144 



LIFE. 



plan on which the universe itself is constructed. 

 It is under the influence of such a power that 

 every particular species of soul regularly con- 

 structs a system of organs adapted to its func- 

 tions ; and every species of soul appears uni- 

 formly to have its own species of body." * 

 Now it is a little singular that, whilst the ten- 

 dency of modern philosophy has been to ex- 

 plode the idea of any secondary existence 

 acting beneath the Creator on the constitution 

 and actions of the universe, but to refer all 

 its phenomena to the continued operation of 

 the laws which He first impressed on matter, 

 physiologists, neglecting the obvious analogy 

 between the actions of the universe and those 

 of any single organised being (the Macrocosm 

 and Microcosm) pointed out by Aristotle, 

 should have retained, with but little modifica- 

 tion, his opinion regarding the second ; and 

 should still attribute ihe phenomena of life to 

 a secondary agency existing in each being and 

 modifying the ordinary laws of matter to its 

 purposes. This subject, however, we shall 

 dismiss for the present, to return to it here- 

 after. 



The mode of explaining vital phenomena 

 which has been adduced as an example of 

 early speculation on the subject, appears to 

 have resulted from two tendencies that may be 

 observed to characterise the unenlightened mind 

 both in past ages, and at the present time. The 

 first is that which may be considered as natural 

 to man in the infancy of philosophy, to regard 

 all matter, at least the grosser forms of it, as 

 essentially inert, and therefore to attribute all 

 spontaneous motion to a union of the thing 

 moved with some substantial moving cause. 

 Now, although modern science has given a 

 more correct explanation of the causes of mo- 

 tion in the inorganic world, and has shown 

 that, so far from being inert, every particle of 

 matter is capable of exhibiting actions of va- 

 rious kinds when placed in certain relations to 

 others, the superficial enquirer still regards 

 matter as inert quoad vital actions, and is un- 

 willing to attribute them to any possible ope- 

 ration of its properties. And in this mode of 

 reasoning he would seem borne out by the 

 peculiar history of organised beings, the phe- 

 nomena of their origin, growth, decline, dis- 

 solution, and decay, the contemplation of 

 which, with the desire of accounting for them, 

 occasions the second tendency to which we 

 have alluded ; that, namely, to infer from this 

 history the existence of an unknown something, 

 which during the living state preserves the in- 

 tegrity of the body, and the loss of which 

 occasions the disintegration of the fabric. 

 Thus it has happened that the doctrine of the 

 animating principle has retained its hold over 

 the public mind from the earliest ages of the 

 world to the present day ; and the vestiges of 

 the opinions of the early Greek philosophers 

 may be traced in the expressions, vital spark, 

 vital spirit, breath of life, and others which 

 are still prevalent. 



* Barclay on Life anil Organisation, pp. 429- 

 433. 



The chief modification which these doctrines 

 have undergone, in their transit to modern 

 physiologists, has been the separation of the 

 vital principle the entity which is supposed 

 to effect the organisation of the body, and to 

 employ that organism as the instrument of its 

 operations from the soul or mental principle, 

 which is concerned in a series of actions en- 

 tirely distinct. It is somewhat singular, how- 

 ever, that even Aristotle regarded the vovi; or 

 reasoning faculties as separable from the re- 

 mainder of the Vv/jr), and as capable of ex- 

 isting independently of the body ; and a sub- 

 division of this kind was adopted by the 

 Roman philosophers, who designated the vital 

 and sensitive principles by the term Anima, 

 whilst to the rational they applied the name of 

 Animus. We shall not follow these doctrines 

 through all the modifications which resulted 

 from the unfathomable profundity of some 

 systems of philosophy, and the pretending 

 shallowness of others ; but shall proceed at 

 once to the more modern opinions, which are 

 either openly professed at the present time, or 

 lurk in the unillumined corners in which the 

 heterogeneous relics of former systems find a 

 hiding place, whose darkness is congenial to 

 their disunited formlessness. 



The ancient doctrine of the identity of the 

 vital with the mental principle was revived by 

 Stahl in a somewhat altered form. This philo- 

 sopher maintained that the rational soul is the 

 primum movens of organisation ; that it is the 

 ultimate and sole cause of organic activity; 

 and that by its operation, according to certain 

 fixed laws, it preserves the body from decay 

 and cures the effects of disease. Still, however, 

 a distinction was drawn by him between the acts 

 of the animus and the anima, which was not ob- 

 served by his followers, who have regarded him 

 as wishing to identify them. He looked upon 

 them as the common effects of one principle ; 

 and his great error was in supposing that any 

 analogy or parallelism existed between them. 

 Now it is necessary to bear this doctrine con- 

 stantly in mind when reading the works of 

 many of the physiologists of the last century, 

 otherwise their meaning will be greatly mis- 

 understood. In the writings of Whytt, for 

 example, we constantly find actions referred to 

 the soul as their cause, when it is perfectly 

 evident that the author did not mean that the 

 mind (as it is now termed) was at all concerned 

 in them. This was the case with his whole 

 class of vital and involuntary motions, to the 

 production of which, he expressly states, con- 

 sciousness is not always necessary. Although 

 there are few if any philosophers who would 

 avow such a doctrine as that of Stahl at the 

 present time, we trace its effects very evidently 

 exerted upon popular opinion. We have known 

 it maintained by many well-informed persons, 

 that the phenomena of life and mind are 

 obviously so closely connected, that, to refer 

 one class to the operation of the properties of 

 matter without an independent controlling- 

 entity, in other words, to set aside the doc- 

 trine of a vital principle, necessarily implies 

 the relinquishment of the idea of mind as a 



