THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY 32*7 



a natural factor, viz. of a certain form of entelechy, just as 

 the child in our instance pushed not only " a stone," but 

 a stone endowed with a specific potential energy. 



By these considerations, it seems to me, not only the 

 logical and ontological similarities between entelechy and 

 the other natural agents have been put into the clearest 

 evidence, but also the general relations between laws of 

 " ideal nature " or " Platonic ideas " and factors in natural 

 Givenuess as far as it is conceived and not merely immediate 

 Givenness have acquired a certain sort of final elucidation. 

 A deeper analysis, of course, would belong to a theory of 

 knowledge. 



The Problem of Entelechian Systematics 



Now, as to entelechy just as with respect to space there 

 is still a third kind of " explaining." In this sense the 

 typical features of a certain specific type of entelechian 

 manifestation, say of a dog or a bee, may be said to be 

 " explained " by entelechy as a whole. This new sort of 

 explaining is nearly related to explaining in the real 

 rational sense, though it is not identical with it. We 

 approach the realm of this sort of explaining if we now turn 

 to devote a few words to the problem of entelechian systeni- 

 atics, shortly mentioned already on another occasion. 



It certainly is a problem whether or not the category of 

 individuality would allow us to predict how many types of 

 manifestations of entelechy culminating in man might be 

 possible, and for what reasons these manifestations are what 

 they actually are in fact, just as the category of space x allows 



1 It would be useless for our purposes to make a sharp distinction between 

 the categories of "imagination" and the categories of ontology. 



