THE PROGRAMME 7 



fundamental event which is called experience, and therefore 

 are not independent of it, but they are not inferences from 

 experience, as are so-called empirical laws. We almost 

 might say that we only have to be reminded of those 

 principles by experience, and, indeed, we should not, I 

 think, go very far wrong in saying that the Socratic 

 doctrine, that all knowledge is recollection, holds good as 

 far as categories and categorical principles are in question. 



But enough at present about our general philosophy. 



As to the philosophy of nature, there can be no doubt 

 that, on the basis of principles like those we have shortly 

 sketched, its ultimate aim must be to co-ordinate every- 

 thing in nature with terms and principles of the categorical 

 style. The philosophy of nature thus becomes a system ; 

 a system of which the general type is afforded by the 

 innate constructive power of the Ego. In this sense 

 the Kantian dictum remains true, that the Ego prescribes 

 its own laws to nature, though, of course, " nature," that 

 is, what is given in space, must be such as to permit that 

 sort of " prescription." 



One often hears that all sciences, including the science 

 of sciences, philosophy, have to find out what is true. 

 What, then, may be called " true ' by an idealistic 

 philosopher, for whom the old realistic formula of the 

 conformity between knowledge and the object cannot 

 have any meaning ? Besides its ordinary application to 

 simple facts or to simple judgments, where the word truth 

 only means absence of illusion or no false statement, truth 

 can be claimed for a philosophical doctrine or for a system 

 of sucli doctrines only in the sense that there are no 

 contradictions amongst the parts of the doctrine or of the 



