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  ADAPTIVENESS 
  AND 
  PURPOSIVENESS 
  

  

  but 
  this 
  we 
  do 
  know, 
  that 
  they 
  are 
  going 
  back 
  to 
  their 
  nests. 
  

   The 
  nesting 
  impulse 
  remains 
  strong 
  for 
  two 
  or 
  three 
  weeks, 
  

   and 
  this 
  gives 
  an 
  illuminating 
  significance 
  to 
  the 
  homing 
  

   of 
  these 
  sea-swallows. 
  They 
  are 
  returning 
  to 
  activities 
  in 
  

   which 
  their 
  life 
  reaches 
  its 
  climax, 
  to 
  the 
  continuance 
  of 
  

   which 
  they 
  are 
  urged 
  by 
  a 
  deep 
  organic 
  impulse, 
  by 
  an 
  

   irresistible 
  will 
  which 
  is 
  not 
  readily 
  baulked. 
  

  

  But 
  difficulties 
  increase 
  when 
  we 
  pass 
  to 
  the 
  field 
  of 
  purely 
  

   or 
  predominantly 
  instinctive 
  behaviour 
  among 
  animals 
  i 
  of 
  

   the 
  little 
  brain 
  type 
  ', 
  such 
  as 
  ants 
  and 
  bees. 
  We 
  see 
  numer- 
  

   ous 
  acts 
  dovetailed 
  in 
  a 
  series, 
  correlated 
  in 
  a 
  definite 
  se- 
  

   quence 
  which 
  leads 
  to 
  a 
  useful 
  result. 
  We 
  cannot 
  make 
  the 
  

   behaviour 
  intelligible 
  without 
  saying: 
  " 
  Somehow 
  or 
  other 
  

   these 
  several 
  acts 
  have 
  been 
  concatenated 
  in 
  relation 
  to 
  an 
  

   end." 
  But 
  in 
  what 
  sense 
  can 
  we 
  say 
  that 
  a 
  bee 
  on 
  its 
  

   first 
  honey-collecting 
  expedition 
  is 
  actuated 
  by 
  a 
  purpose 
  ? 
  

   We 
  dare 
  not 
  suppose 
  a 
  conceived 
  purpose 
  and 
  we 
  cannot 
  

   clearly 
  think 
  in 
  this 
  case 
  of 
  a 
  perceived 
  purpose, 
  for 
  the 
  bee 
  

   is 
  operating 
  effectively 
  in 
  a 
  world 
  previously 
  unknown 
  to 
  it. 
  

   What 
  kind 
  of 
  purpose 
  can 
  there 
  be? 
  We 
  shall 
  speak 
  of 
  

   instinctive 
  purposiveness, 
  differing 
  from 
  perceptual 
  purpose- 
  

   fulness 
  in 
  the 
  probable 
  absence 
  of 
  any 
  clear 
  vision 
  of 
  the 
  

   end. 
  

  

  Here 
  we 
  have 
  to 
  include 
  the 
  extraordinary 
  cases 
  where 
  the 
  

   individual 
  works 
  resolutely 
  towards 
  a 
  goal 
  which 
  it 
  never 
  

   experiences. 
  Many 
  Digger-wasps, 
  for 
  instance, 
  make 
  elab- 
  

   orate 
  preparations 
  for 
  offspring 
  which 
  they 
  never 
  survive 
  to 
  

   see. 
  Since 
  social 
  wasps 
  are 
  geologically 
  ancient 
  it 
  is 
  reason- 
  

   able 
  to 
  suppose 
  that 
  their 
  behaviour 
  originated 
  in 
  the 
  distant 
  

   past 
  when 
  the 
  ancestors 
  of 
  our 
  present-day 
  species 
  did 
  survive 
  

   to 
  see 
  their 
  progeny. 
  Originally, 
  on 
  this 
  supposition, 
  whether 
  

   the 
  primitive 
  behaviour 
  arose 
  as 
  an 
  intelligent 
  new 
  de- 
  

  

  