316 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



and in the second, how could the end, which is not yet 

 reached but is to le reached, be an acting factor at all ? 

 The " end " determines entelechy to be what it is : for 

 instance, it determines a psychoid in its specificity by so- 

 called imagination ; but " the end " does not act : the " having 

 the end in one's imagination " acts ! 



"or 



Entelechy and Causality 



But is it really true that neither entelechy nor any 

 factor similar to it is causality ? 



It simply is true by reason of definitions, and the defini- 

 tions correspond to irreducibilities : causality relates to 

 singularities only, but entelechy has to do with the construc- 

 tion of complexes which are unities. And besides this : a 

 causa is spatial like its effect, but entelechy is not spatial, 

 though its effects are. We thus may say that with 

 reference to spatial effects the category of individuality 

 implies causality in a certain sense, just as causality implies 

 substance. But there is no identity at all ; and, on the 

 other hand, entelechy is by no means " causality seen from 

 behind," as is occasionally asserted by those philosophers 

 who have not realised that individuality or teleology is as 

 true a category as causality, able to establish really elemental 

 and irreducible natural agents. 



We shall get a still more explicit idea of the relation 

 between individuality and causality, if we remember that all 

 factors created on the basis of individuality such as 

 entelechy, for instance are intensive manifoldnesses. That 

 is to say, they are composite, though not in space, and 

 their single but merely conceptual constituents, qua 

 single, act into space. In so far as the single manifestations 



