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  ANIMAL 
  BEHAVIOUR 
  

  

  ality, 
  and 
  therefore 
  no 
  behaviour. 
  It 
  is 
  an 
  interesting 
  point 
  

   that 
  the 
  rare 
  occasions 
  on 
  which 
  one 
  applies 
  the 
  term 
  be- 
  

   haviour 
  to 
  a 
  not-living 
  thing 
  are 
  when 
  one 
  is 
  dealing 
  with 
  

   something 
  like 
  a 
  ship 
  to 
  which 
  man 
  has 
  given 
  a 
  quasi-indi- 
  

   viduality. 
  

  

  (4) 
  Perhaps 
  the 
  most 
  important 
  question 
  before 
  us 
  is 
  

   whether 
  the 
  behaviour 
  of 
  organisms 
  has 
  any 
  real 
  spontaneity, 
  

   precluding 
  or 
  limiting 
  the 
  possibility 
  of 
  prediction, 
  or 
  

   whether 
  the 
  suggestion 
  of 
  spontaneity 
  is 
  fictitious 
  and 
  due 
  

   to 
  the 
  complexity 
  of 
  the 
  conditions. 
  It 
  was 
  once 
  true 
  to 
  

   say 
  that 
  the 
  wind 
  bloweth 
  where 
  it 
  listeth, 
  but 
  now 
  the 
  

   meteorologist 
  tells 
  us 
  whence 
  it 
  comes 
  and 
  whither 
  it 
  goes. 
  

   Are 
  we, 
  in 
  our 
  ignorance 
  or 
  obscurantism, 
  postulating 
  for 
  

   the 
  living 
  creature 
  a 
  spontaneity 
  and 
  unpredictability 
  such 
  

   as 
  our 
  forefathers 
  believed 
  to 
  be 
  exhibited 
  by 
  the 
  wind 
  ? 
  This 
  

   is 
  the 
  problem 
  of 
  biological 
  determinism, 
  analogous 
  to 
  the 
  

   problem 
  of 
  psychological 
  determinism 
  and 
  free 
  will. 
  We 
  

   venture 
  to 
  say 
  just 
  a 
  little 
  on 
  this 
  difficult 
  problem. 
  

  

  As 
  we 
  ascend 
  the 
  scale 
  of 
  being 
  there 
  is 
  a 
  growing 
  amount 
  

   of 
  experimental 
  indeterminism. 
  An 
  organism 
  is 
  free 
  as 
  com- 
  

   pared 
  with 
  a 
  not-living 
  system. 
  When 
  we 
  begin 
  experiment- 
  

   ing 
  with 
  a 
  starfish, 
  we 
  cannot 
  tell 
  what 
  it 
  will 
  do 
  in 
  the 
  

   various 
  situations 
  in 
  which 
  we 
  place 
  it, 
  but 
  after 
  we 
  have 
  

   experimented 
  for 
  a 
  long 
  time 
  we 
  can 
  tell 
  what 
  the 
  starfish 
  

   we 
  have 
  worked 
  with 
  will 
  do 
  under 
  certain 
  circumstances, 
  

   provided 
  always 
  that 
  we 
  know 
  its 
  ' 
  physiological 
  condition 
  '. 
  

   For 
  a 
  hungry 
  animal 
  does 
  not 
  behave 
  as 
  a 
  full-fed 
  one 
  does. 
  

   But 
  when 
  we 
  are 
  rash 
  enough 
  to 
  make 
  a 
  prediction 
  in 
  regard 
  

   to 
  the 
  behaviour 
  of 
  a 
  fresh 
  starfish, 
  of 
  the 
  same 
  kind 
  and 
  

   weight 
  and 
  size, 
  we 
  are 
  very 
  likely 
  to 
  be 
  very 
  far 
  wrong. 
  

   Why 
  is 
  this 
  ? 
  It 
  is 
  otherwise 
  in 
  the 
  inorganic 
  world, 
  where 
  

   we 
  can 
  safely 
  argue 
  from 
  one 
  thing 
  to 
  another 
  thing 
  of 
  the 
  

  

  