252 Animal Intelligence 



Other cases of imitation are mere adjuncts to the ordinary 

 process of habit-formation. In the first place, the act of an- 

 other, or its result, may serve as a model by which the satis- 

 fyingness of one's own responses are determined. Just as 

 the touch and taste of food tells a baby that he has got it 

 safely into his mouth, so the sound of a word spoken by an- 

 other or the sight of another performing some act of skill 

 tells us whether our pronunciation or technique is right or 

 wrong. 



In the second place, the perception of another's act may 

 serve as a stimulus to a response whereby the situation is 

 altered into one to which the animal responds from habit by 

 an act like the one perceived. For example, the perception 

 of another making a certain response (A) to a situation (B) 

 may lead in me by the laws of habit to a response (C) 

 which puts me in a situation (D) such that the response (A) 

 is made by me by the laws of habit. Suppose that by pre- 

 vious training the act of taking off my hat (A) has become 

 connected as response to the situation (D), ' thought of hat 

 off,' and suppose that with the sight of others uncovering 

 their heads (A) in church (B) there has, again by previous 

 habituation, been connected, as response (C), ' thought of 

 hat off.' Then the sight of others uncovering their heads 

 would by virtue of the laws of habit lead me to uncover. 

 Imitation of this sort, where the perception of the act or 

 condition in another gives rise to the idea of performing the 

 act or attaining the condition, the idea in turn giving rise 

 to the appropriate act, is certainly very common. 



There may be cases of imitation which cannot be thus 

 accounted for as special instinctive responses to the percep- 

 tion of certain acts by the same acts, as habits formed under 

 the condition that the satisfyingness of a response is its 

 likeness to the perceived act of another, or as the connection 



