THE LOGIC OF HISTORY 317 



generality, an element in nature, so to say, in spite of its 

 factual singularity. But history is not obliged to become 

 that, Bickert states ; and we may add that history in fact 

 cannot become that, because it simply proves not to be an 

 evolution as far as we know at present. 



But what importance does Eickert attach to his history 

 specified and non-repeatably single? 



History has a logic of its own, he says ; the scheme 

 of its logic is not the syllogism, but the relation to " values." 

 So far as the single historical facts can be related to values, 

 they are of historical importance, and in such a way only 

 does history in its proper sense become important in itself 

 and through itself at the same time. Must history always 

 lose its historical aspect to become of importance to human 

 knowledge ? That is the question we asked whilst con- 

 sidering the general logical types of the " evolution ' and 

 " cumulation ' that arose out of the analysis of the 

 historical facts of problematic phylogeny. It now might 

 seem that this question may be answered, and that it may 

 be answered by a clear and simple " No." The history 

 of mankind, according to Eickert, seems to be important 

 in itself, and without borrowing from any other branch 

 of study. But is his reasoning altogether cogent and 

 convincing ? 



Has it really been able to attribute to history in the 

 strictest sense such an importance for philosophy, for the 

 theory of the universe, " fur die Weltanschauung," that 

 history proper may in fact be allowed to take its place 

 beside science proper ? 



The relation to values is not to include any kind of 

 " Bewertung " of judgment, Eickert allows. In fact, history 



