THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY 293 



exclusively ; that is to say, they only hold good if " being r 

 is regarded as equivalent to " being perceived or concerned 

 by a conscious subject." As soon as any metaphysical 

 concessions with regard to absolute or independent being 

 are made and we ourselves shall make them anon our 

 arguments fall to the ground. But in that case our analysis 

 of action takes their place. 



ft. A NEW FORM OF PARALLELISM 



If finally we turn back to the part which " my body ' 

 and its " psychoid >: play in objectified nature, that is to 

 say the part which they play as the objects of natural 

 science, we are met at the first glance by a rather strange 

 difficulty, or rather ambiguity. 



My body and the part played by it were first considered 

 as phenomena to the Ego only, just like volition, judging, 

 etc. ; afterwards my body was understood as belonging to 

 objectified nature, though also within the bounds of idealism. 

 What was the intra-psychical series in the first case became 

 the psychoid in the second. Of course, the intra-psychical 

 series was an immediate experience of consciousness, whilst 

 the psychoid is only a concept, or better still a conceived 

 factor in nature, created to fill a gap in the chain of events, 

 which otherwise might exist in objectified nature, as has 

 now been proved both indirectly and directly. The direct 

 proof of its " existence," in the sense of phenomenal objecti- 

 fication, has been based in part upon the impossibility of the 

 parallelistic doctrine and now apparently our discussion 

 ends in a sort of parallelism again ! For there can be 

 no doubt that the immediate conscious experience of the 



