Man's Place in Nature 239 



that of science. It is the work of science to reduce 

 things to a common denominator or to a simple 

 beginning, such as Matter, Energy, and Ether, or 

 the life of a protoplast. This sort of analysis and 

 genetic description clears up obscurities, affords 

 a basis for action, and is in any case forced upon 

 us by our desire to unravel things, to refund phe- 

 nomena into their antecedent conditions. But it 

 does not satisfy the human spirit, partly because 

 the common denominator is in itself mysterious, 

 partly because science never tells us why so much 

 should come out of apparently little. It gives an 

 account of the tactics of Nature, but never explains 

 the strategy. It is unsatisfying. 



For this reason every one has some philosophy, 

 which is based on his own experience. He feels, 

 for instance, that the surest reality to him is his 

 own personal agency, particularly his moral activ- 

 ity, and he projects this upon Nature, saying that 

 there must be a First Cause, some real power, 

 giving substance to all the metaphorical causes, 

 the secondary or caused causes, that Natural 

 Science deals with. Thus he finds God as the 

 ever-present real power in the world, operating in 

 and through natural laws. He sees in "natural 

 causes only the connections of phenomena es- 

 tablished by an ever-active divine will"; he believes 

 in God as "the real agent in Nature and in all 

 natural evolution." 



