Laws and Hypotheses for Behavior 273 



into the mind in various ways and had power to arouse 

 certain acts and other ideas more or less mysteriously, in the 

 manner described by the laws of ideo-motor action, atten- 

 tion, association by contiguity, association by similarity, 

 suggestion, imitation, dynamo-genesis and the like, with 

 possibly a surplus of acts and ideas due to 'free will.' The 

 mind was treated as a crucible in which a multifarious so- 

 lution of ideas, impulses and automatisms boiled away, 

 giving off, as a consequence of a subtle chemistry, an 

 abundance of thoughts and movements. Human behavior 

 was rarely viewed from without as a series of responses 

 bound in various ways to a series of situations. The stu- 

 dent of animal behavior passed as quickly as might be from 

 such mere externals to the inner life of the creature, making 

 it his chief interest to decide whether it had percepts, 

 memories, concepts, abstractions, ideas of right and wrong, 

 choices, a self, a conscience, a sense of beauty. The facts 

 in intellect and character that are due to learning, that are 

 not the inherited property of the species and that conse- 

 quently are beyond the scope of evolution in the race, 

 were not separated off from the facts of original nature. 

 The comparative psychologist misspent his energy on such 

 problems as the phylogenesis of the idea of self, moral 

 judgments, or the sentiment of filial affection. 



At the other extreme, the behavior of the protozoa was 

 either contemplated in the light of futile analogies, for 

 instance, between discriminative reactions and conscious 

 choice, and between inherited instincts and memory, or 

 studied crudely in its results without observation of what 

 the animals really did. The protozoa were regarded either 

 as potential 'conscious selves' or as drifting lumps turned 

 hither and thither by the direct effects of light, heat, gravity 

 and chemical forces upon their tissues. 



T 



