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  THE 
  UNIQUENESS 
  OF 
  LIFE 
  

  

  another. 
  This 
  holds 
  only 
  when 
  we 
  are 
  dealing 
  with 
  two 
  

   logical 
  opposites, 
  one 
  of 
  which 
  must 
  be 
  true. 
  Many 
  times 
  

   over 
  in 
  the 
  history 
  of 
  thought 
  there 
  has 
  been 
  a 
  rebound 
  

   from 
  mechanistic 
  interpretation 
  discovered 
  to 
  be 
  inadequate, 
  

   and 
  the 
  rebound 
  has 
  almost 
  always 
  landed 
  the 
  inquirer 
  in 
  a 
  

   doctrine 
  of 
  positive 
  vitalism, 
  in 
  the 
  assumption 
  that 
  there 
  

   is 
  some 
  non-perceptual 
  agency 
  at 
  work 
  in 
  a 
  living 
  body 
  which 
  

   is 
  not 
  present 
  in 
  the 
  inorganic 
  domain, 
  and 
  without 
  which 
  

   the 
  results 
  would 
  be 
  otherwise. 
  We 
  shall 
  not 
  jump 
  to 
  this 
  

   conclusion, 
  but 
  we 
  must 
  consider 
  it 
  carefully. 
  In 
  its 
  clearest 
  

   form 
  %t 
  asserts 
  the 
  actuality 
  of 
  a 
  ' 
  vital 
  principle 
  ', 
  or 
  i 
  vital 
  

   impulse 
  ', 
  or 
  c 
  entelechy 
  ', 
  of 
  a 
  non-perceptual 
  character, 
  oc- 
  

   casionally 
  operating 
  in 
  living 
  creatures 
  and 
  operating 
  direc- 
  

   tively. 
  Is 
  this 
  a 
  tenable 
  theory? 
  

  

  2. 
  The 
  Problem: 
  Vitalism 
  or 
  Mechanism, 
  or 
  Neither? 
  

  

  Before 
  we 
  discuss 
  the 
  theories 
  of 
  vitalism, 
  it 
  may 
  be 
  use- 
  

   ful 
  to 
  refer 
  to 
  three 
  preliminary 
  considerations. 
  

  

  (a) 
  It 
  is 
  maintained 
  by 
  some 
  that 
  mechanistic 
  formula- 
  

   tion 
  (i.e., 
  description 
  in 
  terms 
  of 
  matter 
  and 
  motion) 
  is 
  

   not 
  exhaustive 
  even 
  within 
  the 
  domain 
  of 
  the 
  not-living. 
  

   It 
  seems 
  to 
  be 
  adequate 
  for 
  certain 
  purposes, 
  e.g., 
  when 
  the 
  

   navigator 
  deals 
  with 
  the 
  tides, 
  but 
  is 
  it 
  certain 
  that 
  it 
  is 
  

   an 
  ideal 
  formulation 
  for 
  things 
  in 
  general 
  ? 
  Does 
  it 
  take 
  

   account 
  of 
  everything, 
  e.g., 
  of 
  the 
  probability 
  that 
  the 
  living 
  

   evolved 
  from 
  the 
  not-living 
  ? 
  But 
  the 
  adequacy 
  of 
  mechanical 
  

   categories 
  in 
  the 
  domain 
  of 
  the 
  inorganic 
  is 
  a 
  question 
  for 
  

   expert 
  physicists; 
  it 
  is 
  not 
  the 
  biologist's 
  business. 
  Our 
  

   question 
  is 
  whether 
  the 
  formulae 
  which 
  work 
  adequately, 
  

   if 
  not 
  exhaustively, 
  in 
  describing 
  the 
  not-living 
  world, 
  are 
  

   beginning 
  to 
  answer 
  the 
  distinctively 
  biological 
  problems. 
  

   If 
  not, 
  what 
  alternatives 
  are 
  there? 
  

  

  