324 THE FOUNDATJONS OF ZOOLOGY 



which we become instinctively, and, as I have said, unconsciously, 

 the translators of the thoughts of God, the most conclusive proof 

 of our affinity with the Divine Mind ? and is not this intellectual 

 and spiritual connection with the Almighty worthy our deepest 

 consideration ? 



" If there is any truth in the belief that man is made in the 

 image of God, it is surely not amiss for the philosopher to en- 

 deavor, by the study of his own mental operations, to approximate 

 the workings of the Divine Reason, learning, from the nature of 

 his own mind, better to understand the Infinite Intellect from 

 which it is derived. Such a suggestion may, at first sight, appear 

 irreverent. But, which is the truly humble ? He who, penetrating 

 into the secrets of creation, arranges them under a formula which 

 he proudly calls his scientific system ? or he who, in the same 

 pursuit, recognizes his glorious affinity with the Creator, and, in 

 deepest gratitude for so sublime a birthright, strives to be the 

 faithful interpreter of that Divine Intellect with whom he is per- 

 mitted, nay, with whom he is intended, according to the laws of 

 his being, to enter into communion ? " 



I find no reference to Berkeley in the Essay on Classification, 

 although the Swiss naturalist would have found much to interest 

 him in the works of the Irish bishop; for they have much in 

 common, and the study of Berkeley might have taught Agassiz 

 that there is no necessary antagonism between mechanical concep- 

 tions of nature and belief that nature is intended; for Berkeley holds 

 that "all the phenomena in nature are produced by motion." 



While something like that of Agassiz, Berkeley's reasoning com- 

 pares with it much as Agassiz's reasoning itself compares with 

 that of Paley and the authors of Bridgewater Treatises. 



Berkeley neither reasons like Paley from the contrivances in 

 living beings, nor like Agassiz from the relations of living things to 

 each other and to the world about them, but from nature in itself, 

 telling us that "setting aside all help of astronomy and natural 

 phylosophy, all contemplation of the contrivance, order, and adjust- 

 ment of things," there is a teleological argument which is "inde- 

 pendent of research into the sciences." 



Even Berkeley himself is not always consistent, however; for 



