THE MECHANISM OF NATURE 311 



In the famous argument by which Butler shows that the 

 assertion that nature is necessary is no answer to the question 

 whether it is intended, he supposes that a fatalist and one who 

 believes himself a free agent are disputing together. 



The reasoning, while conclusive, is hard to follow ; but if we 

 substitute for fatalist, or one who believes whatever is is neces- 

 sary, the word naturalist, or one who believes whatever is is 

 orderly, and for the word necessary the word orderly, the argu- 

 ment becomes so simple that it seems like a parody. 



"Suppose," he would say if this change were made, "that one 

 who was a naturalist and one who kept to his natural sense of 

 things, and believed himself a free agent, were disputing together, 

 and vindicating their respective opinions, and they should happen 

 to instance a house ; they would agree that it was built by an archi- 

 tect. Their difference concerning order and freedom would occa- 

 sion no difference of judgment concerning this ; but only concerning 

 another matter, whether the architect built it as might have been 

 expected or not \jtecessarily or freely, in the original.] 



"When it is said by a naturalist that the whole constitution of 

 nature, the actions of men, everything, and every mode and circum- 

 stance of everything is orderly, and could not reasonably have been 

 expected to have been otherwise, it is to be observed that this 

 order doth not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting 

 from certain principles, and to certain ends ; because all this is a 

 matter of undoubted experience acknowledged by all, and what 

 every man may every moment be conscious of. Hence it follows 

 that order, alone and of itself, is in no sort an account of the con- 

 stitution of nature, and how things came to be and to continue as 

 they are ; but only an account of this circumstance relating to their 

 origin and continuance, that they could not reasonably have been 

 expected to have been otherwise than they are and have been. The 

 assertion that everything is in order of nature is not an answer to 

 the question whether the world came into being as it is by an 

 intelligent Agent forming it thus, or not; but to quite another 

 question, whether it came into being as it is in that way and 

 manner which we call orderly, or in that way and manner which we 

 call . . . ? " In the original the last word is freely, as contrasted 

 with necessarily ; but while I have substituted orderly for necessarily, 



