NOTES 45 



volition of the ' wise man ' made their Divinity (for logical 

 thinkers) a subject for compliments, rather than a power to be 

 reckoned with. In Hindu speculation the ' Arahat,' still more 

 the 'Buddha,' becomes the superior of Brahma :i the stoical 

 * wise man ' is, at least, the equal of Zeus. 



Berkeley affirms over and over again that no idea can be 

 formed of a soul or spirit " If any man shall doubt of the truth 

 of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can 

 form any idea of power or active being ; and whether he hath 

 ideas of two principal powers marked by the names of will and 

 understanding distinct from each other, as well as from a third 

 idea of substance or being in general, with a relative notion of 

 its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid power, which 

 is signified by the name soul or spirit. This is what some hold : 

 but, so far as I can see, the words will, soul, spirit, do not stand 

 for different ideas or in truth, for any idea at all, but for 

 something which is very different from ideas, and which, being 

 an agent, cannot be like unto or represented by any idea 

 whatever [though it must be owned at the same time, that we 

 have some notion of soul, spirit and the operations of the mind, 

 such as willing, loving, hating, inasmuch as we know or 

 understand the meaning of these words."] (The Principles of 

 Human Knowledge, Ixxvi.) a 



It is open to discussion, I think, whether it is possible to have 

 * some notion ' of that of which we can form no ' idea.' 



Berkeley attaches several predicates to the " perceiving active 

 being mind, spirit, soul or myself " (Part I. II.). It is said, for 

 example, to be " indivisible, incorporeal, unextended and incor- 

 ruptible." The predicate indivisible, though negative in form 

 has highly positive consequences. For, if ' perceiving active being ' 

 is strictly indivisible, man's soul must be one with the Divine 

 spirit: which is good Hindu or Stoical doctrine, but hardly 

 orthodox Christian philosophy. If, on the other hand, the 

 ' substance ' of active perceiving ' being ' is actually divided 

 into the one Divine and innumerable human entities, how can 

 the predicate ' indivisible ' be rigorously applicable to it ? 



1 See also Ixxxix., cxxxv., cxlv. 



