The Study of Consciousness and Behavior n 



also, as with the toothache, have data from internal sense- 

 organs and perhaps from centrally initiated neural actions. 

 In so far as he could report these data to himself for use 

 in scientific thought more efficiently than he could report 

 them to the other observers, he would have, as with the 

 toothache, an advantage comparable to the advantage 

 of a criminologist who happened also to be or to have been 

 a thief, or of a literary critic who happened to have written 

 what he judged. It is important to note that only in so 

 far as he who has 'immediate experience' of or participates 

 in or is ' directly conscious' of the anxiety, reports it to 

 himself as thinker or scientific student, in common with 

 the other nineteen, that this advantage accrues. To 

 really be or have the anxiety is not to correctly know it. 

 An insane man must become sane in order to know his 

 insane condition. Bigotry, stupidity and false reasoning 

 can be understood only by one who never was them or has 

 ceased to be them. 



In our last illustration, John's thinking of 'g x 7 equals 

 63,' the effect on John's behavior may be so complicated 

 by other conditions in John, and is so subject to the par- 

 ticular conditions which we name John's 'will,' that the 

 observers would often be at loss except for John's verbal 

 report. Not that the observer is restricted to that. If 



217 

 John does the example x 69 in the usual way, it is a very 



safe inference that he thought 9X7 equals 63, regardless 

 of the absence of a verbal report from him. But often there 

 is little else to go by. To John himself, on the contrary, 

 it is easier to be sure that he is thinking of 9 x 7 equals 

 63, than that he has a particular sort and strength of tooth- 

 ache. Consequently if we suppose John to be thinking 

 of that fact while under observation, and the twenty ob- 



