290 THE FOUNDATIONS OF ZOOLOGY 



mechanical principles, also tells us (" Physical Basis of Life," 1868), 

 that a wise man must be fully possessed of two beliefs : " The 

 first, that the order of nature is ascertainable by our faculties to 

 an extent which is practically unlimited; the second, that our 

 volition counts for something as a condition of the course of 

 events." 



Again, twenty-five years later (1893), he says ("Evolution and 

 Ethics") that fragile reed as man may be, "there lies within 

 him a fund of energy, operating intelligently, and so far akin to 

 that which pervades the universe, that it is competent to influence 

 and modify the cosmic process." 



While I see no reason why every living thing may not contain 

 some small part of this influence which counts for something as 

 a condition of the course of events, I am unable to see how or 

 where this assertion is irreconcilable with the admission that, for 

 all one knows to the contrary, all nature may ultimately prove 

 mechanical. 



If I admit my accountability, if I have every reason to 

 believe, and no reason to doubt, that my volition will count, how 

 can proof that I do nothing which might not have been expected 

 show that my confidence is deceptive ? 



" If it is foreseen that such an action shall be done, may it 

 not," asks Berkeley, " also be foreseen that it shall be an effect 

 of human choice and liberty ? To me, certain and necessary 

 seem very different; there being nothing in the former notion 

 that implies restraint, nor consequently which may not consist 

 with a man's being accountable for his actions. And though by 

 abstract reasoning you would puzzle me, and seem to prove the 

 contrary, this inward evidence of plain fact will bear me up 

 against all your reasonings, however subtle and refined." 



Even if one doubt whether volition be a good thing, whether 

 ability to do wrong may not outweigh the ability to do right, 

 how does this disprove responsibility ? If what I will come about 

 as I expect, I am responsible; whether the "causa causarum," or 

 "I," or "physical causation," be the cause of the effect; or even 

 if I know nothing of absolute or efficient causation. 



The answer I give to the question whether my volition be 

 within or without the chain of physical causation, has nothing to 



