322 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



constituent of ideal nature, and the concept of an 

 " entelechy " as an irreducible constituent of ideal nature 

 are formed, the first with the aid of causality, the second 

 with the aid of individuality, is exactly the same so far 

 as spatiality is excluded the second time. Let us not 

 forget that even a force or a potential energy or a constant, 

 though they are in space, are not immediately imaginable 

 but only conceivable ; they are " realities " in the sphere 

 of the conceptual world, but only express possibilities with 

 regard to the real in the sense of immediately imaginable 

 Givenness. The sphere of reality has to be enlarged in 

 order to embrace them. It is just the same with entelechy, 

 except that entelechy has no spatial localisation. 



If we may be permitted to say a few words about our 

 concept of morality in this place, we find the Kantian 

 conception of " nature " untenable once more. How could 

 morality have any meaning whatever to a human being, 

 if it were to relate to something not only quite inaccessible 

 to science, but even, as Kant claims, absolutely unknowable 

 and undiscussable, and not to a something that forms a 

 part of Givenness in the widest sense ? It seems to me 

 that morality is Givenness itself if it were not, it would 

 be undiscussable. Morality, i.e. the application of a 

 categorical concept of a special and elemental kind to 

 the actions of other men and oneself, relates to " nature " 

 in our enlarged meaning of the word. Therefore, moral 

 acting is natural acting, at least part of it, and it is 

 very misleading to oppose morality to nature : morality is 

 part of nature itself. 



