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  ADAPTIVENESS 
  AND 
  PURPOSIVENESS 
  

  

  is 
  hardly 
  less 
  effective 
  purposelike 
  behaviour 
  in 
  animals 
  

   with 
  no 
  nerve-ganglia 
  at 
  all. 
  Our 
  typical 
  case, 
  already 
  

   described, 
  is 
  the 
  struggle 
  between 
  the 
  brainless 
  starfish 
  and 
  

   the 
  brainless 
  sea-urchin. 
  Here 
  we 
  have 
  a 
  long 
  series 
  of 
  

   difficult 
  operations, 
  not 
  in 
  the 
  line 
  of 
  least 
  resistance, 
  not 
  

   habitual, 
  not 
  a 
  sequence 
  of 
  tropisms 
  or 
  reflexes, 
  but 
  a 
  cor- 
  

   related 
  behaviour-chain. 
  Can 
  we 
  avoid 
  saying 
  that 
  the 
  star- 
  

   fish 
  shows 
  endeavour? 
  We 
  do 
  not 
  dream 
  of 
  calling 
  it 
  pur- 
  

   poseful, 
  but 
  is 
  it 
  in 
  any 
  way 
  purposive 
  ? 
  We 
  have 
  to 
  remem- 
  

   ber 
  that 
  the 
  starfish 
  has 
  no 
  nerve-ganglia. 
  It 
  has 
  diffusely 
  

   scattered 
  neurons, 
  a 
  line 
  of 
  them 
  up 
  each 
  arm, 
  and 
  a 
  pen- 
  

   tagon 
  uniting 
  these 
  lines 
  around 
  the 
  mouth. 
  But 
  there 
  is 
  

   no 
  concentration 
  into 
  ganglia, 
  and 
  therefore 
  we 
  must 
  be 
  very 
  

   parsimonious 
  in 
  our 
  use 
  of 
  mental 
  terms. 
  We 
  propose 
  to 
  

   speak 
  of 
  this 
  sort 
  of 
  purposelike 
  behaviour 
  as 
  illustrating 
  

   organic 
  purposiveness, 
  organised 
  endeavour. 
  

  

  Summing 
  up 
  to 
  this 
  point, 
  we 
  find 
  that 
  a 
  modicum 
  of 
  

   purpose 
  or 
  intention 
  is 
  to 
  be 
  recognised 
  over 
  a 
  very 
  wide 
  

   range, 
  that 
  it 
  is 
  a 
  vera 
  causa 
  that 
  counts, 
  that 
  we 
  are 
  not 
  at 
  

   liberty 
  to 
  take 
  it 
  or 
  leave 
  it, 
  that 
  it 
  must 
  enter 
  into 
  the 
  

   scientific 
  description. 
  It 
  probably 
  represents 
  in 
  all 
  cases 
  

   an 
  organismal 
  summarising 
  of 
  past 
  experiences 
  in 
  such 
  a 
  

   way 
  that 
  a 
  definite 
  endeavour 
  is 
  engendered, 
  and 
  behaviour 
  

   is 
  effectively 
  dominated. 
  But 
  it 
  tends 
  to 
  clearness 
  to 
  distin- 
  

   guish 
  conceptual 
  purposefulness 
  in 
  man's 
  conduct, 
  perceptual 
  

   purposefulness 
  in 
  the 
  intelligent 
  behaviour 
  of 
  man 
  and 
  some 
  

   animals, 
  instinctive 
  purposiveness 
  in 
  the 
  routine 
  behaviour 
  

   of 
  ants 
  and 
  bees, 
  and 
  organic 
  purposiveness 
  in 
  the 
  controlled 
  

   and 
  experimental 
  endeavours 
  of 
  brainless 
  animals, 
  even 
  

   in 
  the 
  architectural 
  achievements 
  of 
  the 
  arenaceous 
  

   Foraminifera. 
  

  

  We 
  began 
  with 
  deliberate 
  purposefulness 
  and 
  worked 
  

  

  