320 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



but not " in " spatial nature. This is the most important 

 characteristic of this category. Therefore all constituents 

 of external nature created on the basis of individuality, 

 such as entelechies and psych oids, are completely and abso- 

 lutely unimaginable. All that is imaginable must have 

 spatial characteristics, and it is quite impossible to form 

 an imaginable idea of something that is manifold but not 

 in space. 



All constituents of nature the ontological prototype of 

 which is based upon individuality can only be conceived 

 but never imagined, though their effects are realised in 

 imaginable nature. All entelechies and psychoids are 

 voov/jieva in this sense, but they are not voovpeva in the 

 transcendent sense of Kant, for they are constituents of the 

 world of (pawofjieva, as far as the " world " they relate to is 

 given to the Ego. Thus entelechies, though transcending 

 the realm of the Imaginable, do not ly reason of their logical 

 character as such form constituents of metaphysics in the 

 sense of something absolute and independent of a subject. 1 

 Even morality, if there were need to assume yet another 

 new kind of category to be at work here, would not depart 

 from phenomenality in the widest sense. 



Thus, whilst we conceive " nature " as the totality of 

 what may ~be related to spatiality in any way, and include 

 in nature vitalistic principles, acting, and morality, all 

 of which indeed relate to spatiality, the whole analysis 

 of so - called objective Givenness acquires a far more 



1 Once more I repeat, that entelechy is not identical with "consciousness" 

 or "the Psychical." Even if we were to proceed from our methodological 

 critical idealism ("solipsism") to metaphysics, entelechy and psyche would 

 not be identical, though they might then be nothing but two forms under 

 which one and the same reality is expressed. Comp. also p. 294. 



