ON THE LATEST FORM OF THE DEVELOPMENT THEORY. 113 
whole work, we see not why one of them should be accepted to the rejection of the 
other. Guided by the doctrine of Homologies, the comparative anatomist searches for 
corresponding parts in different animals; guided by that of Final Causes, whenever he 
finds a marked peculiarity in one part, he suspects there is a special use or function to 
be subserved by it; and by persevering in the search, he usually finds out what this 
use is. Thus, Harvey found that the valves in the veins and arteries opened in oppo- 
site directions ; and assuming that this difference could not be without a use or pur- 
pose, he discovered the circulation of the blood. Homologies may be the better guide 
to systems of classification of parts and members, though naturalists are not agreed 
upon this point. But the principle of Final Causes more frequently leads to discov- 
eries in physiology, which science, indeed, has been built up almost exclusively by 
its aid. | 
The theist believes, it is true, that a Creator of infinite wisdom and benevolence has 
made nothing in vain; that there is a use for everything, and a use which it was in- 
tended to serve. But he cannot assert that he has discovered this use and fathomed 
this intention in every instance, without assuming that he possesses infinite wisdom 
himself. And the naturalist who, because he cannot discover the use, affirms that it 
does not exist, is guilty of similar presumptuous folly. Looking at the works of finite 
intelligence, indeed, we find that a purpose is seldom unaccompanied by a want of pur- 
pose; that chance appears, so to speak, as the residuum of design. ‘Thus, we often throw 
a stone, not intending to hit anything with it, but only to toss it out of the way. The 
throwing was intentional, the hitting was accidental. Every act is attended with sev- 
eral immediate results; and as all of them are not necessarily in view of the agent at 
the time, those which do not enter distinctly into his purpose are ascribed to chance. 
They are caused by him, but not intended by him. A mechanic cannot fashion a 
machine, an artist cannot chisel out a statue, without leaving behind him a heap of 
chips, dust, and refuse matter. A chip is struck off at every blow; but neither its 
shape, nor the position in which it falls, is designed by the artisan, who is thinking 
only of the work from which he has pared it away. But because we cannot discern 
either use or purpose in that heap of refuse matter, we are not to conclude that the 
finished machine or statue by the side of it is destitute of both. Absence of purpose, 
then, may often be affirmed of the results of human labor; but it can never be de- 
clared with certainty of the works of creation. Infinite wisdom leaves no residuum 
for chance, and that which is not subservient to one purpose may have been intended 
for another. ` TE not useful to the organism in which it is found, it may answer some 
higher object in the economy of creation. It may be a means, and intended as such, 
VOL. VIII. 15 
