﻿THE 
  PROBLEM 
  OF 
  BODY 
  AND 
  MIND 
  237 
  

  

  shadows 
  cast 
  by 
  the 
  vanes 
  of 
  the 
  cerebral 
  windmill, 
  or 
  the 
  

   creakings 
  of 
  the 
  machinery, 
  or 
  at 
  the 
  best 
  the 
  electrical 
  

   sparks 
  which 
  accompany 
  the 
  friction. 
  There 
  may 
  seem 
  to 
  

   be 
  two 
  watches, 
  but 
  only 
  one 
  is 
  going 
  (the 
  brain) 
  ; 
  when 
  

   the 
  going 
  watch 
  ticks 
  there 
  is 
  an 
  echoing 
  tick 
  in 
  the 
  other; 
  

   nay 
  more, 
  by 
  induction 
  the 
  going 
  watch 
  may 
  cause 
  move- 
  

   ments 
  of 
  the 
  hands 
  of 
  the 
  watch 
  which 
  only 
  seems 
  to 
  go. 
  

   Perhaps 
  the 
  most 
  generous 
  image 
  is, 
  that 
  the 
  elements 
  of 
  

   consciousness 
  are 
  the 
  short-lived 
  foam-bells 
  on 
  the 
  wonderful 
  

   current 
  of 
  cerebral 
  processes. 
  

  

  We 
  cannot 
  accept 
  this 
  view 
  because 
  it 
  is 
  wrapped 
  up 
  with 
  

   the 
  mechanistic 
  hypothesis, 
  because 
  it 
  hands 
  over 
  the 
  reins 
  

   of 
  life 
  to 
  matter 
  and 
  motion, 
  because 
  it 
  denudes 
  the 
  thought- 
  

   life 
  of 
  all 
  reality. 
  When 
  biologists 
  become 
  preoccupied 
  

   with 
  the 
  psychical 
  concomitants 
  of 
  blots 
  in 
  the 
  brain, 
  or 
  

   with 
  the 
  localisation 
  of 
  particular 
  mental 
  functions 
  in 
  partic- 
  

   ular 
  areas 
  in 
  the 
  cerebral 
  cortex, 
  they 
  are 
  apt 
  to 
  lean 
  towards 
  

   epiphenomenalism, 
  but 
  this 
  has 
  to 
  be 
  corrected 
  by 
  trying 
  

   to 
  see 
  life 
  whole. 
  

  

  The 
  epiphenomenalist 
  theory 
  (which 
  regards 
  mentality 
  as 
  

   a 
  negligible 
  phosphorescence 
  of 
  life) 
  is 
  to 
  be 
  rejected 
  on 
  

   common-sense 
  grounds 
  because 
  we 
  are 
  sure 
  that 
  in 
  human 
  

   life 
  consciousness 
  and 
  awareness 
  of 
  meaning 
  count 
  for 
  much. 
  

   It 
  is 
  rejected 
  by 
  most 
  biologists 
  because 
  they 
  cannot 
  evade 
  

   the 
  conviction, 
  we 
  can 
  hardly 
  say 
  conclusion, 
  that 
  mentality 
  

   is 
  pervasive 
  throughout 
  all 
  creatures 
  that 
  exhibit 
  genuine 
  

   behaviour, 
  associative 
  memory, 
  and 
  profiting 
  by 
  experience; 
  

   and 
  because 
  they 
  find 
  it 
  difficult 
  to 
  believe 
  in 
  the 
  elabora- 
  

   tion 
  and 
  persistence 
  of 
  what 
  is, 
  on 
  the 
  epiphenomenalist 
  

   theory, 
  a 
  useless 
  by-play, 
  counting 
  for 
  nought. 
  And 
  if 
  it 
  be 
  

   asserted 
  that 
  the 
  persistence 
  and 
  evolutionary 
  elaboration 
  

   may 
  be 
  accounted 
  for 
  because 
  consciousness 
  is 
  the 
  inevitable 
  

  

  