24 



INSTINCT. 



whether the reflex function of Dr. Mar- 

 shall Hall, on which respiration, degluti- 

 tion, the evacuation of the bowels and blad- 

 der, &c. depend, is to be regarded as the re- 

 sult of a merely physical impression on the 

 nerves and spinal cord, like the impression of 

 blood on the heart; or whether the sensations 

 which naturally accompany these actions are, 

 in the natural state, part of the cause which 

 excites them. But that even when the volun- 

 tary powers of animals are certainly the means 

 employed for the ends of their creation, they 

 are still very generally guided by the superior 

 intelligence which has framed both their phy- 

 sical and mental constitution, and which rules 

 the mental but instinctive efforts consequent 

 on the sensations that are felt, as surely as the 

 laws of muscular contraction rule the move- 

 ments of the heart ; and it is into the hands of 

 man alone that the reins of voluntary power 

 are absolutely resigned. 



And when we thus pass in review the sen- 

 sorial and voluntary powers of animals, we 

 are naturally led to the question, whether there 

 is really in our own case so great an exception 

 to those laws of nature which regulate all the 

 other members of the animal creation; whe- 

 ther, admitting the essential superiority of the 

 intellect or reason of man, the different desires 

 and motives to action, which are implanted in 

 him, are not equally subject to the control of 

 the power that gives them, and whether their 

 consequences are not as exactly ruled by laws 

 and as fully anticipated, as those of the in- 

 stincts of animals. 



Without entering fully on this abstruse ques- 

 tion, we would take the liberty of remarking, 

 in the view of placing it in its simplest form 

 before our readers, that as the intimations of 

 our own consciousness are the ultimate foun- 

 dation of all the knowledge that we have or 

 can have of our own minds, and as certain of 

 the intuitive principles of belief which our 

 minds naturally suggest to us must be trusted, 

 if we are to inquire into the subject at all ; 

 so the only question that can " be reasonably 

 proposed on this point is, whether there is any 

 good reason for suspecting that the belief of 

 our own free-will, which naturally attends cer- 

 tain of the operations of our minds, is a de- 

 ception; and that the analogy of other ani- 

 mals is only applicable to the subject in so 

 far as it can throw light on that question. 



Now, we find that the works of man, which 

 we ascribe to his reason, and in the execution 

 of which the consciousness of his free-will 

 intervenes, are essentially different from those 

 which we ascribe to the blind instincts of ani- 

 mals, in the total absence (already noticed) of 

 that uniformity which is so leading a charac- 

 teristic of the effects of the latter; and we may 

 reasonably assert that this is just the difference 

 to be expected between the works of man and 

 of other animals, on the supposition that the 

 power concerned in the former is not subject 

 to the direct influence and control of that 

 higher intellect, by which the laws and limits 

 of that concerned in the latter are irrevocably 

 set ; and therefore, that there exists no such 



analogy between the works of man and of other 

 animals as need induce us to suspect, that the 

 evidence of his consciousness on the point in 

 question is not to be trusted. 



At the same time it ought to be observed, 

 and perhaps has not been duly remarked, not 

 only that the desires which are the principal 

 motives to human action, are analogous to, 

 sometimes identical with, the instincts of ani- 

 mals, (many of them having been evidently 

 given him with the same intention, and with a 

 clear perception of their general result on his 

 condition,) but also that the constitution of 

 the human mind appears from the intimations 

 of our own consciousness to be such, as to 

 allow of interposition of a superior power, 

 controlling in a certain degree the will of man, 

 without making itself obvious to his mind. 

 For it is admitted by the soundest metaphy- 

 sicians, that the only truly voluntary power 

 which we are conscious of possessing over the 

 train of thought in our minds, and therefore 

 ultimately over many of our actions, operates 

 only indirectly.* We have no power of de- 

 termining the thoughts that succeed one ano- 

 ther or regulating the order of their succes- 

 sion ; and although various laws of association 

 have been laid down, by which many of the 

 component parts of the train appear to be con- 

 nected, yet it will hardly appear to any one 

 who reflects on the operations of his mind, 

 that all the thoughts which succeed one ano- 

 ther can be ascertained to have such bonds of 

 connection with one another. At all events, 

 the only strictly voluntary power which we 

 are conscious that we possess, is that of singling 

 out and detaining any particular portion of the 

 train, whereby it may be made to predominate 

 in the mind, and to produce practical results 

 which might not otherwise have followed ; and 

 even this kind of influence over the train of 

 thought is not exercised exclusively by volition, 

 but is produced in a great measure also by 

 other causes, physical and moral. Now if this 

 be so, how can we deny the possibility of a 

 superior intelligence retaining a power of con- 

 trolling the acts of any individual human mind, 

 or of any number of minds, either by suggest- 

 ing particular thoughts, or by causing the mind 

 to dwell upon particular thoughts in preference 

 to others, without its sense of its own volun- 

 tary power being interrupted or withdrawn, 

 nay, without the spontaneous voluntary power 

 being really suspended, the only difference 

 beins in the degree of influence which it exerts 

 over the train of thought and consequent vo- 

 litions? 



It has been said that the expression in Pope's 

 Universal Prayer 



* " So completely is the current of thoughts in 

 the mind," says Stewart, " subjected to physical 

 laws, that it has been justly observed by Lord 

 Kames that we cannot, by an effort of our will, 

 call up any one thought, and that the train of our 

 ideas depends on causes which operate in a man- 

 ner inexplicable by us. This observation, although 

 it has been censured as paradoxical, is almost self- 

 evident ; for to call up any particular thought sup- 

 poses it to be already in the mind." Elements, <Sfc. 

 ch. v. sect. 3. 



