AS APPLIED TO MAX. 361 



its proper treatment. No physiologist or philosopher 

 has yet ventured to propound an intelligible theory, of 

 how sensation may possibly be a product of organiza- 

 tion ; while many have declared the passage from mat- 

 ter to mind to be inconceivable. In his presidential 

 address to the Physical Section of the British Associa- 

 tion at Norwich, in 1868, Professor Tyndall expressed 

 himself as follows : 



" The passage from the physics of the brain to the 

 corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. 

 Granted that a definite thought, and a definite mole- 

 cular action in the brain occur simultaneously, we do 

 not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any 

 rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass 

 by a process of reasoning from the one phenomenon 

 to the other. They appear together, but we do not 

 know why. Were our minds and senses so expanded, 

 strengthened, and illuminated as to enable us to see and 

 feel the very molecules of the brain ; were we capable 

 of following all their motions, all their groupings, all 

 their electric discharges, if such there be, and were we 

 intimately acquainted with the corresponding states of 

 thought and feeling, we should be as far as ever from 

 the solution of the problem, ' How are these physical 

 processes connected with the facts of consciousness ? ' 

 The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would 

 still remain intellectually impassable." 



In his latest work (" An Introduction to the Classifica- 

 tion of Animals,") published in 1859, Professor Huxley 

 unhesitatingly adopts the "well founded doctrine, that 



