284 RE GENERA TION 



the archenteron of the starfish, in which differentiation has not begun, 

 we can picture to ourselves the formation of the divisions of the archen- 

 teron in a causal way by supposing the end of the axis, or pole, to be 

 the location (Site) of an initiative "action at a distance" (auslosende 

 Fernkraft}. This 'locality, just because it is the end of a system, 

 is something special ; and it acts in such a way that wherever an effect 

 is produced, it is the cause of that effect. This very way of looking 

 at the problem postulates a sort of causal harmony. But how, it may 

 be asked, can a special point or pole of an axis bring about an action 

 in the system ? This can be shown by means of a simple case, viz. 

 the dividing up of the archenteron of the starfish into its character- 

 istic parts. There are two effects produced, viz. the formation of the 

 two constrictions of the wall. We need not consider the fact that the 

 constrictions are formed, for this is established in the potence of the sys- 

 tem, and is awakened by the initiating cause, but the place at which 

 the constrictions are produced is that for which we should account. 

 We must think of this cause as "action at a distance," and indeed as 

 an " action at a distance " that works at a determinate, typical dis- 

 tance. This inherent measure of distance of the action is not one of 

 absolutely fixed size, for a gastrula made shorter by an operation also 

 subdivides into proportionate parts. The action starts from the poles 

 of the system, and acts, not at an absolute, but at a relative distance, 

 since it is dependent upon the length of the axis of the whole differ- 

 entiating system. " The localization of ontogenetic processes is a 

 problem sui generis. The phenomenon can always be expressed on 

 the scheme of cause and effect, if we assume the 'action at a dis- 

 tance ' to start from fixed points of a differentiating system." 



In regard to the criterion of vitalistic phenomena Driesch makes 

 the following statement : " On the current view we are inclined to 

 see, in the formative changes, actual causes at work that even initiate 

 those processes that we call stimuli ; we do so because we pretend at 

 present to know something of the special mechanism by which the 

 formative changes work. The effects come into play through a 

 causal union of simple processes of a physical-chemical sort that we 

 may call a chain of stimuli. From the new point of view, the initia- 

 tory stimulus is not an initiatory cause or the effect of a causally 

 united chemico-physical phenomenon. The stimulus is, from this 

 point of view, a true stimulus, but the effect is not a true effect of 

 its initiation, but is rather to be designated a responsive effect, for 

 there is no connecting chain of stimuli. It is in the place of the 

 latter that the vitalistic view appears. The only data of a machine 

 sort in the conception are the arrangements for the reception and 

 guidance of the stimulus, perhaps also the means for carrying out 

 the response effect; for the machine data are only the prerequi- 



