The Study of Consciousness and Behavior 13 



Nor is it true that physical facts are known to many 

 observers and mental facts to but one, who is or has or 

 directly experiences them. If it were true, sociology, 

 economics, history, anthropology and the like would 

 either be physical sciences or represent no knowledge at 

 all. The kind of knowledge of which these sciences and 

 the common judgments of our fellow men are made up is 

 knowledge possessed by many observers in common, the 

 individual of whom the facts is known, knowing the fact 

 in part in just the same way that the others know it. 



The real difference between a man's scientific judgments 

 about himself and the judgment of others about him is 

 that he has added sources of knowledge. Much of what 

 goes on in him influences him in ways other than those 

 in which it influences other men. But this difference is 

 not coterminous with that between judgments about his 

 'mind' and about his 'body.' As was pointed out in the 

 case of body-temperature, a man knows certain facts about 

 his own body in such additional ways. 



Furthermore, there is no more truth in the statement 

 that a man's pain or anxiety or opinions are matters of 

 direct consciousness, pure experience, than in the statement 

 that his length, weight and temperature are, or that the sun, 

 moon and stars are. If by the pain we must mean the pain 

 as felt by some one, then by the sun we can mean only the 

 sun as seen by some one. Pain and sun are equally subjects 

 for a science of 'consciousness as such.' But if by the 

 sun is meant the sun of common sense, physics and astron- 

 omy, the sun as known by any one, then by the pain we 

 can mean the pain of medicine, economics and sociology, the 

 pain as known by any one, and by the sufferer long after 

 he was or had it. 



All facts emerge from the matrix of pure experience; 



