proved that Dr. Woodrow maintains that view; and, secondly, if that were so, he would still leave him exposed to the charge of admitting no other miracle but that, for such was my argument touching the evolutionist assailed in the paragraph in question. That would be to misrepresent both Dr. Woodrow and my argument. That argument was briefly this: If a miracle, as contra-natural, has occurred, it contradicts the position of the theistic evolutionist, for he admits no miracle but that of creation out of nothing in the first instance, but that cannot be a miracle.

WAS CREATION A MIRACLE?

Now, a few last words as to the position that creation out of nothing in the first instance was not a miracle.

(1) I expressly spoke of "creation from nothing *in the first instance*," and the whole paragraph limits the argument to that act of creation. The attempt, therefore, to involve me in self-contradiction, because I had admitted that creation out of nothing, as in the creation of Lazarus's animal life, may be miraculous, is utterly vain. Creation out of nothing *originating* a course of nature, and creation out of nothing *during* a course of nature, are very different things. The argument *ad hominem* is irrelevant. Dr. Martin misconceived, and therefore unintentionally misrepresented my position.

(2) That creation out of nothing *in the first instance* could not have been a miracle, was a conclusion from an argument in which I had vindicated the contra-natural character of the miracle. Manifestly, if the miracle be contra-natural, this conclusion is true, for, according to the supposition of creation from nothing in absolutely the first instance, there could have been no nature to be contradicted. It behooved Dr. Martin, therefore, to have refuted the argument for the contra-natural character of the miracle before he could fairly invalidate the conclusion. This, however, he has not done. To say that creation from nothing in the first instance was supernatural, is not enough. He must have shown that every supernatural event is miraculous. He did not show this, and, I imagine, cannot. So, also, in denying that creation out of nothing in

the first instance was evidential, and concluding that therefore it could not be a miracle, I meant to deny that it was a credential of a divine message or revelation. Now that we are certified of the fact, I admit that it is evidential of God's existence and almighty power. But that it was either when it occurred, or now, evidential of a divine message or revelation, I cannot see. Neither can I see how, in the first instance, it was evidential of anything, since, *ex hypothesi*, there were no recipients of evidence in exchange. If, however, Dr. Martin chooses to regard the miracle as not essentially evidential, he is entitled to his opinion. Only he must be content to occupy an exceptional position.

I must close here. I cannot follow Dr. Martin in his three remaining articles. If his charge that I have contradicted logic has been proved to be inconclusive, it is likely that the charge of contradiction to the Confession of Faith, standard authors, and the Bible, is in the same category. Be that as it may, the first argument must serve as a sample of the others. As to the charge that I have contradicted my humble self, I have only this to say, that as Dr. Martin has proved that I contradict logic, the Confession, standard writers, the Bible—everything, the proof that I contradict myself may be proof that I have got right.

A friend of Dr. Martin shouts triumphantly, in the *Southern Presbyterian*, that I have been struck by the "Martin cyclone." I deprecate the discourtesy, as he himself will the logic, of this definition of his attack: proximate genus, Storm; specific difference, consisting of four specific marks—(1) Windy; (2) Moving in a circle; (3) Blown by Dr. Martin; (4) Demolishing *Professor Girardeau*. "I would hasten my escape from the windy storm and tempest. . . . For it was not an enemy that reproached me; then I could have borne it; neither was it he that hated me that did magnify himself against me; then I would have hid myself from him: but it was thou, a man mine equal, my guide and mine acquaintance. We took sweet counsel together, and walked unto the house of God in company."