84 ANIMAL INDIVIDUALITY [CH. 



individual as defined in this book cannot be cut in 

 two without its individuality being either lost or 

 impaired (p. 46) ; and though the loss may be only 

 temporary it is none the less real, 



Le Dantec's idea, however, is not merely based on 

 error. The centralized nervous system does form the 

 nucleus, not of any individuality it is true, but of 

 that special kind of individuality, a personality. 



However, since not all brains, but only those 

 whose mechanism allows some conscious reason and 

 memory, are the structural tokens of a personality, 

 and since it is beyond our present power to dis- 

 criminate between conscious and non-conscious brains 

 from mere appearance, this structural criterion breaks 

 down in practice and we are driven to accept be- 

 haviour as the only accessible touchstone for 

 personality. 



The same is true of individuality. An individual 

 is not an individual because it arises from the sexual 

 fusion of two cells, nor yet because it possesses 

 a certain aggregate of white fibres and grey cells 

 called a nervous centre. Even were it a fact that 

 on this earth these two properties were always 

 associated with individuals, they would still not 

 aiford the proper basis for a philosophic definition of 

 an individual. They would be mere accidents of the 

 individual, which would still owe its individuality not 

 to them, but to the particular way in which it works. 



