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Mr. EDM

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.

MAY 10, 1888.—Injunction of secrecy removed and ordered to be printed.

MAY 7, 1888.

Mr. EDMUNDS, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following

REPORT (EXECUTIVE No. 3)

ON THE TREATY (EX. M.) BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN, CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION OF OCTOBER 20, 1818, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON FEBRUARY 15, 1888; WHICH, TOGETHER WITH THE VIEWS OF THE MINORITY ON THE SAME SUBJECT, SUBMITTED BY MR. MORGAN, WAS ORDERED TO BE PRINTED IN CONFIDENCE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE.

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the message of the President of the United States of the 20th February last, transmitting a proposed treaty between the United States and Great Britain concerning the interpretation of the convention of the 20th October, 1818, signed at Washington February 15, 1888, respectfully reports :

That it has had the said proposed treaty under careful and deliberate consideration and that it returns herewith a resolution in the ordinary form for its ratification, with the expression of its opinion that said resolution ought not to be adopted.

As preliminary to a consideration of the text of the treaty itself in its various aspects, the committee thinks it proper to give a brief résumé of the history of the fisheries question and other matters relating to the intercourse between the United States and the British dominions of North America having more or less relation thereto.

Before the Revolution the inhabitants of all the British colonies in North America possessed, as a common right, the right of fishing on the coasts of British North America, and these rights were, in a broad sense, prescriptive and accustomed rights of property. At the end of the Revolution and by the treaty of peace of 1783, which adjusted the boundaries between the dominions of the two powers, it was (Article III)—

Agreed that the people of the United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank and on all the other banks of the Newfoundland; also in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish, and also

that the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island), and also on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America.

This was a grant or recognition of a property right agreed upon on a consideration, viz, the adjustment of the boundaries and the other engagements into which the United States by that treaty entered. As to the open-sea fishing, it was merely a recognition of a right common to all nations, and as to the fishing within the municipal dominion of His Majesty on his coasts, bays, and creeks, it was an agreement that these rights theretofore existing in all British subjects should of right belong to those British subjects who, by force of the revolution, had become the citizens of an independent nation; and thus it was, in the partition of the territory, a reservation in favor of the people of the United States of a right which they, as British subjects, had theretofore lawfully enjoyed.

From 1783 until the war of 1812 between the two countries citizens of the United States continued to enjoy the ancient rights belonging to them as subjects of Great Britain before the Revolution and reserved to them as citizens of the United States after it, with the full freedom secured by the article last referred to. During this period of time other subjects of difference and negotiation arose between the two countries, which were disposed of by the treaties of 1794, with its explanatory articles, and of 1802; but the fishery provision of 1783 continued to exist unquestioned and apparently as having been, as it plainly purported to be, a treaty disposing of and adjusting property rights which had become by force of its own operation an executed contract.

The treaty of peace concluded on December 24, 1814, at the close of the war of 1812, provided:

First, for a restoration to each party of all countries, territories, etc. taken by either party during the war, without delay, saving some questions of islands in the bay of Passamaquoddy.

Secondly, it provided for disposition of prizes and prisoners of war.

Thirdly, it provided for questions of boundary and dominion regarding certain islands and for the settlement of the northeastern boundary and also for the northwestern boundary, etc. It made no reference whatever to any question touching the fisheries mentioned in the treaty of 1783.

The commercial treaty concluded on the 3d of July, 1815, between the two countries provided for reciprocal liberty of commerce between

the territories of Great Britain *in Europe* and the territories of the United States, but left without any new treaty stipulation or obligation commercial intercourse between British dominions in North America and the United States remaining under the exclusive control of each.

But after the conclusion of the treaties following the war of 1812, there being then no treaty obligations or reciprocal laws in force between or in either of the countries respecting commercial intercourse, the British Government set up the pretension that the fishing rights recognized and secured to citizens of the United States by the treaty of 1783 had become abrogated in consequence of the war of 1812, which, on the principle of the war annulling all unexecuted engagements between the two belligerents, it was contended, annulled the fishing rights described in the treaty of 1783, and that the citizens of the United States had, therefore, no longer the right to fish in any of the British North American waters. This pretension led to the conclusion of the treaty of the 20th October, 1818, the fisheries article of which provided that (Article I)—

Whereas differences have arisen respecting the liberty, claimed by the United States, for the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, and cure fish on certain coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America, it is agreed between the high contracting parties that the inhabitants of the said United States shall have forever, in common with the subjects of His Britannic Majesty, the liberty to take fish of every kind on that part of the southern coast of Newfoundland which extends from Cape Ray to the Rameau Islands; on the western and northern coast of Newfoundland from the said Cape Ray to the Quirpon Islands, on the shores of the Magdalen Islands, and also on the coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks, from Mount Joly, on the southern coast of Labrador, to and through the Straits of Belle Isle, and thence northwardly indefinitely along the coast, without prejudice, however, to any of the exclusive rights of the Hudson Bay Company: And that the American fishermen shall also have liberty forever to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbors, and creeks, of the southern part of the coast of Newfoundland, above described, and of the coast of Labrador; but so soon as the same, or any portion thereof, shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such portion so settled without previous agreement for such purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground. And the United States hereby renounce forever any liberty heretofore enjoyed or claimed by the inhabitants thereof to take, dry, or cure fish on or within three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America not included within the above-mentioned limits: *Provided, however,* That the American fishermen shall be admitted to enter such bays or harbors for the purpose of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever. But they shall be under such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent their taking, drying, or curing fish therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing the privileges hereby reserved to them.

This arrangement divided, and limited in territorial extent, the fishing rights of the people of the United States, that had existed while they were British subjects and had been recognized and existed under the treaty of peace of 1783 until the war of 1812, and it provided for a continuance of the ancient rights of fishing on certain named parts of the coasts of British North America, and its islands, and in their bays, harbors, and creeks, etc. It also provided for a renunciation by the United States of pre-existing rights to take fish, etc., "within 3 marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors" of His Majesty's dominions in British North America, not included within the previously-mentioned limits, but with a proviso, as a reservation upon the renunciation of the right to fish, that the—

American fishermen shall be admitted to enter such bays or harbors for the purposes of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of obtaining water, and for no other purposes whatever. But they shall be under such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent their taking, drying, or curing fish therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing the privileges hereby reserved to them.

It will be observed that the ancient right continued in all its force in every bay, harbor, and creek of a described territory, and that the renunciation of the right to fish on other coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks is in the same language, and is perfectly correlative to the first, and that the line of British municipal dominion was recognized and stated to be a line 3 marine miles from these British coasts, bays, creeks, and harbors, and that this renunciation was, both in substance and form, a renunciation only of a right to *fish* and to exercise the incidents of the fishing, as drying, etc., and that the proviso to that renunciation admitted the American fishermen to enter such waters, bays, and harbors for the specific purposes necessary to them in their character as fishermen only, and not having the slightest reference, either expressly or by implication, to any *fishing* or *other* vessel of the United States and sailing under their flag, entering any port of His Majesty's dominions anywhere for any commercial or trading purpose. And these entries into exclusively British fishing waters fishing vessels (the only ones entitled to be there at all) were to be under such restrictions, and such only, as should be necessary to prevent their exercising the fishing rights that had been renounced and abusing the privileges of such entry so reserved; that is, by doing the renounced thing, viz, the taking and curing of fish, or violating the British laws excluding all American trading vessels.

It is to be kept clearly in view that at the time of the conclusion of this treaty of 1818, and for twelve years afterward, no American vessel had any right to enter any port of British North America, with the few exceptions named in the mutual arrangements of 1820 and 1823. hereinafter stated. The treaty of 1815 and the British laws and policy reserved the whole trade and intercourse with the ports of these colonies to her own vessels, and, reciprocally, there was no law or treaty of the United States which authorized the entry into ports (with the exceptions stated) of the United States of British vessels from British North American ports.

Thus it was that the treaty of 1818 omitted to make any mention of the ports in the British provinces in connection with the arrival or departure of American vessels, either fishing or other, and so it was a clear and necessary construction of the treaty of 1818 that the arrangements, conditions, and renunciations therein provided had no relation, one way or the other, to the exercise of what may be called commercial rights by the American fishing or other vessels in the waters or ports of British North America, for the *status* of things was such, that it could not be done in the case of *any* American vessel without regard to her character as a vessel engaged in fishing upon the high seas or in the British territorial waters, wherein, as was provided, she might continue to fish, or to her commercial character.

The right (except in the cases before stated) of the British to exclude such vessels and all others of the United States from her ports in British North America, as the matter stood until 1830, is fully conceded, and it is also conceded that during that time the only right of any vessel of the United States to enter the waters of British North America depended upon the treaty of 1818 alone, and in order to obtain the benefit of that treaty for such purposes, the American vessel *must* have been a fishing vessel, and must have resorted to those particular waters for some one of the purposes mentioned in the treaty, and no others.

The foregoing statement is, of course, subject to the limitation implied in whatever rights might have existed by the general law of nations in respect of vessels under circumstances requiring the exercise of humanity, etc. It must be also remarked that at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of 1818 the ports of British North America were very few and far between, and that there could be very little motive for American vessels, either fishing or other, to resort to such ports

for the purposes of trade until the British colonial policy should have been abandoned or very largely modified.

The matter, then, under the treaty of 1818 was a very simple one and can be restated thus:

(1) No American vessel had any right to resort to British North American ports for any commercial or other purpose, and no British North American vessel had any right to resort to any port of the United States for such purposes.

(2) But American fishing vessels had a right to resort to certain of the coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks of that part of British North America described in the treaty of 1818 for all purposes of fishing which they had anciently enjoyed.

(3) But American fishing vessels, and fishing vessels *only*, had also a right to resort to all other British North American waters for the special purposes named in the treaty.

(4). The general result of this was, as to American fishing vessels, that they had, on all the British North American coasts and in all her bays and harbors, the right to shelter, to repair damages, and to obtain wood and water, but on certain named parts of the same coasts, etc., they had not the right to take or cure fish; and

(5) As a consequence of the situation embraced in the British laws and in that treaty, the matter of resorting to British North American ports either by American fishing or other vessels was entirely outside of and unaffected either way by that treaty.

From 1818 forward, until after the reciprocal arrangements of 1830 concerning commerce, it is not known that any serious difficulties occurred in respect of the rights of American fishermen pursuing their calling in those regions of the sea.

Two or three instances only of seizure appear to have occurred until after 1830 and none of those touched or raised the bay or headlands question. In 1835 the British Government brought to the notice of our own the complaints of the Canadian authorities concerning alleged infractions of the treaty of 1818 by our fishermen. These complaints did not involve the bay or headlands question or any commercial question and the complaints were immediately attended to by our Government to the satisfaction of that of Great Britain (Ex. Doc. 100, Thirty-sixth Congress, first session, pp. 56 and 58).

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In 1838-39 there were a few more seizures, but none of them appear to have raised the bay or headlands question. One was seized at the Gut of Canso but released; and none of these seizures appear to have involved any commercial or trade question excepting the *Shetland*, which, being driven inshore by a storm, anchored, and the master was enticed into selling a boy who came on board, a pair of trousers and a little tea and tobacco, for which the vessel was immediately seized, it being evident that the boy had been sent by the authorities to entrap the master (Ex. Doc. 100, Thirty-sixth Congress, first session, pp. 65 and 66); and excepting the *Magnolia*, which purchased a barrel of herring for bait; and excepting the *Hart*, which, running into Tusket Harbor in heavy weather, and while the master was on shore procuring wood and water, a British subject asked some of the crew to help him clear his nets. Some of the crew accordingly went on board the British vessel and assisted in clearing the nets, for which the British owner gave two barrels of fresh herring; and excepting the *Eliza*, which, being at anchor in a gale, carried away one of her larboard chains, and ran into Bevet Harbor, and got it repaired by a British subject, and was accordingly seized.

These instances are specially referred to to show that the bay and headlands question almost never practically arose, and that the offenses, if offenses they were, of the seized vessels, were of the most trivial and unimportant character, scarcely worthy the notice of a government.

In 1818 (and before the treaty of that year) Congress passed an act closing our ports against British vessels coming from colonial ports which were closed against vessels owned by citizens of the United States (Stats., vol. 3, p. 432); and in 1820 Congress passed a supplementary act upon the same subject and upon the same principle of mutuality, applied particularly to British North American ports and certain West Indian ones (Stats., vol. 3, p. 602); and in 1823 Congress passed an act suspending the former acts so far as they applied to sundry ports named—the Canadian ones being St. John and St. Andrews, New Brunswick; Halifax, Nova Scotia; Quebec, Canada; and St. John's, Newfoundland.

But this act was passed with the condition that the enumerated British colonial ports should be open for the admission of the vessels of the United States, and provided that, if trade and intercourse should be interrupted by the British authority in those ports, similar action should be taken by the President in respect of our own.

The act of Congress of May 29, 1830, provided for opening of all American ports to certain British colonial vessels on a mutual opening of

British colonial ports to American vessels. Section 2 of that act declared that—

Whenever the ports of the United States shall have been opened, under the authority given in the first section of this act, British vessels and their cargoes shall be admitted to an entry in the ports of the United States from the islands, provinces, or colonies of Great Britain, on or near the North American continent, and north or east of the United States (Stats., v. 4, p. 420).

Pursuant to this act President Jackson, on the 5th of October, 1830, in accordance with a mutual understanding upon the subject with the Government of Great Britain, issued his proclamation, putting this act of 1830 into effect (Stats. V. 4, p. 817). And on the 18th of November, 1830, a British order in council was issued, declaring among other things—

That the ships of, and belonging to, the United States of America may import from the United States aforesaid into the British possessions abroad goods with produce of those States, and may export goods from the British possessions abroad to be carried to any foreign country whatever (British Foreign and State Papers, V. 17, p. 894).

It is clear that under this act of Congress all British vessels, without regard to their occupation, whether fishing or other, coming from British North America, were entitled to admission into our ports for all purposes of trade and commerce. Canadian fishing vessels had the same rights as any other, for they fell within the general description stated in the statute. So, too, reciprocally, our fishing vessels fell within the general description of "ships of and belonging to the United States." Before this time *all* American vessels were excluded from British North American ports with the then recent exception before stated; then, under this arrangement *all* ships of the United States were to be admitted into British North American ports. The former almost universal exclusion was abolished without reserve. If any literal reading of this British order in council can be suggested as of a narrower construction, it would destroy the mutuality of the action of the two governments and be unworthy of a government.

Surely no nation not in a state of vassalage would consent that its citizens or subjects should for a moment be treated in or by another nation in a less favorable way than it treated the citizens and subjects of the same class and occupation of such other nation.

From the conclusion of the treaty of 1818 down to nearly 1840, as we have seen, the incidents of collision or difficulty in respect of the rights of the purely American fishing vessels under that treaty were com-

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paratively few; and, so far as the committee is advised, such incidents of difficulty as occurred did not arise under any bay or headland pretension of Great Britain, but came out of a few American vessels, from time to time having come within 3 miles of the British North American shores, being seized upon one accusation or another.

In the year 1836 the province of Nova Scotia passed laws of a more stringent and unjust character than any that had existed before, and in the year 1838 that province complained, in an address to the Queen, of American aggressions and asking for a naval force to prevent them. It appears that a British force was accordingly placed on the British North American coast and the seizures of American vessels became much more numerous. (See reports and papers on the subject, Senate Ex. Doc. 100, Thirty-second Congress, first session.)

It appears from these papers that most of the cases of British seizure were for alleged violations of the customs laws. That others of them were for violations of the privileges secured by the treaty of 1818, by coming within 3 miles of the shore; and so far as it is known, it was not until the 10th May, 1843, that any American vessel was seized for fishing more than 3 miles from the shore in a bay indenting the British North American coast.

But in the diplomatic correspondence of that period the pretension was asserted by the British Government that bays more than 6 miles wide, and of indefinite width, if bays indenting British shores, were within the exclusion of the treaty of 1818, and under this pretension the American fishing vessel *The Washington* was seized for fishing in the Bay of Fundy, but more than 3 miles from the shore. This pretension of the British Government was denied by our own, but no agreement upon the subject was come to.

This state of things, with more or less of collision and harassment to our fishing vessels, continued, but without very serious difficulty, until, in 1852, an attempt was made by the British Government to induce the United States to conclude a reciprocity treaty, which failing, the British Government sent a strong force of war steamers and sailing vessels to these waters for the alleged purpose of enforcing the provisions of the treaty of 1818, but, as was believed by the people and Government of the United States, intended not only for that, but as an overawing enterprise, which should frighten the American fishermen from resorting to British waters for any of the purposes mentioned in the treaty, and to so much disturb American fishing interests as to

seriously cripple or destroy them, and thus lead the United States to enter into reciprocity with British North American provinces.

Documentary papers and discussions in the Senate at the time will show how fully this matter was understood, and how it was regarded by the people and Government of the United States. Mr. Webster, then Secretary of State, thereupon issued a circular notice to American fishermen, in which he states what the rigid and strict construction of the treaty of 1818 would be, as claimed by the British, as it respected the entrance of fishing vessels into the bays or harbors indenting the British provinces. He stated the British pretension in respect of drawing lines from headland to headland and their asserted pretension of a right to capture all American fishermen who should follow their pursuits in bays inside of such lines. But he distinctly also stated, in the same circular, that he did not agree to the construction thus put by the British upon the treaty, or that it was conformable to the intention of the contracting parties; but he informed the public of the British pretension, "to the end that those concerned in American fisheries may perceive how the case at present stands and be on their guard." (H. R. Mis. Doc. No. 32, Forty-second Congress, second session.)

This circular of Mr. Webster was of July, 1852, and on the 23d August of the same year, twenty-two years after the laws of 1830, the provincial secretary of Nova Scotia issued a notice that "no American fishing vessels are entitled to commercial privileges in provincial ports," etc. (Memorandum respecting North American fisheries, prepared for the information of the American commissioners who negotiated the treaty of 1871).

Following these operations, the claims convention of the 8th of February, 1853, between the United States and Great Britain, was concluded, and under that convention the case of the *Washington*, seized for fishing in the Bay of Fundy, as before mentioned, was heard, and the umpire decided that the true meaning of the treaty of 1818 made it lawful for the *Washington* to fish more than three miles from the shore in the Bay of Fundy, and in respect of the headland pretension he says:

That the Bay of Fundy is not a British bay, nor a bay within the meaning of the word as used in the treaties of 1783 and 1818.

He refers to the convention of 1839 between France and Great Britain in respect of reciprocal fishing by the subjects of each country along the shores of the other, providing that their conventional arrangements shall exclude the fishermen of each from bays which do not exceed 10 miles

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in width within the shores of the other as a proper limit of the doctrine of headlands.

But upon this point (immaterial to the question before him) it is to be observed that the 10-mile headland arrangement between France and Great Britain was a mutual one, applying to the shores and bays of both countries along which the fishermen of each were accustomed to ply their calling, and if, therefore, that convention had agreed upon a distance of 10 miles from shore, and 20 miles for the width of the waters between headlands, it would have furnished no argument in respect of the principle of public law applicable to such questions or in respect of the ancient rights of the citizens of the United States in regard to the fisheries in northeastern waters, for the fishermen of each country were put upon a precisely equal footing in respect of the waters and ports of the other, which, on the British theory, strangely enough, has not existed between British and American fishermen since the act of Congress of 1830, and will not exist if the treaty under consideration should go into effect.

In 1854, however, the objects of British and Canadian desire were at last accomplished by the conclusion of the treaty of the 5th of June of that year, by which an extensive reciprocity, so called, of trade was agreed upon, and the right granted to the Americans to fish within the limits prohibited by the treaty of 1818 under a variety of restrictions and limitations, and a similar right granted to British fishermen in the waters of the United States north of latitude 36°.

In the same treaty were various other provisions respecting navigation of the St. Lawrence, American and Canadian canals, etc., and the treaty was terminable on notice after the expiration of ten years. The experience of the United States and their citizens under that treaty led Congress to terminate it in the winter of 1864-'65 by a vote of nearly 2 to 1 in the House of Representatives and by a vote of nearly 5 to 1 in the Senate.

The Canadian Government then for a few years resorted to a system of licensing American fishermen to fish in the waters from which they were excluded for fishing purposes by the treaty of 1818. For the first year the number of licenses is reported to have been 354, at 50 cents per ton. The next year, 1867, the license fee was made \$1 per ton; the number of licenses is reported to have been 281. The next year, 1868-'69, the license fee was again doubled—\$2 per ton—and in 1868 only 56 licenses were taken out, and in 1869 only 25.

In 1868 the Dominion Government proceeded to enact the most harsh and stringent laws on the subject of American fishermen calculated and, it is thought, undoubtedly designed to so harass American fishermen in the exercise of the rights reserved to them by the treaty of 1818 as to cripple and destroy their operations. Analogous legislation by Newfoundland in 1836 had led the United States to remonstrate against it as a "violation of the well-established principles of the common law of England and of the principles of all just powers and of all civilized nations, and seemed to be expressly designed to enable Her Majesty's authorities, with perfect impunity, to seize and confiscate American vessels and embezzle almost indiscriminately the property of our citizens employed in the fisheries on the coasts of the British Possessions" (Ex. Doc. 100, Thirty-second Congress, first session).

In 1870 the British Government informed our own that the Canadian Government would issue no more licenses to American fishermen; and, notwithstanding the decision of the umpire in the case of the *Washington* in 1853, announced the British claim to the exclusion of the American fishing vessels from coming within British headlands, without regard to the width of the bay between. (See Report on Foreign Relations, 1870).

Then came the treaty of 1871, devoted primarily to the Alabama claims, but which provided that for the period of ten years fishermen of the United States should have, in addition to their rights under the treaty of 1818, the right of British North American in-shore fishing under certain limitations, etc.; and the United States agreed to the free admission of British North American fishery products into our country, and it was also provided that the British fishermen might fish in certain American waters, and that the balance of alleged advantage to the United States in these respects should be settled by a commission.

This commission, as is well known, by the vote of the British commissioner and the Belgian umpire, and against the vote of the American commissioner, fixed the sum to be paid by the United States at \$5,500,000. The gross injustice of this, as believed by the United States, led the Senate, on the 27th February, 1879, six years before the fisheries provision could expire by the terms of the treaty, to unanimously pass a resolution declaring that steps ought to be taken to provide for the earliest possible termination of these fishery arrangements by negotiations with the British Government to that end. It is under-

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stood that the President of the United States, in pursuance of this recommendation, endeavored to obtain the agreement of Great Britain to an immediate termination of these clauses in the treaty, but without success.

In February, 1883, however, as the period was approaching when these provisions could be terminated on notice, both houses of Congress unanimously (or certainly without any division) passed resolutions terminating Articles XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXX, and XXXII of said treaty, which articles covered the whole fishery subject as well as certain matters of navigation, etc. This termination took effect on July 1, 1885.

By the twenty-ninth article of the same treaty, which is still in force, the United States engaged that all goods, wares, and merchandise arriving at certain ports named and destined for the British possessions in North America, should have entry and transit without the payment of duty, and it was reciprocally agreed on the part of Great Britain that all goods, wares, and merchandise arriving at any of the ports of British North America and destined for the United States, should also have the right of free entry and transit to the United States, etc.

That the foregoing mentioned article of the treaty of 1871 covered and included the transmission of fish from American fishing vessels as well as other goods is evident, not only from the plain and comprehensive language of the article, but from the statements of the formal British case laid before the Halifax Commission in 1877, wherein the right of the transshipment of fish from Canadian ports to the United States free of duty, covered by that article, was made the ground of claim for compensation.

But it will be seen on inspection of the treaty of 1871 that the fisheries articles of that treaty contained no provision either in respect of any commercial rights in Canadian ports or in respect of transshipments, and that the reciprocal transshipment article of the treaty was entirely separate and distinct from any question of fisheries or fish as such; but the proceedings before that commission distinctly demonstrated that under article 29 the right to transship fish was understood by the British to be included and without any conditions depending upon the force of any other of the articles of the treaty, and it is also to be observed that the fisheries articles, in respect of their duration and termination, are treated of separately and by themselves in article 33, which provided that they, as a group by themselves, might be ter-

minated after ten years, on two years' notice, while the reciprocal transshipment article 29 was left to stand independently by itself.

It inevitably follows:

(1) That the right of American fishing vessels to transship their fish from Canadian ports to those of the United States was not derived from the fisheries articles and did not depend upon them.

(2) That such right clearly existed by force of article 29 and did not depend upon any other article, and

(3) That article 29, not having been terminated, the right of American fishing vessels to enter Canadian ports for the purpose of transshipping their cargoes is as clear and unquestionable as that of any other American vessels.

Under the treaty of 1871, with all the privileges granted to Americans in respect of fishing in British waters, the practical result was the diminution of American fishing interests and a corresponding large increase of the Canadian fishing interests, owing to the superior facilities of the Canadians in fishing near their own homes and their right guaranteed by that treaty to dispose of their fish in American ports free from all duties and impositions. It was this, doubtless, that led the British Government to refuse to terminate the fisheries article of 1871 when it had already obtained \$5,500,000 as the established recompense for the superior (alleged) advantages obtained by American fishermen under that treaty.

After the final termination of the fisheries articles of the treaty of 1871, it being apparent that the United States could not be persuaded or beguiled into a renewal of the so-called reciprocity with Canada, the former methods of unfriendly coercion and harassment were again resorted to and with great exaggeration. New Canadian laws, sanctioned by the home government, were enacted, calculated and evidently designed to effectually frustrate and destroy all the substantial rights that American fishermen were entitled to enjoy under the treaty of 1818, and to destroy the mutuality of the act of 1830 and the benefits of article 29 of the treaty of 1871.

Our Government remonstrated, at first mildly, and later on with something of the vigor that should belong to those intrusted with the defense of clear American rights. But these remonstrances, unaccompanied or followed by any further steps, were unavailing.

The President, in his annual message of December, 1885, in view of these circumstances, recommended to Congress the making provision

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for a commission to adjust and settle the difficulties and disputes thus arisen, but Congress did not see fit to do it, and the Senate, on the 13th of April, 1886, adopted a resolution by a majority of 25 declaring that, in its judgment, no such commission ought to be established; and by a resolution of the 24th of July, 1886, proceeded to order an investigation by its committee on foreign relations into the fishery question and into the unjust treatment of our fishermen and the circumstances connected therewith, with a view, as it may be presumed, to taking such measures on the report of its committee as the interests and honor of the United States should require.

That committee made an exhaustive investigation, and without any dissent from any of its members reported to the Senate, on the 19th of January, 1887, upon the subject, stating the history of these difficulties and the clear rights that it was thought belonged to the United States and to their citizens, and recommended the enactment of a law for the protection of American rights.

Such a law was enacted, the bill passing the Senate by a vote of 46 in the affirmative to 1 in the negative, and passing the House of Representatives with an engaging amendment by a vote of 256 in the affirmative to 1 in the negative.

On the passage of this law the only difference between the two houses was that concerning the extent to which these defensive measures should go. This act of Congress was approved by the President on the 3d of March, 1887, and is in the following words:

AN ACT to authorize the President of the United States to protect and defend the rights of American fishing vessels, American fishermen, American trading and other vessels, in certain cases, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever the President of the United States shall be satisfied that American fishing vessels or American fishermen, visiting or being in the waters or at any ports or places of the British dominions of North America, are or then lately have been denied or abridged in the enjoyment of any rights secured to them by treaty or law, or are then or lately have [been] unjustly vexed or harassed in the enjoyment of such rights, or subjected to unreasonable restrictions, regulations, or requirements in respect of such rights; or otherwise unjustly vexed or harassed in said waters, ports or places; or whenever the President of the United States shall be satisfied that any such fishing vessels or fishermen, having a permit under the laws of the United States to touch and trade at any port or ports, place or places, in the British dominions of North America, are or then lately have been denied the privilege of entering such port or ports, place or places, in the same manner and under the same regulations as may exist therein applicable to trading vessels of the most favored

nation, or shall be unjustly vexed or harassed in respect thereof, or otherwise be unjustly vexed or harassed therein, or shall be prevented from purchasing such supplies as may there be lawfully sold to trading vessels of the most favored nation; or whenever the President of the United States shall be satisfied that any other vessels of the United States, their masters or crews, so arriving at or being in such British waters or ports or places of the British dominions of North America, are or then lately have been denied any of the privileges therein accorded to the vessels, their masters or crews, of the most favored nation, or unjustly vexed or harassed in respect of the same, or unjustly vexed or harassed therein by the authorities thereof, then, and in either or all of such cases, it shall be lawful, and it shall be the duty of the President of the United States, in his discretion, by proclamation to that effect, to deny vessels, their masters and crews, of the British dominions of North America, any entrance into the waters, ports, or places of, or within the United States, (with such exceptions in regard to vessels in distress, stress of weather, or needing supplies as to the President shall seem proper), whether such vessels shall have come directly from said dominions on such destined voyage or by way of some port or place in such destined voyage elsewhere; and also, to deny entry into any port or place of the United States of fresh fish or salt fish or any other product of said dominions, or other goods coming from said dominions to the United States. The President may, in his discretion, apply such proclamation to any part or to all of the foregoing-named subjects, and may revoke, qualify, limit, and renew such proclamation from time to time as he may deem necessary to the full and just execution of the purposes of this act. Every violation of any such proclamation, or any part thereof, is hereby declared illegal, and all vessels and goods so coming or being within the waters, ports or places of the United States contrary to such proclamation shall be forfeited to the United States; and such forfeiture shall be enforced and proceeded upon in the same manner and with the same effect as in the case of vessels or goods whose importation or coming to or being in the waters or ports of the United States contrary to law may now be enforced and proceeded upon. Every person who shall violate any of the provisions of this act, or such proclamation of the President made in pursuance hereof, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

Approved, March 3, 1857.

So far as is known to the committee, no step whatever was taken by the President to put this law into execution, but negotiations were initiated and continued, to the apparent end of accomplishing, what Congress had thought it unfit to undertake in such way, an adjustment of these difficulties by the diplomatic course of securing a part of American rights at the expense of yielding other and the most fundamental and important of them.

These negotiations culminated in the appointment by the President during the recess of the Senate, on the 22d of November, 1857, only ten days before the meeting of Congress, of three "plenipotentiaries," to

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consider, with like plenipotentiaries appointed by Her Majesty, the whole subject, with a view of coming to a solution thereof.

These plenipotentiaries, thus created, began their real work at Washington while both houses of Congress were sitting, and without any communication by the President in his annual message on the meeting of Congress, or otherwise, of the fact that such important and extraordinary operations were in progress, or that very grave interests of the United States had been placed in the custody of gentlemen whose names had not even been communicated to it.

These "plenipotentiaries" came to a conclusion of their labors on the 15th of February, 1888, and the offices of "plenipotentiaries" terminated, and the result was reached without the advice and consent of the Senate having been asked or taken concerning the selection of these public ministers, and without any communication to either house of Congress concerning this most important subject.

It is not difficult to see that, in evil times, when the President of the United States may be under influence of foreign and adverse interests, such a course of procedure might result in great disaster to the interests and even the safety of our Government and people.

It is no answer to this suggestion to say that an arrangement thus concluded can not be valid or effectual without the advice and consent of the Senate, for the rights and interests of the people of the United States might be so neglected, misunderstood, abandoned, or sold by President's "plenipotentiaries" as to greatly embarrass, if not defeat, their ultimate re-assertion in better times and under better administrations, though it is hoped that such will not be the case in respect of these negotiations.

The document submitted to the Senate by the President as the outcome of these negotiations may, it is thought, well illustrate the dangers of such methods.

But holding in reserve, for the time being, these grave questions touching usurpations of unconstitutional powers, or the abuse of those that may be thought to exist on the part of the Executive, the committee thinks it sufficient for the present occasion to deal with the document itself.

The subject with which, according to the message of the President transmitting it, this document professes to deal, is "the settlement of the questions growing out of the rights claimed by American fishermen in British North American waters." And the document opens with the

statement that it has to deal with "differences * * * concerning the interpretation of Article I of the convention of October 20, 1818." The article referred to appears in an earlier part of this report.

The language of this article is, as has often been stated in long discussions upon the subject, perfectly clear. And as it respects the territorial limits wherein American fishermen should no longer have their ancient right of fishing, there has not been and can not be any question capable of discussion, other than that which may arise from the use of the words "bays," etc., of Her Majesty's dominions.

The article itself, in clear and unmistakable language, recognized and adopted 3 miles from the shore as the extreme limit of municipal dominion and exclusion, but it also used the words "bays," etc.—British bays—as included within the prohibited territory.

For many years after the conclusion of this treaty of 1818 there does not appear to have been any difficulty in respect of the exercise of the rights of American fishermen in bays along the British North American coast that were more than 6 miles wide at their entrance, thus following the description embraced in the 3-mile designation of municipal boundary.

But when the Canadians found that they could not have the same advantages enjoyed by American citizens, fishermen, in introducing their fish and other products into the United States on the same terms as our own citizens, a system of restrictive claim was adopted, and the pretension was set up that *any* bay, no matter how wide, indenting British North America, was a British bay, and that the American fishermen were by the treaty of 1818 forbidden to fish therein, and in 1841 the first seizure under that claim occurred. The American fishing vessel *Washington* was the vessel. What was decided and settled in her case has already been stated.

From that day to this no instance has been brought to the attention of the committee (among all the various and very numerous seizures of American fishing vessels by the British authorities under the claim of violations of the treaty of 1818) of any seizure of any American fishing vessel for the act of fishing in any bay indenting the British North American coast more than 3 miles from the shore.

It is curious to note that in the opening British case before the Halifax Commission, no mention is made of the headlands question that has from time to time been a subject of theoretical discussion between the two Governments. But after the case had been presented the question

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was referred to, but it appears to have been dropped in view of the fact that fishing in such bays did not appear to be of any substantial value at that time. Thus the bay and headland matter stood when these last negotiations began.

The first article of the treaty now under consideration provides for the appointment of a mixed commission, to delimitate "the British waters, bays, creeks, and harbors of the coasts of Canada and of Newfoundland, as to which the United States, by Article I of the convention of October 20, 1818, between the United States and Great Britain, renounced forever any liberty to take, dry, or cure fish."

Certainly a delimitation of 3 miles from the shore could not possibly be made more clear than it was by the treaty of 1818. Monuments can not be set up in the sea which shall separate the waters of Her Majesty's dominions from the waters belonging to the fishermen and all other people of the United States in common with the rest of mankind.

The only possible point must be to describe what were British bays, etc., and if this article had only been devoted to naming the bays, etc., that were less than 6 miles wide, there might have been some theoretic ground for such an operation. But the treaty easily dismisses all such as a part of the coast line, and proceeds to show that the 3-mile limit mentioned in the treaty of 1818 is not the one that is to define the rights of citizens of the United States, but that a new and different principle, entirely favorable to Great Britain, is to be adopted. To this end the third article of the treaty provides that the 3 marine miles mentioned in the treaty of 1818—

shall be measured seaward from low-water mark; but at every bay, creek, or harbor, not otherwise specially provided for in this treaty, such 3 marine miles shall be measured seaward from a straight line drawn across the bay, creek, or harbor, in the part nearest the entrance at the first point where the width does not exceed ten marine miles.

By this simple British process the 3 miles mentioned in the treaty of 1818 is nearly doubled and extended to 5 miles from either shore at the entrance or along the bays indenting the coast. It needs no comment to show that this provision is not an execution of the treaty of 1818, but is making, by an assumed construction or otherwise, a new one of entirely different dimensions and entirely in the interest of Her Majesty's Government.

But this is not all. The "plenipotentiaries" went still further (not stopping at nearly doubling the area of British municipal dominion

measured by the treaty of 1818), and agreed that many of (and perhaps all the valuable) great bays, much more than 10 miles in width, should be forevermore included in British municipal dominion, and that forevermore no American fisherman should have the right to drop a line or cast a seine therein.

These great bodies of water, thus given up to the British, are named in the treaty as follows: (1) The Baie des Chaleurs; (2) Bay of Miramichi; (3) Egmont Bay; (4) St. Ann's Bay; (5) Fortune Bay; (6) Sir Charles Hamilton Sound; (7) Barrington Bay; (8) Chedabucto Bay; (9) Mira Bay; (10) Placentia Bay; (11) St. Mary's Bay.

These agreements contained in article 4 of the treaty, as has been said, really cede (so far as the United States are concerned) to Great Britain forever the complete dominion over these numerous and, for fishing purposes, the most valuable of the bays along the coasts of British North America, and exclude forever all the American fishing vessels therefrom, except for the limited and narrow purposes mentioned in the treaty of 1818, and recognize that by force of the treaty of 1818 these are and always have been British waters, while it is thought by the committee that by the public law of nations these same waters will be open to the vessels of all other countries than our own, unless they, too, shall, from generosity or fear, or for some consideration, renounce their right to use the same.

The principle on which this article is formed is a recognition by the United States of the municipal and territorial sovereignty of Great Britain in and over all the other bays, etc., on the British North American coast, however large, in which, by this treaty, our citizens are to be admitted to fish, exterior to a line 3 miles from shore.

The article in terms professes to delimit the *British bays mentioned in the treaty of 1818*, and as it mentions eleven such bays even more than 10 miles wide, and some of which are 20 or more miles wide, it follows that the British contention of municipal dominion over all bays without regard to width, is acted upon, and that the right of American to fish in the few other wide bays not mentioned is a grant by the British Government.

If the Baie de Chaleurs is a now British bay, so also must be the bay of Fundy and all the rest. But if it be suggested that the "plenipotentiaries" renounced the right of fishing in these bays as public waters (for which no hint appears in the treaty) in consideration of supposed advantages gained to the United States by other provisions of the

treaty, it is entirely with the fisheries to the dignity of its citizens world. Subjects of pure The question of exercise of the shores of a nation of nation committee the regard to the instances, such in view of the political boundaries of worthy of consideration now in hand. The supposed treaty, of the Britain, Germany far indeed the fisheries in parties. It was neither granted, etc., inside respective powers not settled of her own country. Such regulations are competent for Great Britain; existing over the being and for a fishing vessels to other vessels bearing occupation, so far as they placed the ad-

treaty, it is, the committee thinks, equally objectionable; and this entirely without regard to any present practical value or want of value of the fisheries therein. It is not thought by the committee to be suitable to the dignity or interests of the United States to renounce the right of its citizens to pursue business in any part of the public waters of the world. Such rights, the committee thinks, should neither be the subjects of purchase, sale, barter, nor gift.

The question of the extent of territorial dominion, as it respects the exercise of fishing rights in bays more than 6 miles wide indenting the shores of a country, must of course be determined by the law and practice of nations as they existed in the year 1818, at which time, as the committee thinks, the 3-miles limit from shores was recognized without regard to large indenting bays, except under very peculiar circumstances, such as the prescriptive exercise of dominion, etc. Whether, in view of recent inventions in the implements of warfare, it may not be politic for maritime nations to agree upon an enlargement of the boundaries of their territorial dominion seaward is a question well worthy of consideration, but it has no place in respect of the matters now in hand.

The supposed precedent for such agreements as are set up in this treaty, of the convention of 1882 (Ex. Doc. 113, p. 18), between Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands, is very far indeed from being such. That was for the *police regulation* of the fisheries in the North Sea, and on the coasts of all the contracting parties. It was limited to five years, and not perpetual, as this treaty is. It neither granted nor renounced any right. The freedom of navigation, etc., inside the 3-mile limit was reserved. The naval vessels of the respective powers were to enforce the regulation. For serious infractions not settled at sea the offending vessel was to be taken to a port of her own country for trial.

Such regulations as these just cited might well have formed a precedent for composing the differences between the United States and Great Britain; for, first, they did not admit territorial dominion as existing over bays more than 6 miles wide, but conferred it for the time being and for a limited purpose; second, they recognized the rights of fishing vessels to be considered as vessels entitled to the rights of all other vessels bearing the flag of their country, without regard to their occupation, so far as it respected every thing else than fishing; third, they placed the administration of these fishing affairs in the commanders

of national vessels; and, fourth, they provided that an accused vessel should be taken to her own country for trial.

The contrast between this North Sea fisheries treaty, to which Great Britain was a party, and the one now before the Senate is vivid. They are substantially the opposites of each other in nearly every particular.

Nor does the treaty now before the Senate bear any material resemblance to the protocol proposed by Mr. Seward in 1866 (Ex. Doc. 113, p. 17), nor to the scheme sent by Mr. Bayard to Mr. Phelps in November, 1886 (Ex. Doc. 113, Fiftieth Congress, first session, p. 17).

The fifth article of the treaty, declaring that the treaty shall not be construed to include within common waters any interior portions of bays, etc., that "can not be reached from the sea without passing within the 3 marine miles mentioned in Article I of the convention of October 20, 1818," is very sweeping, and may cover a great deal more than the mere reading of it would imply to one un instructed in the nature of the northeastern lands and waters, with their deep indenting bays, their many islands and islets, and their tremendous tides, the rise and fall of which, in many places, change the aspects of nature to an astonishing degree. But it is purely language making the test the capacity of *passing* within 3 miles of the shore, and plainly indicates that no matter how large may be the bay, no matter how wide apart may be its headlands, no matter how deep may be the waters between such headlands at high tide, if the ship-channel to it at low tide be within 3 miles of land it is an excluded bay.

Having now seen what the proposed treaty accomplishes in respect of "delimitation," we proceed to examine its provisions in respect of what American vessels engaged in fishing on the high seas may and may not do in British North American waters ascertained, enlarged, and defined as before stated, and in the ports on those coasts.

In order to understand more clearly the disastrous nature of what the "plenipotentiaries" have agreed to, it is valuable to consider and again state the situation of affairs existing in 1818, and to which the treaty of that year applies.

Before and at that time and down to 1830 no American vessel of any kind was as of right admitted to any British North American port, and no rights of commerce or trade existed (with the few exceptions before stated); and, reciprocally, no British North American vessel of any

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kind, fishing or other, was admitted to ports of the United States otherwise than as an act of mutuality in the cases stated. The treaties of 1794 and 1815 purposely left all these ports and all trade between British North America and the United States to be regulated according to the particular policy of each nation. Such is still the condition of things so far as any treaty obligation is concerned, excepting article 29 of the treaty of 1871.

In 1818, then, no American fishing vessel or any other American vessel could enter a port on any of the coasts of British North America, even where the full right of fishing in-shore existed. And the treaty of 1818, formed on that basis, was not intended to, and it did not in any way, touch the question of any trade or commercial right whatever, and of course made no distinction in these respects between fishing and other American vessels. It looked and spoke only in regard to the fact of the renunciation by the United States of their fishing rights in that part of the territorial waters of British North America named in the treaty, and, as an *incident* of that renunciation and as an incident only, it provided that American fishing vessels might enter those renounced waters, not to fish, but only for "the purpose of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and obtaining water;" and this right was to be exercised under such restrictions as should be necessary to prevent their fishing, etc., therein, or in any other manner abusing the privileges so reserved to them.

These words, "in any manner abusing the privilege of entry," clearly referred to the then existing state of British law which prevented all trade intercourse by foreign vessels with the provinces, and were intended to authorize such action on the part of Great Britain as should be justly necessary to prevent violations of British navigation and commercial laws.

But in the course of years, when after these mutual arrangements of a legislative character were made, the business and trade between the United States and British North America developed, the British North Americans, like their fellows in England, began to see that the American system of customs laws operated to the advantage of American citizens and industries and unfavorably to Canadian and British interests. They then commenced, and have since steadily continued (except during the intervals of so-called reciprocity, under the treaties of 1854 and 1871), a systematic and persistent course of hostile legislation and administration under the pretext of enforcing the restrictions of the

treaty of 1818, well calculated, and designed, as the committee thinks is clear, to so embarrass and harass the citizens of the United States, engaged in the legal pursuit of fishing on the high seas as well as in the British North American waters reserved to them by the treaties of 1783 and 1818, as to drive them out of the business, and so to leave it all in British hands, or else to induce the United States, by such a course of unfriendly and even outrageous conduct, to allow the free entry of Canadian fish and other products into our markets as the price of their fair treatment of our fishermen.

Yet, during the last two or three years of this course of studied injustice and of outrage, while no American fishing vessel, even bearing a full commercial character under the laws of the United States and with the flag of the United States at the fore, could enter a port of British North America for any purpose without being exposed to seizure and forfeiture, or enter a British North American harbor for shelter or to repair damages or obtain wood and water without being subjected to this unjust and even outrageous treatment, the fishing vessels of British North America could lawfully and without molestation enter any harbor or port of the United States, sell or transship their cargoes, and do every kind of trade, and depart in peace.

This condition of things became so intolerable that, at last, the remonstrances of the Executive became vigorous and urgent, and on the 8th of December, 1886, the President sent to Congress the following message on the subject:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

I transmit herewith a letter from the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by the correspondence in relation to the rights of American fishermen in the British North American waters, and commend to your favorable consideration the suggestion that a commission be authorized by law to take perpetuating proofs of the losses sustained during the past year by American fishermen, owing to their unfriendly and unwarranted treatment by the local authorities of the maritime provinces of the Dominion of Canada.

I may have occasion hereafter to make further recommendations during the present session for such remedial legislation as may become necessary for the protection of the rights of our citizens engaged in the open-sea fisheries of the North Atlantic waters.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

Washington, December 8, 1886.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

Justly influenced, doubtless, by this message and by the state of affairs shown in the documents accompanying it, and by the evidence

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taken by, and the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the same subject made on the 19th of January, 1887 (Rep. No. 1683, 49th Cong., 2d sess.), Congress came to the conclusion that the period of negotiation and unavailing remonstrance had passed, and with almost absolute unanimity and without any party division enacted the act of March 3, 1887, hereinbefore mentioned, by which the duty was imposed upon the President of withdrawing from British North American vessels, etc., those liberties and advantages which by the pre-existing laws they were enjoying in the harbors and ports of the United States, whenever and as often as it should appear to him that similar rights and liberties were denied the United States fishing vessels, etc., in the ports, etc., of British North America, or whenever it should appear to him that American fishing vessels should have been subjected to outrageous or unjust treatment in the exercise of the rights secured to them by the treaty of 1818.

All that remained unprovided for according to the sense of self-respect and of just policy on the part of the United States was to obtain indemnity from the British Government for the injuries that had thus far been committed.

In view of this state of affairs, thus briefly mentioned, we come to consider what the proposed treaty undertakes to provide in regard to American vessels engaged in fishing.

The first clause of Article X provides that American fishing vessels entering the bays or harbors referred to in Article I shall conform to harbor regulations common to them and Canadian fishing vessels. This, by necessary implication, concedes the right on the part of the Canadians to subject United States fishing vessels resorting to a British North American bay for shelter from a tempest, to the municipal laws of Canada, no matter how far different those regulations may be from the provision in the treaty of 1818 giving to the British the right only to make such restrictions as should be *necessary to prevent an abuse of the privilege* of entry for the purpose stated.

This clause adopts the principle of the British contention in the Fortune Bay affair, which contention was that American vessels in Canadian waters, under either the treaty of 1818 or 1871, were subjected to all the municipal laws of that country. This British contention was successfully resisted by Mr. Evarts, then our Secretary of State, and the

British Government paid an indemnity for an interference with our fishing vessels in respect of their being engaged in fishing in those waters contrary to the municipal statutes of Newfoundland.

This clause, then, gives away important American rights, and adopts the principle that under the treaty of 1818 American fishing vessels are subject to the full force of foreign municipal law. But this clause is, in part only, qualified by the next, which excuses them from reporting, entering, or clearing when putting into such bays for shelter or repairing damages, and when putting into the same *outside the limits of established ports of entry*, for the purpose of purchasing wood or obtaining water, with certain exceptions even in respect of that excuse. But we think it may be safely assumed to be true that there are very few, if any, British North American bays or harbors that are not within the limits of established ports of entry, for doubtless (which is the case in the United States) the Dominion customs laws bring every part of the seashore, and all its bays and harbors, within the customs limits of some port of entry.

This modification, then, of the sweeping requirement of the first clause really amounts to nothing, and, indeed, can (if it does not already) by a simple legislative or administrative act of the Dominion government bring every bay and harbor and every part of the coast within the limits of established ports of entry, and thus again completely surrender the fishing vessels of the United States to every commercial regulation of the Dominion government which operates against them, while it gives them almost none of the benefits of commercial intercourse.

The next clause, also, further provides that American fishing vessels, when in these bays and harbors for shelter, etc., under the treaty of 1818, shall not be liable for harbor dues, etc. This is a mere statement of what results from the treaty of 1818, for it has no application to these vessels other than in their purely fishing character, and in that character they were not subjected by the treaty of 1818 to any such imposition, and could not be, for none of them were necessary to prevent their fishing or to prevent their smuggling.

Article X, then, taken as a whole, is a diminution instead of an enlargement of the rights of American fishing vessels under the treaty of 1818, and its modifying and limiting clauses would be only valuable in any case as a renunciation by Great Britain of a totally unfounded pretension.

Article XI provides, first, that American fishing vessels entering the ports, etc., of British North America under stress of weather or other *casualty* may unload, reload, transship, or sell, subject to customs laws, all fish on board, when such unloading, transshipment, or sale is made *necessary as incidental to repairs*, and may replenish outfits, provisions, or supplies damaged or lost by disaster, and in case of death or sickness, shall be allowed all needful facilities, including the shipping of a crew.

The most of these provisions are already clearly covered by the treaty of 1818, and all of them are covered by the real substance and spirit of the arrangement of 1830; and in respect of transshipment, by article 29 of the treaty of 1871. They are much more than covered by article 29 of the treaty of 1871, and are, in fact and effect, a voluntary abandonment on the part of the United States of the rights secured in respect of the transshipment of all American goods and merchandise arriving at any British North American port. That article uses language of the most comprehensive character, and it can not be doubted that under it a Canadian fishing vessel bringing a cargo of fish from the fishing-grounds to the south of Nantucket, or from any other place on the high seas or any British waters, to the ports of New York, Boston, or Portland, would be entitled to land them and transship them to Canada without the payment of any duty, and it is, of course, equally clear that a cargo of fish on board a fishing vessel of the United States, when brought from the fishing-grounds of the high seas or elsewhere to any British North American port, may, in like manner, be entered and transshipped to the United States without the payment of duty.

It would seem, then, that in respect of the clause of Article XI, now under consideration, as well as with respect of the clauses hereinbefore considered, that the Executive in negotiating this treaty had failed to remember, or had left out of view, what the present rights of citizens of the United States already clearly are under treaties now in force, and had proceeded upon the idea that every right that the United States is to obtain by force of this treaty is a new one, and is granted by Her Majesty's Government in consideration of the renunciation to her of the great bodies of water mentioned in the earlier articles of this treaty and of all commercial rights not mentioned in this treaty.

The next paragraph of Article XI provides that *licenses* in British North American ports shall be granted to United States fishing vessels on the *homeward* voyage only, to purchase such provisions and supplies

as are ordinarily sold to trading vessels, but such provisions shall not be obtained by barter nor purchased for resale or traffic. A Canadian fishing vessel, on whatever voyage, either outward or inward, may now lawfully purchase anything in a port of the United States that any citizen of the United States can purchase, and on the same terms, without any license whatever, and may dispose of any such purchase without any restriction. How does it happen that the United States are to buy, or to accept as an act of generosity, the privilege for our fishing vessels only when they are on the way home, sufficient food to preserve them from starvation, and under the restriction that, being without money, they must not obtain it by the exchange either of fish-hooks or wearing apparel?

If all vessels of the United States, including those engaged in the occupation of catching fish on the high seas, are now, under the arrangements of 1830, entitled as of right to trade in British North American ports, this clause of Article XI surrenders nearly the whole of such right; but if, under the arrangements of 1830 or otherwise, American vessels engaged in fishing on the high seas have no right of entry into British North American ports and no right to trade therein, and their enjoyment of such privileges depends upon the legislative policy of the British Dominion government, can the United States, with the least sentiment of self-respect or with the least regard to American honor, accept such a privilege, so limited, without on the other hand limiting the privileges of similar Dominion vessels in the ports of the United States?

The United States is under no treaty obligation whatever in respect of Dominion fishing or any other vessels, other than those contained in the treaty of 1871 and all those, whatever they may be, are strictly mutual. The committee thinks that such an arrangement as is here proposed, and which necessarily implies that there can be no other or greater rights of American vessels than those here described, is utterly inadmissible unless it be conceded that the business of American citizens carried on on the high seas, hundreds of miles, in many instances, from British North American coasts, is and ought to be subjected in British North American ports to the free will and pleasure of the government of that country and they are to have few of the rights that, by the common intercourse of nations, are accorded to the vessels of all countries as acts of hospitality and humanity, and which by treaty or legislative arrangements of nearly all nations are accorded to

the citizens of each in the ports of the other upon perfectly mutual and equal terms, and never otherwise. If we are to buy hospitality why should we not sell it? If we are to submit to British regulations of any occupation on the high seas why should not British subjects in like manner submit to a similar control or exclusion of their vessels by the United States?

The last paragraph of Article XI appears to be thought by the President in his message communicating the treaty to give to our fishing vessels, whether on the homeward voyage or not, the right of purchasing provisions and supplies that ordinarily belongs to trading vessels. In this the committee thinks the President is much mistaken. The first clause of the paragraph provides for licenses to purchase supplies for "the homeward voyage." It then says that such vessels, having obtained the required licenses, shall also be accorded upon all occasions such *facilities* for the purchase of casual or needful supplies as are ordinarily accorded to trading vessels.

If these last-mentioned words have the meaning imputed to them by the President, the words immediately preceding are absolutely useless and can have no meaning whatever; for the privilege, if expressed, is included within those afterwards used, and as the two phrases stand in immediate connection with each other, the absurdity of their insertion in such a case could not possibly have been overlooked by any intelligent person. And if such a really broad provision as is supposed was intended to be inserted in the treaty—one which was intended to completely reverse the whole British pretension upon the subject, and put our fishing vessels, for all purposes of provisions and supplies, upon the same footing that British fishing vessels occupy in the United States and that American trading vessels do in the British provinces—it certainly should, and probably would, have been stated in language incapable of sincere misunderstanding.

What the committee thinks it means is that an American fishing vessel, having obtained a license to purchase provisions on and for the homeward voyage, which is all that the first clause says or describes, viz, the mere act of obtaining the license upon application, such vessel, having obtained such license, shall, upon all occasions to which the license, viz, upon all occasions of the homeward voyage, be accorded facilities for doing what the license says she may. This, the committee thinks, is the literal and grammatical construction of the paragraph, and all that can be extracted from it by the ordinary principles of construction.

The whole of this article, then, as it appears to the committee, is one that would be totally derogatory to the honor and interests of the United States to agree to. The committee can never recommend or agree that any American vessel or citizen shall receive less free and favorable treatment in any foreign port whatever than is accorded to the vessels or subjects of such foreign country by the laws and policy of the United States.

The subject of commercial rights, viewed in another aspect, compels the inquiry whether it is not entirely absurd to consider that if a British port existed on the southwestern or western coast of Newfoundland, or on the coast of Labrador, in respect of which, by the treaty of 1818, there is no exclusion of American vessels from territorial waters, such American vessel could, so far as the treaty of 1818 is concerned, enter such port for all and the same purposes that any other American vessel could, and that, under the same treaty, 50 miles to the eastward on the southern coast of Newfoundland, the very same American vessel should not now have any right of entry for the same purpose?

The twelfth article of the treaty under consideration provides that—

Fishing vessels of Canada and Newfoundland shall have on the Atlantic coast of the United States all the privileges reserved and secured by this treaty to United States fishing vessels in the aforesaid waters of Canada and Newfoundland.

If this article was intended to put Canadian fishing vessels upon the same footing only in American ports and waters that American vessels are put in Canadian ports and waters, there would be mutuality and equality, however narrow, in it. But this, evidently, was not the purpose of the article, for it is evident to the committee that Great Britain would not have consented to any such great diminution of the rights of her fishing vessels as they now exist in the ports and waters of the United States. The article itself, it will be seen, while somewhat obscure, is still drawn in such a way as only to be affirmative, and measures privileges, reserved and secured, and says nothing of conditions and limitations and nothing of ports, etc. But, however this may be, the committee does not think that it comports with the dignity or hospitality of the United States to deny to British North American fishing vessels or those of any other country the ordinary commercial rights, hospitalities, and humanities that are now supposed to be nearly universal among nations calling themselves civilized, unless, unhappily, they should be compelled to do so in order to induce just and hospitable treatment to the vessels of our own country.

The thirteenth article provides that the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States shall make regulations for the conspicuous exhibition by every United States fishing vessel of its official number on its bows, and that no vessel shall be entitled to the licenses provided in the treaty which shall fail to comply with such regulations. This provision on its face and taken literally applies to every fishing vessel of the United States, whether it is ever to enter Canadian waters or not, and it is a law to the Secretary of the Treasury of perpetual application.

But assuming, however mistaken the language may have been for this purpose, that it is only to apply to United States fishing vessels entering Canadian ports or waters, it is bad enough, for it proceeds upon the idea that vessels of the United States engaged in the occupation of fishing are to be put under a ban of specific apparel and appearance that is not imposed upon any other vessel.

By the article next preceding, and already commented upon, all Canadian fishing vessels are entitled in our waters to all the privileges that American fishing vessels are entitled to have in Canadian waters so far as it regards fishing, at least; but they are not required to be thus numbered and marked. A hundred Canadian fishing vessels may anchor in the harbor of Gloucester, the great fishing port of the United States, and be entitled to every right and every hospitality only upon the evidence of their papers, which show their nationality and that they are not pirates; but if a single American fishing vessel appears in the harbor of Halifax, and under the guns of Her Majesty's forts, she can not obtain any supplies, and her crew may starve at anchor unless upon each bow there is the number affixed by order of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. Certainly, American fishermen and, we should hope, every other American citizen would not be proud of such a distinction.

The fourteenth article of the treaty deals with the subject of penalties for fishing contrary to the treaty of 1818 and the first article of this treaty, and thereby the United States are to agree that such penalty may extend to forfeiture, etc. This is a singular provision (and probably unique) to be found in a treaty between two civilized nations, the general tenor of whose laws and the general social nature of whose institutions are very nearly homogeneous.

The article also provides for a limitation or an exception, as the case may be, of the legal penalties for other violations of fishery rights, three dollars a ton.

It also provides that the proceedings shall be summary and as inexpensive as practicable and that the trial shall be at the place of detention—the place of detention being left to the discretion of the seizing authorities, for without special provision the seized vessel could be taken to any port in the Dominion.

It then provides that security for costs shall not be required of the defense except when bail is offered; that is to say, that when a vessel, with all its furniture, tackle, apparel, and cargo, and its captain and all its crew are seized and arrested and taken to a place of detention, security for costs shall not be required until the arrested citizen of the United States shall desire to release his vessel or get out of prison.

This certainly must be only what every just government would provide of itself. The same may be said of all the other provisions of this article. They are all identical with or analogons to the practice of civilized governments, and rest upon common principles of good administration of justice. Surely they should need no treaty contract to bring them into practice.

The fifteenth article of the treaty is open and conditional, and provides that when the United States shall admit British North American fish oil, whale oil, seal oil, and fish of all kinds except fish preserved in oil, free of customs duties, the like products of the United States shall be admitted free into British North America, and it is also provided that in that case United States fishing vessels may be entitled—not to fish in-shore as the treaty of 1871 provided but—to annual *licenses* for the following purposes in British North America:

- (1) The purchase of provisions, bait, ice, seins, supplies, etc.
- (2) The transshipment of catch.
- (3) The shipping of crews, but that supplies shall not be obtained by barter.
- (4) And that the like privileges shall be *continued* or given to fishing vessels of British North America on the Atlantic coast of the United States.

This is a much worse "reciprocity" than existed under the treaty of 1871, for while the treaty of 1871 was silent in respect of commercial rights in either country and left the matter of the commercial rights standing upon mutual legislative regulations of the two countries, this treaty limits the rights of the fishing vessels to certain specified forms and descriptions of commercial privileges, though it does seem to recognize the truth that would otherwise appear to have been forgotten in

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the negotiations, that Canadian fishing vessels now have commercial rights and privileges in the ports of the United States.

The impolicy of the general provisions of article 15 have already been twice fully demonstrated, and, on the last occasion of the kind, were unanimously abrogated by Congress. It is thought needless to now go into a discussion of that subject.

We have thus briefly reviewed all the substantial articles of the treaty of positive obligation excepting Article IX, which declares that nothing in the treaty shall affect the free navigation of the Strait of Canso. This article was evidently inserted on account of the renunciation by the United States of its rights in Chedabucto Bay—this bay being at the southern entrance of that strait.

It is almost unnecessary to say that the committee is fully sensible that in many matters of fair difference and of doubtful consideration between two governments, in order to arrive at an amicable composition thereof there must be mutual concessions, and that the same is true in respect of entering into new engagements for commercial and other intercourse between nations, in order that, in the last-named case, perfect mutuality of right and privilege may be had in respect of the same matters; but the committee does not think that the proposed treaty can be justified in this way.

This idea of concession was doubtless the ground and guide upon which the treaty of 1818 was founded. At the time of that treaty the United States claimed (and justly as the committee thinks) that the fishing rights recognized by the treaty of 1783 on all the shores of British North America were property rights and that they were not lost by the war of 1812, and that after the treaty of peace of 1814, which made no mention of the subject, those rights existed with all their original force.

The British Government insisted upon the contrary and that the right of citizens of the United States to fish in any British North American waters had been entirely lost. This led to a partition of the disputed territory—whether wise or unwise is immaterial to the present question—but in making this settlement the contracting parties had evidently in view the then understood law of nations, that territorial waters only extended to three miles from the shore; and they also had in view the then existing state of treaty and legal relations between Great Britain and the United States in respect of intercourse between the British North American Provinces and this country, and the treaty

provided in clear terms where, in British waters, United States fishermen might fish and where they might not.

The only possible question that could fairly arise under the treaty of 1818 was the question what was a British bay. But the question, as a practical one, has been in all the sixty-nine years since the making of that treaty of little or no account; for, so far as is known, the only seizure of an American vessel by the British authorities for fishing more than 3 miles from the shore in a bay more than 6 miles wide was the seizure of the *Washington*, in 1843, and in that case, as has been before stated, the international umpire decided the seizure to have been an illegal and unjust one.

What American fishermen standing in all other respects on the footing of other Americans engaged in business on the sea, might do in their character as *fishermen* in the territorial waters and harbors of British North America was clearly stated, and in language that would seem to have been incapable of sincere misunderstanding.

The whole of the substance of the present state of the difficulty and discord has arisen from the course of the British and Canadian legislation and administration, directed against the vessels and fishermen of the United States in respect of their coming into British North American ports or harbors or within three miles of their shores, either under treaty rights or commercial rights.

In view of the plain history of these transactions and of the matters hereinbefore stated, it does not seem to the committee that the existing matters of difficulty are subjects for treaty negotiation; and such appears to have been the opinion of the Senate by its action and by the remarks of many of its members of both political parties and by the action of the House of Representatives upon and in the passage of the act of March 3, 1887, and its approval by the President.

No new event or situation of affairs has arisen since that time, and the only real questions subsisting between the two countries in respect of the subject were those of reclamations by the United States for outrages upon its citizens, for which this treaty makes no provision, and the question of whether the mutual arrangements of 1830 and the mutual rights of transit under the treaty of 1871 shall continue.

This treaty makes no provision for an indemnity. It does make provision for establishing forever the full measure and limit of rights and privileges to be enjoyed by fishing vessels of the United States, whatever other character they may also have and appear in, in the ports and waters of British North America, and it thus surrenders rights

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and privileges that the committee thinks are clearly and fully established under the arrangements of 1830, and the treaty of 1871, or, if such rights and privileges can be claimed not to exist in these respects, that it provides, as of original and perpetual engagement, for the exclusion of the American vessels engaged in a particular occupation on the high seas from the ordinary humanities and hospitalities and equalities enjoyed in the British North American ports by all other vessels of the United States, and, so far as is known, all the vessels of every character of every other country, while at the same time British North American vessels engaged in the same occupation and in the same seas have, without restraint, every right and facility of commerce, hospitality, and immunity in all the ports of the United States. To enter into such an engagement, finally and perpetually, as this, the committee thinks contrary to the dignity and just interests of the United States.

The committee regrets that these conclusions do not meet the approval of all its members. It had hoped, as has been the case generally hitherto, that no influences or divisions of a nature coincident with the lines of political parties would enter into a matter of this character, and that, as was the case only a little more than a year ago, all Senators of all political parties would unite in standing firmly in the attitude taken in the winter of 1886-'87 and culminating in the act of March 3, 1887, and in declining, at whatever cost, to enter into any new engagements with the British Government that should leave any American citizen, engaged in whatever occupation or business, deprived of any right or privilege, other than fishing, in any British North American or other waters, that is or may be granted to citizens of the United States engaged in any other occupation, and that have been and are fully and freely granted by the United States to every British subject, whatever may be his occupation.

The committee thinks it due to the Senate to state that, contrary (as it believes) to the universal previous practice of the Executive in connection with the consideration of treaties when the Senate has asked for all the papers and information in detail concerning the progress of the negotiations, the Executive has not thought it for the "public interest," in this instance, to communicate all such papers and such detailed information to the Senate, although the Senate requested it; and it was stated in reply to the resolution of request that the deliberations of the pleni-

potentiaries were in confidence, and "that only results should be announced and such other matters as the joint protocolists should sign under the direction of the plenipotentiaries."

It is, however, stated that every point submitted to conference is covered by papers already in possession of the Senate, excepting the question of damages sustained by our fishermen, and which, it is stated, was met by a counter-claim for damages to British vessels in the Behring Sea. It is then added that—

To the discretion and control of the Executive are intrusted the initiation and conduct of the negotiation of treaties, and without the guaranty of mutual and implicit confidence between the agents, negotiations for the voluntary adjustment of vexed questions in controversy between nations could not hopefully be entered upon.

It thus appears to be claimed by the Executive that the Senate, without whose advice and consent no treaty can be concluded, has no right to be informed, confidentially, of the course of negotiations and discussions and the various propositions and arguments *pro* and *con* arising in the negotiation of a treaty. The committee feels it to be their duty to protest against any such assumption. It believes that such a claim is contrary to the essential nature of the constitutional relations between the President and the Senate on such subjects, and that it is the reverse of the continuous practice in such matters from the commencement of the Government to this time.

The principal points of the treaty, etc., that have been considered by the committee in the foregoing statement and discussion may be summarized substantially as follows:

SUMMARY.

I. The United States recognize as British territory and renounce forever all claim of independent right in all the great bays along the British North American coasts, named in the treaty, and admit that all such bays form a part of and are within British territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction.

II. Of the few of such great bays that are left to be visited by American fisherman the larger part are understood to be valueless, and some of them are subject to French fishery rights older than our own, if they are British bays.

III. If bay fishing is not profitable now it may be in the future.

IV. Whether profitable or not, the United States ought not to give up, upon any consideration whatever, the right of its vessels of every character to visit and carry on business in any part of the public seas.

V. which of its on the and right tribun VI. ceases waters, VII. States i sea with the conv States whose h happen VIII. existing Congress article of in fishing character merical pr which, in to the full solely from IX. It b by this tre it forever, be obtained X. In th vessels pos the United XI. Wha thus provid that no fish unless such the Treasur on each bow be communi

V. The treaty surrenders the claim and right of the United States, which has been acted upon and exercised for now more than a century, of its vessels engaged in fishing or other occupations to visit and carry on their business in these great bays, and the principle of which claim and right has once been solemnly decided against Great Britain by a tribunal organized under a treaty with that Government.

VI. The new area of delimitation described in the treaty greatly increases the danger of our fishermen unintentionally invading prohibited waters, and thereby exposing them to seizures and penalties.

VII. The treaty, by its fifth article, renounces any right of the United States in any bay, etc., however large, that "can not be reached from the sea without *passing* within the 3 marine miles mentioned in article 1 of the convention of October 20, 1818," thus excluding vessels of the United States from all waters, however extensive, and the distance between whose headlands is however great, the sailing channel to which may happen to be within 3 miles of the shore.

VIII. The treaty is a complete surrender of any claim of a right now existing either under the treaty of 1783, the treaty of 1818, the acts of Congress and the British orders in council of 1830, or the twenty-ninth article of the treaty of 1871, for vessels of the United States engaged in fishing anywhere on the high seas, and even having a commercial character also, to enter any port of British North America for any commercial purpose whatever, and puts in the place of these clear rights, which, in respect of British fishing vessels, exist in the United States to the fullest extent, greatly restricted and conditional rights as arising solely from a present grant of Great Britain.

IX. It binds the United States to be content with whatever is given by this treaty as the full measure of its rights, and to be content with it forever, or until greater hospitality and freedom of intercourse can be obtained by further concessions or considerations on our part.

X. In the face of all this it leaves British North American fishing vessels possessed of all commercial rights in all the ports and waters of the United States.

XI. Whatever privileges of commerce, hospitality, or humanity are thus provided for in the treaty are to be obtained only upon condition that no fishing vessel of the United States shall receive any of them unless such fishing vessel shall, under regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, be branded with an official number on each bow, and that such regulation shall, before they become effectual, be communicated to Her Majesty's Government.

XII. It provides that general, and even then, much limited, commercial rights and rights of transshipment, as mentioned in article fifteen, shall be obtained only at the price of exempting all Canadian fishery products from our custom duties.

XIII. Its provisions concerning the executive and judicial treatment of American vessels and fishermen that may be seized or arrested for supposed illegal conduct are, to make the most of them, nothing other, and probably something less, than a statement of what the laws and conduct of any administration of every government professing to be civilized should adopt and exercise as an act of duty and justice.

XIV. Instead of diminishing sources of irritation and causes of difficulty, different interpretations and disputes, it will, the committee thinks, very largely increase them.

Various other suggestions adverse to the wisdom of ratifying this treaty might easily be made, but the committee does not think it necessary to go into them.

The committee can not but hope, that if these ill-advised negotiations, which, as is known to all the world, can not properly commit the United States in any degree until they shall have received the constitutional assent of the Senate, shall fail to meet the approval of this body, Her Majesty's Government will take measures to secure justice and fair treatment in her North American dominions to American vessels and American citizens, in all respects and under all circumstances, and that that Government will see the justice and propriety of according to American vessels engaged in the business of fishing all the commercial rights and facilities in her North American ports that are so freely and cheerfully accorded to her own in the ports of the United States, and that thus the friendship and good feeling which ought to exist between neighboring nations may be finally established and secured.

JOHN SHERMAN.
GEO. F. EDMUNDS.
WM. P. FRYE.
WM. M. EVARTS.
J. N. DOLPH.

MAY 7, 1888.

VIEWS

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VIEWS OF THE MINORITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UPON THE

Treaty signed on the 15th February, 1838, by the plenipotentiaries of the United States and Great Britain, dissenting from the report of the majority of that committee, which recommends that the Senate refuse to advise and consent to the ratification of said treaty.

The minority of the Committee on Foreign Relations dissent from the report of the majority recommending the rejection of the treaty with Great Britain dated February 15, 1838, and submitted to the Senate for its consideration, and present the following as their principal reasons for their dissent :

Two objections to this treaty were stated in committee.

(1) That it had been negotiated and signed by persons who were not duly empowered, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to conduct and conclude a treaty.

(2) That the treaty, on its merits, should not be ratified by the Senate.

To meet the first objection, a member of the minority of the committee introduced the following resolution :

Resolved, That the treaty signed by Thomas F. Bayard, William L. Putnam, and James B. Angell, as plenipotentiaries of the United States, in conjunction with the British plenipotentiaries, on the 15th day of February, 1838, and sent to the Senate by the President as a treaty duly negotiated, for the consideration and action of the Senate, is properly authenticated as a treaty made by the President of the United States, acting within his constitutional powers, and is lawful and valid as a negotiation.

The purpose of this resolution was to bring before the Senate, in distinct form, the recommendation of the committee as to the merits of the treaty, apart from any collateral matter relating to the negotiation of the instrument.

In committee, this resolution was laid upon the table, and thereby any recommendation as to the question it presents, in answer to the first objection to the treaty, as above stated, was avoided.

The minority of the committee hold that it is entirely competent for a majority in the Senate to declare the treaty has been negotiated and signed in a proper manner, and by persons duly qualified, or otherwise to return it to the President as a paper that does not call into exercise the powers and jurisdiction of the Senate upon the question of its ratification by them. And, if a majority in the Senate shall declare that the treaty is sent to the Senate by the President and is duly signed and authenticated, or if no objection to it on that ground is made, then the subject-matter of the treaty is in order and should be considered by the Senate.

It is not disputed, or, so far as the undersigned are informed, doubted, by any one that the Senate may accept and ratify, on the part of the United States, any treaty that the President has made with a foreign government, that he sends to the Senate for consideration, and may waive any informality attending its negotiation.

In accepting the paper sent to the Senate by the President as a treaty, and by referring the same to its committee, the Senate have virtually waived any informality, if there is any, in the negotiation and signing of the instrument, and the undersigned conceive that the whole duty of the committee was to consider and report upon the merits of the treaty.

The undersigned will, therefore, present their views upon the substance of the treaty, first, and will then state the reasons that force them to the conclusion that there can be no just ground for the rejection of the treaty, growing out of the manner of its negotiation.

If it is better for the country that the treaty should be ratified, the rejection of it for matters that are merely formal or technical, in so grave an emergency as is now presented in connection with this old and harassing controversy, would be a serious injury to the country.

The undersigned believe that it is better for our country that the treaty should be ratified, and they are equally convinced that the entire class of our people who are actively engaged in our North Atlantic fishing industry will be benefited by its ratification.

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The first article of the treaty of 1818 is as follows:

Whereas differences have arisen respecting the liberty claimed by the United States, for the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, and cure fish on certain coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America, it is agreed between the high contracting parties that the inhabitants of the said United States shall have forever, in common with the subjects of His Britannic Majesty, the liberty to take fish of every kind on that part of the southern coast of Newfoundland which extends from Cape Ray to the Rameau Islands, on the western and northern coast of Newfoundland; from the said Cape Ray to the Quirpon Islands, on the shores of the Magdalen Islands, and also on the coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks, from Mount Joly, on the southern coast of Labrador, to and through the Straits of Belle Isle, and thence northwardly, indefinitely, along the coast, without prejudice, however, to any of the exclusive rights of the Hudson Bay Company. And that the American fishermen shall also have liberty forever to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbors, and creeks of the southern part of the coast of Newfoundland hereabove described, and of the coast of Labrador; but, so soon as the same or any portion thereof shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such portion so settled without previous agreement for such purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground. And the United States hereby renounce forever any liberty heretofore enjoyed or claimed by the inhabitants thereof to take, dry, or cure fish, on or within three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America not included within the above-mentioned limits: *Provided, however,* That the American fishermen shall be admitted to enter such bays or harbors for the purpose of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever. But they shall be under such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent their taking, drying, or curing fish therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing the privileges hereby reserved to them.

Articles 18 to 25, both inclusive, of the treaty of 1871, covered the whole subject of the fishing rights and liberties between the United States and the British North American colonies, "*in addition*" to those secured by the treaty of 1818. No other articles in the treaty of 1871 related to the fisheries, or the rights of fishermen. When the United States abrogated these articles, that completely ended the influence of that treaty over our fishing rights. Article 29 was not terminated, but it never had the least reference to the fisheries treaty of 1818, to enlarge its scope, change its meaning, or in any way to affect any right to which that treaty related. Yet, if that is not the true meaning of the 29th article of the treaty of 1871, this present treaty in no way affects that article, and it stands for all that it was ever worth in favor of our fishermen.

I.

GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE SITUATION WHICH HAS RESULTED FROM THE "MISUNDERSTANDING" AS TO THE TRUE MEANING OF THE TREATY OF 1818.

During seventy years the people of the United States and of the British North American provinces in the northeast have been frequently engaged in contention and dispute, in controversy and conflict, about the true interpretation of the fisheries treaty of 1818.

The most frequent and serious disagreements have arisen under the *proviso* to the first article, which is as follows:

Provided, however, That the American fishermen shall be admitted to enter such bays or harbors for the purpose of shelter and of repairing damages therein, and of purchasing wood, and of obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever. But they shall be under such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent their taking, drying, or curing fish therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing the privileges hereby reserved to them.

This proviso, as it was proposed by our negotiators, contained the words "and bait" after the word "water." These words were stricken out, with the consent of our Commissioners. The right to obtain bait was thus finally disposed of as a treaty right.

In this proviso the four distinct "privileges hereby reserved to" American fishermen are stated definitely, while "such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent" them in any manner from "abusing the privileges" reserved to them are not defined, except in the most general terms.

American fishermen are placed "under such restrictions" with no guaranty as to the jurisdiction, whether provincial or imperial, that shall promulgate and enforce them; or whether they shall be declared by legislative authority, or administered by executive authority or by the judiciary.

It was contemplated in this treaty that further definitions on these delicate questions should be settled, either by the future agreement of the treaty powers, or that Great Britain should choose the tribunals that would declare and enforce these "restrictions" against American fishermen, subject only to the requirement that they should be "such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent their taking, drying, or curing fish therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing the privileges hereby reserved to them."

That controversies would arise under this uncertain definition of the power to prescribe restrictions to our fishermen in the enjoyment of

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positive treaty rights was as certain in 1818 as seventy years' experience has proven it to be, in an unfortunate history.

It was probably expected in 1818 that the good sense of the people and the good will of their Governments would enable them to arrange these indefinite "restrictions" by precedent and acquiescence, and thus adopt a series of regulations, the justice and propriety of which all would admit. But such hopes, if they were entertained, have been disappointed, and the eager rivalry that a very lucrative employment has stimulated has involved the people and their Governments in dangerous controversies as to the "restrictions" that were left without accurate definition in the proviso to the first article of the treaty of 1818.

Efforts have been made, that were for a time successful, to compose these and other troublesome questions growing out of article 1 of the treaty of 1818, by new treaty arrangements relating to the fisheries in British waters on the northeastern coasts.

In the treaty of 1854 the repose of these questions was secured for a time for the consideration of a liberal reciprocity extending to a variety of subjects. The right of the free navigation of the St. Lawrence River was included in that reciprocal agreement, and was made perpetual by the reciprocity treaty of 1871.

In the treaty of 1871 we again put these questions to rest for a time by the promise of enough money to equalize the possible advantages of the Canadian and other fisheries over those on our coast north of 39° north latitude.

Neither of these arrangements proved satisfactory to us as to the fisheries, and they were terminated by the United States.

In addition to these efforts, our diplomatists have employed every argument that seemed possible, through many years of laborious correspondence and conference, to find a ground of mutual understanding and consent as to the true interpretation of the treaty of 1818.

Without attempting to state all the cases of warnings, seizures, fines, and confiscations, of searches and captures and other rigorous applications of "restrictions" that have been visited upon our fishermen, it is painfully true that they have been very numerous, frequently very aggravated, and have caused our fishermen great expense and serious losses.

Every fishing season, when the reciprocity treaties were not in force, has added to these complications and rendered their solution more difficult.

That very little progress has been made in reaching a common basis of agreement in the solution of these contentions and conflicting constructions of the proviso in article 1 of the treaty of 1818, or in respect of the headland theory (which is based, as we understand, upon the language of that proviso and the preceding parts of that section, and not upon the principles of international law), is apparent from the citations of cases that have arisen since 1818, presently to be made.

Instead of a nearer approach to such an understanding as to a true and mutually acceptable construction of the first article of the treaty, a wide divergence of opinion and a more determined contention have characterized the diplomacy of both the treaty powers.

We seem now to have reached a point where we must seek to allay the growing bitterness of these differences by a friendly, sincere, and mutually respectful consideration of the positions assumed by each Government, or else we must enforce our views by vigorous measures of retaliation.

It seems to have become necessary to make such modifications of that treaty as are suggested by our changed commercial relations since 1818, and also by our methods of fishing with purse seines and of preserving fish in ice and snow, which have grown up into almost entirely new systems, with new attending wants, in the past thirty years.

The gradual abridgment of our right to land and cure fish on the shores of the British possessions, as the country along the shores should become populated, was provided for in the treaties of 1783, 1818, 1854, and 1871. This feature in a treaty is thought to be entirely novel. It relates to a future expected change in the condition of the then uninhabited coasts of British America. It certainly suggests in a forcible way that it was contemplated that future modifications of the treaties would be necessary to meet these changed conditions when they should occur.

The progress of civilization on the North American continent, with the necessary increase of commerce and of improvement in every industry, has wrought changes in the condition of the people which have demanded, from time to time, changes in the treaty relations of the adjoining countries that were indispensable.

The right of navigating the Mississippi and St. Lawrence Rivers, as now agreed upon, is a most forcible illustration of this necessity for an international policy, modified by international agreement, that will provide for the mutual wants and advantage of these adjoining countries as the occasion demands.

1. June 26, 1822.
2. In 1823, *Ch*
3. July 18, 182
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5. October 7, 1

An inflexible adherence to the literal construction of ancient agreements that have become too narrow for the convenience of either country, whether it results from national jealousy or commercial rivalry, creates an incubus upon the progress of the communities concerned that is derogatory to those who refuse to yield their prejudices.

Mr. Bayard, in presenting to the consideration of the British Government the reasons for a more liberal interpretation of the treaty of 1818, and for an enlargement of the privileges of our fishermen in the colonial ports, strongly urged the necessity for this relaxation of the strict and literal construction placed by that Government on that treaty, because of the growth of the commerce of both countries, the building of vast lines of railways, the increase of population, the enlarged demand for the products of the fisheries, and the more intimate commercial and social relations of the people.

Such considerations demand careful attention, and are, of themselves, sufficient reasons to induce both Governments to lay aside prejudices and resentments, and to induce their people to cultivate friendly relations, rather than to put their welfare at hazard by fostering ill-will towards each other, resulting in continual strife.

To show the very serious results of a different policy, the undersigned present the following statement of cases that have arisen out of the conflicting views as to the meaning of the first article of the treaty of 1818. It is probably far short of the full list of cases that have actually occurred, but it is large enough to disclose the fact that wide and serious differences have existed since 1819 in the interpretation of that treaty, attended with complaints and remonstrances and protests, followed by diplomatic correspondence, and at times threatening the gravest consequences to the peace of the two countries.

In all the long list of cases that are here referred to only in one case, that of *The Washington*, seized for fishing in the Bay of Fundy in 1843, has any reparation been made for any wrong done our fishermen under the treaty of 1818.

Reparation was not, indeed, demanded in any such case until 1886.

List of cases above referred to.

1. June 26, 1822, *L'Orient* seized, taken to St. John, and condemned September 14, 1822.
2. In 1823, *Charles of York*, Maine, seized by the *Argus* and taken into port for trial.
3. July 18, 1824, *Gallion* seized, taken to St. John, and condemned August 16, 1824.
4. July 18, 1824, *William* seized, taken to St. John, and condemned August 16, 1824.
5. October 7, 1824, *Escape* seized, taken to St. John, and condemned November 18, 1824.

6. October 7, 1824, *Rorer* seized, taken to St. John, and condemned November 18, 1824.
7. October 7, 1824, *Sea Flower* seized, taken to St. John, and condemned November 18, 1824.
8. June 1, 1838, *Hero* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned January 28, 1839.
9. November 1, 1838, *Combene* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned January 28, 1839.
10. May —, 1839, *Jara* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned August 5, 1839.
11. June 4, 1839, *Shetland* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned July 8, 1839.
12. May 26, 1839, *Independence* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned August 5, 1839.
13. May 25, 1839, *Magnolia* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned August 5, 1839.
14. May —, 1839, *Hart* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned August 5, 1839.
15. June —, 1839, *Batelle* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned July 8, 1839.
16. June 14, 1839, *Hyder Ally* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned July 8, 1839.
17. June 14, 1839, *Eliza* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned July 8, 1839.
18. June —, 1839, *May Flower* seized, taken to Halifax, and restored to its owners.
19. June 2, 1840, *Papineau* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned July 10, 1840.
20. June 2, 1840, *Mary* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned July 10, 1840.
21. September 11, 1840, *Alms* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned December 8, 1840.
22. September 18, 1840, *Director* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned December 8, 1840.
23. October 1, 1840, *Ocean* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned December 8, 1840.
24. May 6, 1841, *Pioneer* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned August 18, 1841.
25. May 20, 1841, *Two Friends* seized, taken to Halifax, and restored.
26. September 20, 1841, *Mars* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned November 2, 1841.
27. September 20, 1841, *Egret* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned November 2, 1841.
28. October 13, 1841, *Warrior* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned November 9, 1841.
29. October 13, 1841, *Hope* seized, taken to Halifax, and restored.
30. October 13, 1841, *May Flower* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned December 7, 1841.
31. May 7, 1843, *Washington* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned August 1, 1843.
32. In 1844, *Argus* seized by the *Sylph*, off the coast of Cape Breton, when "fifteen miles from any land." "This was the second seizure under the new construction of the treaty of 1818."
33. In 1845, "an American fisherman * * * was seized in the Bay of Fundy, at anchor inside the light-house at the entrance of Digby Gut."
34. In 1846, "the seizure and total loss of several American vessels," not named, is noted in S. Doc. 22, 2d sess., 32d Congress.
35. May 10, 1848, *Hyades* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned September 5, 1848.
36. May 11, 1849, *Leonidas* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned June 29, 1849.
37. September 14, 1850, *Harp* seized, taken to Halifax, and condemned January 28, 1851.

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38. October 29, 1851, *Tiber* seized, but there is no information as to the disposition made of it.
39. June 16, 1852, *Coral* seized, taken to St. John, and condemned July 28, 1852.
40. July 20, 1852, *Union* seized, taken to Charlottetown, and condemned September 24, 1852.
41. August 5, 1852, *Florida* seized, taken to Charlottetown, and condemned September 7, 1852.
42. September 11, 1852, *Caroline Knight* seized, taken to Charlottetown, and condemned.
43. In 1852, *Golden Rule* detained and taken to Charlottetown, and liberated on the owner acknowledging violation of the treaty and that the liberation was an act of clemency.
44. November 16, 1869, Vice-Admiral Wellesley reported that during the past season 162 vessels had been boarded by the British cruisers, of which 131 within the three-mile limit had been warned once, and 19 had been warned twice.

In 1870 the following eleven (11) vessels were seized and taken into the provincial ports, some of which were condemned, while others, perhaps, were liberated: June 27, *Wampatuck* (condemned); June 30, *J. H. Nickerson* (taken to Halifax); August 27, *Lizzie A. Tarr* (condemned); September 30, *A. H. Wonson* (taken to Halifax); October 15, *A. J. Franklin* (taken to Halifax); November 8, *Romp*; November 25, *White Faun* (taken to St. John); and *S. G. Marshall*, *Albert*, and *Clara F. Friend*.

In January, 1878, the *Fred. P. Frye*, *Mary M.*, *Lizzie* and *Namari*, *Edward E. Webster*, *William E. McDonald*, *Crest of the Wave*, *F. A. Smith*, *Hereward*, *Moses Adams*, *Charles E. Warren*, *Moro Castle*, *Wild-fire*, *Maud* and *Effie*, *Isaac Rich*, *Bunker Hill*, *Bonanza*, *Moses Knowlton*, *H. M. Rogers*, *John W. Bray*, *Maud B. Wetherell*, *New England*, and *Ontario* were driven from Long Harbor in Fortune Bay by the violence of a mob, which destroyed some of their seines, and did not again that season return to their fishing-grounds. Twenty-two vessels were included in this list, the interference with which was made the occasion of a separate and important correspondence, conducted, on our side, chiefly by Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State.

The following lists are taken from the subjoined correspondence of Secretary Bayard and Professor Baird with Mr. Edmunds, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Revised list of vessels involved in the controversy with the Canadian authorities.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, January 26, 1887.

SIR: Responding to your request, dated the 17th and received at this Department on the 18th instant, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, for a revision

of the list, heretofore furnished by this Department to the committee, of all American vessels seized, warned, fined, or detained by the Canadian authorities during the year 1886, I now inclose the same.

Every such instance is therein chronologically enumerated, with a statement of the general facts attendant.

Very respectfully, yours,

T. F. BAYARD.

Hon. GEORGE F. EDMUNDS,
United States Senate.

List of American vessels seized, detained, or warned off from Canadian ports during the last year.

1. *Sarah B. Putnam*. Beverly, Mass.; Charles Randolph, master. Driven from harbor of Pubnico in storm March 22, 1886.
2. *Joseph Story*. Gloucester, Mass. Detained by customs officers at Baddeck, N. S., in April, 1886, for alleged violation of the customs laws. Released after twenty-four hours' detention.
3. *Seth Stockbridge*. Gloucester, Mass.; Antone Olson, master. Warned off from St. Andrews, N. B., about April 30, 1886.
4. *Annie M. Jordan*. Gloucester, Mass.; Alexander Haine, master. Warned off at St. Andrews, N. B., about May 4, 1886.
5. *David J. Adams*. Gloucester, Mass.; Alden Kinney, master. Seized at Digby, Nova Scotia, May 7, 1886, for alleged violation of treaty of 1818, act of 59, George III, and act of 1883. Two suits brought in vice-admiralty court at Halifax for penalties. Protest filed May 12. Suits pending still, and vessel not yet released apparently.
6. *Susie Cooper*. (Hooper?) Gloucester?, Mass. Boarded and searched, and crew rudely treated, by Canadian officials in Canso Bay, Nova Scotia, May, 1886.
7. *Ella M. Doughty*. Portland, Me.; Warren A. Doughty, master. Seized at St. Ann's, Cape Breton, May 17, 1886, for alleged violation of the customs laws. Suit was instituted in vice-admiralty court at Halifax, Nova Scotia, but was subsequently abandoned, and vessel was released June 29, 1886.
8. *Jennie and Julia*. Eastport, Me.; W. H. Travis, master. Warned off at Digby, Nova Scotia, by customs officers, May 19, 1886.
9. *Lucy Ann*. Gloucester, Mass.; Joseph H. Smith, master. Warned off at Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, May 29, 1886.
10. *Matthew Keany*. Gloucester, Mass. Detained at Souris, Prince Edward Island, one day for alleged violation of customs laws, about May 31, 1886.
11. *James A. Garfield*. Gloucester, Mass. Threatened, about June 1, 1886, with seizure for having purchased bait in a Canadian harbor.
12. *Martha W. Bradley*. Gloucester, Mass.; J. F. Ventier, master. Warned off at Canso, Nova Scotia, between June 1 and 8, 1886.
13. *Eliza Boynton*. Gloucester, Mass.; George E. Martin, master. Warned off at Canso, Nova Scotia, between June 1 and 9, 1886. Then afterwards detained in manner not reported, and released October 25, 1886.

14. *Mascot*. Gloucester, Mass.; Alexander McEachern, master. Warned off at Port Amherst, Magdalen Islands, June 10, 1886.
15. *Thomas F. Bayard*. Gloucester, Mass.; James McDonald, master. Warned off at Bonne Bay, Newfoundland, June 12, 1886.
16. *James G. Craig*. Portland, Me.; Webber, master. Crew refused privilege of landing for necessaries at Brooklyn, Nova Scotia, June 15 or 16, 1886.
17. *City Point*. Portland, Me.; Keene, master. Detained at Shelburne, Nova Scotia, July 2, 1886, for alleged violation of customs laws. Penalty of \$400 demanded. Money deposited, under protest, July 12, and in addition \$120 costs deposited July 14. Fine and costs refunded July 21, and vessel released August 26. Harbor dues exacted August 26, notwithstanding vessel had been refused all the privileges of entry.
18. *C. P. Harrington*. Portland, Me.; Frellick, master. Detained at Shelburne, Nova Scotia, July 3, 1886, for alleged violation of customs laws; fined \$400 July 5; fine deposited, under protest, July 12; \$120 costs deposited July 14; refunded July 21, and vessel released.
19. *Hereward*. Gloucester, Mass.; McDonald, master. Detained two days at Canso, Nova Scotia, about July 3, 1886, for shipping seamen contrary to port laws.
20. *G. W. Cushing*. Portland, Me.; Jewett, master. Detained July (by another report, June) 3, 1886, at Shelburne, Nova Scotia, for alleged violation of the customs laws; fined \$100; money deposited with collector at Halifax about July 12 or 14, and \$120 for costs deposited 14th; costs refunded July 21, and vessel released.
21. *Golden Hind*. Gloucester, Mass.; Ruben Cameron, master. Warned off at Bay of Chaleurs, Nova Scotia, on or about July 23, 1886.
22. *Norelty*. Portland, Me.; H. A. Joyce, master. Warned off at Pietou, Nova Scotia, June 29, 1886, where vessel had entered for coal and water; also refused entrance at Amherst, Nova Scotia, July 24.
23. *N. J. Miller*. Booth Bay, Me.; Dickson, master. Detained at Hopowell Cape, New Brunswick, for alleged violation of customs laws, on July 24, 1886. Fined \$400.
24. *Rattler*. Gloucester, Mass.; A. F. Cunningham, master. Warned off at Canso, Nova Scotia, June, 1886. Detained in port of Shelburne, Nova Scotia, where vessel entered seeking shelter August 3, 1886. Kept under guard all night and released on the 4th.
25. *Caroline Fought*. Booth Bay, Me.; Charles S. Reed, master. Warned off at Paspebiac, New Brunswick, and refused water, August 4, 1886.
26. *Shiloh*. Gloucester, Mass.; Charles Nevit, master. Boarded at Liverpool, Nova Scotia, August 9, and subjected to rude surveillance.
27. *Julia Ellen*. Booth Bay, Me.; Burnes, master. Boarded at Liverpool, Nova Scotia, August 9, 1886, and subjected to rude surveillance.
28. *Freddie W. Allton*. Provincetown, Mass.; Allton, master. Boarded at Liverpool, Nova Scotia, August 9, 1886, and subjected to rude surveillance.
29. *Howard Holbrook*. Gloucester, Mass. Detained at Hawkesburg, Cape Breton, August 17, 1886, for alleged violation of the customs laws. Released August 20 on deposit of \$400. Question of remission of fine still pending.

30. *A. R. Crittenden*, Gloucester, Mass.; Bain, master. Detained at Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia, August 27, 1886, for alleged violation of customs laws. Four hundred dollars penalty deposited August 28 without protest, and vessel released. Three hundred and seventy-five dollars remitted, and a nominal fine of \$25 imposed.
31. *Mollie Adams*, Gloucester, Mass.; Solomon Jacobs, master. Warned off into storm from Straits of Canso, Nova Scotia, August 31, 1886.
32. *Highland Light*. Wellfleet, Mass.; J. H. Ryder, master. Seized off East Point, Prince Edward Island, September 1, 1886, while fishing within prohibited line. Suit for forfeiture begun in vice-admiralty court at Charlottetown. Hearing set for September 20, but postponed to September 30. Master fitted the charge and confessed judgment. Vessel condemned and sold September 14. Purchased by Canadian Government.
33. *Pearl Nelson*, Provincetown, Mass.; Kemp, master. Detained at Arichat, Cape Breton, September 8, 1886, for alleged violation of customs laws. Released September 9, on deposit of \$200. Deposit refunded October 26, 1886.
34. *Pioneer*, Gloucester, Mass.; F. F. Cruched, master. Warned off at Canso, Nova Scotia, September 9, 1886.
35. *Everett Steel*, Gloucester, Mass.; Charles H. Forbes, master. Detained at Shelburne, Nova Scotia, September 10, 1886, for alleged violation of customs laws. Released by order from Ottawa, September 11, 1886.
36. *Moro Castle*, Gloucester, Mass.; Edwin M. Joyce, master. Detained at Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia, September 11, 1886, on charge of having smuggled goods into Chester, Nova Scotia, in 1884, and also of violating customs laws. A deposit of \$1,600 demanded. Vessel discharged November 29, 1886, on payment, by agreement, of \$1,000 to Canadian Government.
37. *William D. Daisley*, Gloucester, Mass.; J. E. Gorman, master. Detained at Souris, Prince Edward Island, October 4, 1886, for alleged violation of customs law. Fined \$400, and released on payment; \$375 of the fine remitted.
38. *Laara Sayward*, Gloucester, Mass.; Medeo Rose, master. Refused privilege of landing to buy provisions at Shelburne, Nova Scotia, October 5, 1886.
39. *Marion Grimes*, Gloucester, Mass. Detained at Shelburne, Nova Scotia, October 9, for violation of port laws in failing to report at custom-house on entering. Fined \$400. Money paid under protest and vessel released. Fine remitted December 4, 1886.
40. *Jennie Seaverns*, Gloucester, Mass.; Joseph Tupper, master. Refused privilege of landing, and vessel placed under guard at Liverpool, Nova Scotia, October 20, 1886.
41. *Flying Scud*, Gloucester, Mass. Detained for alleged violation of customs laws at Halifax, November 1, or about that time. Released November 16, 1886.
42. *Sarah H. Prior*, Boston, Mass. Refused the restoration of a lost seine, which was found by a Canadian schooner, December 1886.
43. *Boat* (name unknown). Stephen R. Balcom, master, Eastport, Me. Warned off at St. Andrews, New Brunswick, July 9, 1886, with others.
44. *Two small boats* (unnamed); Charles Smith, Pembroke, Me., master. Seized at East Quaddy, New Brunswick, September 1, 1886, for alleged violation of customs laws.

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45. *Druid* (foreign built). Gloucester, Mass. Seized, warned off, or molested otherwise at some time prior to September 6, 1886.
46. *Abbey A. Snow*. Injury to this vessel has not been reported to the Department of State.
47. *Eliza A. Thomas*. Injury to this vessel has not been reported to the Department of State.
48. *Wide-Awake*. Eastport, Me.; William Foley, master. Fined at L'Etang, New Brunswick, \$75 for taking away fish without getting a clearance; again November 13, 1886, at St. George, New Brunswick, fined \$20 for similar offense. In both cases he was proceeding to obtain clearances.

U. S. COMMISSION OF FISH AND FISHERIES,

Washington, D. C., February 5, 1887.

SIR: I forward herewith, for your information, a copy of a communication from Mr. R. Edward Earl, in charge of the Division of Fisheries of this Commission, accompanied by a list of New England fishing vessels which have been inconvenienced in their fishing operations by the Canadian authorities during the past season; these being in addition to the vessels mentioned in the revised list of vessels involved in the controversy with the Canadian authorities, furnished to your committee on January 26 by the Secretary of State.

The papers containing the statements were received from the owners, masters, or agents of the vessels concerned, and, though not accompanied by affidavits, are believed to be correct.

Very respectfully, yours,

SPENCER F. BAIRD,
Commissioner.

Hon. GEORGE F. EDMUNDS,

Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.

U. S. COMMISSION OF FISH AND FISHERIES,

Washington, D. C., February 5, 1887.

SIR: Sometime since, at your request, I mailed circulars to owners or agents of all New England vessels employed in the food-fish fisheries. These called for full statistics of the vessels' operations during the year 1886, and, in addition, for statements of any inconveniences to which the vessels had been subjected by the recent action of the Canadian Government in denying to American fishing vessels the right to buy bait, ice, or other supplies in its ports, or in placing unusual restrictions on the use of its harbors for shelter.

A very large percentage of the replies to these circulars have already been received, and an examination of same shows that, in addition to the vessels mentioned in the revised list transmitted by the Secretary of State to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate on January 26, 1887, sixty-eight other New England fishing vessels have been subjected to treatment which neither the treaty of 1818 nor the principles of international law would seem to warrant.

I inclose for your consideration a list of these vessels, together with a brief abstract of the statements of the owners or masters regarding the treatment received. The statements were not accompanied by affidavits, but are believed to be entirely reliable. The name and address of the informant are given in each instance.

Very respectfully, yours,

R. EDWARD EARLE,
In charge Division of Fisheries.

Prof. SPENCER F. BAIRD,
U. S. Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries.

PARTIAL LIST OF VESSELS INVOLVED IN THE FISHERIES CONTROVERSY WITH THE
CANADIAN AUTHORITIES, FROM INFORMATION FURNISHED TO THE UNITED STATES
COMMISSIONER OF FISH AND FISHERIES.

[Supplementing a list transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, by the Secretary of State, January 26, 1887.]

1. *Eliza A. Thomes* (schooner). Portland, Me.; E. S. Bibbs, master. Wrecked on Nova Scotia shore, and unable to obtain assistance. Crew not permitted to land or to save anything until permission was received from captain of cutter. Canadian officials placed guard over fish saved, and everything saved from wreck narrowly escaped confiscation. (From statements of C. D. Thomes, owner, Portland, Me.)
2. *Christina Ellsworth* (schooner). Eastport, Me.; James Ellsworth, master. Entered Port Hastings, Cape Breton, for wood; anchored at 10 o'clock, and reported at custom-house. At 2 o'clock was boarded by captain of cutter Hector and ordered to sea, being forced to leave without wood. In every harbor entered was refused privilege of buying anything. Anchored under lee of land in no harbor, but was compelled to enter at custom-house. In no two harbors were the fees alike. (From statements of James Ellsworth, owner and master, Eastport, Me.)
3. *Mary E. Whorf* (schooner). Wellfleet, Mass.; Simon Berrio, master. In July, 1886, lost seine off North Cape, Prince Edward Island, and not allowed to make any repairs on shore, causing a broken voyage and a long delay. Ran short of provisions, and being denied privilege of buying any on land, had to obtain from another American vessel. (From statements of Freeman A. Snow, owner, Wellfleet, Mass.)
4. *Stowell Sherman* (schooner). Provincetown, Mass.; S. F. Hatch, master. Not allowed to purchase necessary supplies, and obliged to report at custom-houses situated at distant and inconvenient places; ordered out of harbors in stress of weather, namely, out of Casumpee harbor, Prince Edward Island, nineteen hours after entry, and out of Malpeque harbor, Prince Edward Island, fifteen hours after entry, wind then blowing too hard to admit of fishing. Returned home with broken trip. (From statements of Samuel T. Hatch, owner and master, Provincetown, Mass.)

5. *Walter L. Rich* (schooner). Wellfleet, Mass. : Obadiah Rich, master. Ordered out of Malpeque, P. E. I., in unsuitable weather for fishing, having been in harbor only twelve hours. Denied right to purchase provisions. Forced to enter at custom-house at Port Hawkesbury, C. B., on Sunday, collector fearing that vessel would leave before Monday and he would thereby lose his fee. (From statements of Obadiah Rich, owner and master, Wellfleet, Mass.)
6. *Bertha D. Nickerson* (schooner). Booth Bay, Me.; N. E. Nickerson, master. Occasioned considerable expense by being denied Canadian harbors to procure crew, and detained in spring while waiting for men to come from Nova Scotia. (From statements of S. Nickerson & Sons, owners, Booth Bay, Me.)
7. *Newell B. Hares* (schooner). Wellfleet, Mass. ; Thomas C. Kennedy, master. Refused privilege of buying provisions in ports on Bay Saint Lawrence, and in consequence obliged to leave for home with half a cargo. Made harbor at Shelburne, Nova Scotia, in face of storm, at 5 p. m., and master immediately started for custom-house, 5 miles distant, meeting captain of cutter *Terror* on way, to whom he explained errand. On returning, found two armed men from cutter on his vessel. At 7 o'clock next morning was ordered to sea, but refused to go in the heavy fog. At 9 o'clock the fog lifted slightly, and, though the barometer was very low and a storm imminent, vessel was forced to leave. Soon met the heavy gale, which split sails, causing considerable damage. Captain of *Terror* denied claim to right of remaining in harbor twenty-four hours. (From statements of T. C. Kennedy, part owner and master, Wellfleet, Mass.)
8. *Helen F. Tredick* (schooner), Cape Porpoise, Me.; R. J. Numan, master. July 20 1886, entered Port Latour, N. S., for shelter and water. Was ordered immediately to sea. (From statements of R. J. Numan, owner and master, Cape Porpoise, Me.)
9. *Nellie M. Snow* (schooner), Wellfleet, Mass.; A. E. Snow, master. Was not allowed to purchase provisions in any Canadian ports, or to refit or land and ship fish, consequently obliged to leave for home with broken trip. Not permitted to remain in ports longer than local Canadian officials saw fit. (From statements of J. C. Young, owner, Wellfleet, Mass.)
10. *Gertrude Summers* (schooner), Wellfleet, Mass.; N. S. Snow, master. Refused privilege of purchasing provisions, which resulted in injury to voyage. Found harbor regulations uncertain. Sometimes could remain in port twenty-four hours, again was ordered out in three hours. (From statements of N. S. Snow, owner and master, Wellfleet, Mass.)
11. *Charles R. Washington* (schooner), Wellfleet, Mass.; Jesse S. Snow, master. Master was informed by collector at Ship Harbor, C. B., that if he bought provisions, even if actually necessary, he would be subject to a fine of \$100 for each offense. Refused permission by the collector at Souris, P. E. I., to buy provisions, and was compelled to return home September 10, before close of fishing season. Was obliged to report at custom-house every time he entered a harbor, even if only for shelter. Found no regularity in the amount of fees demanded, this being apparently at the option of the collector. (From statements of Jesse S. Snow, owner and master, Wellfleet, Mass.)

12. *John M. Ball* (schooner), Provincetown, Mass.; N. W. Freeman, master. Driven out of Gulf of St. Lawrence to avoid fine of \$400 for landing two men in the port of Malpeque, P. E. I. Was denied all supplies, except wood and water, in same port. (From statements of N. W. Freeman, owner and master, Provincetown, Mass.)
13. *Zephyr* (schooner), Eastport, Me.; Warren Pulk, master. Cleared from Eastport, May 31, 1886, under register for West Isles, N. B., to buy herring. Collector refused to enter vessel, telling captain that if he bought fish, which were plenty at the time, the vessel would be seized. Returned to Eastport, losing about a week, which resulted in considerable loss to owner and crew. (From statements of Guilford Mitchell, owner, Eastport, Me.)
14. *Ibdou Keene* (schooner), Bremen, Me.; William C. Keene, master. Was not allowed to ship or land crew at Nova Scotia ports, and owner had to pay for their transportation to Maine. (From statements of William C. Keene, owner and master, Bremen, Me.)
15. *William Keene* (schooner), Portland, Me.; Daniel Kimball, master. Not allowed to ship a man or to send a man ashore except for water, at Liverpool, N. S., and ordered to sea as soon as water was obtained. (From statements of Henry Trefethen, owner, Peak's Island, Me.)
16. *John Nye* (schooner), Swan's Island, Me.; W. L. Joyee, master. After paying entry fees and harbor dues was not allowed to buy provisions at Malpeque, P. E. I., and had to return home for same, making a broken trip. (From statements of W. L. Joyee, owner and master, Atlantic, Me.)
17. *Asa H. Perrere* (schooner), Wellfleet, Mass.; A. B. Gore, master. Entered harbor for shelter; ordered out after 24 hours. Denied right to purchase food. (From statements of S. W. Kemp, agent, Wellfleet, Mass.)
18. *Nathan Cleaves* (schooner). Wellfleet, Mass.; P. E. Hickman, master. Ran short of provisions, and, not being permitted to buy, left for home with a broken voyage. Customs officer at Port Mulgrave, Nova Scotia, would allow purchase of provisions for homeward passage, but not to continue fishing. (From statements of Parker E. Hickman, owner and master, Wellfleet, Mass.)
19. *Frank G. Rich* (schooner). Wellfleet, Mass.; Charles A. Gorham, master. Not permitted to buy provisions or to lay in Canadian ports over twenty-four hours. (From statements of Charles A. Gorham, owner and master, Wellfleet, Mass.)
20. *Emma O. Curtis* (schooner). Provincetown, Mass.; Elisha Rich, master. Not allowed to purchase provisions, and therefore obliged to return home. (From statements of Elisha Rich, owner and master, Provincetown, Mass.)
21. *Pleiades* (schooner). Wellfleet, Mass.; F. W. Snow, master. Driven from harbor within twenty-four hours after entering. Not allowed to ship or discharge men under penalty of \$400. (From statements of F. W. Snow, owner and master, Wellfleet, Mass.)
22. *Charles F. Atwood* (schooner). Wellfleet, Mass.; Michael Burrows, master. Captain was not permitted to refit vessel or to buy supplies, and when out of food had to return home. Found Canadians disposed to harass him and put him to many inconveniences. Not allowed to land seine on Canadian shore for purpose of repairing same. (From statements of Michael Burrows, owner and master, Wellfleet, Mass.)

23. *Gertie May* (schooner). Portland, Me.; I. Doughty, master. Not allowed, though provided with permit to touch and trade, to purchase fresh bait in Nova Scotia, and driven from harbors. (From statements of Charles F. Guptill, owner, Portland, Me.)
24. *Margaret S. Smith* (schooner). Portland, Me.; Lincoln W. Jewett, master. Twice compelled to return home from Bay of St. Lawrence with broken trip, not being able to secure provisions to continue fishing. Incurred many petty inconveniences in regard to customs regulations. (From statements of A. M. Smith, owner, Portland, Me.)
25. *Elsie M. Smith* (schooner). Portland, Me.; Enoch Bulger, master. Came home with half fare, not being able to get provisions to continue fishing. Lost seine in a heavy gale rather than be annoyed by customs regulations when seeking shelter. (From statements of A. M. Smith, Portland, Me.)
26. *Fannie A. Spurling* (schooner). Portland, Me.; Caleb Parris, master. Subject to many annoyances, and obliged to return home with a half fare, not being able to procure provisions. (From statements of A. M. Smith, owner, Portland, Me.)
27. *Carleton Bell* (schooner). Booth Bay, Me.; Seth W. Eldridge, master. Occasioned considerable expense by being denied right to procure crew in Canadian harbors, and detained in spring while waiting for men to come from Nova Scotia. (From statements of S. Nickerson & Sons, owners, Booth Bay, Me.)
28. *Abbie M. Deering* (schooner). Portland, Me.; Emory Gott, master. Not being able to procure provisions, obliged to return home with a third of a fare of mackerel. (From statements of A. M. Smith, owner, Portland, Me.)
29. *Cora Louisa* (schooner). Booth Bay, Me.; Obed Harris, master. Could get no provisions in Canadian ports and had to return home before getting full fare of fish. (From statements of S. Nickerson & Sons, owners, Booth Bay, Me.)
30. *Eben Dale* (schooner). North Haven, Me.; R. G. Babbidge, master. Not permitted to buy bait, ice, or to trade in any way. Driven out of harbors, and unreasonable restrictions whenever near the land. (From statements of R. G. Babbidge, owner and master, Pulpit Harbor, Me.)
31. *Charles Haskell* (schooner). North Haven, Me.; Daniel Thurston, master. Obligated to leave Gulf of St. Lawrence at considerable loss, not being allowed to buy provisions. (From statements of C. S. Staples, owner, North Haven, Me.)
32. *Willie Parkman* (schooner). North Haven, Me.; William H. Banks, master. Unable to get supplies while in Gulf of St. Lawrence, which necessitated returning home at great loss, with a broken voyage. (From statements of William H. Banks, owner and master, North Haven, Me.)
33. *D. D. Geyer* (schooner). Portland, Me.; John K. Craig, master. Being refused privilege of touching at a Nova Scotia port to take on resident crew already engaged, owner was obliged to provide passage for men to Portland, at considerable cost, causing great loss of time. (From statements of F. H. Jordan, owner, Portland, Me.)

34. *Good Templar* (schooner). Portland, Me.; Elias Tarlton, master. Touched at La Have, Nova Scotia, to take on crew already engaged, but was refused privilege and ordered to proceed. The men being indispensable to voyage, had them delivered on board outside of three-limit by a Nova Scotia boat. (From statements of Henry Trefethen, owner, Peak's Island, Maine.)
35. *Eddie Davidson* (schooner). Wellfleet, Mass.; John D. Snow, master. June 12, 1886, touched at Cape Island, Nova Scotia, but was not permitted to take on part of crew. Boarded by customs officer and ordered to sail within twenty-four hours. Not allowed to buy food in ports on Gulf of St. Lawrence. (From statements of John D. Snow, owner and master, Wellfleet, Mass.)
36. *Alice P. Higgins* (schooner). Wellfleet, Mass.; Alvin W. Cobb, master. Driven from harbors twice in stress of weather. (From statements of Alvin W. Cobb, master, Wellfleet, Mass.)
37. *Cynosure* (schooner). Booth Bay, Me.; L. Rush, master. Was obliged to return home before securing a full cargo, not being permitted to purchase provisions in Nova Scotia. (From statements of S. Nickerson & Sons, owners, Booth Bay, Me.)
38. *Naiad* (schooner). Lubec, Me.; Walter Kennedy, master. Presented frontier license (heretofore acceptable) on arriving at St. George, N. B., but collector would not recognize same; was compelled to return to Eastport and clear under register before being allowed to purchase herring, thus losing one trip. (From statements of Walter Kennedy, master, Lubec, Me.)
39. *Louisa A. Grout* (schooner). Provincetown, Mass.; Joseph Hatch, jr., master. Took permit to touch and trade; arrived at St. Peter's, Cape Breton, in afternoon of May 19, 1886; entered and cleared according to law; was obliged to take inexperienced men at their own prices to complete fishing crew, to get to sea before the arrival of a seizing officer who had started from Straits of Canso at 5 o'clock same afternoon in search of vessel, having been advised by telegraph of the shipping of men. (From statements of Joseph Hatch, jr., owner and master, Provincetown, Mass.)
40. *Lottie E. Hopkins* (schooner). Vinal Haven, Me.; Emery J. Hopkins, master. Refused permission to buy any article of food in Canadian ports. Obtained shelter in harbors only by entering at custom-house. (From statement of Emery J. Hopkins, owner and master, North Haven, Me.)
41. *Florine F. Nickerson* (schooner). Chatham, Mass.; Nathaniel E. Eldridge, master. Engaged fishermen for vessel at Liverpool, Nova Scotia, but action of Canadian Government necessitated the paying of their transportation to the United States and loss of time to vessel while awaiting their arrival; otherwise would have called for them on way to fishing-grounds. Returning, touched at Liverpool, but immediately on anchoring, Canadian officials came aboard and refused permission for men to go ashore. Captain at once signified his intention of immediately proceeding on passage, but officer prevented his departure until he had reported at custom-house, vessel being thereby detained two days. (From statement of Kendrick & Barse, owners, South Harwich, Mass.)

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 51. *Electric*

42. *B. B. B.* (sloop), Eastport, Me.; George W. Copp, master. Obligated to discontinue business of buying sardine herring in New Brunswick ports for Eastport canneries, as local customs regulations were, during the season of 1886, made so exacting that it was impossible to comply with them without risk of the fish becoming stale and spoiled by detention. (From statements of George W. Copp, master, Eastport, Me.)
43. *Sir Knight* (schooner). Southport, Me.; Mark Rand, master. Compelled to pay transportation for crew from Nova Scotia to Maine, the vessel not being allowed to call at Nova Scotia ports for them on her way to the fishing-grounds. (From statements of William T. Maddocks, owner, Southport, Me.)
44. *Uncle Joe* (schooner), Southport, Me.; J. W. Pierce, master. Compelled to pay transportation for crew from Nova Scotia to Maine, the vessel not being allowed to call at Nova Scotia ports for them on her way to the fishing-grounds. (From statements of William T. Maddox, owner, Southport, Me.)
45. *Willie G.* (schooner). Southport, Me.; Albert F. Orne, master. Compelled to pay transportation for crew from Nova Scotia to Maine, the vessel not being allowed to call at Nova Scotia ports for them on her way to the fishing-grounds. (From statements of William T. Maddocks, owner, Southport, Me.)
46. *Lady Elgin* (schooner). Southport, Me.; George W. Pierce, master. Compelled to pay transportation for crew from Nova Scotia to Maine, the vessel not being allowed to call at Nova Scotia ports for them on her way to the fishing grounds. (From statements of William T. Maddocks, owner, Southport, Me.)
47. *John H. Kennedy* (schooner). Portland, Me.; David Dougherty, master. Called at a Nova Scotia port for bait, but left without obtaining same, fearing seizure and fine, returning home with a broken voyage. At a Newfoundland port was charged \$16 light-house dues, giving draft on owners for same, which, being excessive, they refused to pay. (From statements of E. G. Willard, owner, Portland, Me.)
48. *Ripley Ropes* (schooner). Southport, Me.; C. E. Hare, master. Vessel ready to sail when telegram from authorities at Ottawa refused permission to touch at Canadian ports to ship men; consequently obliged to pay for their transportation to Maine, and vessel detained while awaiting their arrival. (From statements of Freeman Orne & Son, owners, Southport, Me.)
49. *Jennie Armstrong* (schooner). Southport, Me.; A. O. Webber, master. Vessel ready to sail when telegram from authorities at Ottawa refused permission to touch at Canadian ports to ship men; consequently obliged to pay for their transportation to Maine, and vessel detained while awaiting their arrival. (From statements of Freeman Orne & Son, owners, Southport, Me.)
50. *Vanguard* (schooner). Southport, Me.; C. C. Dyer, master. Vessel ready to sail when telegram from authorities refused permission to touch at Canadian ports to ship men; consequently obliged to pay for their transportation to Maine, and vessel detained while awaiting their arrival. (From statements of Freeman Orne & Son, owners, Southport, Me.)
51. *Electric Flash* (schooner). North Haven, Me.; Aaron Smith, master. Unable to obtain supplies in Canadian ports and obliged to return home before obtaining full cargo. (From statements of Aaron Smith, master and agent, North Haven, Me.)

52. *Daniel Simmons* (schooner). Swan's Island, Me.; John A. Gott, master. Compelled to go without necessary outfit while fishing in Gulf of St. Lawrence. (From statements of M. Stimpson, owner, Swan's Island, Me.)
53. *Grover Cleveland* (schooner). Boston, Mass.; George Lakenm, master. Compelled to return home with only partial fare of mackerel, being refused supplies in Canadian ports. (From statements of B. F. De Butts, owner, Boston, Mass.)
54. *Andrew Burnham* (schooner). Boston, Mass.; Nathan F. Blake, master. Not allowed to buy provisions or to land and ship fish to Boston, thereby losing valuable time for fishing. (From statements of B. F. De Butts, owner, Boston, Mass.)
55. *Harry G. French* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; John Chisholm, master. Refused permission to purchase any provisions or to land cargo for shipment to the United States. (From statements of John Chisholm, owner and master, Gloucester, Mass.)
56. *Col. J. H. French* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; William Harris, master. Was refused permission to purchase any supplies, or to forward fish to the home port by steamer, causing much loss of time and money. (From statements of John Chisholm, owner, Gloucester, Mass.)
57. *W. H. Wellington* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; D. S. Nickerson, master. Was refused permission to purchase any supplies, or to forward fish to the home port by steamer, causing much loss of time and money. (From statements of John Chisholm, owner, Gloucester, Mass.)
58. *Ralph Hodgdon* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; Thomas F. Hodgdon, master. Was refused permission to purchase any supplies, or to forward fish to the home port by steamer, causing much loss of time and money. (From statements of John Chisholm, owner, Gloucester, Mass.)
59. *Hattie Evelyn* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; James A. Cromwell, master. Not allowed to buy any provisions in any provincial ports, and thereby compelled to return home during the fishing season, causing broken voyage and great loss. (From statements of James A. Cromwell, owner and master, Gloucester, Mass.)
60. *Emma W. Brown* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; John McFarland, master. Was forbidden buying any provisions at provincial ports, and thereby lost three weeks' time, and was compelled to return home with only part of cargo. (From statements of John McFarland, master, Gloucester, Mass.)
61. *Mary H. Thomas* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; Henry B. Thomas, master. Prohibited from buying provisions, and, in consequence, had to return home before close of fishing season. (From statements of Henry B. Thomas, owner and master, Gloucester, Mass.)
62. *Hattie B. West* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; C. H. Jackman, master. Prevented from buying provisions to enable vessel to continue fishing. Two of crew deserted in a Canadian port, and captain went ashore to report at custom-house and to secure return of men. Was delayed by customs officer not being at his post, and ordered to sea by first officer of cutter *Howlett* before having an opportunity of reporting at custom-house or of finishing business. Had to return

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and report on same day or be subject to fine. Prevented from shipping men at same place. At Port Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia, while on homeward passage, not allowed to take on board crew of seized American fishing schooner *Moro Castle*, who desired to return home. (From statements of C. H. Jackman, master, Gloucester, Mass.)

63. *Ethel Maud* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; George H. Martin, master. Provided with a United States permit to touch and trade, entered Tignish, Prince Edward Island, to purchase salt and barrels. Was prohibited from buying anything. Collector was offered permit, but declared it to be worthless, and would not examine it. Vessel obliged to return home for articles mentioned. On second trip was not permitted to get any food. (From statements of George H. Martin, owner and master, East Gloucester, Mass.)
64. *John W. Bray* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; George McLean, master. "On account of extreme prohibitory measures of the Canadian Government in refusing shelter, supplies, and other conveniences, was obliged to abandon her voyage and come home without fish." (From statements of John F. Wonson & Co., owners, Gloucester, Mass.)
65. *Henry W. Lonsfellow* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; W. W. King, master. Obligated to leave the Gulf of St. Lawrence with only 62 barrels of mackerel, on account of restrictions imposed by Canadian Government in preventing captain from procuring necessary supplies to continue fishing. (From statements of John F. Wonson & Co., owners, Gloucester, Mass.)
66. *Rushlight* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; James L. Kenney, master. Compelled to leave Gulf of St. Lawrence with only 90 barrels of mackerel, because of restrictions imposed by Canadian Government in prohibiting captain from purchasing supplies needed to continue fishing. (From statements of John F. Wonson & Co., owners, Gloucester, Mass.)
67. *Belle Franklin* (schooner). Gloucester, Mass.; Henry D. Kendrick, master. Obligated to leave Gulf of St. Lawrence with 156 barrels of mackerel, on account of restrictions imposed by Canadian Government in denying to captain the right to procure necessary supplies to continue fishing. (From statements of John F. Wonson & Co., owners, Gloucester, Mass.)
68. *Neponset* (schooner). Boston, Mass.; E. S. Frye, master. August 27, 1886, anchored in Port Hawkesbury, C. B., and immediately reported at custom house. Being short of provisions, master asked collector for permission to buy, but was twice refused. The master, expressing his intention of seeing the United States consul at Port Hastings, C. B., 3 miles distant, the customs officer forbade him landing at that port to see the consul. He did so, however, saw the consul, but could get no aid, the consul stating that if provisions were furnished the vessel would be seized. Master being sick and wishing to return home by rail, at the suggestion of the consul he landed secretly and traveled through the woods to the station, 3 miles distant. (From statements of E. S. Frye, owner and master, Boston, Mass.)

In 1886 700 vessels were boarded, and 1,362 in 1887, to investigate their conduct, of which 30 were brought to the attention of the British Government.

These lists comprise, in all, nearly 400 vessels that have been involved in seizures and other interferences growing out of disputed constructions of the treaty of 1818.

That so many cases have arisen out of this conflict of opinion is, in part, fairly attributable to an aggressive temper on the part of the Canadians, which has not been successfully restrained by the Government of Great Britain, and to an obstinate adherence to the letter of the treaty, to the sacrifice of its spirit and to the prejudice of the "liberties" and "privileges" secured by its terms to American fishermen, as our Government understands the matter.

The treaty had reference to extensive lines of sea-coast upon which the bays, harbors, and creeks were as well known by name and location in 1818 as they are now, but they were not exactly described in that instrument.

It can not be assumed, at least in our diplomacy, that it is irrational or unbecoming for the British Government to contend that the entrance of these places, so well known, was intended to designate a base-line from which to measure the 3-mile limit, within which we forever renounced the right to take or cure or dry fish.

Our construction has been that we did not renounce these "liberties" in the bays, harbors, and creeks, except within 3 miles of the coasts thereof, while the British contention has been that the word "coasts" in the treaty relates only to the open sea-coasts, and not to the coasts of bays, harbors, and creeks that are claimed and controlled by the provincial governments as territorial waters.

The British contention is also fortified by the argument, as they insist, that, in the proviso to article 1 of the treaty, our right to enter for shelter, wood, water, and repairs, is limited to "bays or harbors" and does not extend to "creeks" or to "coasts," and that these were not opened to our right of entry, because of the difficulty of enforcing the "restrictions" upon the use of these privileges, to which we gave our consent in the treaty, on the coasts and creeks, at places remote from their ports.

It has been the duty of our diplomatists, forced upon them by the importance of our interests, to endeavor to overcome these contentions of the British Government, and to insist upon a more liberal construction of the treaty.

The task has not been an easy one, and the progress we have made is scarcely discernible; for no admitted change in British opinion seems

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to have been accomplished in respect of the exclusion, from our treaty rights of fishery, of the creeks, bays, and harbors whose names, limits, and location were known, and were recognized by their laws as territorial waters in 1818, except in reference to the Bay of Fundy.

In 1854 and in 1871 we submerged these questions beneath others of great importance, and paid heavily, in reciprocal tariff arrangements in one case, and in money in the other instance, for the security and protection of our fishermen against the British head-land theory, as they claimed it, in territorial waters, and for the right of inshore fishing.

On the other branch of the subject, relating to the promulgation and enforcement of "such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent * * * abusing the privileges * * * reserved to" American fishermen, the cases have been more numerous, the discussions more heated, the interferences with our fishermen and their vessels, and with other vessels, more annoying and damaging, than those that have arisen under the head-land theory.

In most of these cases the provincial courts, or the privy council of the local governments, have made decisions, or statements, expounding their laws, both provincial and imperial, and insisting upon their right and jurisdiction, under the treaty, to do all that has been done by them to our fishermen, except in the affair of Fortune Bay.

What is sometimes termed the reciprocity of 1830, by which the interdiction on commercial intercourse between the North American British Provinces and the United States was relieved, and commercial intercourse was established on a liberal footing, gave to our merchant ships extensive privileges that the treaty of 1818, under the British construction, denied to our fishing vessels.

This so-called reciprocity was not established by positive law in either country; but, under the proclamation of President Jackson, authorized by law, and under the orders of the Privy Council of Great Britain, the liberties of commerce were mutually accorded to the merchant ships of each country in the ports of the other. We will hereafter refer more particularly to that arrangement.

Many of our fishing vessels being licensed, under our laws, to touch and trade in foreign ports, our Government has since claimed for them in Canadian ports the hospitality accorded to our other merchant vessels and all the liberties that they enjoy.

This reasonable claim was based upon the new conditions of our commercial intercourse with Canada as established by "the reciprocity of 1830."

It was met with the declaration that American fishermen and their vessels had only the rights, in Canadian waters and ports, that are expressly reserved to them under the treaty of 1818; and that all other rights are denied to them by that treaty; and the further insistence that the United States can confer no other rights upon them, in those waters, than such as the treaty gives them in their character as fishermen.

This question has led to serious disagreement and has been unavoidably mixed up with the question of the proper construction of the treaty of 1818.

This blending of these subjects has resulted, in part, from the enlarged privileges secured to our fishermen in the treaties of 1854 and 1871, and from the British laws and regulations, under which no express distinction is made between fishing vessels and purely commercial vessels as to entrance and clearance; port and harbor dues; pilotage and tonnage dues; the right to demand manifests and to inspect cargoes.

They employ their regulations, prescribed for commercial vessels, to prevent fishing vessels from having shelter for more than twenty-four hours in a bay or harbor; or from obtaining water or wood, or making repairs, unless they have been duly entered in the custom-house and have conformed to all the regulations that apply to merchant vessels.

The denial of every commercial privilege to our fishermen, even to the supply of wants that humanity demands, while imposing upon them every "restriction" that merchant vessels were required to endure, naturally excited the indignation of our people.

The contrast between the treatment, in these respects, of merchant vessels of all nations (including those of the United States) and our fishing vessels was painful and unjust, as it was unnecessary, and placed the men engaged in an honorable and highly useful pursuit under the ban of unjust and unfriendly discrimination, and branded them as persons against whom there was a general and recognized suspicion of bad character or of unworthy designs.

During the interval between 1818 and 1830 the treaty of 1818 furnished the only rule, equitable or legal, for the admeasurement of the rights of our fishermen.

Since 1830, except when the treaties of 1854 and 1871 were in force, the British Government, instead of relaxing the "restrictions" upon our fishermen, has increased them, and has been very alert in confining them to the strict letter of the treaty of 1818, whenever that has operated, as to their fishing and other liberties and privileges.

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II.

WHETHER IT IS OUR WISEST AND SAFEST POLICY TO RESORT TO THE LAWS OF NATIONS, ENFORCED BY ALL MEASURES THAT MAY BE NECESSARY, OR TO TREATY ARRANGEMENTS, FOR THE REGULATION, GENERALLY, OF OUR FISHING RIGHTS?

It is quite clear that, until we are free from the obligations of the treaty of 1818, they are a part of our supreme law, which no department of our own Government can violate without violating our Constitution.

As the treaty is perpetual in the renunciation of our right of common fishery, partitioned to us as an appanage of the country whose independence we established, we can not, by any means short of a successful war, re-instate the United States, by our own act, in the enjoyment of the right that was so renounced.

We can free ourselves of any embarrassment arising out of the treaty of 1818, as to our fishermen, licensed to touch and trade, by repealing it, but nobody seems to desire such a course of action, or to court the situation in which it would place both countries.

The struggle, in such an event, would be at once renewed under retaliatory laws (if this treaty is rejected); but every movement in such a policy would be very costly to the people of both countries, and, as a probable result, would eventuate in war.

So, we must live under the treaty and be constantly embroiled with the British Government as to its proper interpretation; or we must reform that interpretation by a fair and just agreement with that Government; or we must repeal or abandon it, and then rely upon retaliation to redress our wrongs.

The demand of our fishermen for an enlargement of their commercial privileges, to correspond with those of our merchant vessels, and for a more liberal hospitality in their bays, is the pith and essence of our demand for a more liberal interpretation of the treaty of 1818.

This demand has to a great degree grown out of the changed conditions, both of fishing ventures and commercial intercourse, with the British provinces since 1830.

It was not considered in 1818, but it can not be denied consideration now, in view of these changed conditions.

It is insisted by some that the treaty of 1818 gives no commercial rights to our fishing vessels; that it relates only to fishing rights and to some incidental privileges of hospitality accorded to our fishermen;

that there is no need to amend the treaty so as to secure them commercial rights; and that these should be secured, and would be, through our legislative powers of retaliation upon the commerce of the British possessions.

If we infuse into that treaty the substance of this demand, it must be done by an agreement, in the nature of an amendment, that furnishes some reciprocal concession to the people of the British possessions concerned in the fisheries; otherwise we will fail to gain their consent to it.

If we stand upon that treaty without amendment, as a fishing treaty, insisting that it has nothing to do with the commercial privileges of our fishing vessels, and that it leaves us free to demand for them the same commercial privileges that we accord to Canadian fishermen, we place this demand alone upon the ground of international comity, which is in no sense a substantial right, and is outside of all treaty agreements.

We would then have the treaty prohibition against our fishing vessels entering Canadian bays and harbors for "any other purpose whatever" than to buy wood, obtain water, make repairs, and find shelter; while their commercial privileges would entitle them to enter the ports of these bays and harbors for any lawful commercial purpose; and this would result from our act in giving them, under our laws, the double character of fishermen and merchantmen.

The British Government treats this proposition as a mere attempt to evade the treaty of 1818, and, in that view, they insist upon its rigid enforcement. They quote the restrictions of the treaty of 1818 as being obligatory upon the United States, and insist that we can not change the character of a vessel from a fisherman to a merchantman by giving to such vessel any form of license, enrollment, registry, or sea papers, in addition to such as place it in the class of a fishing vessel.

However illiberal such a contention may be, they certainly claim the right, under the treaty, and outside of it as well, to refuse entrance of our fishing vessels to their bays and harbors, and to treat them as fishermen. As vessels of commerce, the British Government claims that they enter the ports by comity alone. As fishing vessels, they admit that they enter the bays and harbors by right, under the treaty, but only for the purposes to which the treaty of 1818 restricts them.

We do not intend to lay down what we may believe to be the limits of jurisdiction over adjacent seas that are said to be secured to the Gov-

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ernments owning the coasts by the laws of nations. Chancellor Kent, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Seward, and many other great lawyers and statesmen of our country have advocated theories on this subject quite at variance with the 3-mile boundary of our right of jurisdiction seaward from the coast. This question needs to be handled with great circumspection. This is a very important matter.

A vast extent of the coast of the Pacific, reaching to the arctic circle, and destined to become a more important fishing-ground than the Atlantic coasts, must be affected by the principles of international law which the United States shall assert as defining the limits seaward from the coasts of our exclusive right to fish for seals and sea-otters, whales, and the many varieties of food-fishes that swarm along the coasts of Behring Sea and Straits. We might find, in that quarter, a very inconvenient application of the doctrine that, by the law of nations, the three-mile limit of the exclusive right of fishery is to follow and be measured from the sinuosities of the coasts of the bays, creeks, and harbors that exceed six miles in width at the entrance; and an equally inconvenient application of our claim for full commercial privileges in Canadian ports for our fishermen, when applied to British Columbian fishermen in our Pacific ports, which are nearer to them than to our fisheries in Alaska.

No allusion is made in the treaty of 1818 to the laws of nations as furnishing canons for its interpretation; and we infer that its meaning is to be gathered alone from its context and the circumstances that attended its adoption.

The undersigned believe that the interpretation of that treaty, which has led to its reformation in the treaty now before the Senate, is far in advance of anything that any American diplomat has officially demanded of the British Government, and will lead to a full and amicable adjustment of all troubles of the sort that have heretofore arisen; and that it will open the way for a liberal and neighborly agreement as to such differences as may hereafter arise, both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

In this interpretation and reformation of our existing treaty, the United States make no committals as to the exclusive rights of fishing under the laws of nations that may affect our interests in the Pacific and the Gulf of Mexico in the future; nor do they place the delimitations of the fishing-grounds, or the alleged commercial rights of our fishermen, upon any principle of the international law that may be quoted to us at Victoria (within a very short distance of our northern
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border), or along the extensive sea-coast between Puget Sound and Alaska, our great Pacific fishery.

The undersigned prefer the certainty which this treaty has secured as to our specific rights in the fisheries of the Atlantic coasts of North America to the uncertainty of the international law as to all those questions, which will leave in bitter dispute our rights and liberties both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks, and in Behring's Sea and Straits.

The undersigned believe that the treaty now under consideration affords a better foundation for both our fishing and commercial rights than any that can be stated as resting alone upon international law, or upon comity secured by retaliatory laws and maintained by the fluctuating interests of commerce, that are very unstable.

Those who assert that it is not the duty, and is scarcely the right, of the President to resort to negotiations, in preference to the retaliation provided for in existing laws, in order to secure commercial rights to fishermen in Canadian ports, are not willing that their *privileges* shall be enlarged and converted into *rights* secured by treaty. They prefer the chances of greater success through legislation that will intimidate the British Government or greatly embarrass British commerce. This seems to indicate that they rely for success more upon British cupidity and the fear that Government has of the consequences of war, than upon its sense of justice, or its good faith in keeping treaty obligations.

Whether or not this may be true, it is very obvious, as the undersigned believe, that the advantages we are supposed to enjoy under such circumstances would be quite as available for the increase of our commercial privileges by retaliatory laws, after this treaty is ratified, as they are at present. Our good faith is no more pledged in this treaty than it is in the treaty of 1818.

This treaty does not bind us to advance no claim hereafter to increased commercial privileges in favor of our fishermen. The spirit in which it is framed is one of conformity, in our treaty relations, to the progressive interests and necessities of the country, so that a further increase of commercial privileges would naturally result from the policy of both countries; as is shown by the fact of the negotiation of this treaty, when such increase should appear to be, as it will be, mutually advantageous.

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III.

AN IMPORTANT PRECEDENT FOR THIS TREATY IN THE ARRANGEMENT OFFERED BY MR. SEWARD IN 1866 TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

There is a very important precedent for the plan of this treaty, and for some of its leading features, in the protocol proposed in 1866 by Mr. Seward, then Secretary of State, through Mr. Adams, our minister to Great Britain. The letter of Mr. Seward and the protocol are as follows:

Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.

No. 1737.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, April 10, 1866.

SIR: I send you a copy of a very suggestive letter from Mr. Richard D. Cutts, who, perhaps you are aware, was employed as surveyor for marking, on the part of the United States, *the fishery limits under the reciprocity treaty*. Mr. Cutts's long familiarity with that subject practically and theoretically entitles his suggestions to respect.

It is desirable to avoid any collision or misunderstanding with Great Britain on the subject growing out of the termination of the reciprocity treaty. With this view I inclose a draught of a protocol, which you may propose to Lord Clarendon for a temporary regulation of the matter. If he should agree to it, it may be signed. When signed it is desirable that the instructions referred to in the concluding paragraph should at once be dispatched by the British Government.

As the fishing season is at hand, the collisions which might be apprehended may occur when that season advances.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Draught protocol communicated by Mr. Adams to the Earl of Clarendon in 1866.

Whereas in the first article of the convention between the United States and Great Britain, concluded and signed in London on the 26th October, 1818, it was declared that—

"The United States hereby renounce, forever, any liberty heretofore enjoyed or claimed by the inhabitants thereof to take, dry, or cure fish on or within 3 marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America, not included within certain limits heretofore mentioned ;"

And whereas differences have arisen in regard to the extent of the above-mentioned renunciation, the Government of the United States and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, being equally desirous of avoiding further misunderstanding, have agreed to appoint, and do hereby authorize the appointment, of a mixed commission for the following purposes, namely :

(1) To agree upon and define, by a series of lines, the limits which shall separate the exclusive from the common right of fishery, on the coasts and in the seas adjacent,

of the British North American colonies, in conformity with the first article of the convention of 1818. The said lines to be regularly numbered, duly described, and also clearly marked on charts prepared in duplicate for the purpose.

(2) To agree upon and establish such regulations as may be necessary and proper to secure to the fishermen of the United States the privilege of entering bays and harbors for the purpose of shelter; and of repairing damages therein; of purchasing wood, and of obtaining water; and to agree upon and establish such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the privilege reserved by said convention to fishermen of the United States.

(3) To agree upon and recommend the penalties to be adjudged, and such proceedings and jurisdiction as may be necessary to secure a speedy trial and judgment with as little expense as possible, for the violation of rights and the transgression of the limits and restrictions which may be hereby adopted.

Provided, however, that the limits, restrictions, and regulations which may be agreed upon by the said commission shall not be final, nor have any effect, until so jointly confirmed and declared by the United States and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, either by treaty or by laws mutually acknowledged and accepted by the President of the United States, by and with the consent of the Senate, and by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain.

Pending a different arrangement on the subject, the United States Government engages to give all proper orders to officers in its employment; and Her Britannic Majesty's Government engages to instruct the proper colonial or other British officers to abstain from hostile acts against British and United States fishermen respectively.

This protocol was offered by Mr. Seward, as a *modus vivendi*, after the termination of the treaty of 1854 had thrown us back upon that of 1818, as to our fishery rights. He offered it, also, for acceptance by Great Britain as the basis of a new treaty of interpretation and regulation of those rights.

Mr. Seward's recommendation of a mixed commission, (1) "to agree upon and define by a series of lines" the fishing limits, in conformity with the first article of the convention of 1818; (2) "to agree upon and establish such regulations as may be necessary and proper to secure the fishermen of the United States the privilege of entering bays and harbors" under the proviso to the treaty; and (3) "to agree upon and recommend the penalties to be adjudged, and such proceedings and jurisdiction as may be necessary to secure a speedy trial," etc., "for violations of rights and transgressions of *limits and restrictions*," etc., indicates an earnest apprehension on his part *that no settlement could be reached by ordinary negotiations*; that the treaty could not be amicably kept unless it was amended; and that the amendments he proposed would cure the defects of the indefinite description of *the rights and restrictions and fishing limits* that were too generally stated in the treaty of 1818.

He saw the increasing danger of the situation, and came boldly forward to provide against its results.

The cordial manner in which these three propositions were then received by the British Government, as a basis of agreement, inspired the efforts of the present administration to renew the negotiation on this plan as the basis of a new treaty.

IV.

MEASURES OF HOSTILITY, EITHER COMMERCIAL OR ACTUAL, ARE NOT PREFERABLE TO THE TREATY BEFORE THE SENATE.

The undersigned have found no opinion expressed by any of our diplomatists in their official correspondence that the proper interpretation of article 1 of the treaty of 1818 could be otherwise secured than by a further agreement, as to its meaning, between the treaty powers.

If we demand a still more favorable agreement than that presented in this convention now under consideration, we shall probably encounter many more years of controversy and negotiation before a better result can be reached.

If, laying aside all treaty agreements, we attempt to coerce a better understanding and less grievous practices than we have already suffered through commercial retaliation, we shall find that the cost to our own people is far greater than the entire value of the fisheries.

If we resort to war, or to measures that may lead to hostilities, upon what precise definition of our rights and grievances will we justify such grave proceedings, either to our own people, or before the nations of the earth? We believe that no man can safely venture to formulate such a declaration.

Unless we can clearly state the causes that justify a war for the redress of grievances, or the clear definition of the right we seek to assert or defend, we have no right to subject the country to the perils, or even the apprehensions, of hostilities.

It has never been stated by any administration, or diplomatist, or by Congress that any one case, or that all the cases that have grown out of our disputes with Great Britain about the treaty of 1818, gave a just ground for retaliation, reprisals, or war.

The undersigned think it can not be safely denied that in articles 10, 12, 13, and 14 of this treaty we have gained advantages and privi-

leges of a very important character. In them is found the full concession of every claim to fishing rights we have ever made, as being within the letter or the spirit of the treaty of 1818 that is now of any practical value; and the methods provided for their administration are quite as satisfactory as any we have ever claimed under our interpretation of that treaty. For convenience of reference we insert those articles in this paper, as follows:

ARTICLE X.

United States fishing vessels entering the bays or harbors referred to in Article I of this treaty shall conform to harbor regulations common to them and to fishing vessels of Canada or of Newfoundland.

They need not report, enter, or clear when putting into such bays or harbors for shelter or repairing damages, nor when putting into the same, outside the limits of established ports of entry, for the purpose of purchasing wood or of obtaining water; except that any such vessel remaining more than twenty-four hours, exclusive of Sundays and legal holidays, within any such port, or communicating with the shore therein, may be required to report, enter, or clear; and no vessel shall be excused hereby from giving due information to boarding officers.

They shall not be liable in any such bays or harbors for compulsory pilotage; nor, when therein for the purpose of shelter, of repairing damages, of purchasing wood, or of obtaining water, shall they be liable for harbor dues, tonnage dues, buoy dues, light dues, or other similar dues; but this enumeration shall not permit other charges inconsistent with the enjoyment of the liberties reserved or secured by the Convention of October 20, 1818.

ARTICLE XI.

United States fishing vessels entering the ports, bays, and harbors of the Eastern and Northeastern coasts of Canada or of the coasts of Newfoundland under stress of weather or other casualty may unload, reload, tranship, or sell, subject to customs laws and regulations, all fish on board, when such unloading, transshipment, or sale is made necessary as incidental to repairs, and may replenish outfits, provisions, and supplies damaged or lost by disaster; and in case of death or sickness shall be allowed all needful facilities, including the shipping of crews.

Licenses to purchase in established ports of entry of the aforesaid coasts of Canada or of Newfoundland, for the homeward voyage, such provisions and supplies as are ordinarily sold to trading vessels, shall be granted to United States fishing vessels in such ports, promptly upon application and without charge; and such vessels having obtained licenses in the manner aforesaid shall also be accorded upon all occasions such facilities for the purchase of casual or needful provisions and supplies as are ordinarily granted to the trading vessels; but such provisions or supplies shall not be obtained by barter, nor purchased for resale or traffic.

ARTICLE XIII.

The Secretary of the Treasury of the United States shall make regulations providing for the conspicuous exhibition, by every United States fishing vessel, of its official

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number on each bow; and any such vessel, required by law to have an official number, and failing to comply with such regulations, shall not be entitled to the licenses provided for in this treaty.

Such regulations shall be communicated to Her Majesty's Government previously to their taking effect.

ARTICLE XIV.

The penalties for *unlawfully fishing* in the waters, bays, creeks, and harbors, referred to in Article I of this treaty, may extend to forfeiture of the boat or vessel, and appurtenances, and also of the supplies and cargo aboard when the offense was committed; and for *preparing* in such waters to *unlawfully fish therein*, penalties shall be fixed by the court, not to exceed those for unlawfully fishing; and for *any other violation of the laws of Great Britain, Canada, or Newfoundland* relating to the right of fishery in such waters, bays, creeks, or harbors, penalties shall be fixed by the court, *not exceeding in all three dollars for every ton of the boat or vessel concerned*. The boat or vessel may be holden for such penalties and forfeitures.

The proceedings shall be summary and as inexpensive as practicable. The trial (except on appeal) shall be at the place of detention, unless the judge shall, on request of the defense, order it to be held at some other place *adjudged by him more convenient*. Security for costs shall not be required of the defense, except when bail is offered. Reasonable bail shall be accepted. There shall be proper appeals *available to the defense only*; and the *evidence at the trial may be used on appeal*.

Judgments of forfeiture shall be reviewed by the Governor-General of Canada in council, or the governor in council of Newfoundland, *before the same are executed*.

We accord (in Article 12) to the fishing vessels of Canada and Newfoundland the same *privileges* on the Atlantic coasts of the United States that are secured to our fishing vessels by this treaty, without admitting them to fish within 3 miles of the coasts of the bays, harbors, or creeks along that sea-coast.

This treaty secures to our fishermen the free navigation of the Strait of Canso.

Article 15 secures to us the option to acquire very important commercial privileges to our fishermen whenever Congress shall conclude that they are worth the money that we may otherwise collect in duties on fish.

Congress may never make this concession; but the power to acquire these privileges, as permanent treaty rights, may become very valuable to us when the diminishing products of the fisheries in the waters adjacent to the eastern coasts of the United States and of Canada and Newfoundland increase in value, because they will be required to supply the needs of 100,000,000 of people in the United States and 20,000,000 of people in the Dominion of Canada.

This article is suggested by a wise forecast of the future necessities of our fishermen, as well as those of the people of the United States, when our population is greatly increased, and the supply of food is to be distributed to such a vast multitude of people that the allowance, *per capita*, will be, accordingly, diminished.

The treaty now before the Senate is one of reciprocal concessions.

The unconditional concessions to the fishermen are not strictly commercial, but they give them great assistance in their business and in the means of relieving any distress which may befall them.

Can we ever hope to engraft on the treaty of 1818 any new agreement for commercial privileges to our fishermen without giving an equivalent in some liberty or privilege that Great Britain will claim for her fishermen?

This question is answered by the fact that we renounced in 1818 the best part of the fisheries that were of the fruits of the war for independence in order to make the residue a permanent right; and in 1854 and 1871 we agreed to pay heavily for a temporary suspension of the restrictions and limitations of the treaty of 1818.

We have made four fisheries treaties with Great Britain, in 1783, 1818, 1854, and 1871, and in none of them has any commercial privilege been secured to our fishermen. No serious effort has been made to secure such privileges prior to the negotiation now before the Senate. All that we have heretofore secured to our fishermen has been the privilege of inshore fishing, of curing and drying fish on certain parts of the British coasts, more or less restricted and changed in each successive treaty, and the right to buy wood, obtain water, make repairs, and find shelter.

Now, we find, according to the testimony of everybody concerned, and the thoroughly considered report of our Committee on Foreign Relations, made after a searching investigation conducted upon our coasts, and upon the testimony of experts laid before the Senate, that the inshore fisheries, for which we have paid and suffered so much, are of no value to us, and that the privilege of purchasing bait from the Canadians is an injury to our fishing interests rather than a benefit.

These declarations, which were true, show that many of the contentions and strifes we have had over this subject, for seventy years, have been about a claim of rights and privileges that are no longer of any advantage to us.

They prove that we need only such advantages, or privileges, for our

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fishermen on the Canadian coasts as are enjoyed by our merchant vessels, and that these are not very important to them.

Purse-seining has revolutionized the mackerel fishery almost entirely, and has largely affected the herring fishery, and has given to our fishermen great advantages in "the catch." But Canadian capital and energy will not long permit us to do all the purse or deep-water seining.

The freezing of fish on shipboard, so as to get them fresh to our markets, is of recent date, but is a very important change in the fishing business. In this the Canadians have no greater advantages than our fishermen.

These two improvements in the fishing business, with the added power of steam, which has been applied to sea navigation since 1818, have produced the revolution in these pursuits which renders it more convenient to have commercial rights for some of our fishing vessels, but has removed the necessity to have fishing privileges within three miles of any of the coasts or in the bays of the British possessions that are not classed as great arms of the sea.

The history of the controversies that have found a final solution in the treaty now before the Senate, and the explanation of the bearing of the treaty upon those questions, are so clearly and ably stated by Hon. W. L. Putnam, in a letter dated April 16, 1888, that we append it to this report (Appendix E).

Mr. Putnam being one of our plenipotentiaries who negotiated this treaty, his review of the diplomatic and legislative history is an important exposition of the merits of this subject.

V.

THIS TREATY COMPARED WITH THE COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENT STYLED "THE RECIPROCITY OF 1830."

This treaty proposes liberal reciprocity to us, confined to fishing interests, and gives us all the time we may choose to claim in which to consider our best interests and determine whether we will accept or reject the overture.

The right of choosing between this proffered commercial reciprocity and the privileges accorded to us under what is termed "the reciprocity of 1830" is a decided advantage in favor of our fishermen.

The products of our fisheries in Canadian waters are not permitted to enter Canadian ports on any ships of the United States by the Brit-

ish proclamation of November 5, 1830. That proclamation declares "that the ships of and belonging to the said United States of America may import from the United States aforesaid into the British possessions abroad *goods the produce of those States*, and may export goods from the British possessions abroad to be carried to any foreign country whatever."

This cannot apply to fishery products taken or purchased in the Canadian waters or ports, and was not intended in any manner to add to the four purposes for which our fishermen may enter Canadian ports under the treaty of 1818, as we understand that proclamation, or to repeal that treaty.

This proclamation was a month later than that made by President Jackson, and was the British response to our proclamation, under which "British vessels and their cargoes are admitted to an entry into the ports of the United States from the islands, provinces, and colonies of Great Britain, on or near the North American continent and north or east of the United States." The full text of these proclamations is hereto appended as Appendices A and B.

These proclamations set forth the entire concurrent action of the two Governments (which is called the reciprocity of 1830). There having been no change in the situation since that time, that is "the reciprocity" which still exists, as matter of law.

The broad liberality of our concession is in very striking contrast with that of Great Britain; but we have lived under this inequality of rights for more than fifty years, without a serious protest until within three years, and the complaints we have made arose from the British construction of our fishing rights and not of our commercial rights under that reciprocity.

Our fishing vessels are equally barred (under the British contention) by the treaty of 1818, and by the British proclamation of November 5, 1830, from entering their ports with cargoes of fish taken in Canadian waters, without reference to the rights to touch and trade or to any other commercial character, that we may give them under our laws. To gain these rights for our fishermen, we have a choice of grave alternatives.

But the cost of the naval and military preparation that would be necessary to give confidence to our own people, in supporting any extreme demand or stringent measures connected with this subject, would be greater than the whole value of these fisheries for the next half century.

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VI.

THE PRESIDENT HAS ONLY PERFORMED A PLAIN DUTY, IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, AND TO THE SENATE IS LEFT THE RESPONSIBILITY.

The undersigned do not find it necessary to answer in detail the various objections urged in committee by the Senators opposed to the ratification of this treaty, because no amendment was offered to indicate that the treaty could be so improved as to gain the support of any member of the majority of the committee.

The undersigned understand that the dissent from this negotiation is directed to it as an entirety. This dissent is based, in part, upon the opinion of some members of the majority that the President should not have entered upon any negotiation, in view of the resolution adopted by the Senate on the 3d day of February, 1886, and the opinion of Congress as it was expressed in the non-intercourse act approved March 3, 1887. That resolution is as follows:

Resolved, That in the opinion of the Senate the appointment of a commission, in which the Governments of the United States and Great Britain shall be represented, charged with the consideration and settlement of the fishing rights of the two Governments on the coasts of the United States and British North America, ought not to be provided for by Congress.

This resolution related, as we understand it, solely to the question whether such negotiation should be conducted by commissioners, under an act of Congress, or by the President, under his constitutional power to make treaties.

The Senate adhered to its constitutional power to ratify or reject a treaty, and insisted that the President should make any negotiation he might see fit to conduct in such form and under such conditions that the power of the Senate over such subjects should not be interfered with.

The retaliatory act of Congress above mentioned was not intended, and could not have been intended, to instruct the President as to the will of the legislature in a matter over which Congress has no authority—the negotiation, ratification, or promulgation of a treaty.

Congress has the right to declare that in some or all of the hundreds of cases that have occurred in which the treaty of 1818 has been in question, it has been violated, and that retaliation, reprisals, or war shall follow such abuses until they are compensated, and they shall cease. Such a declaration as to the violation of the treaty was dis-

tinently made in the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on the 19th of January, 1887. We quote from that report, as follows :

It will be seen, from the correspondence and papers submitted by the President, in his message on the subject, of the 8th of December last (Ex. Doc. No. 19, Forty-ninth Congress, second session), and from the testimony taken by the committee, that some of these instances of seizure or detention, or of driving vessels away by threats, etc., were in clear violation of the treaty of 1818, and that others were on such slender and technical grounds, either as applied to fishing rights or commercial rights, as to make it impossible to believe that they were made with the large and just object of protecting substantial rights against real and substantial invasion, but must have been made either under the stimulus of the cupidity of the seizing officer, sharpened and made safe by the extraordinary legislation to which the committee has referred, whereby the seizing officer, no matter how unjust or illegal his procedure may have been, is made practically secure from the necessity of making substantial redress to the party wronged, or of punishment, or else they must have arisen from a systematic disposition on the part of the Dominion authorities to vex and harass American fishing and other vessels so as to produce such a state of embarrassment and inconvenience with respect to intercourse with the provinces as to coerce the United States into arrangements of general reciprocity with the Dominion.

But Congress did not follow up this bold declaration of that committee with a demand for redress, or with any provision of law that was based upon the fact that the treaty of 1818 had been violated by Great Britain. It was our commercial rights that Congress undertook to protect.

The committee did not ask the Senate to pass a bill that would commit the country, if it should become a law, to a state of actual hostility towards Great Britain, or even to a firm declaration that Great Britain had violated the treaty of 1818 in the manner and with the motives stated in the foregoing extract from their report.

Congress was either satisfied that no occasion had arisen which would justify decisive measures, such as retaliation, reprisals, or war, in resentment for any actual violation of the treaty, or else it sought to evade its just responsibility to the country by increasing the powers of the President to retaliate on British commerce, and by throwing upon him the responsibility of deciding whether the "recent" conduct of that Government and of the provinces demanded of the United States that any retaliation should be proclaimed and enforced.

The House of Representatives demanded broader powers for the President than the Senate would agree to, but both houses hastened to devolve upon him the decision of the whole question of our treaty re-

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lations with Great Britain, and gave him the discretion to employ all necessary means to put his decision in force.

This is the law that Congress enacted to meet that aggravated state of affairs, as described in the report of the Senate committee :

AN ACT to authorize the President of the United States to protect and defend the rights of American fishing-vessels, American fishermen, American trading and other vessels, in certain cases, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever the President of the United States shall be satisfied that American fishing vessels or American fishermen, visiting or being in the waters or at any ports or places of the British dominions of North America, are or then lately have been denied or abridged in the enjoyment of any rights secured to them by treaty or law, or are or then lately have [been] unjustly vexed or harassed in the enjoyment of such rights, or subjected to unreasonable restrictions, regulations, or requirements in respect of such rights; or otherwise unjustly vexed or harassed in said waters, ports, or places; or whenever the President of the United States shall be satisfied that any such fishing vessels or fishermen, having a permit under the laws of the United States to touch and trade at any port or ports, place or places, in the British dominions of North America, are or then lately have been denied the privilege of entering such port or ports, place or places in the same manner and under the same regulations as may exist therein applicable to trading vessels of the most favored nation, or shall be unjustly vexed or harassed in respect thereof, or otherwise be unjustly vexed or harassed therein, or shall be prevented from purchasing such supplies as may there be lawfully sold to trading vessels of the most favored nation; or whenever the President of the United States shall be satisfied that any other vessels of the United States, their masters or crews, so arriving at or being in such British waters or ports or places of the British dominions of North America, are or then lately have been denied any of the privileges therein accorded to the vessels, their masters or crews, of the most favored nation, or unjustly vexed or harassed in respect of the same, or unjustly vexed or harassed therein by the authorities thereof, then, and in either or all of such cases, it shall be lawful, and it shall be the duty of the President of the United States, in his discretion, by proclamation to that effect, to deny vessels, their masters and crews, of the British dominions of North America, any entrance into the waters, ports, or places of, or within the United States (with such exceptions in regard to vessels in distress, stress of weather, or needing supplies as to the President shall seem proper), whether such vessels shall have come directly from said dominions on such destined voyage or by way of some port or place in such destined voyage elsewhere; and also, to deny entry into any port or place of the United States of fresh fish or salt fish or any other product of said dominions, or other goods coming from said dominions to the United States. The President may, in his discretion, apply such proclamation to any part or to all of the foregoing-named subjects, and may revoke, qualify, limit, and renew such proclamation from time to time as he may deem necessary to the full and just execution of the purposes of this act. Every violation of any such proclamation, or any part thereof, is hereby declared illegal, and all vessels and goods so coming or being within the waters, ports,

or places of the United States contrary to such proclamation shall be forfeited to the United States; and such forfeiture shall be enforced and proceeded upon in the same manner and with the same effect as in the case of vessels or goods whose importation or coming to or being in the waters or ports of the United States contrary to law may now be enforced and proceeded upon. Every person who shall violate any of the provisions of this act, or such proclamation of the President made in pursuance hereof, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

Approved, March 3, 1887.

This law relates to past offenses as well as to those that may hereafter occur. As to past offenses, Congress abdicated its authority to declare that they constituted just grounds for retaliation, and left that matter solely to the discretion of the President or else Congress intended that the President should have these powers to meet a case of emergency, and should also employ his constitutional power of making treaties (which Congress could not control) as a part of "his discretion" in providing a way through which the evils complained of should be remedied.

The undersigned can not impute to Congress that its purpose, in devolving upon the President these broad discretionary powers and conditional duties, was to forbid, or to embarrass, the free exercise by him of his constitutional power to make treaties, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or that these extraordinary powers were given him to enable Congress to escape its just responsibility for measures that were necessary for the protection of the honor of the country or the interests of the people.

If the President had resorted to retaliatory measures against Canadian commerce, under this act of March 3, 1887, without having attempted any negotiation with Great Britain, the open way that was indicated by Mr. Seward's protocol in 1865, to which we have referred, and the favorable impression it made on the British Government, would have been pointed out by an indignant people as an abandoned opportunity for an amicable agreement with Great Britain, and he would have been amenable to just censure.

But, aside from this, his duty to humanity, as well as to his country, forbade him from exposing the interests and prosperity of 65,000,000 of people to danger, by hasty or extreme measures of retaliation, while it was possible to reach a just settlement of our disputes with Great Britain over matters that concern only a few thousand people, who

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would be more benefited by such an agreement than they could be by retaliatory laws.

The President has succeeded in making provision for a settlement of these long-standing disputes on terms that are just and reasonable, as we are satisfied—a much better settlement than has been even attempted heretofore, and one that will increase, in the future, the liberality of commerce with Canada.

If the Senate shall decline to ratify this treaty there will remain no doubt that it assumes all the responsibility for what may hereafter result from the proper employment by the President of the retaliatory powers that Congress has conferred upon him.

If the proper use of those powers is considered by Great Britain as a violation of the treaty of 1818, in demanding for our fishermen greater liberties and privileges than that treaty secured to them, and that we are enforcing that demand through commercial duress, the Senate will also take whatever responsibility may belong to that situation.

Congress declined to say in the act of March 3, 1887, that the rights of American fishermen had been denied or abridged, but left it to the President to determine that question. If this treaty is rejected, it is beyond dispute that retaliation is the only means, short of war, by which we can redress our wrongs, if we have suffered any. The Senate, in rejecting this treaty, will affirm that such wrongs exist, which Congress did not so assert, and, because thereof, will force the President to proclaim non-intercourse.

VII.

THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY IS AN HONORABLE AND FRIENDLY OFFER OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AND SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DEVELOP, BY ACTUAL EXPERIENCE, WHETHER THIS TREATY WILL BE BENEFICIAL TO OUR FISHERIES AND COMMERCE.

In view of a possible disagreement between the Senate and President as to the value of this treaty to our fishermen, the undersigned respectfully call the attention of the Senate to the importance of postponing its consideration until the next December session of Congress.

The protocol to the treaty, suggested and offered by the British plenipotentiaries, tenders to our fishermen very liberal commercial privileges in Canadian ports for two years.

This overture is equivalent, almost, to a guaranty that during this period the British Government, in conjunction with the provincial gov-

eruments, will prevent the recurrence of the interferences with our fishermen that have given them such serious disquietude. It will also put into practice, substantially, all the provisions of the present treaty, except those relating to the delimitation of fishing boundaries.

A single fishing season, under such conditions, will demonstrate that this treaty is a failure, or else that it is of great value to the country.

The advantage of such experience is manifest, and we should not rashly trust to our opinions, which must be largely conjectural, when we can fortify them or disprove their soundness by a short delay in our action, which does not commit us, in the least degree, either for or against the treaty.

The British Government has exerted a restraining influence during the whole period since 1818 over the provincial governments as to their demands and proceedings under that treaty. That Government has encouraged liberality in the conduct of the fishermen and in commercial interchange between the United States and the provinces; seeing that the prosperity of those countries greatly depended on such a policy.

It has not been an easy task to restrain the people of the provinces to a course of moderation. Political reasons, not always favorable to the Crown, and the jealousies of rival interests in fishing rights held in common by the people of two countries, and even the lingering hatreds engendered by our Revolutionary war, have been active in promoting discord in these colonies. Great Britain never before had so capital an interest in fostering the loyalty of the Canadians. The Suez Canal is scarcely more important to the interests of that Empire than the Canadian Pacific Railway.

But other interests of the most important character inspire the British Government with an earnest purpose to cultivate the closest friendship with the people of Canada.

It is evidently the true policy of the British Government to satisfy the people of these provinces that the treaty now before the Senate will be of advantage to them, because of the additional liberty of commerce that it extends to our fishermen; and this was doubtless a strong inducement to that Government to offer voluntarily to us the privileges stated in the protocol to the treaty.

We have almost as great an interest in affording to our people the opportunity of a practical test of the advantage of these privileges offered in this protocol.

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proposition, not requiring our formal acceptance to make it available, on the ground that we could not, without dishonor, permit such a course, resulting in such possible advantages to us, even for one fishing season, and then reject the treaty.

We have not in any way invited or suggested this offer of the British Government, and we are not asked to accept it. It proposes, for a time, to liberalize the commercial privileges of our fishermen in the provincial ports, for reasons satisfactory to the British Government.

If we should hasten our action on this treaty with the purpose of preventing an effort of that Government to satisfy Her Majesty's subjects that a liberal policy towards us is the best, or even of convincing our people by experience that such a policy is also best for us, we would incur greater discredit by such action than could possibly attend our rejection of the treaty, after a fair trial of the British expedient presented in this protocol had satisfied our people that the treaty should not be ratified.

VIII.

THE HEADLAND THEORY, AS APPLICABLE TO THE BAYS, HARBORS, AND CREEKS THAT ARE CLAIMED AS TERRITORIAL WATERS, HAS NOT BEEN ABANDONED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, EXCEPT IN THIS TREATY. IT WAS A VITAL QUESTION WHEN THIS NEGOTIATION WAS ENTERED UPON.

It is insisted by some that Great Britain had abandoned the headland theory, and that it was obsolete when this treaty was made.

The undersigned do not understand that the British headland theory, as applied to the bays, harbors, and creeks that had geographical names and limits, and were included by British or provincial laws within the local jurisdictions in 1818, has been abandoned by Great Britain. Outside of a limit of 3 miles from the headlands of such indentations of the sea-coast it was abandoned as early as 1815, in the case of the American fishing vessels that were warned off the coast by the British man-of-war *Jossecur*.

Our claims could not be fairly predicated, diplomatically, on such an admission by Great Britain as to the base-line from which the 3-mile limit is to be measured.

That being still an open question, the claims of either side were a necessary feature in the negotiation of this treaty.

If our contention was *indisputably just*, a peremptory demand for its allowance was the only course we could adopt. Such a demand, we

believe, has never been formally made by this Government. Congress certainly has never affirmed the indisputable justice of our claim. The United States have preferred to let this question, with all the others that have arisen under the treaty of 1818, continue in reach of discussion and negotiation.

In that situation the present administration found this controversy.

Mr. Bayard proposed to the British Government that the 3-mile fishing limit should be measured, in the bays that were 10 miles or less in width, from that point nearest the entrance where the shores are 10 miles distant from each other. He found his support for that offer in the arrangement between Great Britain and other European nations for fishing in the bays and harbors of their respective coasts along the North Atlantic and the northern seas.

It being generally conceded that the limit of local jurisdiction extended 3 miles from the coast out into the sea, and that this distance was adopted because it measured the range of artillery in ancient times, it is obvious that when the range of artillery is extended to 5 miles it is due to the security of bays and harbors reaching far inland that treaty arrangements fixing a new measurement should have some reference to the increased limits for the protection of the people residing along such shores corresponding with the improved range of artillery.

This offer made no allusion to any headland theory that the British Government had ever asserted; still it was directly opposed to assertions of that theory which Great Britain had often made, and called forth the following "observation from the Marquis of Salisbury upon the proffer made by Mr. Bayard:"

A reference to the action of the United States Government, and to the admission made by their statesmen in regard [to] bays on the American coasts, strengthens this view: and the case of the English ship *Grange* shows that the Government of the United States, in 1793, claimed Delaware Bay as being within territorial waters.

Mr. Bayard contends that the rule, which he asks to have set up, was adopted by the umpire of the commission, appointed under the convention of 1853, in the case of the United States fishing schooner *Washington*; that it was by him applied to the Bay of Fundy, and that it is for this reason applicable to other Canadian bays.

It is submitted, however, that as one of the headlands of the Bay of Fundy is in the territory of the United States, any rules of international law applicable to that bay are not therefore equally applicable to other bays the headlands of which are both within the territory of the same power.

This provision would involve a surrender of fishing rights which have always been regarded as the exclusive property of Canada, and would make common fishing-grounds of the territorial waters which, by the law of nations, have been invariably regarded both in Great Britain and the United States as belonging to the adjacent

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country. In the case, for instance, of the Baie des Chaleurs, a peculiarly well-marked and almost land-locked indentation of the Canadian coast, the 10-mile limit would be drawn from points in the heart of Canadian territory, and almost 70 miles from the natural entrance or mouth of the bay. This would be done in spite of the fact that, both by imperial legislation and by judicial interpretation, this bay has been declared to form a part of the territory of Canada. (See Imperial Statute, 14 and 15 Vict., cap. 63; and *Mouatt v. McPhee*, 5 Sup. Court of Canada Reports, p. 66.)

From this statement of the British contention, it appears that the headland theory was still adhered to by that Government in March, 1887, but it was admitted that it had been relaxed as to the Bay of Fundy for special reasons.

Mr. Bayard's reply to the "observations" of the Marquis of Salisbury, which is set forth on pages 55 to 60, inclusive, of Senate Executive Document No. 113, first session of Fiftieth Congress, refutes the force of those "observations" by citing precedents furnished by the conduct of the British Government in this matter, and the decision of the umpire in the cases of the *Washington* and the *Argus*, in which he wholly discarded the headland theory and made an award in favor of the owner.

But these counter-statements only served to show that the headland theory, in its application to bays within the jurisdictional limits, was still in controversy between the two Governments, and that there was little disposition on the part of the British Government to yield, as there was on our part to admit, the justice of that construction of the treaty of 1818.

These contentions made it necessary that a better understanding should be reached; and if the two Governments could not accomplish this by negotiation, it was certain that increasing strife and broils between their people would seriously endanger the commerce of each, and would expose both countries to the peril of being driven into hostilities by the designs of vicious men, or through the angry contentions of well-meaning persons.

IX.

THE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE USE OF THE COMMON RIGHT OF FISHERY MAKE IT IMPERATIVE TO REGULATE THEIR ASSOCIATION BY FRIENDLY AGREEMENT RATHER THAN BY RETALIATORY LAWS.

Mutual and amicable agreement between the two Governments, clearly understood and faithfully executed, is the only way in which the people

of Newfoundland and Canada and of the United States can ever peacefully enjoy, *in common*, the valuable rights of fishery.

Reciprocity, in some form, is an element in every treaty made for the settlement of questions that are sincerely in dispute between independent powers. In all of our treaties with Great Britain, relating to the extra-territorial rights, liberties, or privileges of each in the other's country or jurisdiction, reciprocity has been conspicuously stated as a leading motive and purpose. The provisional treaty of peace of November 30, 1782, sets out with this declaration:

Whereas reciprocal advantages and mutual convenience are found by experience to form the only permanent foundation of peace and friendship between States, it is agreed to form the articles of the proposed treaty on such principles of liberal equity and reciprocity as that, partial advantages (those seeds of discord) being excluded, such a beneficial and satisfactory intercourse between the two countries may be established as to promise and secure to both perpetual peace and harmony.

This declaration was repeated, in substance, in the definitive treaty of peace of September 3, 1783.

In both these treaties the right of fishery was defined as between the people of both countries, the United States expressly yielding some of the liberties they had enjoyed in common with the colonies that remained subject to the British Crown on the coasts of Newfoundland as as to curing and drying fish on that island.

The treaty of October 20, 1818, was made "to cement the good understanding which happily exists between" the two Governments. In that treaty we renounced our right of fishery on certain coasts, etc., but regained the right to cure and dry fish on a part of the southern coasts of Newfoundland.

Under that treaty, which was reciprocal, misunderstanding arose as to its meaning, and the reciprocity treaty of 1854 was made, in part, "to avoid further misunderstanding between their respective citizens and subjects in regard to the extent of the right of fishing on the coasts of British North America secured by Article I of the Convention" of 1818, and "to regulate the commerce and navigation between their respective territories and people."

The extensive reciprocity of this treaty continued for twelve years.

At its termination by the United States the "misunderstandings" under the treaty of 1818 again arose, when that convention became then, as it is now, the measure of our treaty rights.

The treaty of 1871 was made so as "to provide for an amicable set-

tlement of causes of difference between the two countries," and arbitration and reciprocity pervaded every one of its forty-three articles.

In all the wide range of our treaty engagements with the treaty powers of the world there is scarcely one that does not contain some mutual advantage or reciprocal concession, and they cover every subject that has been suggested, in the experience of mankind, as being fit or convenient to be settled by international agreement rather than to be left under the control or security that might be afforded by the laws enacted by the respective countries, which they could alter or repeal at pleasure.

Now we are again remitted to the field of "misunderstanding," "in regard to the extent of the right of fishing on the coasts of British North America," with an increased number of cases of seizures and interferences with our fishermen growing out of those disputes, and the question is, whether we shall abandon all efforts to remove these misunderstandings by further agreements, or shall we treat every claim we make as a *sine qua non*, and its refusal an ultimatum, and resort, as the first expedient, to retaliatory legislation to enforce it. That failing, shall we stop and abandon the claim, or prepare for its support by coercive measures?

Retaliation may secure just dealing between nations whose interests are entirely distinct and separate; but that is not our situation toward the people or the governments of Canada or Newfoundland.

X.

THE CHARACTER AND VALUE OF THE FISHERIES ON THE COAST OF LABRADOR AND THE BANKS OF NEWFOUNDLAND, AND THE INCREASING DEMAND FOR FOOD-FISHES TO SUPPLY THE WANTS OF THE PEOPLE.

The inshore fishing along the coasts of Labrador are the best we have in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, while that along the southern and western shores of Newfoundland is far better than any along the coasts of Nova Scotia or New Brunswick.

Our plenipotentiaries who negotiated the treaty of 1818 mention these facts to show that we lost nothing of value when we gave up the inshore fisheries of Nova Scotia, and gained much advantage by having access to the shores of Labrador, as will hereafter appear in this report.

Mr. Sabine, in his report to the Secretary of the Treasury, in 1852, gives a very interesting account of the fisheries on the northeastern

coast, from which we make the following extracts, found in Senate Ex. Doc. 22, second session Thirty-second Congress

An account of the fishing-grounds has been reserved for the conclusion. Of those near our cities, and visited for the purpose of supplying our markets with fish to be consumed fresh, it is unnecessary to speak. Those within the limits of British America, and secured to us by treaty, as well as those on the eastern coasts of Maine, are less generally known and may properly claim attention. Of the distant, Newfoundland is the oldest. That vessels from Boston fished there as early as the year 1645 is a fact preserved in the journal of Governor Winthrop. The "great bank," which has been so long resorted to, is said to be about 200 miles broad and nearly 600 miles long. In gales the sea is very high, and dense fogs are prevalent. The water is from 25 to 95 fathoms deep. The edges of the bank are abrupt and composed of rough rocks. The best fishing-grounds are between the latitudes of 42° and 46° north. The "bankers," as the vessels employed there are called, anchor in the open sea, at a great distance from the land, and pursue their hazardous and lonely employment, exposed to perils hardly known elsewhere. The fish are caught with hooks and lines, and (the operations of splitting and dressing performed) are salted in bulk in the hold, from day to day, until the cargo is completed. The bank fish are larger than those taken on the shores of Newfoundland, but are not often so well cured. The first American vessel which was fitted for the Labrador fishery sailed from Newburyport toward the close of the last century. The business, once undertaken, was pursued with great energy, and several hundred vessels were engaged in it annually previous to the war of 1812. A voyage to Labrador, unlike a trip to the Banks of Newfoundland, is not without pleasant incidents, even to landsmen. The coast is frequented for a distance of 10 or 12 degrees of latitude. It has been preferred to any other on account of its security and a general certainty of affording a supply of fish. Arriving in some harbor early in June, an American vessel is moored and remains quietly at anchor until a full "fare" has been obtained, or until the departure of the fish requires the master to seek another inlet.

The fishing is done entirely in boats, and the number usually employed is one for about 30 tons of the vessel's register. Here, under the management of an experienced and skillful master, everything may be rendered systematic and regular. As soon as the vessel has been secured by the necessary anchors, her sails and light rigging are stowed away, her decks cleared, her boats fitted, and a day or two spent in fowling and sailing, under color of exploring the surrounding waters and fixing upon proper stations for the boats, and the master announces to his crew that they must try their luck with the hook and line. Each boat has now assigned to it a skipper or master, and one man. At the time designated, the master departs with his boats, to test the qualities of his men, and to mark out for them a course for their future procedure.

Nothing could be more injurious to men, who are brought into such intimate association by their common right of fishing on those distant shores, than a policy of their governments which would cause them to make reprisals, the stronger against the weaker.

Hon. Robert J. Walker, whose ability as a statesman is nowhere

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seriously questioned, in a letter to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, dated April 24, 1868, thus describes the value of the fisheries as sources of food supply. He says:

But there are other most important considerations connected with extended coasts and great fisheries. The fisheries are capable of furnishing more and cheaper food than the land.

The reasons are—

(1) The ocean surface is nearly four times that of the land, the area being 145,000,000 square miles of ocean surface to 52,000,000 of land.

(2) The ocean everywhere produces fish, from the equator to the pole, the profusion of submarine animals increasing as you go north up to a point but 433 miles from the pole and believed to extend there, whereas, in consequence of mountains, deserts, and the temperature of the surface of the earth in very high latitudes, less than half its surface can be cultivated so as to produce food in any appreciable quantities.

(3) The temperature of the ocean, in high latitudes, being much warmer than that of the land surface, there is increased profusion of submarine animal life, especially in the Arctic and Atlantic Seas, where, on account of extreme cold, the land surface produces no food. In warm latitudes the deep-sea temperature diminishes with the depth, until a certain point, below which it maintains an equable temperature of 40° Fahrenheit. The temperature of the ocean in latitude 70° (many degrees warmer than the land surface) is the same in all depths. There are wonderful provisions for the multiplication of animal life in the ocean, and it moderates both heat and cold. These are additional reasons in favor of the existence of a Polar Sea, filled with a far greater profusion of submarine animal life than any other seas, and, as a consequence, possessing far the best fisheries. Indeed, as fish progress northward, on account of the better ocean temperature there, as also, because the marine food there is more abundant, there can be little doubt that the open Polar Sea will furnish fisheries of *incredible value*.

(4) The ocean produces food in all latitudes for the support of animal submarine life. These are squid (the principal food of the whale), also abundance of nutritious sea-grasses, etc., upon which the fish feed. Besides, as the earth is more and more cultivated, and farms, as well as towns and cities, drained by creeks and rivers to the seas, the submarine food is correspondingly augmented. Even in mid-ocean the phosphorescence observed there is produced by the presence in the water of myriads of living animals.

(5) Whilst the earth produces food by plowing its surface only a few inches deep, the ocean supplies myriads of fish, tier on tier, thousands of fathoms deep. Thus, the registered take of herrings in the Scotch fisheries, in 1861, was 900,000,000, whilst that of Norway, in the latitude of Iceland and Greenland, was far greater.

Perhaps, however, the main reason why the ocean produces so much more food for man than the land is, that whilst land animals only give birth to one or two of their young at a time, some fish produce millions of ova, to be matured into life. Thus, a female cod has been found to contain 3,400,000 ova; and other fish ova varying from several millions to 35,000. Hence, the vast success attending the increased production of fish by transfer, by sowing the spawn, and other methods known to ichthyology.

Nothing could more certainly lessen the food supply of the people, which, after all, is the basis of all human progress, than to promote strife amongst fishermen visiting the same waters. A policy that leads to such a result is an injustice to the human family.

No wealth, national or personal, can be justly earned when it comes from diminishing the supply of human food.

With all our vast excess of cereals and of animal food we still need all the fish we can gather from the oceans and seas for the comfort and economy of living, especially among the industrial classes of our rapidly increasing population. The Atlantic and Pacific fisheries rank in importance along with the production of beef, mutton, and pork as a source of food supply, and as a competitive element in the food markets even of this abundant country.

Our fishing rights and liberties along the coasts of Labrador and Newfoundland, as fixed by the treaty of 1818, are rights to be enjoyed in common with the British people, and are such as no other nation has. They are partnership rights, in the intimate character of the association, in their labors and privileges, of our fishermen with theirs. No two nations were ever drawn into a closer relationship, or one in which good-will and mutual forbearance were more essential to the profitable pursuit of a great industry, than that established between us by the joint struggles of the colonies, confirmed by the treaty of 1783, and renewed, as to parts of Labrador and Newfoundland, almost without restriction, by the treaty of 1818.

As to this, by far the most essential part of the rights reserved to us in that treaty, we can no more preserve and enjoy its value to us, under the plan of reprisals, through retaliatory laws, upon British commerce, than copartners can promote their joint business interests by each one attempting constantly to destroy the value of the other partner's share in the venture.

Our vessels and theirs are anchored side by side in the bays, or follow the same schools of fish, and capture them wherever they are found along these coasts. One fisherman entices the fish around his vessel with bait and another comes in and takes what he can with his lines or nets, just as if the whole business was a copartnership.

If these vessels belong to countries that are arrayed in commercial hostility based upon retaliatory laws and ready to break out, upon slight provocation, into a war, their friendly association will be impossible.

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XI.

THE USE OF FLEETS TO INTERPRET A TREATY.

Under the misunderstandings of the past we have on both sides sent fleets to these waters to protect our fishermen against each other, and against the unfriendly conduct of the local governments; fleets to enforce agreements that the governments concerned could not expound by a mutual understanding.

If these questions are left open, and commercial war is inaugurated through measures of retaliation, how many ships and guns is it supposed will be needed to keep the peace between our fishermen on the coasts of Labrador and Newfoundland?

The danger in this direction does not come from the desire of either Government to promote a war, but from their inability to prevent its initiation through the personal hostilities of men associated in the use of common rights and privileges, and stimulated by rivalries which are encouraged by laws of retaliation enacted by their respective Governments.

These are some of the dangers against which this treaty wisely makes safe provision.

XII.

THE AREA YIELDED BY THE DELIMITATIONS OF THIS TREATY, AS COMPARED WITH THOSE YIELDED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON THEIR CONSTRUCTION OF THE LIMITS OF OUR "RENUNCIATION" UNDER THE TREATY OF 1818.

It is alleged by some that this treaty yields to the British Government 50,000 square miles of exclusive fishing-grounds beyond what we yielded in the treaty of 1818.

Taking the contention of the United States that no headland theory is to be found in the treaty of 1818, and that the exclusive fishing limit is a line 3 miles from the shore, at low water, that enters all harbors, bays, and creeks that are more than 6 miles wide at the entrance, and follows the sinuosities of the coast thereof, this estimate of the area surrendered in this treaty is greatly exaggerated.

This is the narrowest limit to which we have confined our renunciation in the treaty of 1818, of the common right of fishery, in our contentions with Great Britain.

The total area as to which we renounced the common right of fishing, according to this construction of that treaty, is 16,424 nautical square miles.

The additional area of renunciation under the delimitations of the proposed treaty, now before the Senate, is 1,127 square miles, being $6\frac{8}{10}$ per cent. addition to the former area of exclusion.

The total area of bays, creeks, and harbors not more than 6 miles wide at their mouths is about 6,599 square miles, and is included in the above-mentioned measurement of 16,424 square miles.

The British claim as the true construction of the agreement in the treaty of 1818, that it fixed the line within which we renounced the common right of fishery at the distance, measured seaward, of 3 miles from the entrance of *all* bays, harbors, and creeks of His Majesty's dominions. This would add an area of 3,489 square miles to the exclusive fishing grounds claimed by the British Government, while the area in which we have renounced the common right of fishing in those bays, harbors, and creeks under the proposed treaty now before the Senate is 1,127 square miles.

Thus, under the British contention that Government yields, in this treaty, 3,489 square miles of exclusive fishing waters to the people of the United States as a common fishery, and we yield 1,127 square miles to the British Government as exclusive fishing waters, which we now claim to enjoy with them as a common fishery under our construction of the treaty of 1818, which they refuse to admit.

They yield more than two-thirds of their claim to us, and we yield less than one-third of our claim to them, for the sake of settling forever a dispute that has lasted for seventy years, and has been in every way a costly and disturbing contention to our people. (See official statement from the Coast Survey, marked D.)

If these disputed areas were the richest fisheries in the world, the settlement of our respective rights in them, as arranged in the treaty now before the Senate, should be welcomed by the American people with entire satisfaction.

When we knew, from the examination and report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that this disputed area is of no real advantage to our fishermen, and that this statement is supported by conclusive evidence, furnished by the Halifax Commission, and by Professor Baird, our former Commissioner of Fisheries, no ground seems to be left for the contention of those who oppose this settlement.

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XIII.

THE VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AS TO THE PROPER EXECUTION OF THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF MARCH 3, 1887, OPPOSED TO THOSE OF THE CAPITALISTS WHO CONTROL OUR FISHING INDUSTRY AND REAP THE GREATEST ADVANTAGES FROM THEM.

The president of the American Fishery Union, in 1887, brought the subject of retaliation to the attention of the President of the United States, and insisted that it should be applied only to the exclusion of British-American fishing products from the markets of the United States. To that demand the President of the United States replied as follows :

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

Washington, D. C., April 7, 1887.

GENTLEMEN: I have received your letter lately addressed to me, and have given full consideration to the expression of the views and wishes therein contained in relation to the existing differences between the Government of Great Britain and the United States growing out of the refusal to award to our citizens engaged in fishing enterprises the privileges to which they are entitled either under treaty stipulations or the guaranties of international comity and neighborly concession. I sincerely trust the apprehension you express of unjust and unfriendly treatment of American fishermen lawfully found in Canadian waters will not be realized; but if such apprehension should prove to be well founded, I earnestly hope that no fault or inconsiderate action of any of our citizens will in the least weaken the just position of our Government, or deprive us of the universal sympathy and support to which we should be entitled.

The action of this administration since June, 1855, when the fishery articles of the treaty of 1871 were terminated under the notification which had two years before been given by our Government, has been fully disclosed by the correspondence between the representatives and the appropriate departments of the respective Governments, with which I am apprised by your letter you are entirely familiar. An examination of this correspondence has doubtless satisfied you that in no case have the rights or privileges of American fishermen been overlooked or neglected, but that, on the contrary, they have been sedulously insisted upon and cared for by every means within the control of the executive branch of the Government.

The act of Congress approved March 3, 1887, authorizing a course of retaliation, through executive action, in the event of a continuance on the part of the British-American authorities of unfriendly conduct and treaty violations affecting American fishermen, has devolved upon the President of the United States exceedingly grave and solemn responsibilities, comprehending highly important consequences to our national character and dignity, and involving extremely valuable commercial intercourse between the British possessions in North America and the people of the United States.

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)

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I understand the main purpose of your letter is to suggest that, in case recourse to the retaliatory measures authorized by this act should be invited by unjust treatment of our fishermen in the future, the object of such retaliation might be fully accomplished by "prohibiting Canadian-caught fish from entry into the ports of the United States."

The existing controversy is one in which two nations are the parties concerned. The retaliation contemplated by the act of Congress is to be enforced, not to protect solely any particular interest, however meritorious or valuable, but to maintain the national honor, and thus protect all our people. In this view the violation of American fishery rights and unjust or unfriendly acts towards a portion of our citizens engaged in this business is but the occasion for action, and constitutes a national affront which gives birth to or may justify retaliation. This measure once resorted to, its effectiveness and value may well depend upon the thoroughness and extent of its application; and in the performance of international duties, the enforcement of international rights, and the protection of our citizens, this Government and the people of the United States must act as a unit, all intent upon attaining the best result of retaliation upon the basis of a maintenance of national honor and duty.

The nation seeking by any means to maintain its honor, dignity, and integrity, is engaged in protecting the rights of the people; and if, in such efforts, particular interests are injured and special advantages forfeited, these things should be patriotically borne for the public good. An immense volume of population, manufactures and agricultural productions, and the marine tonnage and railways to which these have given activity, all largely the result of intercourse between the United States and British America, and the natural growth of a full half century of good neighborhood and friendly communication, form an aggregate of material wealth and incidental relation of most impressive magnitude. I fully appreciate these things, and am not unmindful of the great number of our people who are concerned in such vast and diversified interests.

In the performance of the serious duty which Congress has imposed upon me, and in the exercise, upon just occasion, of the power conferred under the act referred to, I shall deem myself bound to inflict no unnecessary damage or injury upon any portion of our people; but I shall, nevertheless, be unflinchingly guided by a sense of what the self-respect and dignity of the nation demand. In the maintenance of these and in the support of the honor of the Government, beneath which every citizen may repose in safety, no sacrifice of personal or private interests shall be considered as against the general welfare.

Yours, very truly,

GROVER CLEVELAND.

GEORGE STEELE,

President American Fishery Union, and others,

Gloucester, Mass.

From this letter, to which the minority of the committee refer with great satisfaction, as a correct exposition of the duties that Congress has imposed upon the President in the enforcement of our laws of retaliation, it will be seen that the present administration will treat this

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subject in the same sense that Congress has treated it, as a question of national concern, and not as a means of promoting the pecuniary interests of those who control and derive the chief benefit of our fisheries, such as the owners and outfitters of fishing fleets, and warehousemen and those engaged in salting, drying, and canning fish for the interior markets.

The hardy fishermen of the United States will, we believe, also be protected in the administration of our retaliatory laws, and other similar statutes, against the common practice that speculators in the fishing industry now resort to of placing their vessels in charge of captains and crews imported from Canada, because they can underbid our fishermen in the matter of wages.

This practice is a far more serious injury to our fishermen and to the people of the United States than would come from yielding twice the area of fishing waters that are yielded by the delimitations of this treaty, even if they were good fishing waters. It has already compelled many of our best fishermen to withdraw from this, and to seek a living in other pursuits.

XIV.

THE QUESTION OF THE BRITISH HEADLAND THEORY, AS TO SMALLER BAYS AND HARBORS ALONG THE COASTS, AND THE LIMITS OF OUR RENUNCIATION OF THE RIGHTS OF FISHING, AND THE NATURE OF THE RESTRICTIONS UPON THE RIGHTS OF OUR FISHERMEN TO ENTER THE BAYS AND HARBORS OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, ARE MATTERS OF DISPUTED RIGHT. ADMISSIONS MADE HERETOFORE BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS, AS TO THE DIFFICULTY OF CONSTRUING, GRAMMATICALLY, THE TEXT OF THE TREATY OF 1818, GIVE COLOR TO THE BRITISH CONSTRUCTION, AND PROVE, AT LEAST, ITS SINCERITY.

It is boldly asserted, in opposition to this treaty, that there is no sort of equivalent for the 1,127 square miles of fishing waters that we concede by the fixed lines of delimitation in this treaty. This assertion impeaches both the right of the British Government and the sincerity of its claim of the headland theory, as it applies to bays more than 6 miles wide at the entrance. Nevertheless that assertion is much weakened by the official opinions of eminent American publicists, communicated to the British Government.

If the territorial claims of both Governments were sincerely asserted, as we believe they were, in reference to the fishing waters, the modification of them by mutual consent has always been held in the conduct

of nations as a good equivalent, moving from each to the other, for the concessions mutually made. This doctrine is also applied by the courts as between individuals to support agreements based on the consideration of yielding or settling disputed claims.

In contrast with the assertion of the utter want of reason in the claims of Great Britain, based on the headland theory, we find many strong declarations of our Government. Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, on December 30, 1816, admitted that a discussion of *rights* should be avoided when mutual *concessions were necessary to bring the treaty powers to a mutual agreement*. He said to Mr. Bagot:

In providing for the accommodation of the citizens of the United States engaged in the fisheries on the coasts of His Britannic Majesty's colonies on conditions advantageous to both parties, I concur in the sentiment that it is desirable to avoid a discussion of *their respective rights*, and to proceed, in a spirit of conciliation, to examine *what arrangement will be adequate to the object*. The discussion which has already taken place between our Governments has, it is presumed, *placed the claim of each party in a just light*.

Our claim then was that we had a common right of fishery, on all the coasts, with the people of the British North American Possessions.

The British Government then claimed that the war of 1812-15 had destroyed all our claims in such fisheries. On the 28th July, 1818, Mr. Adams, Secretary of State, instructed Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Rush as follows:

The President authorizes you to agree to an article whereby the United States will desist from the liberty of fishing, and curing, and drying fish *within the British jurisdiction generally*, upon condition that it shall be secured as a permanent right, not liable to be impaired by any future war, *from Cape Ray to Ramea Islands, and from Mount Joli, on the Salvador coast, through the straits of Belle Isle, indefinitely north, along the coast*; the right to extend as well to curing and drying the fish as to fishing.

This instruction was certainly much more liberal to the subjects of Great Britain than the first article of the treaty that was made under it. But the instruction stated the demand of the United States, and the British have a right to argue, at least, that the treaty was intended to conform to it as to the principles involved in it.

Claiming absolutely the right to enjoy these fisheries in common with the Canadians, and basing our claim upon the highest considerations of justice, we were met with the counter-claim of Great Britain, that all our fishing rights in Canadian waters were granted to us by the treaty of 1783, and that that treaty had been abrogated by war. In this dispute, which was vital, we found so much reason for an adjustment, that

our plenipotentiaries offered to Great Britain the surrender of our rights to the extent they were renounced in the treaty of 1818.

Our plenipotentiaries, in explaining the treaty to our Government, say:

It will also be perceived that we insisted on the clause by which the United States renounce their right to the fisheries relinquished by the convention, that clause being omitted in the first British counter-project.

We insisted on it with the view: (1) Of preventing any implication that the fisheries secured to us were a new grant and of placing the permanence of the rights secured and of those renounced precisely on the same footing; (2) of its being expressly stated *that our renunciation extended only to the distance of three miles from the coasts.*

The reasons they assigned for the importance of this point bring into serious doubt the question whether this renunciation extended to the ocean coasts, or the coasts of the bays. They are as follows:

This last point was the more important, as, with the exception of the fishery in open boats within certain harbors, it appeared from the communications above mentioned, *that the fishing-ground on the whole coast of Nova Scotia is more than three miles from the shores; whilst, on the contrary, it is almost universally close to the shore on the coasts of Labrador. It is in that point of view that the privilege of entering the ports for shelter is useful, and it is hoped that, with that provision, a considerable portion of the actual fisheries ON THAT COAST (of Nova Scotia) will, notwithstanding the renunciation, be preserved.*

In view of these declarations of our plenipotentiaries, who negotiated the treaty of 1818, no censure can be due to Daniel Webster for having expressed the opinion, in what is termed his "proclamation" to our fishermen, that "it would appear that, by a strict and rigid construction of this article" (of the treaty of 1818), "fishing vessels of the United States are precluded from entering into the bays," etc., and that "it was undoubtedly an oversight in the convention of 1818 to make so large a concession to England, since the United States had usually considered that these vast inlets or recesses of the ocean ought to be open to American fishermen, as free as the sea itself, to within three miles of the shore."

It was not until March, 1845, that the Bay of Fundy was declared open to our fisheries by the British Government, on condition "*that they do not approach, except in cases specified in the treaty of 1818, within three miles of the entrance of any bay on the coast of Nova Scotia, or New Brunswick.*"

On the 17th September, 1845, the governor of Nova Scotia was in-

structed by the British Government that the permission to fish that had been conceded to us in the Bay of Fundy did not extend "to the Bay of Chaleur and other large bays of similar character on the coast of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick," and that they "*still adhere to the strict letter of the treaties,*" of which Mr. Webster afterwards spoke in his circular letter in 1852.

Many other disputations have occurred over the meaning of this treaty, as to the extent of the renunciation of our fishing rights within 3 miles of the coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks of the British North American possessions, and we are not aware that any of them have been definitively settled. Mr. Everett, minister to Great Britain, on the 25th March, 1845, replied to the letter of Lord Aberdeen, stating the action of the British Government in relation to our right to fish in the Bay of Fundy, in which Lord Aberdeen said:

The undersigned will confine himself to stating that, after the most deliberate reconsideration of the subject, and with every desire to do full justice to the United States, and to view the claims put forward on behalf of the United States citizens in the most favorable light, Her Majesty's Government are nevertheless still constrained to deny the right of United States citizens, under the treaty of 1818, to fish in that part of the Bay of Fundy which, from its geographical position, may properly be considered as included within the British possessions.

Her Majesty's Government still maintain—and in this they are fortified by high legal authority—that the Bay of Fundy is rightfully claimed by Great Britain as a bay within the meaning of the treaty of 1818, and they equally maintain the position which was laid down in the note of the undersigned, dated the 15th of April last, that with regard to the other bays on the British American coasts no United States fisherman has, under that convention, the right to fish within 3 miles of the *entrance* of such bays as designated by a line drawn from headland to headland at that entrance.

That treaty was then 27 years old. It is now 70. But Mr. Edward Everett, instead of recommending war as the means of meeting this flat denial of our rights, that are now considered so clear as to be indisputable, replied to Lord Aberdeen, in the same spirit that subsequently pervaded Mr. Webster's circular (above quoted), as follows:

Speaking of the attitude of the United States as to the British construction of the treaty of 1818, he says:

While they have ever been prepared to admit, that in the letter of one expression of that instrument there is some reason for claiming a right to exclude United States fishermen from the Bay of Fundy (it being difficult to deny to that arm of the sea the name of "bay," which long geographical usage has assigned to it), they have ever strenuously maintained that it is only on their own construction of the entire article that its known design in reference to the regulation of the fisheries admits of being carried into effect.

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Will Mr. Everett also be censured for finding difficulties in the head-land theory of the British Government (so clearly stated by Lord Aberdeen) that staggered Mr. Webster's honest mind in 1852?

A still more conspicuous and deliberate presentation of the difficulty of arriving at a satisfactory construction of the first article of the treaty of 1818, and of the propriety and necessity of an agreement with Great Britain, as to its true meaning, is found in the letter of Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, to Mr. Welsh, our minister to England, of September 27, 1878. Mr. Evarts says:

If the benevolent method of arbitration between nations is to commend itself as a discreet and practical disposition of international disputes, it must be by a due maintenance of the safety and integrity of the transaction, in the essential point of the award, observing the limits of the submission.

But this Government is not at liberty to treat the fisheries award as of this limited interest and operation in the relations of the two countries to the important, permanent, and difficult contention on the subject of the fisheries, which for sixty years has, at intervals, pressed itself upon the attention of the two Governments and disquieted their people. The temporary arrangement of the fisheries by the treaty of Washington is terminable, at the pleasure of either party, in less than seven years from now.

And he then proceeds to argue that if this Government acquiesced in the measure of damages assessed by the Commission, our rights might be prejudiced after the twelve years' period expired. Referring, further on in the dispatch, to the historical aspect of the matter, Mr. Evarts said:

Our diplomatic intercourse has unfolded the views of successive British and American cabinets upon the conflicting claims of mere right on the one side and the other, and at the same time evinced on both sides an amicable preference for practical and peaceful enjoyment of the fisheries, compatibly with a common interest, rather than a sacrifice of such common interest to a purpose of insisting upon extreme right at a loss on both sides of what was to each the advantage sought by the contention.

In this disposition the two countries have inclined more and more to retire from irreconcilable disputations as to the true intent covered by the somewhat careless and certainly incomplete, text of the convention of 1818, and to look at the true elements of profits and prosperity in the fisheries themselves, which alone, to the one side or the other, made the shares of their respective participation therein worthy of dispute. This sensible and friendly view of the matter in dispute was greatly assisted by the experience of the provincial populations of a period of common enjoyment of the fisheries without attention to any sea-line of demarkation, but with a certain distribution of industrial and economical advantages in the prosecution and the product of this common enjoyment.

Here is almost an exact repetition of Mr. Webster's declaration of 1852 as to the unsatisfactory and uncertain character of the convention of 1818, especially to the "sea-line of demarkation."

As to the representations made by the Secretary of State to the British minister in Washington in the cases of the *Joseph Story* and *David J. Adams*, in notes dated respectively the 10th and 20th of May, 1886, the Earl of Roseberry communicated to Sir Lionel West a report of the Canadian minister of marine and fisheries, copy of which was communicated to Mr. Bayard by Mr. Harding, British *chargé d'affaires*, on August 2, 1886. From this report the following in reply to Mr. Bayard's argument for commercial privileges is here quoted :

In addition to this evidence, it must be remembered that the United States Government admitted, in the case submitted by them before the Halifax Commission in 1877, that neither the Convention of 1818 nor the Treaty of Washington conferred any right or privilege of trading on American fishermen. The British case claimed compensation for the privilege which had been given since the ratification of the latter treaty to United States fishing vessels "to transfer cargoes, to outfit vessels by supplies, obtain ice, engage sailors, procure bait, and traffic generally in British ports and harbors."

This claim was, however, successfully resisted, and in the United States case it was maintained "that the various incidental and reciprocal advantages of the treaty such as the privileges of traffic, purchasing bait and other supplies, are not the subject of compensation, because the Treaty of Washington confers no such rights on the inhabitants of the United States, who now enjoy them merely by sufferance, and who can at any time be deprived of them by the enforcement of existing laws or the re-enactment of former oppressive statutes. Moreover, the treaty does not provide for any possible compensation for such privileges."

Still later a reply to the representations made by Mr. Phelps, at London, was written by the Canadian minister of justice. From his reply we quote the following :

But even at this barrier the difficulty in following Mr. Phelps's argument by which he seeks to reach the interpretation he desires, does not end. After taking a view of the treaty which all authorities thus forbid, he says: "Thus regarded, it appears more clear that the words 'for no other purpose whatever,' as employed in the treaty mean for no other purpose inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty." Taken in that sense the words would have no meaning, for no other purpose would be consistent with the treaty, excepting those mentioned. He proceeds, "or prejudicial to the interests of the provinces or their inhabitants." If the United States authorities are the judges as to what is prejudicial to those interests, the treaty will have very little value; if the provinces are to be the judges, it is most prejudicial to their interests that United States fishermen should be permitted to come into the harbors on that pretext, and it is fatal to their fishery interests that these fishermen, with whom they have to compete at such a disadvantage in the markets of the United States, should be allowed to enter for supplies and bait, even for the pursuit of the deep-sea fisheries. Before concluding his remarks on this subject, the undersigned would refer to a passage in the answer on behalf of the United States to the case of Her Majesty's Government as presented to the Halifax Fisheries Commission in 1877: "The various

incidental and reciprocal advantages of the treaty, such as the privileges of traffic, purchasing bait and other supplies, are not the subject of compensation, because the treaty of Washington confers no such rights on the inhabitants of the United States, *who now enjoy them merely by sufferance, and who can at any time be deprived of them by the enforcement of existing laws or the re-enforcement of former oppressive statutes.*"

If the proclamation of 1830 and the order in council of that year extended to the fishing vessels engaged in the fisheries adjacent to the British Provinces on the North Atlantic and repealed the treaty of 1818, in its restrictive parts, the position taken by the United States before the Halifax Commission was a serious error.

XV.

A PRECEDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY PRESIDENT JACKSON IN 1834 AS TO THE WISDOM OF FORBEARANCE IN COMMERCIAL RETALIATION, OR IN MAKING REPRISALS FOR A WILLFUL VIOLATION OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS, AS TO THE MEANING OF WHICH THERE WAS NO DISPUTE, RATHER THAN DISTURB SERIOUSLY THE INTERESTS OF OUR PEOPLE.

The results of a firm but pacific policy in demanding a compliance with treaty obligations with friendly powers are strongly exemplified in the conduct of President Jackson, in reference to the treaty of July 4, 1831, with the French Government.

By that treaty France acknowledged an indebtedness to the United States of 25,000,000 francs, payable in six annual instalments, with interest, the first due February 7, 1833. The Chamber of Deputies, by a majority of eight, refused to enable the King to carry out the treaty by withholding the necessary appropriation. This was on the alleged ground that our plenipotentiary, having a superior knowledge of the facts, had obtained an undue advantage of the French negotiator in the terms of the treaty.

The reply of Mr. Livingston, that he had obtained the information on which he had acted almost exclusively on papers obtained in France, was a conclusive vindication of that good and eminent man.

This and subsequent refusals of the deputies, together with irritating expressions of the French Government, caused the withdrawal of diplomatic intercourse with that Government. And demands of the French deputies that President Jackson should withdraw certain forcible comments made by him in his messages to Congress on this subject gave him just cause for indignation.

In view, however, of the serious results that always follow reprisals, retorsions, and retaliations, even under the heat of a just indignation

for a flagrant wrong, President Jackson thus advised Congress, in his sixth annual message (1834), as to the policy of such action :

Our institutions are essentially pacific. Peace and friendly intercourse with all nations are as much the desire of our Government as they are the interest of our people. But these objects are not to be permanently secured by surrendering the rights of our citizens, or permitting solemn treaties for their indemnity in cases of flagrant wrong to be abrogated or set aside.

It is undoubtedly in the power of Congress seriously to affect the agricultural and manufacturing interests of France by the passage of laws relating to her trade with the United States. Her products, manufactures, and tonnage may be subjected to heavy duties in our ports, or all commercial intercourse with her may be suspended. But there are powerful and, to my mind, conclusive objections to this mode of proceeding. We can not embarrass or cut off the trade of France without at the same time, in some degree, embarrassing or cutting off our own trade. The injury of such a warfare must fall, though unequally, upon our own citizens, and could not but impair the means of the Government, and weaken that united sentiment in support of the rights and honor of the nation which must now pervade every bosom.

Nor is it impossible that such a course of legislation would introduce once more into our national councils these disturbing questions in relation to the tariff of duties which have been so recently put to rest; besides, by every measure adopted by the Government of the United States, with the view of injuring France, the clear perception of right which will induce our own people, and the rulers and people of all other nations, even of France herself, to pronounce our quarrel just, will be obscured, and the support rendered to us, in a final resort to more decisive measures, will be more limited and equivocal.

There is but one point in the controversy, and upon that the whole civilized world must pronounce France to be in the wrong. We insist that she shall pay us a sum of money which she has acknowledged to be due, and of the justice of this demand there can be but one opinion among mankind. True policy would seem to dictate that the question at issue should be kept thus disencumbered, and that not the slightest pretense should be given to France to persist in her refusal to make payment by any act on our part affecting the interests of her people. The question should be left as it is now, in such an attitude that when France fulfills her treaty stipulations all controversy will be at an end.

XVI.

BY THE DELIMITATIONS FIXED IN THIS TREATY WE YIELD NOTHING THAT IS OF ANY VALUE TO OUR FISHERMEN. WHAT WE YIELD IS OF VALUE TO THE BRITISH PROVINCES AS A MEANS OF CONDUCTING THEIR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. THE TREATY IS A JUST AND FAIR SETTLEMENT.

The treaty now before the Senate wisely and reasonably provides for the settlement of all disputed questions that have been under discussion by the two Governments, and adds greatly to the privileges of our fishermen in the British-American ports.

In a published letter of the chief counsel of the "outfitters" and owners of fishing vessels—Mr. Woodbury—he says, that "the right to fish on the coast of Nova Scotia, within the 3-mile limit, our fishermen consider of no value whatever."

The report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of January 19, 1887, on the value of inshore fishing rights, and the right to take or buy bait, to which reference has been made, shows conclusively that they are of no value to our fishermen. In their report, the committee say:

From the investigations made by the committee during the last summer and fall, and as the result of the great mass of testimony taken by it and herewith returned, the committee believe it to be clear, beyond all dispute, that the right to fish within 3 miles of the Dominion shores is of no practical advantage whatever to American fishermen. The cod and halibut fishing has been for many years almost entirely carried on at long distances from the shores, in the deep waters, on banks, etc.; and it is believed that were there absolute liberty for Americans to fish, without restriction or regulation of any kind, within 3 miles of the Dominion shores, no such fisherman would ever think of going there for the purpose of catching cod or halibut.

"As regards the obtaining of bait for this class of fishing, the testimony taken by the committee in its inquiries clearly demonstrates that there is no necessity whatever for American fishermen to resort to Canadian waters for that purpose. Clam bait is found in immense quantities in our own waters, and there have been instances, so frequent and continuous as to amount to a habit, of the Canadian themselves resorting to American waters or ports for the purpose of obtaining it. The squid bait is found on the very banks where the fishing goes on. So that the instances would be extremely rare when any American fishing vessel would wish to resort to a Dominion port for the purpose of buying bait for this kind of fishing.

"It was also proved before the committee that, with the rarest exceptions, it would be absolutely injurious to the pecuniary interests of all concerned for American vessels to resort to Dominion ports or waters, except in need or distress, for the time taken in such departures from the cod and halibut grounds, or from direct sailing to and from them, is so great that, with or without the difference of port expenses, time and money are both lost in such visits.

"In respect of the mackerel fishery the committee finds, as will be seen from the evidence referred to, that its course and methods have of late years entirely changed. While it used to be carried on by vessels fishing with hook and line, and sometimes near the shores, it is now almost entirely carried on by the use of immense seines, called purse-seines, of great length and descending many fathoms into the water. This gear is very expensive, and a fishing vessel does not usually carry more than one or two. The danger of fishing near the shore with such seines is so great, on account of striking rocks and reefs, that it is regarded as extremely hazardous ever to undertake it. Besides this, the large schools of mackerel, to the taking of which this great apparatus is best adapted, are almost always found more than 3 miles from land, either in great bays and gulfs or entirely out at sea.

There will be found accompanying this report (see Appendix) statements showing the total catch of mackerel during certain years and the parts of the seas where they have been taken; and it will also be seen from the evidence *that in general the mackerel fisheries by Americans in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and in the Bay of Chaleur have not been remunerative.*

In view of all these facts, well known to the great body of the citizens of the United States engaged in fisheries and embracing every variety of interest connected therewith, from the wholesale dealer, vessel owner, and outfitter, to that portion of the crew who receive the smallest share of the venture, it must be considered as conclusively established that there would be no material value whatever in the grant by the British Government to American fishermen of absolutely free fishing; and in this conclusion it will be seen, by a reference to the testimony, that all these interests fully concur.

When we consider that the inshore fisheries are of no value and that the right to take bait, or to buy it, is worse than useless to our people, the alleged surrender of fishing territory to the British in this treaty is of far less consequence to us than the surrender we made in 1854, to get these privileges, by purchasing with reciprocity the repose of the British contentions, restrictions, and exclusions, at a cost to our revenues of nearly \$10,000,000; and in 1871, by a purchase with \$5,500,000 in money, and a great sum in the loss of revenues on fish imported from Canada.

We have paid for everything we have got from Great Britain, since 1783, in connection with the fisheries. That concession was the last thing we got under our *strict demand for the right*. It is the last thing we will ever get, without compensation, until we go to war to regain our attitude of 1783.

The extract from the report of the Senate committee, above copied, shows that in such a war we would be fighting over a subject that is utterly barren of any actual value to the American people—a war in which the principles involved would have no relation to rights secured by international laws, but would relate only to the meaning of words in a treaty, that were put there by the mutual consent of two enlightened Governments.

This treaty closes the discussion on the subject of delimitation of fishing boundaries, a matter that was, in some sort, provided for in the treaty of 1854.

It presents a fair and equitable settlement of questions that have been in dispute for seventy years.

It gives our fishermen, as an equivalent for the concessions we make, largely increased privileges, as navigators, beyond the narrow and inhospitable provisions of the treaty of 1818.

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And, for the first time that such a thing was ever attempted, this treaty proposes to open the door to wide commercial privileges for our fishermen, based on concessions that concern them alone.

The *modus vivendi* provided in the protocol enables our fishermen, during two fishing seasons, to compare the value of the very broad commercial privileges therein accorded with the price of annual license at \$1.50 per ton on their ships. A fisherman, outfitting with all he needs to sustain his business in Canadian ports, and having the privilege of sending his fares to our market under bond, over railroads and through such ports as would be easily reached, would be able to make so many more voyages that the annual license of \$1.50 a ton on his ship would be reduced to 30 cents or 40 cents per ton on the voyage. If the business will not bear such a tax in compensation for such privileges, it is scarcely worth a war, or a serious disturbance of good will with our neighbors, to secure these commercial advantages to our fishermen.

We venture to repeat the recommendation that the Senate will await the developments that even one fishing season will make under this protocol before taking final action on the treaty.

XVII.

THERE IS NO FAULT IN THE MANNER OF NEGOTIATING THIS TREATY, AND THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT IN ANY WAY EXCEEDED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS, OR WITHHELD ANY COURTESY DUE TO THE SENATE IN RESPECT OF THE AGENTS SELECTED BY HIM TO CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATION, OR IN THE TIME OR PLACE OF NEGOTIATING OR CONCLUDING THE TREATY.

On the other question, as to the form in which this negotiation has been conducted and the authority of the two plenipotentiaries, Mr. Putnam and Mr. Angell, to act, without a confirmation by the Senate, we rely upon the precedents cited in the annexed brief of cases that seem to conclude any question on this point.

The table hereto appended, marked C, will furnish an easy reference to all the appointments of diplomatic agents to negotiate and conclude conventions, agreements, and treaties with foreign powers since 1792. The whole number of persons appointed or recognized by the President, without the concurrence or advice of the Senate, or the express authority of Congress, as agents to conduct negotiations and conclude treaties is four hundred and thirty-eight. Three have been appointed

by the Secretary of State and thirty-two have been appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

It will be seen that an interval of fifty-three years, between 1827 and 1880, occurred during which the President did not ask the consent of the Senate to any such appointment.

The following important appointments and many others were made when the Senate was in session:

March 2, 1793.—David Humphries. By Washington. Commissioned plenipotentiary to treat with Algiers. Congress adjourned on that day.

January 26, 1832.—Edmund Roberts. By Jackson. Commissioner to treat with Cochin China and Siam. Congress in session.

May 3, 1838.—Nathaniel Niles. By Van Buren. Special agent to negotiate treaty with Sardinia. Congress in session.

March 28, 1846.—A. Dudley Mann. By Polk. Special agent to treat with sundry States of Germany. Congress in session.

The constitutional power of the President to select the agents through whom he will conduct such business, is not affected by the fact that the Senate is or is not in session at the time of such appointment, or while the negotiation is being conducted; or the fact that he may prefer to withhold, even from the Senate, or from other countries, the fact that he is treating with a particular power, or on a special subject.

The secret-service fund that Congress votes to the Department of State annually is that from which such agents are usually paid. That is the most important reasons for such appropriations.

The following is a summary of Appendix C:

Persons appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate:

1792. William Carmichael, William Shott, to treat with Spain.

1794. John Jay, to treat with Great Britain.

1794. Thomas Pinckney, to treat with Spain.

1796. Rufus King, to treat with Great Britain.

1797. John Q. Adams, to treat with Prussia.

1797. John Q. Adams, to treat with Sweden.

1797. C. C. Pinckney, John Marshall, Elbridge Gerry, to treat with France.

1798. John Q. Adams, to treat with Sweden.

1799. Rufus King, to treat with Russia.

1799. Oliver Ellsworth, Patrick Henry, and William Van Murray, to treat with France.

1799. W. R. Davis, *vice* Henry, as above.

1802. James Monroe and R. R. Livingston, to treat for Louisiana.

1803. Rufus King, to treat with Great Britain, northeast boundary.

1806. James Armstrong and James Bowdoin, to treat with Spain.

1814. J. Q. Adams, J. A. Bayard, Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell, to treat with Great Britain.

Persons appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate—Continued.

1814. Albert Gallatin, to treat with Great Britain.

1826. R. C. Anderson and John Sargeant, to treat with the American nations.

1827. Joel R. Poinsett, *vice* Anderson, above.

1880. James B. Angell, John T. Swift, and W. H. Prescott, to treat with China.*

Total number, 32.

Persons appointed by the Secretary of State:

1825. Christopher Hughes, to treat with Denmark.

1826. John James Appleton, to treat with Naples.

1886. George H. Bates, to treat with Tonga.

Total number, 3.

Persons appointed by the President :

Total number, 43E.

JOHN T. MORGAN,
ELI SAULSBURY,
JOSEPH E. BROWN,
H. B. PAYNE.

APPENDIX A.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas by an act of Congress of the United States, passed on the 29th day of May, 1830, it is provided that whenever the President of the United States shall receive satisfactory evidence that the Government of Great Britain will open the ports of its colonial possessions in the West Indies, on the continent of South America, the Bahama Islands, the Caicos, and the Bermuda or Somer Islands, to the vessels of the United States, for an indefinite or for a limited term; that the vessels of the United States, and their cargoes, on entering the colonial ports aforesaid, shall not be subject to other or higher duties of tonnage or impost, or charges of any other description, than would be imposed on British vessels or their cargoes, arriving in the said colonial possessions from the United States; that the vessels of the United States may import into the said colonial possessions from the United States any article or articles which could be imported in a British vessel into the said possessions from the the United States, and that the vessels of the United States may export from the British colonies aforementioned, to any country whatever, other than the dominions or possessions of Great Britain, any article or articles, that can be exported therefrom in a British vessel, to any country other than the British dominions or possessions aforesaid—leaving the commercial intercourse of the United States with all other parts of the British dominions or possessions on a footing not less favorable to the United States than it now is—that then, and in such case, the President of the United States shall be authorized, at any time before the next session of Congress, to issue his proclamation declaring that he has received such evidence, and that thereupon, and from the date of such proclamation, the ports of the United States shall be opened indefinitely, or for a term fixed, as the case may be, to British vessels coming from the said British colonial possessions, and their cargoes subject to no other or higher duty of tonnage or impost or charge of any description whatever than would be levied on the vessels of the United States or their cargoes arriving from the said British possessions, and that it shall be lawful for the said British vessels to import into the United States, and to export therefrom, any article or articles which may be imported or exported in vessels of the United States, and that the act entitled “An act concerning navigation,” passed on the 18th day of April, one thousand eight hundred and eighteen, an act supplementary thereto, passed the fifteenth day of May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty, and an act entitled “An act to regulate the commercial intercourse between the United States and certain British ports,” passed on the first day of March, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-three, shall, in such case, be suspended or absolutely repealed, as the case may require:

And whereas by the said act it is further provided that, whenever the ports of the United States shall have been opened under the authority thereby given, British vessels and their cargoes shall be admitted to an entry in the ports of the United States from the islands, provinces, or colonies of Great Britain, on or near the North American continent, and north or east of the United States:

And whereas satisfactory evidence has been received by the President of the United States that whenever he shall give effect to the provisions of the act aforesaid, the

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Government of Great Britain will open for an indefinite period the ports in its colonial possessions in the West Indies, on the continent of South America, the Bahama Islands, the Caicos, and the Bermuda or Somer Islands, to the vessels of the United States, and their cargoes, upon the terms and according to the requisitions of the aforesaid act of Congress:

Now, therefore, I, Andrew Jackson, President of the United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim that such evidence has been received by me; and that, by the operation of the act of Congress passed on the 29th day of May, 1830, the ports of the United States are, from the date of this proclamation, open to British vessels coming from the said British possessions, and their cargoes, upon the terms set forth in the said act, the act entitled "An act concerning navigation," passed on the 18th day of April, 1818, the act supplementary thereto, passed the 15th day of May, 1820, and the act entitled "An act to regulate the commercial intercourse between the United States and certain British ports," passed the first day of March, 1823, are absolutely repealed, and British vessels and their cargoes are admitted to an entry in the ports of the United States from the islands, provinces, and colonies of Great Britain on or near the North American continent and north or east of the United States.

Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, the 5th day of October, in the year of our Lord 1830, and the 55th of the Independence of the United States.

ANDREW JACKSON.

By the President:

M. VAN BUREN,

Secretary of State.

CIRCULAR TO THE COLLECTORS OF CUSTOMS.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *October 6, 1830.*

SIR: You will perceive by the proclamation of the President herewith transmitted that from and after the date thereof the act entitled "An act concerning navigation," passed on the 15th of April, 1818; an act supplementary thereto, passed the 15th of May, 1820; and an act entitled "An act to regulate the commercial intercourse between the United States and certain British ports," passed on the 1st of March, 1823, are absolutely repealed; and the ports of the United States are opened to British vessels and their cargoes coming from the British colonial possessions in the West Indies, on the continent of South America, the Bahama Islands, the Caicos, and the Bermuda or Somer Islands; also from the islands, provinces, or colonies of Great Britain on or near the North American continent and north or east of the United States.

By virtue of the authority of this proclamation, and in conformity with the arrangement made between the United States and Great Britain, and under the sanction of the President, you are instructed to admit to entry such vessels, being laden with the productions of Great Britain, or her said colonies, subject to the same duties of tonnage and impost and other charges as are levied on the vessels of the United States or their cargoes arriving from the said British colonies. You will also grant clearances to British vessels for the several ports of the aforesaid colonial possessions of Great Britain, such vessels being laden with such articles as may be exported from the United States in vessels of the United States; and British vessels coming from the said British colonial possessions may also be cleared for foreign ports and places other than those in the said British colonial possessions, being laden with such articles as may be exported from the United States in vessels of the United States.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. D. INGHAM,

Secretary of the Treasury.

APPENDIX B.

ORDER IN COUNCIL.

AT THE COURT AT ST. JAMES',
November 5, 1830.

Present: The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas, By a certain act of Parliament, passed in the 6th year of the reign of his late Majesty King George the Fourth, entitled "An act to regulate the trade of the British possessions abroad," after reciting that "by the law of navigation foreign ships are permitted to import into any of the British possessions abroad, from the countries to which they belong, goods the produce of those countries, and to export goods from such possessions to be carried to any foreign country whatever, and that it is expedient that such permission should be subject to certain conditions, it is therefore enacted that the privileges thereby granted to foreign ships shall be limited to the ships of those countries which, having colonial possessions, shall grant the like privilege of trading with these possessions to British ships, or which, not having colonial possessions, shall place the commerce and navigation of this country and of its possessions abroad upon the footing of the most favored nation, unless his Majesty, by his order in council, shall in any case deem it expedient to grant the whole or any of such privileges to the ships of any foreign country, although the conditions aforesaid shall not in all respects be fulfilled by such foreign country.

And whereas, by a certain order of his said late Majesty in council, bearing date the 27th July, 1826, after reciting that the conditions mentioned and referred to in the said act of Parliament had not in all respects been fulfilled by the Government of the United States of America, and that, therefore, the privileges so granted as aforesaid by the law of navigation to foreign ships could not lawfully be exercised or enjoyed by the ships of the United States aforesaid unless His Majesty, by his order in council, should grant the whole or any of such privileges to the ships of the United States aforesaid, his said late Majesty did, in pursuance of the powers in him vested by the said act, grant the privileges aforesaid to the ships of the said United States, but did thereby provide that he should declare that such privileges should absolutely cease and determine in His Majesty's possessions in the West Indies and South America, and in certain other of His Majesty's possessions abroad, upon and from certain days in the said order for that purpose appointed, and which are long since passed:

And whereas, by a certain other order of his said late Majesty in council, bearing date the 16th of July, 1827, the said last mentioned order was confirmed;

And whereas, in pursuance of the acts of Parliament in that behalf made and provided, his said late Majesty, by a certain order in council bearing date the 21st day of July, 1823, and by the said order in council bearing date the 27th day of July, 1826, was pleased to order that there should be charged on all vessels of the said United States which should enter any of the ports of His Majesty's possessions in the West Indies or America, with articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the said States, certain duties of tonnage and of customs therein particularly specified;

And whereas, it hath been made to appear to His Majesty in council, that the restrictions heretofore imposed by the laws of the United States aforesaid, upon British

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vessels navigating between the said States and His Majesty's possessions in the West Indies and America, have been repealed, and that the discriminating duties of tonnage and of customs heretofore imposed by the laws of the said United States upon British vessels and their cargoes, entering the ports of the said States from His Majesty's said possessions, have also been repealed; and that the ports of the United States are now open to British vessels and their cargoes, coming from His Majesty's possessions aforesaid;

His Majesty doth, therefore, with the advice of his privy council, and in pursuance and exercise of the powers so vested in him, as aforesaid, by the said act so passed in the sixth year of the reign of his said late Majesty, or by any other act or acts of Parliament, declare that the said recited orders in council of the 21st day of July, 1823, and of the 27th day of July, 1826, and the said order in council of the 16th day of July, 1827 (so far as the such last mentioned order relates to the said United States), shall be, and the same are hereby, respectively revoked:

And His Majesty doth further, by the advice aforesaid, and in pursuance of the powers aforesaid, declare that the ships of and belonging to the United States of America may import from the United States aforesaid into the British possessions abroad goods the produce of those States, and may export goods from the British possessions abroad to be carried to any foreign country whatever.

And the right honorable the lords commissioners of His Majesty's treasury, and the Right Honorable Sir George Murray, one of His Majesty's principal secretaries of state, are to give the necessary directions herein, as to them may respectively appertain.

JAS. BULLER.

A true copy:

COUNCIL OFFICE, WHITEHALL, Nov. 6th, 1830.

APPENDIX C.

Being a statement of the persons employed by the United States, in conducting negotiations, since 1789.

Name.	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
G. Morris.....	Oct. 13, 1789	President.....	Private agent.....	To ascertain intentions of Great Britain as to treaty of 1763, and making a treaty of commerce.	None.
William Carmichael.....	Mar. 16, 1792	President and Senate.....	Commissioners plenipotentiary.	To treat with Spain as to Mississippi, boundaries, and commerce.	{ Chargé d'affaires in Spain. Minister resident in Netherlands.
John Paul Jones.....	June —, 1792	President.....	Commissioner.....	To treat with Algiers (1) for peace and friendship; (2) for ransom of captive United States citizens.	Admiral in U. S. Navy.
David Humphreys.....	Mar. 26, 1793	.....do.....	Commissioner plenipotentiary.	Same as preceding.....	Minister resident in Portugal.
John Jay.....	Apr. 19, 1794	President and Senate.....	Envoy extraordinary.....	To treat with Great Britain as to all matters of difference, viz. (1) non-execution of treaty of 1783; (2) restitution or compensation to citizens of United States for seizure of their vessels under British instructions of June 6, 1793, etc.; (3) commerce.	Envoy extraordinary to Great Britain.
William Short.....	July 11, 1794	President.....	Commissioner plenipotentiary.	To treat with Spain as to Mississippi, boundaries, and commerce.	Minister resident in Spain.
Thomas Pinckney.....	Nov. 24, 1794	President and Senate.....	Envoy extraordinary and sole commissioner plenipotentiary.	(1) Same as above; (2) to treat for restitution or compensation for American vessels seized by Spanish armed vessels.	Envoy extraordinary to Spain.
David Humphreys.....	Mar. 30, 1795	President.....	Commissioner plenipotentiary.	To settle the boundary of the United States and commerce with the United States.	Minister resident in Portugal.
Rufus King.....	June 10, 1796	President and Senate.....	Minister plenipotentiary.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Great Britain and to modify or extend Jay's treaty.	Minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
John Quincy Adams.....	June 1, 1797	.....do.....	.....do.....	To renew and modify the treaty of amity and commerce with Prussia.	Minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
John Quincy Adams.....	.....do.....	.....do.....	.....do.....	To renew and modify the treaty of amity and commerce with Sweden.	Do.
C. C. Pinckney.....	June 22, 1797	.....do.....	Envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary (jointly and severally).	To conclude a treaty with France in settlement of claims and all matters of difference, and also a treaty of commerce.	Envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary to France (jointly and severally).
Elbridge Gerry.....	Jan. 3, 1798	President.....	Minister plenipotentiary.....	To conclude an additional article to the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation (1794), modifying article V thereof.	Minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Rufus King.....	.....	.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of amity and commerce with Sweden.	Minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
John Quincy Adams.....	Mar. 14, 1798	President and Senate.....	Commissioner.....	.....	Minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.

Richard O'Brien.....	Dec. 18, 1798	President.....	.....	To conclude a treaty with Tunis modifying the treaty of 1797.	{ Consul-general at Algiers. Consul at Tunis.
William Eaton.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
James L. Cathcart.....	Feb. 7, 1799	President and Senate.....	Minister plenipotentiary.....	.....	.....
Rufus King.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oliver Ellsworth.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

Rufus King.....	President and Senate	Commissioner.....	on article V thereof. To conclude a treaty of amity and commerce with Sweden.	Minister plenipotentiary at Berlin.
John Quincy Adams.....	President	Minister plenipotentiary.....	To conclude a treaty with Tunis modifying the treaty of 1797. To negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce with Russia.	{ Consul-general at Algiers. Consul at Tunis. Minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain. (Chief Justice of the Su- preme Court of the Uni- ted States. (None.) Minister resident in Neth- erlands. Governor of North Caro- lina. Minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Richard O'Brien.....	President	Minister plenipotentiary.....	To settle by treaty "all controversies between the United States and France."	(None.)
William Eaton.....	do	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.	To take the place of Patrick Henry on the above commission.	Minister plenipotentiary to France.
James L. Cathcart.....	President	do	Same as preceding.	Minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Rufus King.....	President	Minister plenipotentiary.....	To conclude an additional article or articles to explain or modify Article VI of the treaty of 1794 with Great Britain. To conclude an additional article or articles to Article II of the treaty of 1783 with Great Britain, relative to boundaries.	Do.
Oliver Ellsworth.....	do	do	To conclude a treaty for the cession of Louis- iana.	(None.)
Patrick Henry.....	President	do	To conclude a treaty defining the northeast boundary of the United States.	Minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
William Vans Murray.....	President	do	To conclude a treaty with Spain relative to the boundaries of Louisiana; the cession of any other adjoining territory eastward thereof; the convention concluded August 11, 1802, between the United States and Spain; and claims of the citizens of either country against the other.	Do.
William R. Davie.....	President	do	To conclude a treaty with Spain concerning boundaries and wrongful captures, con- demnation and injuries inflicted by either on the citizens or subjects of the other.	Minister plenipotentiary to France.
William R. Davie.....	President	do	To conclude a treaty settling all matters of difference between the United States and Great Britain "relative to wrongs committed between the parties on the high seas, or other waters, and for establishing the principles of navigation and commerce between them."	Minister plenipotentiary to Spain.
Rufus King.....	President	do	To conclude a treaty of peace and friendship with Great Britain under the mediation of Russia; also to conclude a treaty of commerce. Russia.	Minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Rufus King.....	President	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Russia.	Secretary of the Treasury. Minister plenipotentiary to Russia.
James Monroe.....	President	do		Same as above.
Robert R. Livingston.....	President	do		
Rufus King.....	President	do		
James Monroe.....	President	do		
John Armstrong.....	President	do		
James Bowdoin.....	President	do		
James Monroe.....	President	do		
William Pinkney.....	President	do		
Albert Gallatin.....	President	do		
John Quincy Adams.....	President	do		
James A. Bayard.....	President	do		
Albert Gallatin.....	President	do		
J. Q. Adams.....	President	do		
J. A. Bayard.....	President	do		

APPENDIX C.—Continued.

Name.	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
J. Q. Adams.....	Jan. 18, 1814	President and Senate	Minister plenipotentiary and extraordinary (jointly and severally).	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Great Britain; and a treaty of peace and friendship.	Minister plenipotentiary to Russia.
J. A. Bayard.....	Feb. 9, 1814	do	Minister plenipotentiary and extraordinary.	To join the preceding commission.	Minister plenipotentiary to Sweden.
Jonathan Russell.....	Apr. 9, 1815	President	Commissioners (jointly and severally).	To negotiate a treaty of peace and friendship with Algiers.	Consul-general at Algiers.
Albert Gallatin.....	Aug. 24, 1816	do	do	To negotiate a settlement of existing differences and an amendment of Article XVIII of the treaty of June 30, 1813.	Post Captain, U. S. Navy. Do.
William Shaler.....	Apr. 5, 1817	do	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with the Netherlands.	Consul-general at Algiers.
William Eustis.....	Oct. 31, 1817	do	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Great Britain.	Captain, U. S. Navy.
Richard Rush.....	May 22, 1818	do	do	To renew the convention of July 3, 1815, with Great Britain relative to commerce.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France.
John Quincy Adams.....	Feb. 16, 1819	do	do	To conclude with Spain a treaty of cession, navigation, commerce, and in settlement of all differences between the two countries.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Russia.
Henry Middleton.....	June 6, 1820	do	do	To do any act necessary to give effect to the decision of the Emperor of Russia on the question of the construction of the first article of the treaty of Ghent, referred to him for arbitration under the fifth article of the convention of 1818 by the United States and Great Britain.	Secretary of State.
John Quincy Adams.....	Feb. 20, 1821	do	do	To conclude a treaty of navigation and commerce with France.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Russia.
Henry Dearborn.....	June 23, 1822	President	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Portugal.	Secretary of State.
Hugh Nelson.....	Apr. 21, 1823	do	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Spain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Portugal.
Cesar A. Rodney.....	May 19, 1823	do	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Buenos Ayres.	Minister plenipotentiary to Spain.

Richard C. Anderson..... May 22, 1823

Richard Rush..... June 27, 1822

Henry Middleton..... July 29, 1823

20. M.

To conclude a treaty of commerce with Colombia

To conclude with Great Britain a treaty relative to commerce, the suppression of the slave trade, and the principles of maritime law and neutrality.

Minister plenipotentiary to Colombia.
Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.

Cesar A. Rodney	May 19, 1823	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Colombia.	Minister plenipotentiary to Colombia.
Richard C. Anderson	May 22, 1823	.....do	To conclude with Great Britain a treaty relative to commerce, the suppression of the slave trade, and the principles of maritime law and neutrality.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Richard Rust	June 27, 1823	.....do	To conclude a treaty with Russia relative to the respective rights and claims of the two countries in respect to navigation, fishery, and commerce on the northwest coast of America; the abolition of the slave trade, and the principles of maritime war and neutrality.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Russia.
Henry Middleton	July 29, 1823	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Chili.	Minister plenipotentiary to Chili.
Heman Allen	Nov. 19, 1823	.....do	To conclude a claims convention and a treaty of commerce with France; and also a treaty for the suppression of the African slave trade.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France.
James Brown	Dec. 23, 1823	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Mexico.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
Ninian Edwards	Apr. 15, 1824	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and boundaries with Mexico.	Do.
Joel R. Polinsett	Mar. 14, 1825	.....do	To arrange for the settlement of claims of citizens of the United States against Denmark.	Chargé d'affaires in the Netherlands.
Christopher Hughes	Mar. 24, 1825	Secretary of State	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Spain, and also a claims convention.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.
A. H. Everett	Apr. 27, 1825	President	To conclude a claims convention with Great Britain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Rufus King	May 5, 1825	.....do	To arrange for the settlement of claims of citizens of the United States against the Kingdom of Naples.	None.
John James Appleton	May 12, 1825	Secretary of State	To conclude a treaty of navigation with Colombia.	Minister plenipotentiary to Colombia.
Richard C. Anderson	Sept. 10, 1825	President	To conclude a treaty of peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation with the Central Republic of America.	Secretary of State.
Henry Clay	Nov. 22, 1825	.....do	To conclude a treaty of peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation with Denmark.	Do.
Do	Apr. 17, 1826	.....do	To conclude with Great Britain a treaty relative to commerce, boundaries, the principles of maritime law and neutrality, and the navigation of the St. Lawrence; and also a claims convention.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Albert Gallatin	May 10, 1826	.....do		
Richard C. Anderson	May 11, 1826	President and Senate	To conclude treaties of "peace, friendship, commerce, navigation, maritime law, neutral and belligerent rights, and all other matters interesting to the American nations" with the ministers of that assembly, duly empowered, from all or any of the nations of America.	Minister plenipotentiary to Colombia. (None.)
John Sergeant				

APPENDIX C—Continued.

Name.	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
John James Appleton	Jan. 23, 1827	President	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Sweden.	Chargé d'affaires in Sweden.
Joel R. Polusett	Feb. 12, 1827	President and Senate	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the assembly of American ministers.	To take the place of Richard C. Anderson (deceased) at that assembly.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
Henry Wheaton	June 8, 1827	President	.....	To conclude a claims convention with Denmark.	Chargé d'affaires in Denmark.
William Tudor	Nov. 1, 1827	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a claims convention with Brazil.	Chargé d'affaires in Brazil.
Henry Clay	Nov. 26, 1827	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with the Hanseatic Cities of Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg.	Secretary of State.
William Tudor	Mar. 29, 1828	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Brazil.	Chargé d'affaires in Brazil.
James Cooley	Apr. 8, 1828	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Peru.	Chargé d'affaires in Peru.
Henry Clay	Apr. 18, 1828	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation with Prussia.	Secretary of State.
James Barbour	July 15, 1828	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Great Britain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
William H. Harrison	Oct. 1, 1828	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and claims convention with Colombia.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Colombia.
Henry Clay	Oct. 24, 1828	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Austria.	Secretary of State.
Samuel Larned	Dec. 29, 1828	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Peru.	Chargé d'affaires in Peru.
Do.	Jan. 1, 1829	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Chili.	Do.
Thomas P. Moore	June 9, 1829	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and a claims convention with Colombia.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Colombia.
William C. Rives	June 10, 1829	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a claims convention and a treaty of commerce with France.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France.
Louis McLane	June 10, 1829	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Great Britain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Martin Van Buren	Aug. 11, 1829	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Austria.	Secretary of State.
Joel R. Polinsett	Aug. 25, 1829	.....do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of boundaries and cession with Mexico.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.

Charles Rhind .....

David Olney .....

James Biddle .....

C. F. Van Ness .....

Sept. 12, 1829

Oct. 1, 1829

Commissioners

To conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce with Turkey.

None.
Consul at Smyrna.
Commodore J. S. Vane.

NAME	DATE	COMMISSIONERS	NOTES
Joel R. Poinsett	Aug. 25, 1829	do	To conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce with Turkey.
Charles Rhind	Sept. 12, 1829	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and a claims convention with Spain.
David Ogden	Oct. 1, 1829	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with the Netherlands.
James Biddle	Oct. 17, 1829	do	To conclude (1) a treaty of commerce and boundaries; and (2) a treaty of cession with Mexico.
C. F. Van Ness	Oct. 23, 1829	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Peru.
William F. Preble	June 18, 1830	do	To conclude with Russia treaties relative to (1) the principles of maritime war and neutrality; and (2) commerce and navigation.
Anthony Butler	Oct. 15, 1830	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation and a claims convention with Chili.
Emmanuel I. West	Oct. 15, 1830	do	To receive from Denmark moneys due under Article II of the convention of March 28, 1830.
John Randolph, of Roanoke	Feb. 8, 1831	do	To conclude a claims convention and a treaty of commerce with France.
John Hann	Mar. 18, 1831	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Great Britain.
Ethan A. Brown	Aug. 1, 1831	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and claims with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
Henry Wharton	Oct. 24, 1831	do	To conclude treaties of navigation and commerce with Cochinchina, Siam, and Muscat.
John Nelson	Jan. 26, 1832	Commissioner	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Buenos Ayres.
Edmund Roberts	Feb. 14, 1832	do	To conclude a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with the Netherlands.
Francis Baylies	Mar. 1, 1832	do	To conclude a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with Saxony.
Augusto Davezac	Mar. 13, 1832	do	To conclude with Russia treaties concerning (1) the principles of maritime war and neutrality; and (2) commerce and navigation.
William C. Rives	July 13, 1832	do	To conclude a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with Belgium.
James Buchanan	Jan. 30, 1833	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
Edward Livingston	Mar. 9, 1833	do	To conclude a treaty "concerning certain principles for the guidance of nations at war with each other" with the Republic of Central America.
Augusto Davezac			
Charles G. Dewitt			

APPENDIX C—Continued.

Name.	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
Robert B. McAfee	Mar. 30, 1833	President	.....	To conclude a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with New Granada.	Chargé d'affaires in New Granada.
Edward Livingston	June 4, 1833	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with France.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France.
Cornelius P. Van Ness	Dec. 5, 1833	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and a claims convention with Spain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.
Anthony Butler	Jan. 16, 1834	.....do	.....	To conclude an additional article to the treaty of limits of January 12, 1828, with Mexico, to extend the time for the meeting of commissioners to survey the boundary.	Chargé d'affaires in Mexico.
Edward Livingston	April 30, 1834	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty with the Swiss Confederacy concerning the succession to real and personal estate.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France.
Mallou Dickerson	June 7, 1834	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of navigation and commerce with Russia.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Russia.
William Hunter	July 3, 1834	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation and a claims convention with Brazil.	Chargé d'affaires in Brazil.
William Wilkins	July 22, 1834	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of navigation and commerce with Russia.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Russia.
Edmund Roberts	Mar. 20, 1835	.....do	.....	To conclude treaties of friendship, navigation, and commerce with Siam and Japan.	Chargé d'affaires in Venezuela.
J. G. A. Williamson	Mar. 21, 1835	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation and a claims convention with Venezuela.	Consul at Tangier.
I. R. Leit	July 4, 1835	.....do	Agent	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Mexico.	Chargé d'affaires in Prussia.
Henry Wheaton	Mar. 16, 1836	.....do	.....	To conclude with Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and Baden or any or either of them treaties relative to emigration, succession to property, consuls, etc.	.....
Andrew Stevenson	Apr. 1, 1836	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of navigation and commerce with Great Britain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
R. B. McAfee	Apr. 1, 1836	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and claims with Ecuador.	Chargé d'affaires in New Granada.
James B. Thornton	July 7, 1836	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and claims with Peru and Bolivia.	Chargé d'affaires in Peru.
Lewis Cass	Oct. 4, 1836	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of navigation and commerce with France.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France.

George M. Dallas	Mar. 20, 1837	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Russia.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Russia.
Henry Wheaton	Mar. 28, 1837	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Russia.	.....
Do	June 7, 1837	.....do	.....	.....	.....

to France.

To conclude a treaty of commerce with France.

Oct. 4, 1836

Lewis Cass

George M. Dallas	Mar. 20, 1837	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Russia.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Russia.
Henry Wheaton	Mar. 26, 1837	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Prussia.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
Do	June 7, 1837	.....do	To conclude a treaty for the removal or modification of restrictions on trade with any state or states of Germany except Austria.	Do.
Andrew Stevenson	Nov. 7, 1837	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Great Britain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Henry Wheaton	Dec. 15, 1837	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Hanover, Oldenburg, Brunswick, or any state or states that may join the commercial union.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
James Semple	Jan. 9, 1838	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with New Granada.	Chargé d'affaires in New Granada.
Henry Wheaton	Feb. 9, 1838	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Prussia and the other German states associated with her in a commercial or customs Union.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
C. G. De Witt, and in case of his death or absence, Charles Sav- age.	Mar. 27, 1838	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Central America.	{ Chargé d'affaires in Central America.
Henry A. Muhlenberg	Apr. 11, 1838	.....do	To conclude a treaty of navigation and commerce with Austria.	{ Consul at Guatemala.
John Forsyth	Apr. 13, 1838	.....do	To conclude a boundary treaty with Texas.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Austria.
Alice La Branche	Apr. 28, 1838	.....do	To conclude a claims convention with Texas.	Secretary of State.
Nathaniel Niles	May 3, 1838	.....do	To conclude a treaty with Sardinia relative to the tobacco trade and to commerce.	Chargé d'affaires in Texas.
John Forsyth	June 14, 1838	.....do	To conclude a treaty of peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation with the Netherlands.	Special agent to Sardinia.
James C. Pickett	June 15, 1838	.....do	To conclude (1) a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with Ecuador; (2) a treaty of commerce and a claims convention with Peru-Bolivia.	Secretary of State.
John Forsyth	July 19, 1838	.....do	To conclude a treaty with Mexico for the reference of claims of United States citizens against Mexico to the umpirage of the King of Prussia.	Chargé d'affaires in the Peru-Bolivian Confederation.
Do	.....do	.....do	To conclude a treaty with Great Britain relative to the northeastern boundary of the United States.	Secretary of State.
James Semple	Feb. 4, 1839	.....do	To conclude a claims convention with New Granada.	Do.
John Forsyth	Mar. 18, 1839	.....do	To conclude a claims convention with Mexico.	Chargé d'affaires in New Granada.
Powhatan Ellis	May 3, 1839	.....do	To conclude a treaty of navigation and commerce and a claims convention with Mexico.	Secretary of State.

Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.

APPENDIX C—Continued.

Name.	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
Poshtan Ellis	Feb. 29, 1840	President		To conclude an additional article to the claims convention of April 11, 1839, with Mexico, extending the time for its ratification.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
Allen A. Hall	July 1, 1841	do		To conclude a claims convention with Venezuela.	Chargé d'affaires in Venezuela.
Daniel Jenifer	Sept. 1, 1841	do		To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Austria.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Austria.
William Boulware	Sept. 17, 1841	do		To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.	Chargé d'affaires in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
John S. Pendleton	Nov. 30, 1841	do		To conclude a claims convention with Chili.	Chargé d'affaires in Chili.
Washington Irving	Mar. 22, 1842	do		To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Spain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.
William M. Blackford	May 17, 1842	do		To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with New Granada.	Chargé d'affaires in New Granada.
Daniel Webster	July 30, 1842	do		To conclude a treaty of peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation with Texas.	Secretary of State.
Daniel Webster	Aug. 1, 1842	do		To settle by treaty all matters in controversy or discussion between the United States and Great Britain.	Secretary of State.
Waddy Thompson	Oct. 12, 1842	do		To conclude a claims convention with Mexico.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
John S. Pendleton	Jan. 14, 1843	do		To conclude a claims convention with Chili.	Chargé d'affaires in Chili.
Henry Wheaton	Mar. 16, 1843	do		To conclude an extradition treaty with Prussia and the States composing the German customs union of any of the above.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
George H. Proffit	July 25, 1843	do		To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation and a claims convention with Brazil.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Brazil.
Waddy Thompson	July 25, 1843	do		To conclude a claims convention with Mexico.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
Allen A. Hall	Aug. 9, 1843	do		To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Venezuela.	Chargé d'affaires in Venezuela.
William M. Blackford	Aug. 12, 1843	do		To conclude claims conventions with Ecuador.	Chargé d'affaires in New Granada.
Edward Everett	Oct. 9, 1843	do		To conclude a treaty relative to the boundary between the United States and the possessions of Great Britain, between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific Ocean.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Abel P. Upshut	Oct. 24, 1843	do		To conclude an extradition treaty with France.	Secretary of State.

Henry Wheaton Nov. 18, 1843

- (1) To conclude treaties of commerce and navigation with Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Oldenburg.
 (2) To conclude treaties of commerce and navigation with Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Oldenburg.

Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.

Edward Everett.....	Oct. 9, 1843	do	do	(1) To conclude treaties of commerce and navigation with Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Oldenburg.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
Abel P. Upshur.....	Oct. 24, 1843	do	do	(2) To conclude treaties relative to emigration, succession to property, consuls etc., with Saxony, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Hesse, and Baden.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
Henry Wheaton.....	Nov. 18, 1843	do	do	To conclude a treaty of navigation and commerce with Prussia and the German States joined with her in a commercial and customs union.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
Waddy Thompson, or in his absence Benjamin E. Green.	Dec. 7, 1843	do	do	To obtain the consent of the Mexican Government to modifications introduced by the Senate into the convention of November 29, 1843.	Secretary of State.
John C. Calhoun.....	Apr. 5, 1844	do	do	To conclude a treaty for the annexation of Texas.	Do.
Do.....	Apr. 12, 1844	do	do	To conclude an extradition treaty with France.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Brazil.
Henry A. Wise.....	May 25, 1844	do	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation and a claims convention with Brazil.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
Wilson Shannon.....	June 17, 1844	do	do	To conclude conventions relative to claims and boundaries with Mexico.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
William Brent.....	June 28, 1844	do	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and a claims convention with the Argentine Confederation.	Charge d'affaires in the Argentine Confederation.
William Crump.....	July 1, 1844	do	do	To conclude a claims convention with Chili.	Charge d'affaires in Chili.
William R. King.....	July 24, 1844	do	do	To conclude an extradition treaty with the Swiss Confederacy.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France.
Caleb Cushing.....	Aug. 14, 1844	do	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Japan.	Commissioner to China.
John A. Bryan.....	Aug. 24, 1844	do	do	To conclude a claims convention with Peru.	Charge d'affaires in Peru.
Vespasian Ellis.....	Oct. 12, 1844	do	do	To conclude a claims convention with Venezuela.	Charge d'affaires in Venezuela.
Delazon Smith.....	Dec. 31, 1844	do	do	To conclude a claims convention with Ecuador.	Special agent to Ecuador.
George Brown.....	Jan. 10, 1845	do	do	To conclude a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with Hawaii.	Commissioner to Hawaii.
William H. Polk.....	Mar. 17, 1845	do	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.	Charge d'affaires in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
Benjamin G. Shields.....	Mar. 24, 1845	do	do	To conclude a claims convention with Venezuela.	Charge d'affaires in Venezuela.
Alexander H. Everett.....	Apr. 16, 1845	do	do	To conclude a treaty of navigation and commerce with Japan.	Commissioner to China.
Benjamin A. Bidlack.....	May 30, 1845	do	do	To conclude a claims convention with New Granada.	Charge d'affaires in New Granada.
Anthony Ten Eyck.....	Sept. 10, 1845	do	do	To conclude a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with Hawaii.	Commissioner to Hawaii.
Thomas G. Clemson.....	Sept. 15, 1845	do	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Belgium.	Charge d'affaires in Belgium.

Secretary of State.

To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with the United States and the possessions of Great Britain, between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific Ocean.

To conclude an extradition treaty with France.

APPENDIX C—Continued.

Name.	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
John Stidell.....	Nov. 10, 1845	President.....		To conclude a treaty of commerce and boundaries with Mexico.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
A. Dudley Mann.....	Mar. 28, 1846	.....do.....	Special agent to Han ver, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Mecklenburg-Strelitz.	To conclude with Hanover, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Mecklenburg-Strelitz treaties of commerce and navigation.	None.
William A. Harris.....	Mar. 30, 1846	.....do.....		To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with the Argentine Confederation.	Chargé d'affaires in the Argentine Confederation.
James Buchanan.....	June 13, 1846	.....do.....		To conclude a treaty relative to the boundary between the United States and the possessions of Great Britain west of the Rocky Mountains.	Secretary of State.
Benjamin A. Bidlack.....	Dec. 29, 1846	.....do.....		To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with New Granada.	Chargé d'affaires in New Granada.
Nicholas P. Trist.....	Apr. 17, 1847	.....do.....	Commissioner	To conclude a treaty of peace, friendship, limits, and claims with Mexico.	Chief clerk of the Department of State.
James Buchanan.....	May 18, 1847	.....do.....		To conclude a treaty relative to the succession to property with the Swiss Confederacy.	Secretary of State.
David Tod.....	June 9, 1847	.....do.....		To conclude a treaty relative to commerce and claims with Brazil.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Brazil.
Seth Barton.....	Jan. 7, 1848	.....do.....		To conclude a claims convention with Chile.	Chargé d'affaires in Chile.
James Buchanan.....	Feb. 1, 1848	.....do.....		To conclude a treaty of peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation with Peru.	Secretary of State.
Ambrose H. Sevier.....	Mar. 22, 1848	.....do.....	Commissioners (jointly and severally).	To conclude with Mexico a treaty modifying the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.	Commissioners (with the rank of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary) to Mexico.
Nathan Clifford.....					Chargé d'affaires in Bolivia.
John Appleton.....	Apr. 25, 1848	.....do.....		To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Bolivia.	Secretary of State.
James Buchanan.....	Apr. 28, 1848	.....do.....		To conclude with Austria a treaty extending certain stipulations of the treaty of 27th August, 1829.	Chargé d'affaires in Bolivia.
Vanbrugh Livingston.....	May 2, 1848	.....do.....		To conclude a claims convention with Ecuador.	Chargé d'affaires in Ecuador.
Elijah Hise.....	June 3, 1848	.....do.....		(1) To conclude a treaty of commerce and claims with Guatemala; (2) to conclude a treaty of commerce with San Salvador.	Chargé d'affaires in Guatemala.
R. M. Saunders.....	June 17, 1848	.....do.....		To conclude with Spain a treaty for the cession of Cuba and its dependencies, including the Island of Pines.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.

R. P. Fleuniken

Oct. 14, 1848

.....do.....

George Bancroft.....

To conclude with Denmark a treaty relative to commerce and navigation and to "the Sound and Belt duties."

Chargé d'affaires in Denmark.

minister plenipotentiary
to Spain.

to conclude with Spain a treaty for the
of Cuba and its dependencies, including the
Island of Pines.

do

June 17, 1848

R. M. Sanders

R. P. Fleniken	Oct. 14, 1848	do	To conclude with Denmark a treaty relative to commerce and navigation and to "the Sound and Belt duties."	Chargé d'affaires in Denmark.
George Bancroft.	Jan. 8, 1849	do	To conclude a postal convention with Great Britain and France.	(Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain and France.)
Richard Rush		do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Hawaii.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France.
Charles Eames	Feb. 30, 1849	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and claims with Guatemala, San Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica.	Commissioner to Hawaii.
E. G. Squier	Apr. 24, 1849	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with (1) Hayti; (2) the Dominican Republic.	Chargé d'affaires in Guatemala, San Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica.
Benjamin E. Green	June 13, 1849	do	To conclude a treaty with Hungary on "all matters and subjects interesting to both nations."	(None.)
A. Dudley Mann	June 18, 1849	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Bolivia.	(None.)
A. K. McClung	June 23, 1849	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Ecuador.	Chargé d'affaires in Bolivia.
John T. Van Allen	July 5, 1849	do	To conclude a claims convention with Ecuador.	Chargé d'affaires in Ecuador.
Balie Peyton	Aug. 6, 1849	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce, navigation, and claims with Chili.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Chili.
R. P. Letcher	Sept. 17, 1849	do	To conclude a treaty with Mexico "concerning a road, railroad, or canal across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec."	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
Joseph Bales-tier	Aug. 16, 1849	do	(1) To conclude with Siam a revision of the treaty of March 20, 1833, or any other convention of friendship, navigation, and commerce; (2) to conclude a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Annam; (3) to conclude a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Bruni.	Consul at Singapore.
Thomas M. Foote	Dec. 11, 1849	do	To conclude a treaty modifying the postal convention of March 6, 1844, with New Granada.	Chargé d'affaires in New Granada.
J. R. Steele	Jan. 4, 1850	do	To conclude a claims convention with Venezuela.	Chargé d'affaires in Venezuela.
John M. Clayton	Mar. 1, 1850	do	To conclude a consular convention with New Granada.	Secretary of State.
Do	Apr. 6, 1850	do	To conclude a treaty with Great Britain relative to the Nicaragua Canal, the States of Central America, and the Mosquito coast.	Do.
A. Dudley Mann	June 15, 1850	do	To conclude with the Swiss Confederation a treaty "concerning all matters and subjects interesting to both nations."	None.
George P. Marsh	June 23, 1850	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Turkey.	Minister resident in Turkey.
John M. Clayton	July 13, 1850	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Peru.	Secretary of State.
Do	July 19, 1850	do	To conclude a tradition treaty with Mexico.	Do.
John R. Clay	Jan. 6, 1851	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Peru.	Chargé d'affaires in Peru.
Daniel Webster	Feb. 24, 1851	do	To conclude a claims convention with Portugal.	Secretary of State.

THE FISHERIES TREATY.

APPENDIX C—Continued.

Name.	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
Charles B. Haddock	Mar. 21, 1851	President	.....	To agree with Portugal upon the umpire provided for in the convention of February 26, 1851.	Chargé d'affaires in Portugal.
John S. Pendleton	Apr. 21, 1851	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and claims with the Argentine Confederation.	Chargé d'affaires in the Argentine Confederation.
Yelverton P. King	Apr. 21, 1851	.....do	.....	(1) To conclude a claims convention with New Granada; (2) to negotiate a modification of the postal convention with New Granada of March 6, 1844.	Chargé d'affaires in New Granada.
Robert C. Schenck	Apr. 21, 1851	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and claims with Brazil.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Brazil.
John H. Aulick	May 30, 1851	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Japan.	Commodore, U. S. Navy.
R. P. Letcher	Aug. 4, 1851	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty "concerning the reciprocal obligations of the United States and Mexico in regard to Indians inhabiting their respective territories," and a claims convention with Mexico.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
Courland Cushing	Sept. 10, 1851	.....do	.....	To conclude a claims convention with Ecuador.	Chargé d'affaires in Ecuador.
Daniel Webster	Apr. 27, 1852	.....do	.....	To conclude a consular convention with the Hanseatic Republics of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck.	Secretary of State.
Robert C. Schenck	Apr. 27, 1852	.....do	.....	To conclude treaties of commerce with the Argentine Republic, Uruguay, and Paraguay.	(Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the Argentine Confederation.)
John D. Pendleton	Apr. 27, 1852	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty concerning commerce, navigation, and extradition with the Netherlands.	Secretary of State.
Daniel Webster	May 11, 1852	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Bolivia.	Chargé d'affaires in Bolivia.
Horace H. Miller	June 8, 1852	.....do	.....	To conclude an extradition treaty with Prussia and the other German states associated with her.	Secretary of State.
Daniel Webster	June 15, 1852	.....do	.....	To conclude a claims convention with China.	Chargé d'affaires in China.
Humphrey Marshall	Sept. 9, 1852	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty "concerning the reciprocal obligations of the United States and of Mexico, in regard to Indians inhabiting their respective territories," and a claims convention with Mexico.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
Alfred Conkling	Sept. 23, 1852	.....do	.....		

Matthew C. Perry .....

J. R. Ingersoll .....

Nov. 11, 1852

Dec. 28, 1852

.....do .....

.....do .....

To conclude treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Japan.

To conclude a claims convention with Great Britain.

Captain, U. S. Navy.

to Mexico.

To conclude a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with the United States and of Mexico, in regard to Indians inhabiting their respective territories," and a claims convention with Mexico.

Humphrey Marshall Sept. 3, 1852	Matthew C. Perry	Nov. 11, 1852	.....do	To conclude a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Japan.	Captain, U. S. Navy.
Sept. 23, 1852	J. R. Ingersoll	Dec. 28, 1852	.....do	To conclude a claims convention with Great Britain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
	Robert C. Schenck John S. Pendleton Thomas J. Page	Jan. 31, 1853	.....do	To conclude treaty of commerce with Paraguay.	(Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Brazil. Chargé d'affaires in the Argentine Confederation.
	Edward Everett	Feb. 14, 1853	.....do	To conclude copyright conventions with Great Britain and France.	Lieutenant, U. S. Navy. Secretary of State.
	Solon Borland	June 15, 1853	.....do	To conclude treaties of commerce with Nicaragua and Honduras.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Central America.
	James Buchanan	July 6, 1853	.....do	To conclude an extradition treaty with Bavaria.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
	William L. Marcy James Buchanan	July 21, 1853 Sept. 12, 1853	.....do .....do	To conclude a copyright convention with France. To conclude with Great Britain a treaty concerning all matters of difference connected with Central America.	Secretary of State. Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
	John W. Dana	Nov. 1, 1853	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Bolivia.	Chargé d'affaires in Bolivia.
	Robert M. McLane	Nov. 12, 1853	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with China.	Commissioner to China.
	James Gadsden	Dec. 8, 1853	.....do	To conclude an extradition treaty with Mexico.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
	Charles Eames	Mar. 8, 1854	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Venezuela.	Chargé d'affaires in Venezuela.
	Pierre Soulé	Mar. 28, 1854	.....do	To conclude with Spain a treaty of commerce and concerning a cession of Cuba and its dependencies, including the Island of Pinar.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.
	David L. Gregg	April 4, 1854	.....do	To conclude a treaty for the cession of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.	Commissioner in Hawaii.
	James Buchanan	May 22, 1854	.....do	To conclude a postal convention with Great Britain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
	William L. Marcy	June 5, 1854	.....do	To conclude with Great Britain a treaty concerning the Northeastern fisheries and reciprocity with Canada.	Secretary of State.
	William L. Cazneau	June 17, 1854	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and extradition with Dominican Republic.	Minister resident in Buenos Ayres.
	James A. Peden	July 5, 1854	.....do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and also a claims convention with Buenos Ayres.	Minister resident in the Netherlands.
	August Belmont	July 11, 1854	.....do	To conclude a consular convention with the Netherlands.	Secretary of State.
	William M. Marcy	July 21, 1854	.....do	To conclude a treaty relative to the rights of neutrals with Russia.	

APPENDIX C—Continued.

Name.	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
D. A. Starkweather	July 24, 1854	President.	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and extradition with Chili.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Chili.
Philo White	Aug. 14, 1854	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty granting to the United States or its citizens the right to remove guano from Ecuadorian islands.	Minister resident in Ecuador.
William L. Marcy	Aug. 19, 1854	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty relative to the succession to property with Brunswick.	Secretary of State.
John H. Wheeler	Oct. 21, 1854	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Nicaragua.	Minister resident in Nicaragua.
James Buchanan	Nov. 1, 1854	.....do	.....	To conclude a consular convention with Great Britain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Philo White	.....do	.....do	.....	To conclude a claims convention with Ecuador.	Minister resident in Ecuador.
Charles Eames	Dec. 9, 1854	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty with Venezuela in regard to the rights of neutrals.	Minister resident in Venezuela.
James Buchanan	Dec. 18, 1854	.....do	.....	To conclude an extradition treaty with Hanover.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
John Y. Mason	Aug. 7, 1854	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty with France in regard to the rights of neutrals.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France.
James Buchanan	.....do	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty with Great Britain in regard to the rights of neutrals.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Robert Dale Owen	Nov. 29, 1854	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in regard to the rights of neutrals.	Minister resident in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
John E. Clay	Jan. 12, 1855	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty with Peru in regard to the rights of neutrals.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Peru.
James B. Bowlin	Jan. 30, 1855	.....do	.....	To conclude a claims convention with New Granada.	Minister resident in New Granada.
Robert Dale Owen	Feb. 7, 1855	.....do	.....	To conclude a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.	Minister resident in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
Peter D. Vroom	Feb. 15, 1855	.....do	.....	To conclude an extradition treaty with Baden.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
Augustus C. Dodge	Apr. 19, 1855	.....do	.....	To conclude with Spain a treaty relative to commerce, to the debts due citizens of the United States under the convention of February 17, 1834, and to claims.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.

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Peter D. Vroom.....	Feb. 15, 1855	do	To conclude an extradition treaty with Brazil.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
Augustus C. Dodge.....	Apr. 19, 1855	do	To conclude with Spain a treaty relative to commerce, to the debts due citizens of the United States, under the convention of February 17, 1854, and to claims.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.
William Trousdale.....	Apr. 26, 1855	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and extradition with Brazil.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Brazil.
August Belmont.....	Apr. 30, 1855	do	To conclude an extradition treaty with the Netherlands.	Minister resident in the Netherlands.
Carroll Spence.....	May 24, 1855	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Persia.	Minister resident in Turkey.
William L. Marcy.....	July 16, 1855	do	To conclude a treaty of commercial reciprocity with Hawaii.	Secretary of State.
Townsend Harris.....	Sept. 8, 1855	do	To conclude treaties of commerce with Japan and Siam.	Consul-general in Japan.
Peter Parker.....	Sept. 25, 1855	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with China.	Commissioner to China.
Jonathan Elliot.....	Oct. 5, 1855	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with the Dominican Republic.	Commercial agent at St. Domingo.
Philo White.....	Dec. 3, 1855	do	To conclude with Ecuador a treaty relative to the rights of neutrals.	Minister resident in Ecuador.
John L. O'Sullivan.....	July 22, 1856	do	To conclude a treaty with Portugal "asserting the principle of respect for private property at sea in time of war as the same is paid by civilized nations at the present day on land."	Minister resident in Portugal.
George M. Dallas.....	Sept. 25, 1856	do	To conclude a treaty relative to Central America with Great Britain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
James B. Bowlin.....	Dec. 2, 1856	do	To conclude a treaty with New Granada with reference to transit across the Isthmus of Panama.	Minister resident at New Granada.
Isaac E. Morse.....	Jan. 29, 1857	do	To conclude a treaty with Great Britain "concerning the principles of maritime law which affect neutral and belligerent rights at sea." [Similar powers were sent to our representatives at Paris, St. Petersburg, The Hague, Berlin, Vienna, and Copenhagen.]	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
George M. Dallas.....	Mar. 21, 1857	do	To conclude a treaty with Denmark relative to the sound dues.	Secretary of State.
Lewis Cass.....	Apr. 22, 1857	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce, navigation, and claims with China.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to China.
William B. Reed.....	July 18, 1857	do	To conclude a treaty with Mexico relative to boundaries, claims, and the right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
John Forsyth.....	Nov. 17, 1857	do	To conclude a treaty concerning friendship, commerce, and inter-oceanic communication with Nicaragua.	Secretary of State.
Lewis Cass.....	Aug. 18, 1858	do	To conclude a treaty with Bolivia for her accession to the treaty of July 10, 1853, for the free navigation of the rivers Parana and Paraguay.	Minister resident in Bolivia.
John W. Dana.....	Sept. 30, 1858	do	To conclude a treaty with Paraguay relative to complaints of the United States against Paraguay, to commerce, and to claims.	Commissioner to Paraguay.

APPENDIX C—Continued.

Name.	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
William Preston.....	Dec. 13, 1858	President.....	.....	To conclude with Spain a treaty of commerce and concerning the cession of the island of Cuba and its dependencies, including the island of Pines.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.
Robert M. McLane.....	Mar. 7, 1859	do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty with Mexico relative to boundaries, and the right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
John Y. Mason.....	June 13, 1859	do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with France.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France.
Alexander Dimitry.....	Aug. 16, 1859	do.....	.....	To negotiate a claims convention with Nicaragua.	Minister resident in Nicaragua.
Charles J. Faulkner.....	Jan. 20, 1860	do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with France.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France.
Edward A. Turpin.....	Mar. 17, 1860	do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Venezuela.	Minister resident in Venezuela.
John R. Clay.....	Apr. 26, 1860	do.....	.....	To conclude a claims convention with Peru.....	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Peru.
Norman B. Judd*.....	Apr. 26, 1861	do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty concerning the principles of maritime law which affect neutral and belligerent rights at sea with Prussia.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
James S. Pike.....	May 10, 1861	do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty concerning the principles of maritime law which affect neutral and belligerent rights with the Netherlands.	Minister resident in the Netherlands.
Thomas Corwin.....	June 24, 1861	do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty with Mexico concerning friendship, commerce, claims, and boundaries.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
William H. Seward.....	July 10, 1861	do.....	.....	To conclude an additional article relative to the desertion of seamen to the treaty of April 26, 1826, with Denmark.	Secretary of State.
Norman B. Judd.....	July 25, 1861	do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty with Hanover for the abolition of the Stade dues.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
Christopher Robinson.....	Nov. 20, 1861	do.....	.....	To conclude a claims convention with Peru.....	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Peru.
Charles N. Riotte.....	Mar. 31, 1862	do.....	.....	To conclude a postal convention with Costa Rica.	Minister resident in Costa Rica.
William H. Seward.....	Apr. 4, 1862	do.....	.....	To conclude with Great Britain a convention for the suppression of the African slave trade.	Secretary of State.
James E. Harney.....	Apr. 22, 1862	do.....	.....	To conclude an extradition treaty with Portugal.	Minister resident in Portugal.

Frederick Hassarek.....	Oct. 9, 1862	do.....	.....	To conclude a claims convention with Ecuador.....	Minister resident in Ecuador.
B. F. Whidden.....	Dec. 30, 1862	do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of amity.....	
Henry S. Sanford.....	Mar. 2, 1863	do.....	.....		

Charles N. Riotta.....	Mar. 31, 1862	do	To conclude a claims convention with Ecuador.....	Minister resident in Ecuador.
William H. Seward.....	Apr. 4, 1862	do	To conclude a treaty of amity and commerce with Hayti.	Commissioner and consul-general to Hayti.
James E. Harney.....	Apr. 22, 1862	do	To conclude a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with the Scheldt dunes.	Minister resident in Belgium.
			To conclude a treaty for the final settlement of the claims of the Hudson's Bay and Puget's Sound agricultural companies.	Minister resident in Honduras.
			To conclude a claims convention with Colombia.	Secretary of State.
			To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Italy.	Do.
			To conclude a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Nicaragua.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Italy.
			To conclude a treaty concerning Cape Spartel light-house with Morocco.	Minister resident in Nicaragua.
			To conclude a claims convention with Venezuela.	Consul in Morocco.
			To conclude a treaty of commerce with the Dominican Republic.	Minister resident in Venezuela.
			To conclude a treaty for the cession of territory [Samana Bay] by the Dominican Republic to the United States.	Commercial agent at St. Domingo.
			To conclude a claims convention with Prussia.	Assistant Secretary of State.
			To conclude a treaty for reciprocal commercial intercourse with Hawaii.	Secretary of State.
			To conclude a treaty for the cession or lease of territory by the Dominican Government to the United States.	Minister resident in Hawaii.
			To conclude a treaty with Russia for the cession of territory.	Commercial agent at St. Domingo.
			To conclude postal conventions with France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Belgium.	Secretary of State.
			To conclude a treaty for the cession of the Danish West Indies.	Minister resident in Denmark.
			To negotiate for the extension of the time for ratification of the treaty of March 16, 1859, with Nicaragua.	Minister resident in Nicaragua.
			To conclude an additional article to the convention of October 22, 1864, with Japan.	Minister resident in Japan.
			To conclude an additional article to the treaty of December 6 and 18, 1832, with Russia.	Secretary of State.
			To conclude a consular convention with Italy.	Do.

* Similar powers were sent to our representatives at Vienna, Turin, Copenhagen, and Brussels.

† This seems to be the power under which Corwin concluded a postal and extradition treaty on December 10, 1861.

APPENDIX C—Continued.

Name.	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
George Bancroft	Feb. 13, 1868	President		To conclude treaties of commerce, navigation, extradition, and naturalization with Prussia and the North German Union.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
Do.	May 25, 1868	do		To procure the accession of Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, and Baden to the treaty of February 22, 1868, with the North German Confederation.	Do.
George P. Marsh	June 3, 1868	do		To conclude a naturalization treaty with Italy.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Italy.
Henry S. Sanford	June 25, 1868	do		To conclude treaties with Belgium concerning extradition, naturalization, and consuls.	Minister resident in Belgium.
George F. Seward	June 27, 1868	do		To conclude a claims convention with Korea.	Consul general at Shanghai.
William H. Seward	June 29, 1868	do		To conclude treaties concerning consuls and naturalization with Mexico.	Secretary of State.
Do.	June 30, 1868	do		To conclude claims convention with Mexico.	Do.
Do.	Aug. 18, 1868	do		To conclude an additional article in the treaty with Denmark, signed October 24, 1868.	Do.
Henry M. Watts	Aug. 18, 1868	do		To conclude a naturalization treaty with Austria.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Austria.
J. J. Bartlett	Sept. 22, 1868	do		To conclude a naturalization treaty with Sweden and Norway.	Minister resident in Sweden.
E. Joy Morris	Oct. 13, 1868	do		To conclude a naturalization treaty with Turkey.	Minister resident in Turkey.
John P. Hall	Oct. 13, 1868	do		To conclude a naturalization treaty with Spain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.
William H. Seward	Dec. 4, 1868	do		To conclude a naturalization treaty with France.	Secretary of State.
Do.	Dec. 22, 1868	do		To conclude a claims convention with Great Britain.	Do.
Do.	Jan. 7, 1869	do		To conclude a treaty "concerning a lease or cession to the United States of the Bay of Samana, in the Island of Santo Domingo, and of lands adjacent thereto."	Secretary of State.
Peter J. Sullivan	Mar. 2, 1869	do		To conclude a treaty with Colombia concerning a ship-canal "through the Continental Isthmus."	Minister resident in Colombia.
Hamilton Fish	Apr. 14, 1869	do		To conclude a trade-marks convention with France.	Secretary of State.
John Jay	Apr. 21, 1869	do		To conclude a naturalization treaty with Austria.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Austria.

John Lothrop Motley

May 11, 1869

Henry S. Sanford

June 12, 1869

Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary

To conclude consular and naturalization conventions with Great Britain.

To extend the

Envoy extraordinary and
minister plenipotentiary
to Austria.

To conclude a trade-marks convention
with France.
To conclude a naturalization treaty with Aus-
tria.

Hamilton Fish.....	Apr. 14, 1869	do	To conclude a trade-marks convention with France.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Austria.
John Jay.....	Apr. 21, 1869	do	To conclude a naturalization treaty with Aus- tria.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
John Lothrop Motley.....	May 11, 1869	do	To conclude consular and naturalization con- ventions with Great Britain.	Minister resident in Bel- gium.
Henry S. Sanford.....	June 12, 1869	do	To extend the time for the exchange of the rati- fications of the consular convention of De- cember 5, 1868, with Belgium.	Minister resident in Den- mark.
George H. Yeaman.....	July 8, 1869	do	To conclude a naturalization treaty with Den- mark.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
Thomas H. Nelson.....	June 9, 1869	do	To conclude a treaty with Mexico concerning a road, railroad, or canal across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France.
E. B. Washburne.....	July 30, 1869	do	To conclude a treaty concerning the regulation of telegraphic intercourse between the United States and France.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
George Bancroft.....	Aug. 10, 1869	do	To extend the time for the ratification of the naturalization treaty with Wurtemberg, signed July 27, 1868.	Minister resident in Ven- ezuela.
James K. Partridge.....	Aug. 18, 1869	do	To negotiate with Venezuela concerning the de- ferred payments under the claims convention of April 23, 1864.	Minister resident in Co- lombia.
S. A. Hurlbut.....	Sept. 4, 1869	do	To conclude a treaty with Colombia concerning a ship-canal "through the Continental Isth- mus."	Minister resident in Ja- pan.
Charles E. De Long.....	Sept. 23, 1869	do	To conclude a treaty with Japan "concerning a proposed delay in the payment of the re- mainer of the indemnity due to the United States and other powers under the conven- tion signed on the 23d of October, 1864."	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Brazil.
Henry T. Blow.....	Sept. 23, 1869	do	To conclude a postal convention with Brazil...	Secretary of State.
Hamilton Fish.....	Oct. 9, 1869	do	To extend the time for the ratification of the treaty of October 24, 1867, with Denmark.	Do.
Do.....	Oct. 15, 1869	do	To conclude a protocol relative to the failure of the Mexican Claims Commission, to meet punctually at the time provided by the con- vention of July 4, 1868.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
George Bancroft.....	Dec. 21, 1869	do	To conclude with Wurtemberg a convention explanatory of the third article of the treaty of April 10, 1844.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Brazil.
Henry T. Blow.....	Jan. 21, 1870	do	To conclude a protocol referring to an arbiter, the "Canada" claims against Brazil.	Minister resident in Costa Rica.
J. B. Blair.....	Jan. 22, 1870	do	To conclude an extradition treaty with Costa Rica.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
George Bancroft.....	Feb. 8, 1870	do	To conclude consular and trade-marks conven- tions with Prussia.	Minister resident in Nica- ragua.
C. N. Riotte.....	Feb. 19, 1870	do	To conclude a claims convention with Nicaragua	

* Similar powers to our representatives in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Salvador.

APPENDIX C—Continued.

Name	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
George Bancroft.....	Apr., 1870	President.....		To conclude a treaty with Baden, "regulating the rights of inheritances and marriages."	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Prussia.
Alvin P. Hovey.....	May 6, 1870	do.....		To conclude a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Peru.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Peru.
Hamilton Fish.....	May 11, 1870 (duplicate July 7).	do.....		To conclude an additional article to the convention of November 29, 1869, with the Dominican Republic.	Secretary of State.
John L. Stevens.....	June 9, 1870	do.....		To conclude a treaty of friendship, navigation, and commerce with Uruguay.	Minister resident in Uruguay.
E. Joy Morris.....	July 8, 1870	do.....		To conclude a naturalization treaty with Persia.	Minister resident in Turkey.
A. T. A. Torbert.....	Oct. 3, 1870	do.....		To conclude a treaty of amity and consular privileges with Salvador.	Minister resident in Salvador.
Thomas H. Nelson.....	Oct. 25, 1870	do.....		To conclude a treaty with Mexico concerning a road, railroad, or canal across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
Daniel E. Sickles.....	Dec. 13, 1870	do.....		To conclude a claims convention with Spain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.
Frederick F. Low.....	Feb. 18, 1871	do.....		To conclude with China a treaty for the protection of wrecked seamen, and concealing navigation and commerce.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to China.
Hamilton Fish.....	Feb. 22, 1871	do.....		To conclude with Great Britain a convention concerning citizenship, supplemental to the convention of May 13, 1870.	Secretary of State.
Thomas H. Nelson.....	Mar. 25, 1871	do.....		To extend the duration of the Mexican Claims Commission.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico.
S. A. Hurlbut.....	Apr. 3, 1871	do.....		To extend the time for the ratification of the convention of January 26, 1870, with Colombia.	Minister resident in Colombia.
Do.....	Apr. 4, 1871	do.....		To conclude an extradition treaty with Colombia.	Do.
George Bancroft.....	Apr. 4, 1871	do.....		To conclude with Germany a treaty for "the security of private property at sea."	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Germany.
Hamilton Fish.....					
Robert C. Schenck.....					Secretary of State.
Samuel Nelson.....	May 2, 1871	do.....	{ Plenipotentiaries [jointly and severally]. }	To conclude a treaty "for the settlement of the different questions which should come before them."	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
Ebenezer R. Hoar.....					Associate Justice United States Supreme Court.
George H. Williams.....					None.

Willard W. Edgecomb.....

June 24, 1871

Fisher W. Ames.....

June 28, 1871

Thomas Mann.....

To conclude a treaty of friendship, commerce, and extradition with the Orange Free State.

To conclude additional articles to the convention of November 29, 1869, with the

Consul at Cape Town.

Commercial agent at S.

THE FISHERIES TREATY.

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Associate Justice United States Supreme Court.
None.
None.

To conclude a treaty on different questions which should come before them."

{ Plenipotentiaries [jointly and severally].

May 2, 1871

Samuel Nelson
Ebenezer R. Hoar
George H. Williams

June 24, 1871

Willard W. Edgcomb
Fisher W. Ames

June 28, 1871

Oct. 7, 1871

Thomas Biddle

Nov. 24, 1871

M. J. Cramer

May 3, 1872

Hamilton Fish

Oct. 16, 1872

E. D. Bassett

Nov. 23, 1872

Hamilton Fish

Nov. 26, 1872

John Jay

May 21, 1873

George H. Baker

June 25, 1873

Daniel E. Sickles

Aug. 18, 1873

George H. Baker

Nov. 28, 1873

Cornelius A. Logan

Dec. 12, 1873

Marshall Jewell

Jan. 13, 1874

George Williamson

Feb. 5, 1874

Hamilton Fish

Feb. 27, 1874

William L. Scruggs

Nov. 19, 1874

Hamilton Fish

Jan. 22, 1875

Hamilton Fish

Mar. 8, 1875

Hamilton Fish

May 21, 1875

Horace Maynard

Apr. 27, 1876

Hamilton Fish

To conclude a treaty of friendship, commerce, and extradition with the Orange Free State.
To conclude additional articles to the convention of November 29, 1869, with the Dominican Republic, for the lease of the bay and peninsula of Samana.
To extend the time for the ratification of the extradition treaty of May 23, 1870, and of the treaty of amity, commerce, and consular privileges of December 6, 1870, with Salvador.
To conclude a naturalization treaty with Denmark.
To conclude a naturalization treaty with Ecuador.
To conclude a consular convention with Hayti.
To extend the duration of the claims commission with Mexico.
To conclude a treaty for the protection of patents to be exhibited at the Vienna Exhibition of 1873.
To conclude a naturalization treaty with Turkey.
To conclude an extradition treaty with Spain.
To conclude an extradition treaty with Turkey.
To conclude a claims convention with Chili.
To conclude naturalization and extradition treaties with Russia.
To extend the time for the ratification of the extradition convention of October 11, 1870, with Guatemala.
To conclude an extradition treaty with Belgium.
To conclude a convention with Colombia for the settlement of the Montijo claims.
To extend the duration of the Mexican Claims Commission.
To conclude a treaty of commercial reciprocity with Hawaii.
To conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation with Belgium.
To conclude a naturalization treaty with Turkey.
To extend the functions of the arbitrator under the claims convention of July 4, 1868, with Mexico.

1 Prior power of February 10, 1871, not of record.

Consul at Cape Town.
Commercial agent at San Domingo.
Minister resident in Salvador.
Minister resident in Denmark.
Secretary of State.
Minister resident and consul-general in Hayti.
Secretary of State.
Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Austria.
Minister resident in Turkey.
Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.
Minister resident in Turkey.
Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Chili.
Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Russia.
Minister resident in Guatemala.
Secretary of State.
Minister resident in Colombia.
Secretary of State.
Do.
Do.
Minister resident in Turkey.
Secretary of State.

APPENDIX C—Continued.

Name.	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
Caleb Cushing.....	Nov. 28, 1876	President.....	.....	To conclude an extradition treaty with Spain...	
William M. Everts.....	May 7, 1876	do.....	.....	To conclude a consular convention with Italy...	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.
William M. Everts.....	May 22, 1878	do.....	.....	To conclude a consular convention with the Netherlands.	Secretary of State. Do.
Henry W. Hilliard.....	July 18, 1878	do.....	.....	To conclude a trade-marks convention with Brazil.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Brazil.
William M. Everts.....	July 25, 1878	do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty with Japan for "the revision of the existing treaties of commerce between the United States and Japan."	Secretary of State.
James Birney.....	Dec. 5, 1879	do.....	.....	To extend the time for the ratification of the consular convention of May 23, 1878, with the Netherlands.	Minister resident in the Netherlands.
William M. Everts.....	Jan. 13, 1880	do.....	.....	To conclude a claims convention with France...	Secretary of State.
John A. Bingham.....	Jan. 20, 1880	do.....	.....	To conclude with Japan a convention for "the reimbursement of certain specified expenses which may be incurred by either country in consequence of the shipwreck on its coast of the vessels of the other."	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Japan.
Ernest Dichman.....	Jan. 29, 1880	do.....	.....	To conclude an extradition treaty with Colombia.	Minister resident in Colombia.
William M. Everts.....	Mar. 9, 1880	do.....	.....	To conclude a consular convention with Belgium.	Secretary of State.
William M. Everts.....	May 26, 1880	President.....	.....	To conclude an extradition treaty with the Netherlands.	Secretary of State.
James B. Angell.....	June 4, 1880	President and Senate.....	{ Commissioners plenipotentiary. } Severally and jointly. } ["Then or any two of them."]	To conclude a treaty with China for the "settlement of such matters of interest as are now pending between the two Governments."	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to China.
John F. Swift.....					
William Henry Trescott.....	Feb. 21, 1881	President.....		To conclude a convention supplementary to the consular convention of May 8, 1878, with Italy.	Secretary of State.
William M. Everts.....					
Eugene Schuyler.....	Mar. 2, 1881	do.....	.....	To conclude with Romania a treaty of navigation and commerce, a consular convention, and a treaty concerning trade-marks.	Chargé d'affaires in Roumania.
John A. Hallerman.....	Mar. 9, 1881	do.....	.....	To conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce, additional and supplementary to the treaty of May 29, 1836, with Siam.	Consul at Bangkok.
Eugene Schuyler.....	May 24, 1881	do.....	.....	To conclude with Serbia a treaty of commerce and navigation, a consular convention, and a treaty concerning trade-marks.	Chargé d'affaires and consul-general at Bucharest.

R. W. Shufeldt.....

Nov. 15, 1881

William Henry Trescott.....

Dec. 1, 1881

Special envoy.....

To conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce with China.
To conclude treaties for the "settlement of such matters."

Commodore, U. S. Navy.

Eugene Schuyler	May 24, 1881		Special envoy.	To conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce with Costa Rica.	Commodore, U. S. Navy.
R. W. Shufeldt	Nov. 15, 1881	do	do	To conclude treaties for the "settlement of such matters of interest as are now pending between" the United States and Chili, Peru, and Bolivia.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary on special mission to Chili, Peru, and Bolivia.
William Henry Trescott	Dec. 1, 1881	do	do	To conclude with Mexico a convention for the re-trying of cases of Benjamin Weil and La Abra Silver Mining Company.	Secretary of State.
Fred'k T. Frelinghuysen	Feb. 8, 1882	do	do	To conclude a treaty with Spain "for securing reciprocal protection for trade-marks and articles manufactured in both countries."	Do.
Fred'k T. Frelinghuysen	June 19, 1882	do	do	To extend the duration of the French and American Claims Commission.	Do.
Aaron A. Sargent	Sept 11, 1882	do	do	To conclude an extradition treaty with Luxembourg.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Germany.
Ulysses S. Grant Thomas O. Osborn	Jan. 10, 1883 Apr. 1, 1884	do do	do do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Mexico. To conclude an article supplementary to the treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation of July 27, 1883, with the Argentine Confederation.	Minister-president in the Argentine Confederation.
Fred'k T. Frelinghuysen	Apr. 4, 1884	do	do	To conclude a treaty concerning trade-marks and trade labels with Belgium.	Secretary of State.
John W. Foster	June 7, 1884	do	do	To conclude a treaty of commerce with Spain.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain.
Fred'k T. Frelinghuysen	June 9, 1884	do	do	To conclude a convention supplementary to the Italian extradition convention of March 23, 1868, with Switzerland.	Secretary of State.
Do	Nov. 29, 1884	do	do	To conclude a treaty with Nicaragua for the construction of an interoceanic ship-canal through her territory.	Do.
Do	Feb. 13, 1885	do	do	To conclude a trade-marks convention with Switzerland.	Do.
T. F. Bayard	Dec. 4, 1885	do	do	To conclude an additional article to the convention of July 29, 1882, with Mexico, extending the provisions of Article VIII thereof eighteen months.	Do.
Do	Dec. 5, 1885	do	do	To conclude a convention with Venezuela for the re-opening of the awards of the claims commission under the treaty of April 25, 1866.	Do.
Richard B. Hubbard	Mar. 25, 1886	do	do	To conclude an extradition treaty with Japan.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Japan.
F. M. Cheney	May 5, 1886	do	do	To conclude a convention enlarging and defining the stipulations of the treaty of September 21, 1853, with Zanzibar.	Consul at Zanzibar.

APPENDIX C—Continued.

Name.	When appointed.	By whom.	Rank.	Purposes.	Other office held at same time.
George H. Bates	July —, 1886	Secretary of State	.....	To conclude a treaty of	Special commissioner to Samoa.
Thomas F. Bayard	Mar. 25, 1887	President	.....	To conclude an extradition treaty with Russia.	Secretary of State.
Do.	May 11, 1887	do	.....	To conclude an extradition treaty with the Netherlands.	Ido.
C. W. Buck	June 24, 1887	do	.....	To conclude a treaty of friendship, navigation, and commerce and a claims convention with Peru.	Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Peru.

APPENDIX D.

FISHING-GROUNDS.

Under the treaty of 1818.

	Marine sq. miles.
The 3 marine mile limit, which is the claim of American fishermen, is in blue, and equals	16,424
Of this area there is in bays, cut off by the 3-mile limit	6,599
And outside of the 3-mile limit	9,825
Making a total, as stated, of	16,424
The claims of Canadian fishermen, from headland to headland, would add to the area claimed by American fishermen	6,164
Making the Canadian claim	22,588
As against American claim of	16,424

Under the proposed treaty of 1888.

The American fishermen's claim is conceded to Canada, and is equal to.....	16,424
And in lieu of the 6,164 marine square miles, from headland to headland, as claimed by the Canadians, the Americans concede to them as follows:	
First. At bays of 10 miles or less in width—	
In Newfoundland, 8 bays of	200
In New Brunswick, 8 bays of	67
In Prince Edward Island, 3 bays of	18
In Cape Breton, 2 bays of	13
In Nova Scotia, 11 bays of	85
In all, 32 bays of (colored brown)	383
Second. At the bays named between lines 63 and 80, Article IV, proposed treaty, 1888 (colored solid red):	
At Baie Chaleur, New Brunswick	500
At Bay of Miramichi, New Brunswick	23
At Egmont's Bay, Prince Edward Island	20
At St. Anne's Bay, Nova Scotia	5
At Fortune Bay, Newfoundland	160
At Sir Charles Hamilton's Sound, Newfoundland	2
In all, at 6 bays	710

	Marine Sq. miles.
Third. At bays named between lines 81 and 93 in Article IV, of proposed treaty of 1888 (colored in parallel red lines):	
At Barrington Bay, Nova Scotia.....	2
At Chedebneto and St. Peter's Bays, Nova Scotia.....	18
At Mira Bay, Nova Scotia.....	7
At Placentia Bay, Newfoundland.....	7
In all, 4 bays.....	34
This gives a total concession by Americans under the proposed treaty of 1888 of.....	1, 127
In lieu of a total concession by the Canadians from their headland to headland claim, of.....	5, 037

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APPENDIX E.

THE PENDING TREATY.

REVIEW OF THE FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS BY W. L. PUTNAM—HISTORICAL AND EXPLANATORY—FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CONTROVERSY TO THE PRESENT TIME—WHAT THE TREATY UNDERTAKES TO DO—HOSTILE CRITICISM MET.

We give below a valuable review of "The Fisheries Negotiations—Historical and Explanatory," by the Hon. William L. Putnam, of the commissioners who framed the pending treaty. The paper was prepared for the Portland Fraternity Club and read at a recent meeting. It is an important contribution to the present discussion, and meets adverse criticisms which have been made upon the work of the commission.

Concerning the provisions of the convention of 1818, that our fishermen may enter the bays or harbors of Her Majesty's dominions in Newfoundland and eastern Canada "for the purposes of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood and of obtaining water, and for no other purposes whatever," and are liable to "such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent their taking, drying, or curing fish therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing the privileges" reserved to them, confusion has arisen in Canada and also in the United States—on the Canadian side by converting this limitation of a guaranteed privilege into a universal one, and on our side by overlooking the indubitable fact that the practice of nations recognizes a broad line between fishing vessels and ordinary merchant vessels, granting to each class privileges not possessed by the other. From a time at least as early as A. D. 1836 to the present the claim of Nova Scotia, and afterwards of Canada, has been inflexible, that a fishing vessel is *sui generis*, and, if foreign, has no privileges within British bays and harbors, except those specifically authorized by some law of Great Britain or of her dominions, or by treaty, or by the strictest rules of humanity; though at times this claim has lain dormant in part, and Great Britain herself has not quite countenanced its practical exercise to its full extent. During all this period this construction, although often complained of by the United States, never has been practically overthrown by us in any particular.

Very soon after the ratification of the convention of 1818 the British Parliament passed the statute, chapter 38, George III, which condemned to forfeiture vessels of the United States, and of all other nations foreign to Great Britain, fishing or "preparing to fish" within the prohibited waters. These words "preparing to fish" found in this early act have been the cause of many troubles, and are susceptible of a variety of construction. They have been found in every provincial and Dominion statute relating to this matter passed at different periods, four or five in all; and they have received the sanction of long practical acquiescence on the part of the United States, and, we may also add, the full and cordial approval of so distinguished an American law writer as Professor Pomeroy. On the 12th of March, 1836, nearly one year before President Jackson went out of office, there was passed the act of Nova Scotia, the model of all the legislation since enacted, at which is aimed the thirteenth article of the treaty just negotiated. This act was specially validated by royal orders in council, and provided that local officers might

seize and bring into port vessels hovering on the coasts of Nova Scotia, and repeated the penalty of forfeiture for those fishing or "preparing to fish" within the prescribed waters. It also provided that no person should be admitted to claim the vessel seized without first giving security for costs not exceeding 60 pounds. It also threw on the owner the burden of proof in any suit touching the illegality of seizure. It so hampered the right of action for unjustifiable arrests of vessels as to render it substantially worthless; and it was so extreme in its provisions that the vessel could not be bailed without the consent of the person seizing her. All these provisions have been continued in every statute of the Dominion from that time to the present.

In A. D. 1838, 1839, and 1840, during the administration of Mr. Van Buren, and while John Forsyth was Secretary of State and Levi Woodbury Secretary of the Treasury, sixteen of our vessels were proceeded against at Halifax and all confiscated except one. During the first year of the next administration, and while Webster was Secretary of State, seven were seized and proceeded against, only two of which were restored. These prosecutions were under this statute of 1836. It is not certain that Mr. Forsyth knew of its existence until near the close of his term of office, when he made an earnest remonstrance against it. The records also fail to show that Webster in any way took notice of it; although after Webster retired from the Cabinet, Mr. Everett, while minister at London, under instructions from Mr. Upshur, then Secretary of State, reiterated the complaints of Mr. Forsyth. When Webster again became Secretary of State, and not long before he died, he made the famous speech at Marshfield, in which he said:

"It is not to be expected the United States would submit their rights to be adjudicated in the petty tribunals of the provinces, or that we shall allow our own vessels to be seized by constables or other petty officials, and condemned by the municipal courts of Quebec, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, or Canada."

Notwithstanding this, from the time the statute was enacted in A. D. 1836 till the present negotiations, not only was its repeal or modification not secured by the United States, and not only contrary to the phrases of Webster did the United States submit the rights of their vessels to be adjudicated in the tribunals of the provinces and allow them to be seized by provincial constables and other provincial petty officers, but in A. D. 1868, and afterwards in A. D. 1870, the Dominion, without protest from us, re-enacted and intensified the law of 1836 by statutes ever since in force.

The disputes covering this first period from A. D. 1836 to A. D. 1854 were confined mainly to four questions:

(1) Whether great bays, like those of Chaleur and Fundy, were bays of the British dominions.

(2) Whether—and this was a broader question, though not perhaps wholly distinct—Great Britain could lawfully run a line from headland to headland, so as to shut in great bays like that of Prince Edward Island and that on the east coast of Cape Breton.

(3) Whether the provincial officers could drive out our vessels from provincial bays and harbors when, in the judgment of the authorities, they did not in fact need shelter or repairs; and

(4) The legislation already referred to.

These questions were not in all respects analogous to those which arose between A. D. 1866 and A. D. 1870, and which have again arisen in the last two years; but whatever they were, none of them were settled and all were postponed, and for the time being submerged in the reciprocity treaty of 1854. In A. D. 1866, at the expiration by notice from the United States of the treaty of 1854, the difficulties touching the fisheries were renewed, and they continued until suspended by the treaty of Washington of 1871.

During this period substantially every question arose which has been in dispute within the last two years; yet not one of them was permanently settled by Congress, the Executive of the United States, or by the Treaty of Washington. The consular correspondence in the summer of A. D. 1870 shows that our vessels were then for-

bidden obtaining bait and all other supplies in Canada, and were excluded from Dominion ports except when putting in for the purposes expressly named in the Convention of 1818. Numerous seizures were made at that time, followed by forfeitures, one of which was the well known case of the *J. H. Nickerson*, a vessel proceeded against at Halifax for purchasing bait, while the United States took no action whatever concerning her and made no reclamation, so that she became a total loss to her owners. This period ended in the treaty of 1871, as did that which closed in A. D. 1854, without the United States securing favorable interpretation of any right in dispute.

The references to the treaties of 1854 and 1871 are merely for the necessary purpose of showing their bearing on the present status. Those negotiations were on a much broader scale, and may be said to have involved larger questions than those now under consideration; although everything which endangers in the least the harmony of nations must be regarded as touching the possibilities of great consequences. The nation would not brook that the high motives and great skill and experience of the gentlemen concerned in the formation of those treaties should not be at all times declared. The treaty of 1854 was a beneficent production of broad statesmanship, a blessing to the country, and its good results have come down to this date in the enlargement of commercial relations with Canada, which is among its legitimate issue, and has already long survived its own existence.

The negotiations of 1871, as well as the consequent proceedings at Geneva, were in the hands of practiced statesmen and jurists, led by a Secretary of State eminent alike for his private and public virtues. These citizens had been honored by the people with many trusts; but for their diplomatic accomplishments at Washington and the verdict at Geneva they will also be honored by history. While the purely accidental result of the Halifax commission must, in comparison, be regarded as the spluttering and flickering of a farthing candle, the exact cost of which is known but will soon be forgotten, the moral spectacles of the grander arbitration between the United States and Great Britain, and of the treaty which led to it, have given out a light which will shine on and on for the illumining of civilization so long as the English tongue shall be spoken. Considering all the great interests which those negotiators had in hand, it was not surprising that it was deemed by them sufficient to give the fisheries a temporary peace, which also they had reason to expect would become permanent. It is in no sense, therefore, in a depreciatory spirit that we refer to these events; but only because dry truth requires that their incidental effect on the issues with which we now have to deal should be clearly stated. The protocol of the conference of the commissioners held May 4, A. D. 1871, is as follows:

"The British commissioners stated that they were prepared to discuss the question of the fisheries, either in detail or generally, either to enter into an examination of the respective rights of the two countries under the treaty of 1818 and the general law of nations, or to approach at once the settlement of the question on a comprehensive basis."

Our commissioners selected the latter. The result was no issues in controversy concerning the fisheries were decided, and all were postponed; and a rule of negotiation was adopted for that topic, which has since, justly or unjustly, given great dissatisfaction to the interests involved.

It thus appears that this controversy commenced more than a half century since, and during that period nothing has been determined. After questions have continued so long unsettled and have been twice formally postponed, it necessarily remains that it is difficult for either party to press its full rights to a complete conclusion in all particulars. Traditions become fixed on one side or the other, systems of legislation accumulate which become inextricably involved with the general mass, and the contemporary facts and understandings are lost or assume new phases. Claims made by Great Britain, or by Nova Scotia or Canada in her name, have stood so long without definitive reversal that they gained such strength as to be in some particulars quite

as difficult of disturbance as though originally based on sound principles and correct rules of construction.

This was the status of these questions when the present negotiations commenced; yet former administrations had not failed to give some indications of the suitable methods of meeting them. In the dispatch of Mr. Seward, then Secretary of State, to Mr. Adams, then our minister at London, of April 10, A. D. 1866, Mr. Seward suggested a mixed commission for the following purposes:

"(1) To agree upon and define by a series of lines the limits which shall separate the exclusive from the common right of fishing on the coasts, and in the seas adjacent, of the British North American colonies, in conformity with the first article of the convention of 1818; the said lines to be regularly numbered, duly described, and also clearly marked on charts prepared in duplicate for the purpose.

"(2) To agree upon and establish such regulations as may be necessary and proper to secure to the fishermen of the United States the privilege of entering bays and harbors for the purpose of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood and of obtaining water, and to agree upon and establish such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the privilege reserved by said convention to the fishermen of the United States.

"(3) To agree upon and recommend the penalties to be adjudged, and such proceedings and jurisdiction as may be necessary to secure a speedy trial and judgment with as little expense as possible for the violators of rights and the transgressors of the limits and restrictions which may be hereby adopted."

The "memorandum" prepared by the Department of State for the information of the commissioners who, on the part of the United States, assisted in negotiating the treaty of Washington of 1871, contained suggestions for adjustment in the following language:

"(1) By agreeing upon the terms upon which the whole of the reserved fishing-grounds may be thrown open to American fishermen, which might be accompanied with a repeal of the obnoxious laws and the abrogation of the disputed reservation as to ports, harbors, etc.; or, failing that,

"(2) By agreeing upon the construction of the disputed renunciation, upon the principles upon which a line should be run by a joint commission to exhibit the territory from which the American fishermen are to be excluded, and by repealing the obnoxious laws, and agreeing upon the measures to be taken for enforcing the colonial rights, the penalties to be inflicted for a forfeiture of the same, and a mixed tribunal to enforce the same. It may also be well to consider whether it should be further agreed that the fish taken in the waters open to both nations shall be admitted free of duty into the United States and the British North American colonies."

It will be observed that the suggestions of Mr. Seward were substantially repeated in the instructions of A. D. 1871, and were also embraced almost in terms in the proposals accompanying the dispatch of Mr. Bayard to Mr. Phelps of November 15, 1886; and the treaty just negotiated, it is believed, accomplishes all which was contemplated by them.

The words of delimitation of the convention of 1818 are as follows: "On or within 3 marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America." The prohibition of 1818 covered in terms not only the coasts, but also the bays of the British dominion; so that a fair construction of the language could not be met by running a line which at all points followed the windings of the shore. Such was apparently the theory of Edward Bates, the umpire, in his opinion given in the case of the *Washington*, decided under the convention of 1853, wherein he used the following language: "The conclusion is therefore irresistible that the Bay of Fundy is not a British bay within the meaning of the word as used in the treaties of 1783 and 1818." So also Mr. Everett in his note of May 25, A. D. 1844, said: "The vessels of the United States have a general right to approach all the bays in Her Majesty's colonial dominions within any distance not less than

3 miles." It is not, however, to be understood by this suggestion that the "headland" theory is at all accepted. That assumed to run a line shutting in all sinuosities of the coast, without considering whether or not particular headlands marked jurisdictional bays, or, in other words, bays which were properly parts of the British dominions, and it is now approved.

That there may be no misunderstanding, let us follow this distinction a little further. The *Washington* was seized in the Bay of Fundy in A. D. 1843, and that raised a question of the "bays," that is, whether the whole of Fundy was a part of the British dominions. The *Argus* was seized at nearly the same time in the great bend of Cape Breton. As the affidavits on file at Halifax show, she was captured less than 2 miles within a line from Cape North to Cow Bay; and that capture marked the "headland" disputes.

The opinion of the law officers of the Crown of 1811, in answer to the second and third queries, said, erroneously, of course: "The term 'headland' is used in the treaty to express the part of land we have before mentioned, including the interior of the bays and the indents of the coast." It may here be said that the same opinion in answer to the fourth query denied the free right of navigating the Gut of Canso. Mr. Stephenson, our minister at London, recognized the distinction in his note to Lord Palmerston of March 27, A. D. 1839, where he said: "The provincial authorities assume a right to exclude the vessels of the United States from all their bays, including those of Fundy and Chaleur, and likewise to prohibit their approach within 3 miles of a line drawn from headland to headland," etc. So Mr. Everett, in his note to Earl Aberdeen of May 25, A. D. 1844, admitted that it was "the intent of the treaty, as it is in itself reasonable, to have regard to the general line of the coast, and to consider its bays, creeks, and harbors, that is, the indentations usually so accounted, as included within that line."

Now, the present treaty apparently holds to the rule stated by Mr. Everett, except that it defines what has heretofore been undefined. This, of course, is subject to the qualification that, except in special cases, in A. D. 1818 jurisdiction bays were limited to those not exceeding 6 miles in width between their headlands, or even to narrower ones; while the present treaty has adopted the more modern rule of the 10 miles opening as a practical and not injurious solution of this whole dispute concerning bays and headlands.

Therefore, under the convention of 1818 the question arises in every case: What is a jurisdictional bay, that is, a British bay, or, in other words, a bay which was then a part "of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America?" This having been ascertained, another question arises, whether any bay which was not jurisdictional in A. D. 1818 has since become so inclosed by the growth of population that, on the principles by which we claim as our exclusive waters Chesapeake and Delaware bays and Long Island Sound, we may properly concede it to Great Britain according to its existing circumstances, as an inducement to a suitable and just arrangement of all questions of delimitation? With reference to this question, and indeed with reference to all this branch of the case, the United States, with its extensive coasts, its numerous bays, its rapidly increasing population and commercial interests can not wisely permit a narrow precedent.

The bay of Chaleur, the shores of which in A. D. 1818 were uninhabited, has by the advance of population become a part of the adjacent territory for all jurisdictional purposes; and it has ceased to be of special value to our vessels except for shelter or supplies. The same observations apply with greater force to the bay of Miramichi. The bays of Egmont and St. Ann's are hardly more than mere sinuosities of the coast; but they and the excluded parts of the Newfoundland bays are of no value to our vessels for fishing. It is not unreasonable to grant the release of all of them, in view of the fact that as to all other waters we remove long standing disputes. It is not to be overlooked that all these bays have long been claimed by Great Britain as of right.

At the mouths of all the bays designated in the treaty by name, the fourth article makes special lines of delimitation. There seems to be an impression with some that the exclusion is 3 miles seaward therefrom; but this is plainly erroneous. Each of these lines is run from one powerful light to another, except one terminus at Cape Smoke, which is a promontory over 700 feet in height. The external peripheries of visibility of these lights overlap each other very considerably on each of these lines, so that for our vessels danger is not where bays have been specifically released. This will be found at the 3-mile limit from the open shore, where it always has been. There is, however, confusion about this, and some debit the treaty just negotiated with the inevitable hazards consequential on the principles of that of 1818. If the commission of delimitation is appointed as the treaty provides, this commission, of course, will, as Mr. Seward and Mr. Fish foresaw, diminish the danger on the open coast, by giving on the charts which it prepares bearings of lights and other marked points; so that vessels by the aid of these bearings will be able to protect themselves in some degree. Nevertheless, there are the nights and thick weather, but the consequences of these are inherent in the principles of the convention of 1818, and will be diminished and not enlarged by the practical workings of the present treaty.

In the case of the *Washington*, Mr. Bates referred to the treaty between France and Great Britain of 1839, excluding from the common right of fishing all bays, the mouths of which did not exceed 10 miles in width, and indorsed this as a proper limit. In the treaty between France and Great Britain of 1867 the same limit was adopted; and it was approved by the common judgment of Great Britain, the German Empire, Belgium, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands, in the treaty concerning the North Sea fisheries, signed at The Hague May 6, A. D. 1882. With the weight of international consensus in its favor, and in view of the interest of the United States to aid precedents which will enable us to afford proper protection to our extensive coasts, and admitting the necessity of finding some practical method of delimitation, this rule seems on the whole convenient, wise, and not unjust. Moreover, considering the inability of our mackerel vessels, substantially all of which use the purse seine to fish in shallow waters along the coast, and that very few American fishermen, perhaps none, in the pursuit of halibut or cod desire to fish there, it is impossible to believe that this rule surrenders anything of essential value to us.

It is fair to add that the ten-mile rule was apparently not congenial to Canada. In the proposals made to Great Britain in the autumn of A. D. 1886, Mr. Bayard, after reciting substantially the suggestions made by Mr. Seward, and elaborating them, offered this rule; but the Marquis of Salisbury, in his reply of March 24, 1887, commented that this "would involve a surrender of fishing rights, which have always been regarded as the exclusive property of Canada."

The specific delimitations at several smaller bays will, on examination, be found to be in harmony with the views of the United States as to the proper results of the general rules of 1818. On the whole, by this part of the treaty a long and troublesome dispute affords promise of being ended without either party giving up anything of value.

Next, the treaty touches the matters which have involved our fishing vessels in their most serious troubles, fully covering reports to custom-houses, fees, and other charges, cases of disaster and distress, and incidental supplies such as merchant vessels buy. It is of course impossible to anticipate all the questions which may arise as between coterminous peoples, even with the most careful phraseology; and there are some matters which can not be confined within fixed terms without limiting the rights of one party or the other to an extent to which neither could be expected to submit. Among these is that discretion which must be exercised on the one side by the "skipper" who runs in for shelter in deciding whether or not it is prudent to put to sea, and on the other side by the revenue authorities in determining whether or not the vessel is hovering or loitering unlawfully within the waters of Canada. Such matters must in the main be disposed of satisfactorily by the practical operation of

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The treaty next seeks to alleviate the hardships of the legal proceedings which various statutes of the province and the Dominion have imposed on foreign vessels. These statutes extended to fishing vessels systems of procedure which are with less injustice applied to merchantmen. The latter come voluntarily into port, and are ordinarily furnished either with credit or cash through their consignees, enabling them to protect themselves in case of litigation. Fishing vessels, however, especially those putting into strange waters merely for shelter, have no such aids and frequently have with them very little cash; and the result has been that the forms of proceedings, which might not be burdensome for merchantmen, have, with reference to fishing vessels, obstructed the course of justice. Through the intervention of counsel employed by the Secretary of State for observing the trials of the *David J. Adams* and the *Elta M. Doughty*, there have been received practical lessons in the difficulties surrounding fishing vessels under the statutes and proceedings of the courts of the Dominion. As already explained, these had been allowed to thrive so long without any successful effort on the part of the United States to prevent their growth, that they had become too deeply rooted in the general mass of Canadian legislation to permit their being entirely drawn out. It is believed, however, that so far as this article may fail to remove all these difficulties detail by detail, its limitation of penalties, except for illegal fishing or preparation therefor, will do very much to prevent injustice under any circumstances; while as to vessels poaching, it is for the interest of each Government that they shall be restrained by severe punishments.

To follow out the matter more in detail: A fishing vessel is seized in the Bay of St. Ann's, or up in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Under existing statutes, first of all, and before she can claim a trial or take testimony or other steps towards a trial, she is required to furnish security for costs not exceeding \$240. The practical experience is that fishing vessels taken into strange ports are rarely provided with funds or credit, and therefore they are compelled to communicate with their owners for assistance, and by reason of the consequent delay are unable to take even the preliminary steps before the sharesmen scatter and the witnesses are lost; because sharesmen, not being ordinarily on wages, can not be held to a vessel moored to a pier. This provision of the Canadian law is not singular; in our own admiralty courts no person can ordinarily claim a fishing vessel, or whatever vessel she may be, without furnishing like security. Under the treaty this disappears; and in practice this relief will be found to be of great benefit to our fishermen.

Next, the courts into which all the cases of these fishing vessels have been brought are not provincial, but are Imperial vice-admiralty courts, established and governed by the uniform rules of the Imperial statute, although presided over by a local judge designated for that purpose. As a consequence, all the paraphernalia and fees of Imperial courts are met, and the progress of the trial requires the early disbursement of large sums of money common in all of them, but unknown in our own and in the provincial courts. These are necessarily so large that our consular correspondence shows the burden of securing the costs and advancing fees was alone sufficient in some instances to compel owners to abandon the defense of vessels of moderate value. The statutes to which we have already referred, moreover, stipulated that no vessel should be released on bail without the consent of the seizing officer; and, although it must be admitted that in practice this has not yet been found to create difficulty, it is annulled by the treaty. While it is impossible to anticipate or prevent all causes of legal delays and expenditures, yet there is no reasonable ground for denying that this thirteenth article will essentially moderate these enumerated rigors.

The punishment for illegally fishing in the prohibited waters has always been forfeiture of the vessel and the cargo aboard at the time of seizure. It was not possible, nor was it for the interests of either country, to demand that the penalty imposed on actual poachers should not be severe; but this article provides that only the cargo.

aboard at the time of the offense can be forfeited, and the provincials can not lie back until a vessel has taken a full cargo, and then sweep in the earnings of the entire trip for an offense committed perhaps at its inception. Moreover, the article provides the penalty shall not be enforced until reviewed by the governor-general in council, giving space for the passing away of temporary excitement and for a calm consideration of all mitigating circumstances. Also, from the passage of the statute of 1819 the penalty for illegally "preparing to fish" has been forfeiture. This has at times been construed to extend not only to preparing to fish illegally, but also to a preparation within the Dominion waters for fishing elsewhere. The *J. H. Nickerson*, already referred to, was forfeited in A. D. 1870 on this principle, without any specific protest from the United States or any subsequent reclamation.

If the plenipotentiaries had been working new ground, in view of the intention of the words and of the fact that preparation is ordinarily accepted as a lower grade than actual accomplishment, it may be that the penalty of forfeiture under any circumstances for this offense would have been surrendered; but a statute which has stood for nearly seventy years without successful objection can not easily be wholly overthrown. The treaty, however, clearly eliminates every principle on which were based the forfeiture of the *J. H. Nickerson* and the proceedings against the *Adams* and the *Doughty*, and also, taking into consideration the other elements already referred to, it makes forfeiture the extreme penalty, but directs that the punishment shall be fixed by the court not exceeding the maximum, so that, if circumstances justify in any case, it may be reduced to a minimum. In lieu of all the other penalties rising to forfeiture, imposed by the Dominion statutes concerning the fisheries for technical offenses and offenses known and unknown, the maximum for all such will be \$3 for every ton of the boat or vessel concerned. Under the provisions of this treaty the *Ella M. Doughty*, caught in the ice, would have gone free, and the *David J. Adams*, which ran across from Eastport into Digby basin for bait, if she had found herself snarled in the intricacies of foreign statutes and proceedings, had the option to pay \$3 per ton, or less than \$200—in other words, than the amounts heretofore required as security for costs and to pay expenses of defense in the vice-admiralty court and go free—or she could have demanded a summary and inexpensive trial at the place of detention.

It should be borne in mind that the statutes of Canada which we have been discussing are not aimed particularly at vessels of the United States, but include all foreign fishing vessels. While in all respects, even with the modifications which the thirteenth article imposes on them, they are not our statutes, and therefore not what we would make them, yet several of these modifications are concessions from principles and provisions which are found in our own statutes, and concessions which we ourselves would not willingly make in behalf of foreign vessels. On the whole, a careful examination of this section, taken in the light of the ordinary methods of criminal proceedings wherever the common law exists, will show a present desire on the part of Great Britain and Canada to remove just cause of offense, and to cultivate the friendship of the United States; and take it by and large, the net result must be a modicum of those evils and misfortunes, through legal proceedings, which inevitably await strange vessels in foreign ports.

Concerning the fifteenth article, further reference to the protocol of May 4, 1871, of the joint commissioners who negotiated the treaty of Washington will show, as already explained, that the American commissioners preferred a settlement of the fishery questions "on a comprehensive basis." After setting out other propositions, pro and con, which were not agreed to, the protocol proceeds as follows:

"The subject of the fisheries was further discussed at the conferences held on the 20th, 22d, and 25th of March. The American commissioners stated that, if the value of the inshore fisheries could be ascertained, the United States might prefer to purchase for a sum of money the right to enjoy in perpetuity the use of those inshore fisheries in common with British fishermen."

Our commissioners afterwards named \$1,000,000 as the sum they were prepared to offer. The British commissioners replied that this offer was inadequate, and made some other objections to it. Subsequently our commissioners proposed as an equivalent for the inshore fisheries that coal, salt, and fish should be reciprocally admitted free at once and lumber after the 1st of July, A. D. 1874. On the 17th of April the British commissioners replied that they regarded this latter offer as inadequate. Thereupon our commissioners withdrew it, and the equivalents were finally negotiated, as found in the treaty.

In framing the present convention this principle of negotiation seems to have been held by the United States not admissible, but it ought not be denied, if to purchase bait and in other ways make the shores of Canada and Newfoundland the base of our fishing operations have a pecuniary or property value to the United States, an equivalent therefor may justly be demanded by Great Britain. In any hargaining for the same, however, all the parties concerned should stand free and on equal footing. Great Britain in this article freely states what she is willing to accept, and if the convention is ratified, Congress may freely adopt its terms if it deems it for the interest of the country so to do.

The objections that the treaty does not secure privileges for bait, shipping men and transshipping fish are not considered here, as they have been fully discussed elsewhere. Also discussion of the other ill-founded objection that the treaty gives us nothing worth purchasing is omitted, because it makes no attempt to purchase anything. It gives no consideration whatever for the benefits which we receive under it.

Much has been said by the opponents of the treaty concerning the reciprocal arrangement of A. D. 1830; and indeed some of them apparently suppose a treaty with Great Britain was then made. The most convenient way of understanding that arrangement is to turn to Jackson's proclamation of May 29, A. D. 1830, by which it was brought to its completion; and its entire practical effect is made clear from the circular of the Secretary of the Treasury to the collectors of customs of October 6, A. D. 1830, and by the order in council of November 5 of the same year.

While this marked a long step forward in reciprocal arrangements with the neighboring provinces, so that it afforded the Secretary of State, Mr. Bayard, very just and persuasive arguments in favor of the most liberal treatment by Canada of our fishing vessels, yet its very letter, as well as its spirit, related exclusively to vessels engaged in commerce and to merchandise carried from the ports of one country to the ports of another. Not only did it not contemplate the purchase of fishing supplies to be used on the ocean and other facilities for fishing vessels, but its phraseology clearly excluded any such purpose. Are we any more entitled to demand under it as a right reciprocity in matters of this sort than Great Britain or Canada can demand under it reciprocity in the coasting trade or in the registering of vessels? And is there anything either in this reciprocal arrangement or in any other between the United States and Great Britain or Canada which renders the refusal to our fishermen of the special benefits of the near locality of Nova Scotia to the fishing grounds more unfriendly, in that sense which justifies retaliation, than our refusal to permit British, including Canadian, vessels to enter our coasting trade, while ours freely engage in the larger coasting trade of the British Empire; or than the refusal to permit the sale by the British, including the Canadians, of their vessels to our citizens with registration, while we may freely sell and register our vessels in any part of the British possessions? There is a wide gulf between this class of privileges which nations grant or refuse in accordance with their own broad or narrow views of their own interests and that class which affects the comfort of strangers and their property in foreign ports. All the latter the treaty just negotiated secures and perpetuates.

In the official pamphlet of the National Fishery Association of March 1, 1888, there is given on the twelfth page the following alternative for this treaty:

"It may be asked how shall we deal with this matter? What can be done to settle the fishery question between the British North American provinces and the United

States? This can be done, and it has the sanction of the Forty-ninth Congress. Wipe out all legislative commercial arrangements and let us go back where we were, so far as commercial intercourse with the British provinces is concerned, when the treaty of 1818 was made. In other words, declare non-intercourse! Put Canada in the same relation to the United States as she was seventy years ago! Then our fishermen would have the same rights they have now under the treaty of 1818, and we should then be in a position to say to her: 'Are you willing this should continue, or do you prefer to deal with us on a fair basis and give to all our vessels, as we are willing to give to yours, full commercial rights in your ports?'"

It is not proposed here to dwell on this alternative nor to discuss the propriety of the assumption of a representative character by the National Fishery Association. But in the event the treaty is rejected, if the President heeds this demand, as perhaps under the law he may, neither the association, nor whomsoever it represents, if anybody, nor, more particularly, that part of the community which now fails to rise up against its pretensions, can justly complain.

The fishing interests of New England welcomed with great expectations the expiration of the treaty of 1871, which came about in June, A. D. 1885; but the result has shown how little the prosperity of these interests can rely on political events. The seasons of 1886 and 1887, so far as the mackerel catch was concerned, were disastrous through natural causes, both for our own fleets and for those of Nova Scotia, though less for the latter than for the former. Although the catch for these two seasons was only one-third of the catch for 1882 and 1883, yet the prices made no corresponding advance; so that the money aggregate for the two latter seasons, including all grades of mackerel, could not have been much in excess of one-third of that for the two earlier seasons named. With reference to cod and other ground fish, there was a considerable diminution in the catch for the seasons of 1886 and 1887, with an extremely low market in 1886 and a somewhat improved market in 1887, the net money yield for each being comparatively small. In neither branch of the fisheries, however, were these evils caused by Canadian complications. This is well understood with reference to mackerel, and becomes entirely plain as to cod when the fact is considered that in A. D. 1883, A. D. 1884, and A. D. 1885, the catch on the New England shores and George's Banks exceeded that on the Grand and Western Banks, while the reverse occurred in A. D. 1886 and A. D. 1887. Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in A. D. 1886, Sylvester Cunningham, of Gloucester, testified that—

"The price of fish is so low now that, if we should allow Canadian fish to come in free, our vessels would not sail. The price is very low."

Mr. O. B. Whitten, vice-president of the Fishery Union, also testified before the same committee, October 6, 1886, as follows:

"Q. Have you ever noticed that the duty has increased or that the absence of duty has decreased the price of fish to the consumer during the last fifteen years?"

"A. I do not know that the duty has anything to do with it whatever. *In fact, it is strange that salt fish were never so low as they are at the present time with the duty on.*"

Mr. L. R. Campbell, deputy commissioner of labor for the State of Maine, in an interview with a reporter of the Kennebec Journal, on the 17th day of November last, said:

"The fishermen are in a worse condition to-day than they have been for a number of years, for the reason that they had two bad seasons in succession."

Indeed, the depressed condition of the fisheries for the last two years is too notorious to need evidencing, though the above explanation of its causes seem necessary.

In this state of financial losses and anxiety the fishing interests are, of course, not prone to welcome anything which will not, in their opinion, give them immediate financial relief; yet the writer speaks from a considerable personal knowledge when he says that whomsoever may have part in advancing the wholesome and beneficent treaty just negotiated can without trepidation trust himself in the hands of the fish-

ermen of Maine, those who actually man our fleet, and to the sober second-thought of those who own the vessels.

It is to be hoped the present season will be one of prosperity for the cod and mackerel catchers on each side of the line. Our fishermen need it sorely; and the good humor which would flow therefrom would quickly flood out the recollections of the past ill-will and its consequent mischiefs.

PORTLAND, ME., *April 16, 1888.*

WILLIAM L. PUTNAM.