318 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



more individuals out of one by an artificial separation of 

 parts. In this sense entelechy, though individualising, is 

 supra-individual itself as E. von Hartmann pointed out 

 most clearly or may rather be said to be " supra-personal." 



f. CATEGORIES AND FACTORS IN " NATURE ' 



Before turning to our most important task, namely, to 

 show how the category of individuality may serve to 

 establish a clear and distinct class of agents or factors in 

 nature, the concept of " nature " with special relation to the 

 categories requires a general analysis. 



"Ideal Nature" The " Ontological Prototype' 



All the elemental constituents that science operates 

 with are modelled and formed according to the categorical 

 system, each of them corresponding to a special ontological 

 category of relation. Specificities with regard to quantity, 

 quality, space, and time serve to give the definite character 

 to each constituent, and the general notions of actuality 

 and possibility complete the picture. Thus the constituents 

 of nature, which are known as " mass/' " force," " potential 

 energy of distance," " constant," etc., are created. 



All these instances are such as occur in the sciences of 

 the Inorganic ; only the two categories of substance and of 

 causality are at work here, as far as ontological relation is 

 concerned. 



The system of all these constituents and their relations 



1 Bergson also lias seen this point. He adds that, considered as "finaliU" 

 the organic finality would be " cxternc," as even in ontogeny the whole is 

 formed by the self-limitation of totipotent parts. I believe that these 

 difficulties disappear from our new categorical point of view. Comp. p. 313, 

 note 1. 



