274 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



to the brain, following the stimulation of the optic nerve, 

 we allow to be spatial, i.e. noticeable as being tangible in 

 some way. This phase in consciousness is then followed 

 by " seeing " the lamp, which was only " tangible " before, that 

 is by a conscious act which is spatial also, but belongs to 

 quite another class of so-called qualities. Now the first 

 processes of remembrance and identification appear ; the 

 smoking lamp is regarded as " similar " to smoking lamps 

 of the past. There certainly is nothing of a " spatial' : 

 character in this process of comparison as such, even if the 

 images of lamps formerly experienced, which are among the 

 pre-requisites of identification, are regarded as spatial. 

 Here follow the remembrance of how unpleasant the effects 

 of smoking may be and the wishing to stop smoking. 

 All these processes completely lack the characteristic of 

 spatiality or extent. The moving of my hand is the first 

 spatial process again, at least for the unscientific observer, 

 though the scientific physiologist will tell us that this process 

 follows a certain change which is spatially related to some 

 part of the ("tactile") brain, and that between these two there 

 occurs a spatial phenomenon relating to some motor nerves, 

 i.e. centrifugal nervous conduction. Careful psychological 

 introspection might still add that a certain optical 

 imaginary idea of my moved hand is intermediary between 

 proper willing as such and that change in the brain on 

 which nervous conduction and actual moving finally 

 depend. 



Would it then be advisable to separate all those 

 phenomena of our conscious series which are spatial in any 

 sense from those which are non-spatial ? It seems to 

 me that another kind of distinction would Jead to more 



