﻿THE 
  PROBLEM 
  OF 
  BODY 
  AND 
  MIND 
  247 
  

  

  purpose 
  in 
  bodily 
  affairs 
  without 
  it 
  being 
  possible 
  to 
  prove 
  

   by 
  calorimetric 
  methods 
  whether 
  its 
  interaction 
  is 
  accom- 
  

   panied 
  by 
  expenditure 
  of 
  energy 
  or 
  not. 
  

  

  It 
  need 
  hardly 
  be 
  said 
  that 
  the 
  view 
  of 
  the 
  soul 
  as 
  some- 
  

   thing 
  extended 
  in 
  space 
  is 
  not 
  the 
  genuine 
  animism, 
  no 
  

   matter 
  how 
  subtle 
  that 
  ' 
  something 
  ' 
  may 
  be. 
  Mr. 
  Nor- 
  

   man 
  Pearson 
  (1916) 
  works 
  with 
  a 
  soul 
  which 
  " 
  has 
  no 
  re- 
  

   semblance 
  to 
  the 
  ponderable 
  matter 
  of 
  our 
  senses 
  . 
  . 
  . 
  

   is 
  finer 
  even 
  than 
  the 
  imponderable 
  ether 
  of 
  our 
  inference 
  

   . 
  . 
  . 
  is, 
  in 
  fact, 
  the 
  nearest 
  conceivable 
  approach 
  to 
  

   spirit." 
  This 
  may 
  be 
  a 
  legitimate 
  hypothesis, 
  for 
  one 
  can- 
  

   not 
  dogmatically 
  assert 
  that 
  the 
  extended 
  in 
  space 
  is 
  ex- 
  

   hausted 
  by 
  ordinary 
  physical 
  methods, 
  but 
  it 
  is 
  not 
  pure 
  

   animism. 
  

  

  (VII) 
  The 
  Two-Aspect 
  Theory. 
  There 
  remains 
  a 
  view 
  

   to 
  which 
  biological 
  facts 
  incline 
  us, 
  ' 
  the 
  two-aspect 
  theory 
  ', 
  

   or 
  the 
  ' 
  Identity 
  Hypothesis 
  ', 
  or 
  the 
  i 
  correlation 
  theory 
  '. 
  

   We 
  think 
  of 
  the 
  organism 
  as 
  one, 
  as, 
  while 
  it 
  lives, 
  an 
  in- 
  

   dissoluble 
  psycho-physical 
  being. 
  The 
  mind 
  and 
  the 
  body 
  

   are 
  both 
  abstractions, 
  very 
  convenient 
  for 
  purposes 
  of 
  dis- 
  

   course; 
  there 
  is 
  but 
  one 
  realitv, 
  the 
  life 
  of 
  the 
  organism, 
  

   which 
  has 
  a 
  subjective 
  aspect 
  known 
  as 
  psychosis 
  and 
  an 
  

   objective 
  aspect 
  known 
  as 
  neurosis. 
  The 
  living 
  creature 
  

   gives 
  an 
  account 
  of 
  itself 
  in 
  two 
  ways. 
  It 
  can 
  know 
  itself 
  

   as 
  something 
  extended 
  and 
  intricately 
  built 
  up, 
  burning 
  

   away, 
  moving, 
  throbbing; 
  it 
  can 
  also 
  know 
  itself 
  as 
  the 
  seat 
  

   of 
  sensations, 
  perceptions, 
  feelings, 
  wishes, 
  thoughts. 
  But 
  

   there 
  is 
  not 
  one 
  process, 
  thinking, 
  and 
  another 
  process, 
  cere- 
  

   bral 
  metabolism; 
  there 
  is 
  a 
  psycho-physical 
  life 
  a 
  reality 
  

   which 
  we 
  know 
  under 
  two 
  aspects. 
  This 
  view 
  may 
  be 
  as- 
  

   sociated 
  with 
  the 
  names 
  of 
  Aristotle, 
  Spinoza, 
  Fechner, 
  Eb- 
  

   binghaus, 
  Lloyd 
  Morgan. 
  Cerebral 
  control 
  and 
  mental 
  

  

  