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  THE 
  PROBLEM 
  OF 
  BODY 
  AND 
  MIND 
  

  

  (2) 
  It 
  is 
  also 
  objected 
  to 
  the 
  identity 
  hypothesis 
  that 
  

   there 
  is 
  lacking, 
  except 
  in 
  the 
  case 
  of 
  the 
  introspecting 
  psy- 
  

   chologist, 
  any 
  observer 
  occupying 
  the 
  inner-standpoint. 
  

   But 
  it 
  is 
  not 
  in 
  the 
  least 
  necessary 
  to 
  the 
  theory 
  that 
  there 
  

   should 
  be 
  any 
  continuous 
  observation 
  of 
  the 
  subjective 
  as- 
  

   pect. 
  In 
  ordinary 
  daily 
  life 
  there 
  is 
  introspection 
  only 
  at 
  

   intervals, 
  when 
  this 
  miraculous 
  power 
  of 
  self-awareness 
  has 
  

   a 
  definite 
  role 
  to 
  play. 
  In 
  animal 
  life 
  there 
  is, 
  of 
  course, 
  

   no 
  demonstrable 
  self-consciousness, 
  but 
  there 
  is 
  a 
  mental 
  life 
  

   which 
  cannot 
  be 
  interpreted 
  in 
  terms 
  of 
  the 
  abstractions 
  of 
  

   the 
  physiology 
  of 
  the 
  nervous 
  system. 
  According 
  to 
  the 
  

   identity 
  hypothesis 
  this 
  mental 
  life 
  is 
  one 
  aspect, 
  hypotheti- 
  

   cally 
  imagined 
  by 
  us, 
  of 
  the 
  very 
  highest 
  reach 
  of 
  the 
  

   organism's 
  activity. 
  

  

  (3) 
  It 
  is 
  objected 
  that 
  the 
  two-aspect 
  theory 
  simply 
  in- 
  

   vents 
  and 
  glorifies 
  an 
  X, 
  an 
  unknown 
  and 
  unknowable 
  en- 
  

   tity. 
  To 
  make 
  clearer 
  what 
  we 
  do 
  in 
  some 
  measure 
  know, 
  

   it 
  postulates 
  an 
  indefinable 
  reality 
  of 
  which 
  we 
  can 
  know 
  

   nothing. 
  " 
  The 
  one 
  substance," 
  says 
  Professor 
  Stumpf, 
  

   " 
  which 
  is 
  supposed 
  to 
  manifest 
  itself 
  in 
  the 
  two 
  attributes, 
  

   the 
  physical 
  and 
  the 
  psychical, 
  is 
  nothing 
  but 
  a 
  word 
  which 
  

   expresses 
  the 
  desire 
  to 
  escape 
  from 
  dualism, 
  but 
  which 
  does 
  

   not 
  really 
  bridge 
  the 
  gulf 
  for 
  onr 
  understanding." 
  But 
  

   the 
  charge 
  " 
  nothing 
  but 
  a 
  word 
  ' 
  is 
  readily 
  made 
  and 
  as 
  

   readily 
  recoils. 
  The 
  identity 
  hypothesis 
  does 
  not 
  pretend 
  

   that 
  we 
  know 
  anything 
  like 
  all 
  about 
  that 
  fraction 
  of 
  reality 
  

   which 
  we 
  call 
  a 
  living 
  creature, 
  nor 
  that 
  we 
  can 
  explain 
  

   its 
  having 
  two 
  aspects. 
  It 
  maintains, 
  however, 
  that 
  we 
  know 
  

   this 
  about 
  organisms, 
  that 
  they 
  are 
  agents 
  that 
  do 
  things, 
  

   unique 
  individualities 
  that 
  express 
  themselves 
  in 
  endeavour, 
  

   psycho-physical 
  beings 
  that 
  burn 
  away 
  and 
  yet 
  remember, 
  

   that 
  ripen 
  and 
  rot 
  and 
  yet 
  work 
  towards 
  ends 
  which 
  transcend 
  

  

  