﻿ADAPTIVENESS 
  AND 
  PURPOSIVENESS 
  341 
  

  

  downwards; 
  but 
  deliberate 
  purposefulness 
  is 
  a 
  lofty 
  spe- 
  

   cialisation 
  of 
  organic 
  purposiveness. 
  Without 
  implying 
  too 
  

   hard 
  arid 
  fast 
  boundary 
  lines, 
  we 
  suggest 
  that 
  the 
  word 
  pur- 
  

   poseful 
  be 
  kept 
  for 
  actions 
  in 
  which 
  there 
  is 
  conscious 
  antic- 
  

   ipation 
  of 
  the 
  constraining 
  end. 
  The 
  common 
  note 
  in 
  pur- 
  

   poseful 
  or 
  purposive 
  behaviour 
  is 
  that 
  of 
  the 
  individuality 
  

   or 
  total 
  reaction 
  of 
  the 
  organism. 
  When 
  the 
  organism 
  as 
  a 
  

   whole 
  works 
  towards 
  a 
  future 
  result 
  which 
  is 
  not 
  immediate, 
  

   there 
  is 
  purpose 
  in 
  some 
  form 
  or 
  other. 
  Where 
  the 
  concept 
  

   of 
  purpose 
  or 
  intention 
  is 
  applied 
  beyond 
  the 
  category 
  of 
  

   individuality 
  there 
  is 
  bound 
  to 
  be 
  confusion 
  of 
  thought, 
  and 
  

   care 
  must 
  be 
  taken 
  not 
  to 
  use 
  it 
  to 
  denote 
  the 
  end 
  which 
  a 
  

   particular 
  collocation 
  subserves 
  or 
  the 
  utility 
  which 
  any 
  

   particular 
  collocation 
  may 
  have 
  in 
  the 
  economy 
  of 
  Nature. 
  

  

  6. 
  The 
  Purposelikeness 
  of 
  the 
  Ordinary 
  Functioning 
  of 
  

   the 
  Body 
  is 
  Covered 
  by 
  the 
  Concept 
  of 
  Adaptation. 
  

  

  The 
  organism's 
  behaviour 
  as 
  a 
  whole 
  is 
  fundamentally 
  

   purposelike. 
  It 
  makes 
  for 
  self-preservation 
  and 
  race- 
  

   preservation 
  in 
  the 
  widest 
  sense. 
  It 
  may, 
  on 
  occasions, 
  ex- 
  

   hibit 
  self-determination, 
  selection, 
  and 
  control 
  with 
  reference 
  

   to 
  a 
  distant 
  result. 
  In 
  higher 
  animals, 
  purpose 
  probably 
  

   operates, 
  as 
  in 
  man, 
  as 
  a 
  cognitive 
  anticipation 
  of 
  the 
  future 
  ; 
  

   in 
  lower 
  animals 
  the 
  nervous 
  system 
  is 
  so 
  different 
  that 
  we 
  

   dare 
  not 
  argue 
  from 
  analogy 
  as 
  to 
  the 
  degree 
  of 
  awareness 
  

   with 
  which 
  the 
  conative 
  bow 
  is 
  bent. 
  

  

  It 
  appears 
  probable 
  that 
  activities 
  originally 
  dominated 
  

   by 
  clearly 
  perceived 
  purpose, 
  may, 
  by 
  individual 
  habitua- 
  

   tiori 
  or 
  by 
  germinal 
  variation, 
  sink 
  to 
  a 
  lower 
  level 
  of 
  or- 
  

   ganised 
  purposiveness. 
  Not 
  only 
  the 
  bending 
  of 
  the 
  conative 
  

   bow, 
  but 
  the 
  hitting 
  of 
  the 
  mark, 
  becomes 
  part 
  of 
  the 
  or- 
  

   ganisation, 
  it 
  may 
  be 
  part 
  of 
  the 
  inheritance, 
  part 
  of 
  the 
  

  

  