THE THEORY OF DESCENT 295 



It is here that the relation of the hypothetic transforrnistic 

 principle to our concept of entelechy is concerned. 



We know that entelechy, though not material in itself, 

 uses material means in each individual morphogenesis, 

 handed down by the material continuity in inheritance. 

 What then undergoes change in phylogeny, the means or 

 the entelechy ? And what would be the logical aspect of 

 systematics in either case ? 



Of course there would be a law in systematics in any 

 case ; and therefore systematics in any case would be 

 rational in principle. But if the transformistic factor 

 were connected with the means' of morphogenesis, one 

 could hardly say that specific form as such was a primary 

 essence. Entelechy would be that essence, but entelechy 

 in its generality and always remaining the same in its 

 most intimate character, as the specific diversities would 

 only be due to a something, which is not form, but simply 

 means to form. But the harmony revealed to us in every 

 typical morphogenesis, be it normal or be it regulatory, 

 seems to forbid us to connect transformism with the means 

 of morphogenesis. And therefore we shall close this 

 discussion about the most problematic phenomena of 

 biology with the declaration, that we regard it as more 

 congruent to the general aspect of life to correlate the 

 unknown principle concerned in descent with entelechy 

 itself, and not with its means. Systematics of organisms 

 therefore would be in fact systematics of entelechies, and 

 therefore organic forms would be formae essentiales, 

 entelechy being the very essence of form in its 

 specificity. Of course systematics would then be able to 

 assume a truly rational character at some future date : 



