THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY 291 



Parallelism Impossible on a Truly Idealistic Basis 



Let us now return to the sphere of strict idealism, 

 chosen as our basis of analysis, and let us see whether 

 there be any possibility whatever of the parallelistic 

 doctrine on such a foundation. 



We simply ask : is it imaginable or thinkable in any 

 fashion that to my " seeing a lamp }: or to my " thinking 

 {a + Vf " there corresponds parallelly a movement or a change 

 of energetical intensities in my brain ? To " correspond 

 parallelly " means to " be simultaneous with " ; to " be," on 

 the other hand, means " being perceived by, or at least 

 being perceivable to myself," if strict idealism is maintained. 

 We know already that in principle at least my brain 

 as a whole may rank among the things perceivable. 



Then we have the following chain of events as postulated 

 by the parallelistic doctrine, each link being checked by 

 idealism. I see the lamp ; at the very same moment, 

 I either see or touch a specific fact in the brain as my 

 object. But this " perceived fact " is most obviously not 

 my " perceiving the fact " ; l for the latter a new perceiv- 

 able fact or change in the brain is required, the perceiving 

 of which requires another fact or change, and so on just 

 ,as in our analysis of parallelism founded on a pseudo- 

 idealistic basis. There is a series of postulates with regard 

 to " parallels " which never ends. 



We can express the whole problem still a little differently. 

 I see the lamp after the occurrence of all the changes in 

 the retina, the optic nerve, and the brain that I have 



1 The c ' perceived fact " may be green, but my ' ' perceiving the fact " is 

 certainly not green. 



