Duplicated Functions 



I v) 



of instinct through that agency ; or, put differently, that 

 actions which are of selective value when performed intelli- 

 gently are not afterwards of selective value when performed 

 instinctively. But this seems in a measure to contradict 

 the argument which is based on co-adaptations (examined 

 in the earlier pages), i.e., that instincts could not have 

 arisen by way of partial co-adaptations at all. In other 

 words, the argument from ' co-adaptations ' asserts that the 

 partial co-adaptations are not preserved, being useless ; that 

 from selective value asserts that they are preserved and, 

 with the intelligence thrown in, are so useful as to be of 

 selective value. We have seen that the latter position is 

 probably the true one ; but that the inheritance of acquired 

 characters is then, through this union of variation with 

 intelligence, made unnecessary. 



Second. Assuming the existence side by side in the 

 same creature of the ability to do intelligently certain 

 things that he also does instinctively, it is extraordinary 

 that Romanes should then say that the instinctive reflexes 

 have no utility additional to that of the intelligent per- 

 formance. On the contrary, the two sorts of performance 

 of the same action are of very different and each of extreme 

 utility. Reflex actions are quicker, more direct, less 

 variable, less subject to inhibition, more deep-seated or- 

 ganically, and thus less liable to derangement. Intelligent 

 actions the same actions in kind are, besides the points 

 of opposition indicated, and by reason of them, more 

 adaptable. Then there is the remarkable difference that 

 intelligent actions are centrally stimulated, while reflex 

 actions are peripherally stimulated. We cannot go into all 

 these differences here ; but the case may be made strong 

 enough by citing certain divergencies between the two 



