356 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 



Morality as a Category 



Let me now say a few additional words about the con- 

 cept of morality from a merely ontological point of view, so 

 as to accentuate what we have said on this point on a 

 former occasion. 



Morality, as a form of judging, is also a category, like 

 causality and individuality. 1 Conceiving it in this way we 

 guarantee the unity of the Given, whereas if we regarded 

 morality as something absolutely different from any other 

 kind of dealing with the Given we should be dividing 

 reality into two parts absolutely irreconcilable with one 

 another. No matter what the special so-called content of 

 morality may be, morality in its most general categorical 

 sense comes into play whenever the relation of two or more 

 active entelechian manifestations to each other is the subject 

 of reflection. And morality as a category is as " constitu- 

 tive " as any other category, and not merely regulative, since 

 moral acting individuals are real constituents of nature. 2 

 I finally " understand ' : morality just like causality and 

 individuality psychologically, since I myself may be one 

 of the individuals in question. 



Thus morality has its place first in the system of 

 categories, secondly in nature, thirdly in psychology as all 

 categories have. 3 



1 There is a great difference between morality and moralising. Theoretical 

 ethics is the description of an ideal and is intellectual in the last resort. 

 There is no such thing as "you must," but only "so it ought to be." There- 

 fore the personal moral character of an author has nothing to do with his 

 moral theory. 2 Comp. page 320 f. 



3 Things would turn out differently if all morality were merely apparent, 

 the community of men being in fact one supra-personal individual unity 

 using the biological individuals as means. See page 121. In this case 

 morality might possibly be regarded as the mere psychological or subjective 



