INSTINCT. 



observe by attention to our own feelings on 

 such occasions is, that while we feel the sen- 

 sations of hunger and thirst, we feel also a pro- 

 pensity, all but irresistible, to swallow what- 

 ever grateful food or drink is in the mouth. 

 This propensity is not only prior to reason, 

 but stronger than reason, and prompts us to 

 action more surely and more energetically than 

 the mere recollection of the effects previously 

 resulting from food or drink taken into the sto- 

 mach could have done. 



If we reflect further, we shall find that there 

 are various other sensations, with which we 

 can feel, in our own persons, that an instinctive 

 impulse is naturally linked. The term Appe- 

 tite does not express the whole of these, 

 although it is only by referring to the action 

 which it uniformly prompts that an appetite 

 can be distinguished from another sensation. 

 Sympathetic movements, such as breathing, 

 coughing, sneezing, vomiting, &c. are ascribed 

 by VVhytt and others to sensations ; and laugh- 

 ter, weeping, the expression of feeling in the 

 countenance and features, &c. are strictly refer- 

 able to emotions of mind, and in the perform- 

 ance of all these actions, a propensity which 

 may be called strictly instmotive, because 

 prior to experience, and independent of reason- 

 ing, may be frequently and distinctly felt, and 

 is from the first equally effectual in exciting very 

 complex muscular movements, as the impulse 

 to swallow food in the mouth. We may 

 specify several other kinds or modes of action, 

 which we are all conscious of frequently per- 

 forming, and which we perform on many oc- 

 casions in obedience, not to any effort of 

 reason, but to a truly instinctive impulse, natu- 

 rally consequent on certain sensations or 

 emotions, and felt even in adult age to be inde- 

 pendent of, as they are in the infant prior to, 

 any anticipation of remote consequences, viz. 

 1. those which are prompted by the instinct of 

 self-preservation, (as the winking of the eye- 

 lids when the eyes are threatened with injury, 

 the shrinking of any limb or part of the body 

 which is struck, the projection of the arms 

 when we ate about to fall forwards on the 

 face,* the act of crying from pain or from 

 fear); 2. those which are prompted by the 

 instinct of shame, as when the saliva escapes 

 from the mouth, when the sphincters fail in 

 their office, or the sense of modesty is out- 

 raged ; 3. those which are prompted by the 

 instinct of imitation, existing more or less in 

 the early stage of all human existence, and 

 whereby we are all led to fashion our language, 

 manners, and habits, on the model of those 

 around us, and particularly of those persons with 

 whom we have either the most frequent inter- 

 course, or the intercourse which is most fitted 

 to make an impression on our minds ; 4. those 

 which are prompted by the emotions of affec- 



* Let any one try the experiment of attempting 

 to fall forward on his face, with his arms extended 

 at his sides, and he will be immediately conscious 

 of the instinctive impulse which urges him to 

 throw forward his arms ; and which he feels dis- 

 tinctly and resists with difficulty, even when he 

 knows that he is about to fall only on soi't matter 

 which cannot injure him. 



tion and pity, or still more decidedly by the 

 impulse of maternal love, on witnessing the 

 helpless condition of young infants.* We do 

 not enter into details on these subjects at pre- 

 sent, but merely mention them as examples, in 

 which we may safely and legitimately avail 

 ourselves of the evidence of consciousness to 

 assure ourselves of the essential peculiarity, 

 and of the paramount authority, of the in- 

 stinctive impulse, as distinguished from the 

 voluntary effort, which results from a train of 

 reasoning. 



It has been often said that the nature of 

 instinct is absolutely mysterious and inscru- 

 table; but if what has now been stated be 

 correct, this can be said of instinct only in the 

 same sense in which it may be said of all 

 mental acts without exception ; the essence of 

 mind, like that of matter, being wholly in- 

 scrutable. The characters of the instinctive 

 impulse may be distinguished as clearly as 

 those of any other mental act, in the only 

 way in which any such act can be distin- 

 guished, viz. by attention to our own conscious- 

 ness ; although we never could have antici- 

 pated a priori that this kind of mental impulse 

 could have extended to so long continued and 

 complex actions, and to the concerted ope- 

 rations of so many individuals, as the operations 

 of some animals indicate. 



Having satisfied ourselves of the existence 

 of certain instinctive impulses, both in the 

 lower animals and in ourselves, essentially dis- 

 tinct from those voluntary efforts which are 

 guided by reason, we need not be perplexed 

 at finding that there is much difficulty in some 

 individual instances, in determining to which 

 class of mental acts particular actions ought to be 

 referred. However difficult it may be in any in- 

 dividual instance, to decide whether an action, 

 of man or of animals, is the effect of a blind in- 

 stinct, or of reason, anticipating and desiring 

 its consequences, there can be no doubt or 

 difficulty as to the fact, that these two distinct 

 kinds of mental determination to the perform- 

 ance of actions exist. 



Neither do we consider it of any import- 

 ance to enter on the metaphysical speculations 

 which ingenious men have hazarded at different 

 times as to the nature of the agent, by which 

 the instinctive actions may be supposed to be 

 immediately excited. Some philosophers have 

 been so strongly impressed with the admirable 

 adaptation of means to ends which these phe- 

 nomena present, in animals manifestly devoid 

 of reason, that they have believed them to be 

 in all cases the immediate offspring of the 

 divine intelligence, and have expressed their 

 theory in the form of an axiom, " Deus anima 

 brutorum," which, it is humbly conceived, is 

 admissible only in the same sense in which we 

 assent to the more general assertion, " Deus 

 anima mundi." 



Mr. Kirby, in his very learned and elaborate 

 Bridgewater Treatise on the History, Habits, 

 and Instincts of Animals, seems to favour the 



[* The greater number of the actions enumerated 

 may, however, be accounted for on the principle of 

 reflux nervous artion, now so generally admitted by 

 physiologists, ED.] 



