182 SPANISH LOANS. 



" Whence it will be seen that the government had to sustain in 

 the first instance a loss of 178,999,666 r. v. arising from the differ- 

 ence between the capital of the stock which it issued, and that of 

 the stock which it received in payment ; which loss turned wholly to 

 the profit of the contractors. 



" To this difference of capital must also be added the double 

 interest of the stock which the government was issuing ; which 

 interest the contractors began to enjoy from the outset, reckoning 

 from November 1, 1821 ; besides the interest that had accrued upon 

 the amounts which they remitted in payment as money. All these 

 sums together form an actual amount of more than forty -nine millions 

 of reals vellon. 



" So that in this transaction the contractors gained 227,999,666 

 reals vellon. 



Reales. 



Still, this is not all which the government lost. In 

 fact, the annual interest of the stock which it issued, 



amounted to . 3.7,742,455 



The interest of the amounts which it received in pay- 

 ment, making 20,786,130 



The result to the government was an increase of annual 



interest to the amount of 16,956,425 



So that in gross amount the government sustained 

 the following losses : 



Loss resulting from the difference of capitals, as par- 

 ticularized above . . . . . . 178,999,666 



Loss resulting from the double allocation of interest, 



in actual money 49,000,000 



Losses in interest upon the stock issued, payable 



yearly ...... . 16,959,375 



Total . . 244,959,038 



The contractors therefore gained in this honest transac- 

 tion of paper versus paper, in actual value paid by 



Spain . 228,000,000 



or the best part of TWO MILLIONS AND A HALF POUNDS STERLING. 



Reales. 



Whilst the government lost by the thimble rig . 245,000,000 



or the best part of three millions of pounds. It will be understood 

 that our reductions into sterling are merely approximative, and in 

 round numbers. 



But the 2,500,000 were far from being the limit of profit. When 

 it is considered that the bonds of the former Cortes loans, which by 

 their covenant the contractors were empowered to deliver at par, 

 were at enormous discounts ; that the Dutch loans with the arrears 

 of interest due and unpaid upon them must have been absolutely 

 without price or value in the money market, and were perhaps at 

 the utmost purchased at one-fourth, or one-half of their transferred 

 value ; we may be allowed to hazard a round and not improbable 

 guess, that the collateral and less direct gains the contingent re- 

 mainder did not fall short in the whole in addition of the too rno- 



