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  THE 
  PROBLEM 
  OF 
  BODY 
  AND 
  MIND 
  

  

  values 
  and 
  the 
  thought-life 
  on 
  the 
  other. 
  If 
  we 
  avoid 
  the 
  

   three 
  fatal 
  errors 
  of 
  false 
  simplicity 
  just 
  mentioned, 
  it 
  is 
  

   not 
  perhaps 
  of 
  great 
  moment 
  what 
  theory 
  monist 
  or 
  dual- 
  

   ist, 
  parallelist 
  or 
  animist 
  we 
  are 
  led 
  to 
  adopt. 
  We 
  must 
  

   choose 
  the 
  interpretation 
  which 
  is 
  most 
  consistent 
  with 
  the 
  

   rest 
  of 
  our 
  thinking 
  and 
  experience. 
  

  

  What 
  is 
  familiar 
  ground 
  to 
  the 
  expert 
  philosopher 
  is 
  full 
  

   of 
  pitfalls 
  alike 
  to 
  the 
  biologist 
  and 
  to 
  the 
  man 
  in 
  the 
  street, 
  

   and 
  we 
  probably 
  do 
  well 
  to 
  remind 
  ourselves 
  that 
  the 
  way 
  

   we 
  put 
  the 
  question 
  of 
  the 
  relation 
  between 
  mind 
  and 
  body 
  

   may 
  be 
  misleading. 
  It 
  is 
  often 
  asked: 
  Is 
  the 
  body 
  the 
  real 
  

   thing 
  and 
  the 
  mind 
  a 
  derivative 
  illusion? 
  Or 
  is 
  the 
  mind 
  

   alone 
  real 
  and 
  the 
  body 
  in 
  some 
  way 
  dependent? 
  These 
  

   questions 
  are 
  badly 
  put, 
  for 
  both 
  bodily 
  activity 
  and 
  the 
  

   thought-life 
  are 
  real. 
  A 
  conviction 
  of 
  the 
  actuality 
  of 
  the 
  

   body 
  as 
  an 
  agent 
  to 
  be 
  reckoned 
  with 
  need 
  not 
  imply 
  that 
  

   the 
  mind 
  is 
  in 
  any 
  way 
  illusory. 
  ISTor 
  need 
  a 
  conviction 
  of 
  

   the 
  reality 
  of 
  the 
  mind, 
  readily 
  reached 
  by 
  any 
  one 
  who 
  has 
  

   ever 
  made 
  up 
  his 
  mind, 
  imply 
  that 
  the 
  body 
  is 
  not 
  substan- 
  

   tial 
  and 
  effective. 
  The 
  practical 
  truth 
  is, 
  that 
  what 
  we 
  call 
  

   the 
  mind 
  counts, 
  and 
  that 
  what 
  we 
  call 
  the 
  body 
  counts; 
  or 
  

   perhaps 
  that 
  what 
  counts 
  is 
  body-mind 
  or 
  mind-body. 
  So 
  

   far 
  there 
  is 
  general 
  agreement. 
  But 
  are 
  there 
  two 
  distinct 
  

   and 
  disparate 
  real 
  activities 
  a 
  player 
  and 
  an 
  instrument, 
  

   so 
  to 
  speak, 
  or 
  is 
  there 
  one 
  order 
  including 
  both 
  bodily 
  and 
  

   mental 
  processes, 
  metabolism 
  and 
  awareness 
  of 
  meaning? 
  

   Is 
  there 
  interaction 
  of 
  two 
  orders 
  of 
  being, 
  or 
  correlation 
  

   within 
  one 
  order? 
  (See 
  Lloyd 
  Morgan, 
  1915. 
  p. 
  6.) 
  

  

  We 
  know 
  ourselves 
  by 
  our 
  senses 
  as 
  organisms; 
  we 
  know 
  

   ourselves 
  also 
  as 
  thinking, 
  feeling, 
  purposing, 
  endeavouring 
  

   beings. 
  For 
  immediate 
  experience 
  there 
  is 
  unity. 
  For 
  

   scientific 
  purposes, 
  however, 
  it 
  seems 
  almost 
  necessary 
  to 
  

  

  