﻿ANIMAL 
  BEHAVIOUR 
  207 
  

  

  of 
  reflex-like 
  actions, 
  dependent 
  on 
  hereditary 
  neuro-mus- 
  

   cular 
  prearrangeraents. 
  Subjectively, 
  however, 
  it 
  shows 
  

   " 
  conative 
  impulse, 
  unity 
  and 
  continuity 
  of 
  attention, 
  per- 
  

   severance 
  with 
  adaptive 
  variation 
  of 
  behaviour 
  correspond- 
  

   ing 
  to 
  felt 
  success 
  or 
  failure, 
  and, 
  in 
  many 
  cases, 
  the 
  evi- 
  

   dence 
  of 
  having 
  learned 
  by 
  experience 
  ". 
  " 
  The 
  congenital 
  

   prearrangements 
  of 
  the 
  neuro-muscular 
  mechanism 
  for 
  spe- 
  

   cial 
  modes 
  of 
  behaviour 
  do 
  not 
  of 
  themselves 
  suffice 
  to 
  ex- 
  

   plain 
  the 
  animal's 
  conduct. 
  Their 
  biological 
  utility 
  depends 
  

   from 
  the 
  outset 
  on 
  their 
  operation 
  being 
  sustained, 
  controlled, 
  

   and 
  guided 
  by 
  intelligent 
  interest 
  in 
  the 
  pursuit 
  of 
  ends." 
  

   It 
  seems 
  to 
  us 
  that 
  this 
  view 
  fits 
  the 
  blended 
  instincts 
  of 
  

   birds 
  much 
  better 
  than 
  the 
  pure 
  instincts 
  of 
  bees. 
  

  

  According 
  to 
  Prof. 
  C. 
  S. 
  Myers 
  there 
  is 
  but 
  one 
  psychologi- 
  

   cal 
  function- 
  -instinct-intelligence. 
  " 
  In 
  what 
  is 
  ordinarily 
  

   called 
  instinctive 
  behaviour 
  the 
  innate 
  mechanism 
  is 
  rela- 
  

   tively 
  fixed 
  and 
  given 
  ; 
  in 
  what 
  is 
  ordinarily 
  called 
  intelli- 
  

   gent 
  behaviour 
  the 
  mechanism 
  is 
  relatively 
  plastic 
  and 
  ac- 
  

   quired. 
  But 
  I 
  maintain 
  that 
  such 
  differences 
  are 
  only 
  rela- 
  

   tive 
  and 
  that 
  no 
  mental 
  state 
  (or 
  process) 
  can 
  be 
  spoken 
  

   of 
  as 
  solely 
  instinctive 
  or 
  as 
  solely 
  intelligent." 
  

  

  (C) 
  A 
  third 
  view, 
  particularly 
  associated 
  with 
  Professor 
  

   Bergson, 
  regards 
  instinctive 
  behaviour 
  and 
  intelligent 
  be- 
  

   haviour 
  as 
  two 
  quite 
  different 
  kinds 
  of 
  efficiency, 
  implying 
  

   different 
  kinds 
  of 
  knowing. 
  

  

  If 
  we 
  define 
  intelligent 
  behaviour 
  as 
  that 
  which 
  involves 
  

  

  d' 
  

  

  objectively 
  some 
  trial-and-error 
  experimenting 
  and 
  profiting 
  

   thereby, 
  and 
  subjectively 
  some 
  perceptual 
  inference, 
  we 
  may 
  

   say 
  that 
  instinctive 
  behaviour 
  differs 
  in 
  being 
  non-experi- 
  

   mental 
  (though 
  it 
  may 
  improve 
  as 
  the 
  result 
  of 
  experience) 
  

   and 
  non-inferential 
  (though 
  not 
  necessarily 
  destitute 
  of 
  

   awareness). 
  It 
  is 
  the 
  impression 
  of 
  many 
  observers 
  that 
  

  

  