THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY 325 



say the fall of a certain stone with a certain acceleration, is 

 explained by a generality resting upon a categorical principle 

 in this case by the law of gravitation. The generality as 

 such is a " causal " one in this instance, and may be formulated 

 by the use of the term " force," or " potential," or whatever 

 you prefer. 



But people also speak of " explaining " when they 

 apply the category of causality which has nothing to do 

 with explaining singularities by categorically formulated 

 generalities to immediate givenness with regard to its 

 temporal sequence,. In this case the falling of the stone is 

 explained if you know that it was pushed from a table by 

 a child. In a logical sense there would not be a whit of 

 explanation in this case, unless you were in possession of 

 Newton's, or at least Galilei's law. 



In short, the law resting upon a categorical principle 

 explains falling in general, in the real sense of the word 

 " explaining " ; knowledge of the child's act explains a 

 particular case of falling in quite a secondary meaning of 

 the word. Causal " explaining " is always simply historical. 

 It ought rather to be called " causal reference." 



Ideal Nature and Natural Factors 



It seems to me that the confusion of rational explanation 

 and causal reference so common nowadays is almost 

 always due to the following reasons : Wherever laws of 

 nature resting upon the principle of causality are the 

 generalities which " explain," they do so not merely in their 

 property of general statements in the sphere of mere ideal 

 concepts, not merely as constituents of " ideal nature," but more 



