28 



INSTINCT. 



powers, and its instinctive propensities. Ei- 

 ther directly or indirectly a Mind, and that 

 not the miiid of any living animal, must rule, 

 according to general laws, the instinctive ac- 

 tions of all. 



It is true that there have been, in all ages, 

 some resolute sceptics, who do not assent to 

 the proposition that design can be traced from 

 its effects, or that the observed adaptation of 

 means to ends authorizes us to infer the exist- 

 ence of an intelligent agent; but such a sceptic, 

 if he be consistent, must also refuse his assent 

 to the evidence of the existence of any sentient 

 or intelligent being but himself. " How do I 

 know," says Dr. Reid, " that any man of my 

 acquaintance has understanding? I never saw his 

 understanding. I see only certain effects, which 

 my judgment leads me to conclude to be marks 

 and tokens of it. But, says a sceptical philo- 

 sopher, you can conclude nothing from these, 

 unless past experience has informed you that 

 such tokens are always joined with understand- 

 ing. Alas, it is impossible I can have this ex- 

 perience. The understanding of another man 

 is no immediate object of sight, nor of any 

 other faculty which God has given me ; and 

 unless I can conclude its existence from tokens 

 that are visible, I can have no evidence that 

 there is understanding in any man." 



In fact, the sceptical reasoner who refuses 

 his assent to the intuitive judgment by which 

 we infer design from its effects, can only be 

 truly and thoroughly consistent if he place no 

 faith in any intuitive truth, or first principle of 

 belief, and therefore disbelieves the suggestions 

 of his own consciousness. " To such a scep- 

 tic," says Dr. Reid, " I have nothing to say ; 

 but of the semi-sceptics, I should beg to know, 

 why they believe in the existence of their own 

 impressions and ideas. The true reason I be- 

 lieve to be, because they cannot help it ; and 

 the same reason will make them believe many 

 other things."* 



2. The evidence of design, which we deduce 

 from the instinctive actions of man himself, has 

 this striking peculiarity, that we are actually 

 conscious of the propensities which excite them, 

 and at the same time know that the purpose or 

 design of these actions is not of our own con- 

 trivance. We may be said actually ioj'cel the 

 adaptation, designed by Nature, not by our- 

 selves, of the constitution of our minds to the 

 laws of external nature and to the wants of our 

 bodily organization. The very same machinery, 

 consisting of efforts of volition, of actions pro- 

 pagated along nerves, and of contractions of 

 muscles, which we put in motion to accom- 

 plish any of those objects which our own intel- 

 ligence and foresight enable us to understand, we 

 here put in motion in obedience to propensi- 

 ties implanted in us by nature, with as little 

 knowledge of the purpose which it is to serve, 

 and in the first instance with as little knowledge 

 of the pleasure it is to procure, as the heart 

 that beats within us has of the nature and uses 

 of the circulation which it supports. In the 

 performance of every one of these actions, we 



* Etsays on Intellectual Powers, p. b'21 et seq. 



may truly say that the intelligent mind of man 

 bows to the superior wisdom of the Author of 

 Nature. 



The speculations of Darwin on this subject 

 seem intended to weaken the evidence as to the 

 divine existence and attributes drawn from the 

 phenomena of instinct, first, by attempting to 

 explain the instinctive movements of young 

 animals on the principle of irregular move- 

 ments being first produced by uneasy sensa- 

 tions, and then those motions being selected, 

 and voluntarily performed, which are found by 

 experience to appease these sensations or pro- 

 cure pleasure ; and secondly, by referring to the 

 fact formerly stated, that most instinctive pro- 

 pensities are linked to, and, as he expresses it, 

 " under the conduct of sensations and desires." 

 The first of these assertions is quite inconsistent 

 with what has been observed by others (as 

 already remarked) in regard to the commence- 

 ment of the instinctive actions in young ani- 

 mals.* As to the second, it is quite plain that the 

 inference, which is drawn from the observed 

 adaptation of means to ends in the phenomena 

 of instinct, does not require that there shall be no 

 mental antecedent exciting the instinctive pro- 

 pensity, but only that the mental antecedent 

 shall not be an anticipation, grounded on rea- 

 soning, of the effect which the action will pro- 

 duce. Even if the immediate antecedent of 

 every instinctive effort were a pleasing sensa- 

 tion, it would still be a fact, in the constitution 

 of animals, that certain of their sensations, and 

 not others, are naturally followed by certain 

 definite muscular contractions, varying in the 

 different tribes, and each adapted to a determi- 

 nate end, known neither by experience nor by 

 the reason of the animal exhibiting it; and this 

 is the fact which justifies the conclusion in 

 question. This has been already explained, 

 and is so fully illustrated by Mr. Stewart in the 

 answer, contained in his Life of Dr. Reid, to 

 the criticisms of Darwin, that it is unnecessary 

 to dwell upon it. 



But although it is clearly no objection to the 

 evidence of design and benevolence in the Au- 

 thor of Nature, drawn from the phenomena of 

 instinct, that the instinctive propensities are 

 often linked to and excited by certain pleasur- 

 able sensations, yet it is a strong indication of 

 the superior power by which they are implanted 

 in the different orders of animals, that when 

 they are in full force, and the object to be 

 accomplished by them is important, they have 

 frequently power to supersede and subvert the 

 motives, by which the ordinary actions of the 

 same animals are regulated, and suspend the 

 ordinary laws of their mental constitution, so 

 as to induce an animal to persevere in actions 

 attended with privation and fatigue and positive 

 suffering. " It ought not to be forgotten," says 

 Paley, " how much the instinct often costs the 

 animal that feels it ; how much (e. g.) a bird 

 gives up by sitting on her nest, how repug- 

 nant it is to her organization, her habits, and 

 her pleasures. An animal formed for liberty 



* Sec Kirby and Sponce, Introd. to Entomology, 

 vol. ii, p. 468. 



