354 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



existence under the circumstances that prevailed. But to 

 this objection to teleology as foreboded in mere harmony 

 we again object on our part that this presentment of the 

 facts is powerless to do away with the simple truth that, 

 Givenness being what it is, one thing does occur in favour of 

 the other. In fact, there are teleological relations between 

 different organisms, between plants and the sun, and 

 between water and functions of life in general. Things 

 are so, we say, and therefore there is a certain harmony 

 amongst the elemental constituents of nature, at least with 

 regard to their specific distribution. 



As to anything more than a mere harmony of the kind 

 just described there are, of course, no logical reasons why 

 the constellation of the inorganic world as such or of history 

 as such should not be regarded as merely contingent through- 

 out and as due to an indefinite line of contingencies in the 

 past, always determined from moment to moment by mere 

 probability. In this case the task propounded by the 

 category of individuality with regard to the Inorganic itself 

 or to history as such would appear as factually insoluble. 

 But since we actually discover some sort of harmony 

 between the manifestations of entelechy and the distribution 

 of inorganic realities, do not at least some features of the 

 primordial constellation of the inorganic world seem to 

 gain a special teleological importance, do they not seem to 

 be harmonious for entelechy, and does not thereby the 

 contingency of inorganic constellation cease to be " con- 

 tingency " at least in certain spheres ? Does not the nature 

 of the probability of inorganic constellations seem to be 

 specified in a way that at least suggests a limited 

 purpose ? 



