Psychophysical Dualism 131 



broader category, the final explaining principle of experi- 

 ence as a whole, both objective and subjective. This I 

 do not care to discuss, but I am far from thinking that 

 the automaton or epi-phenomenon theorist can argue his 

 case with much force in this higher court of appeal. 



The other extreme is represented by those writers 

 who think that the revision of the law of causation can 

 be made in the sphere of objective phenomenal action 

 represented by the brain ; and so claim that there is a 

 violation of the principle of conservation of energy in a 

 voluntary movement, an actual efficiency of some kind 

 in consciousness itself for producing physical effects. 

 This, I think, is as illegitimate as the other view. It 

 seems to deny the results of all objective empirical 

 science and so to sweep away the statements of law (on 

 one side) on which the higher interpretation of the 

 group of phenomena as a whole must be based. And 

 it does it in favour of an equally empirical statement of 

 law on the other side. I do not see how any result for 

 the more complex system of events can be reached if 

 we deny the only principles which we have in the partial 

 groups. To do so is to attempt to interpret the objec- 

 tive in terms of the subjective factor in the entire group; 

 and we reach by so doing a result which is just as par- 

 tial as that which the epi-phenomenon theory reaches in 

 the mechanical explanation. Lotze made the same mis- 

 take long ago, but his hesitations on the subject showed 

 that he appreciated the difficulty. I agree with these 

 writers in the claim that the mechanical view of causa- 

 tion cannot be used as an adequate explaining principle 

 of the whole personality of man ; but for reasons of 

 much the same kind it seems equally true that as long 



