CONCLUSIONS OF PART I 



We have reached the end of the first part of our 

 philosophy of the organism ; let us then rest for a moment 

 and look back upon the path we have traversed. 



Our scientific discussion had shown us that the 

 phenomena of life are not explainable by the concepts 

 and laws we know from inorganic science, but that 

 something new and elemental must be introduced by the 

 science of biology. The first part of our philosophy of 

 the organism was devoted to the justification of our newly 

 introduced factor, in a special sense of the term " justification." 

 It has been our endeavour to show how our new elemental 

 agent and its law may be put into relation with the 

 general ontological and logical principles concerned in 

 the science of inorganic nature. But we have only 

 formulated this relation between the Organic and the 

 Inorganic by using those ontological aprioristic principles 

 which are empirically realised in the latter, and that has 

 led us to mere negations with regard to entelechy. 



But, of course, still another kind of justification of 

 our entelechy is required. We not only have to show 

 that there is no contradiction between our new conception 

 and those elements of the system of apriorities which 

 are concerned in inorganic sciences, but we have to 



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