400 NEW ENGLAND FISHERIES 



ordinary sanctions of International Law in regard to ob- 

 servance of Treaty obligations. Such sanctions are, for 

 instance, appeal to public opinion, publication of corre- 

 spondence, censure by Parliamentary vote, demand for arbi- 

 tration with the odium attendant on a refusal to arbitrate, 

 rupture of relations, reprisal, etc. But no reason has been 

 shown why this Treaty, in this respect, should be con- 

 sidered as different from every other Treaty under which 

 the right of a State to regulate the action of foreigners 

 admitted by it on its territory is recognized; 



(&) Because the exercise of such a right of consent by 

 the United States would predicate an abandonment of its 

 independence in this respect by Great Britain, and the 

 recognition by the latter of a concurrent right of regula- 

 tion in the United States. But the Treaty conveys only 

 a liberty to take fish in common, and neither directly nor 

 indirectly conveys a joint right of regulation; 



(c) Because the Treaty does not convey a common right 

 of fishery, but a liberty to fish in common. This is evi- 

 denced by the attitude of the United States Government in 

 1823, with respect to the relations of Great Britain and 

 France in regard to the fishery ; 



(d) Because if the consent of the United States were 

 requisite for the fishery a general veto would be accorded 

 them, the full exercise of which would be socially sub- 

 versive and would lead to the consequence of an unregu- 

 latable fishery ; 



(e) Because the United States cannot by assent give 

 legal force and validity to British legislation; 



(/) Because the liberties to take fish in British terri- 

 torial waters and to dry and cure fish on land in British 

 territory are in principle on the same footing ; but in prac- 

 tice a right of cooperation in the elaboration and enforce- 

 ment of regulations in regard to the latter liberty (drying 

 and curing fish on land) is unrealisable. 



