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  ADAPTIVENESS 
  AND 
  PURPOSIVENESS 
  

  

  occasion 
  of 
  a 
  great 
  flood, 
  and 
  so 
  on, 
  we 
  say, 
  with 
  probable 
  

   accuracy, 
  that 
  the 
  creature 
  was 
  actuated 
  by 
  a 
  definite 
  pur- 
  

   pose, 
  by 
  some 
  sort 
  of 
  intention, 
  by 
  some 
  anticipation 
  of 
  an 
  

   end. 
  The 
  validity 
  of 
  this 
  undemonstrable 
  conclusion 
  de- 
  

   pends 
  (1) 
  on 
  the 
  need 
  of 
  assuming 
  some 
  degree 
  of 
  purpose 
  

   as 
  the 
  connecting 
  thread 
  which 
  binds 
  together 
  the 
  series 
  of 
  

   acts, 
  and 
  (2) 
  on 
  what 
  we 
  know 
  in 
  other 
  ways 
  of 
  the 
  creature's 
  

   psychological 
  analogy 
  with 
  ourselves. 
  If 
  the 
  acts 
  composing 
  

   the 
  chain 
  are 
  discontinuous, 
  the 
  need 
  for 
  postulating 
  a 
  bond 
  

   of 
  purpose 
  is 
  particularly 
  evident. 
  If 
  the 
  creature 
  has 
  a 
  

   fine 
  brain 
  at 
  a 
  high 
  structural 
  level, 
  as 
  we 
  know 
  to 
  be 
  the 
  

   case 
  with 
  dogs, 
  horses, 
  elephants, 
  and 
  the 
  like, 
  the 
  legitimacy 
  

   of 
  inferring 
  an 
  actuating 
  purpose 
  is 
  the 
  more 
  probable. 
  It 
  

   may 
  well 
  be 
  that 
  the 
  purpose 
  is 
  not 
  of 
  the 
  same 
  nature 
  as 
  

   our 
  purpose 
  when 
  we 
  begin 
  a 
  day 
  with 
  the 
  intention 
  of 
  

   economising 
  our 
  energies 
  at 
  every 
  turn 
  for 
  a 
  difficult 
  task 
  

   to-morrow, 
  or 
  of 
  converting 
  as 
  many 
  people 
  as 
  possible 
  to 
  an 
  

   acceptance 
  of 
  methodological 
  vitalism. 
  It 
  may 
  be 
  that 
  the 
  

   animal's 
  ' 
  purpose 
  ' 
  is 
  only 
  a 
  concrete 
  picture 
  with 
  an 
  asso- 
  

   ciated 
  desire, 
  a 
  cognitive 
  disposition 
  at 
  a 
  perceptual 
  level 
  

   and 
  an 
  associated 
  conative 
  disposition. 
  So 
  it 
  is 
  sometimes 
  

   in 
  mankind, 
  especially 
  in 
  childhood. 
  But 
  it 
  will 
  still 
  be 
  

   legitimate 
  to 
  describe 
  the 
  behaviour 
  as 
  purposeful, 
  though 
  

   the 
  purpose 
  was 
  not 
  a 
  conceived 
  purpose. 
  For 
  we 
  mean 
  by 
  

   purpose 
  an 
  intention 
  of 
  the 
  organism, 
  involving 
  a 
  perceptual 
  

   or 
  conceptual 
  anticipation 
  of 
  a 
  desired 
  end. 
  

  

  Difficulties 
  in 
  making 
  sure 
  that 
  an 
  actuating 
  purpose 
  is 
  

   at 
  work 
  begin 
  whenever 
  we 
  pass 
  from 
  ourselves 
  to 
  our 
  

   neighbours 
  ; 
  they 
  increase 
  when 
  we 
  pass 
  to 
  big-brained 
  higher 
  

   animals 
  ; 
  they 
  go 
  on 
  increasing 
  when 
  we 
  pass 
  to 
  cases 
  like 
  

   that 
  of 
  a 
  bird 
  building 
  a 
  nest. 
  The 
  bird 
  goes 
  through 
  a 
  

   certain 
  routine 
  of 
  collecting 
  and 
  interweaving 
  materials, 
  

  

  