THE LOGIC OF HISTORY 315 



sphere perhaps but at present we certainly are ignorant 

 of such an element. 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ' SINGLE AS SUCH 



If history has failed to appear as a true evolution, and 

 if, on the other hand, it reveals to us a great sum of 

 different cumulations, some of very great importance, others 

 of minor importance, what then remains of the importance 

 of the single historical event in its very singleness ? 

 What importance can the description of this event have 

 with regard to our scientific aims ? We could hardly 

 say at present that it appears to be of very much import- 

 ance at all. The historical process as a whole has proved 

 to be not a real elemental unit, as far as we know, and 

 such elemental units as there are in it have proved to be 

 of importance only for individual psychology but not as 

 history. History has offered us only instances of what 

 every psychologist knew already from his own experience, 

 or at least might have known if he had conceived his 

 task in the widest possible spirit. 



But is no other way left by which true history might 

 show its real importance in spite of all our former analysis ? 

 Can history be saved perhaps to philosophical science by 

 any new sort of reasoning which we have not yet applied 

 to it here. 



As a matter of fact, such new reasoning has been tried, 

 and Eickert, 1 in particular, has laid much stress upon the 

 point that natural sciences have to do with generalities, 

 while historical sciences have to do with the single in its 



1 Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen BeyriffsMldung , Tubingen and 

 Leipzig, 1902. 



